Battle of Cabo de Palos

date	March 5, 1938 to March 6, 1938
place	70 nautical miles east of Cape Palos
output	Republican victory
consequences	Without any impact on the course of the war

Parties to the conflict
republican	Nationalists
Commander
Luis González Ubieta	Manuel de Vierna †
Troop strength
2 light cruisers 5 destroyers	2 heavy cruisers 1 light cruiser
losses
no	1 heavy cruiser 785 and 727 dead

The Battle of Cabo de Palos was the greatest naval battle of the Spanish Civil War . In it two light cruisers and five destroyers of the Republicans met three cruisers of the nationalist side. It took place 70 miles east of Cabo de Palos from March 5-6, 1938 and ended in a Republican victory.

Strategic background

The Spanish Civil War was fought between July 1936 and April 1939 between the democratically elected Republican government of Spain and the putschists under General Francisco Franco . Both sides received help from abroad: the nationalists mainly from Italy and Germany, the republicans mainly from the Soviet Union . Convoys from the other side were therefore an important target for both navies.

An international non-interference committee approved a plan to monitor arms imports and the arrival of foreign volunteers. For this purpose, sea patrols off the Spanish coast were carried out by France , Great Britain , Germany and Italy . This measure was not effective and tended to put the Republican side at a disadvantage. The Soviet Navy was unable to participate due to logistical problems and the lack of suitable ships.

During the civil war, the Spanish navy's surface ships remained divided between the nationalists and the republicans. The republic had the majority of the destroyers , while the Franquists came into possession of the two newly built heavy cruisers Canarias and Baleares . They were captured on July 21, 1936, the fifth day of the uprising, when the nationalists captured the Ferrol naval base . The ships were in the last phase of construction and were completed by the nationalists.

The organization of the fleet was chaotic, with power initially in the hands of the committees, not the officers . This circumstance was gradually reversed. The lack of trained officers was also a problem. A large part of the officer corps had been shot when the fleet tried to hand it over to the insurgents. The lack of material, such as torpedoes, also caused problems. The Republican fleet suffered from bad morale, lack of initiative, and little action, while the nationalists kept the initiative.

As a result, the outnumbered nationalist fleet displayed an excess of self-confidence, all the more so since their leaders did not think highly of the expertise of their Republican opponents. The nationalist fleet used its few forces far more offensively.

The nationalist fleet had no supply problems and was supplied with supplies from Italy and Germany. The initial organizational problems were resolved faster than on the Republican side. However, there was mistrust regarding the political reliability of the crews and the lack of well-trained sailors.

Comparison of the fleets


Republican ships	Type	Nationalist ships	Type
Libertad	Light cruiser	Baleares	Heavy cruiser
Méndez Núñez	Light cruiser	Canarias	Heavy cruiser
Gravina	destroyer	Almirante Cervera	Light cruiser
Lazaga	destroyer	Umbe-Mendi	Merchant ship
Sánchez Barcaiztegui	destroyer	Aizkori-Mendi	Merchant ship
Lepanto	destroyer
Almirante Antequera	destroyer

Course of the battle

Map of the battle

The Libertad in 1927

On Saturday, March 5th, 1938, the Republican fleet left Cartagena to carry out an attack on the port of Palma de Mallorca. The plan stipulated that three torpedo boats should enter the port and surprise the Spanish national fleet there. The torpedo boats were to be protected by destroyers of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla , the Ulloa , Jorge Juan , Escaño and the Almirante Valdés , up to the port entrance. The destroyers in turn were to be covered by the light cruisers Libertad and Méndez Nuñez and the 2nd destroyer flotilla, consisting of Sánchez Barcaáiztegui , Almirante Antequetera , Lepanto , Gravina and Lazaga . From 3:40 p.m. to 5:06 p.m., the fleet set off in stages. At 5:11 p.m. she received the news that the torpedo boats had returned to the port on the orders of their Soviet commander Alafuzov because the sea was allegedly too strong. In the opinion of Fleet Commissioner Bruno Alonso, the reason was only advanced because Alafusov did not trust himself. Ubieta asked for his removal. The fleet could not return to port immediately, so Ubieta let them cruise at sea.

On the same day, the two Spanish national heavy cruisers, accompanied by the light cruiser Almirante Cervera, set sail from Palma . The Baleares , which normally should have a crew of 800 men, had, according to archive the Armada Española 1,223 men on board. These were sailors from other units who were to be brought ashore to Cádiz , members of the staff of the cruiser squadron, workers from the Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval who were supposed to carry out repairs on the voyage, and twelve young members of the Flechas Navales (the Navy -Youth organization of the Falange Española de las JONS ).

They were supposed to give two merchant ships, the Umbe-Mendi and the Aizkori-Mendi , escort to the Strait of Gibraltar , which brought weapons and ammunition from Italy , and to replace their escort consisting of the gunboats Canalejas and Cánovas and the destroyers Huesca , Teruel and Velasco . At 5:30 p.m., the cruisers reached the small convoy and removed their cover. When night fell, blackout was ordered.

At 0038, the Baleares spotted the silhouettes of several ships on port side at 330 ° . Since both groups drove in the dark, there was no doubt that they were both enemy ships. The Spanish national ships had encountered the republican fleet consisting of two light cruisers (the modern Libertad and the outdated Méndez Núñez ) and five destroyers ( Gravina , Lazaga , Sánchez Barcaiztegui , Almirante Antequera and Lepanto ). Both fleets were surprised, they assumed that the other was still in port. The Spanish national fleet initially wrongly believed in the presence of a submarine , accelerated to 26 knots and initiated evasive maneuvers. The Sánchez Barcaiztegui shot two torpedoes at the Almirante Cervera without getting a hit.

At 01:09 a.m. Vierna decided to bypass the merchant ships in order to fend off a possible destroyer attack on them. This was a daring maneuver, as the size of the cruisers made them easier targets for the destroyers than the other way around. The two fleets lost sight of each other. At 1:25 a.m., Admiral Vierna resumed its original course of 220 ° (heading south-west ). At 02:00 a.m. the fleet set course for 40 ° (heading northeast ), 15 minutes later it changed its course again to 220 ° in order not to deviate too far from the slower merchant ships, and a few minutes later it met the Republican fleet again.

At 02:14 a.m., the Republican destroyer Sanchéz Barcáiztegui perceived optical signals from the opposing fleet, and the Republican lead ship Libertad gave the order to fire. Canarias and Baleares fired flares to illuminate the targets and opened fire with grenades without getting a hit. Libertad and Méndez Núñez immediately returned fire and scored a hit on the deck of the Baleares . During this cruiser duel, the three republican destroyers Sanchéz Barcáiztegui , Lepanto and Almirante Antequera approached the Spanish national cruisers and shot a fan of twelve torpedoes at 3000 meters . The Sánchez Barcaiztegui fired four, the Almirante Antequera five and the Lepanto three. At around 0220, an unknown number of torpedoes hit the Baleares port on the level of the bridge . The ammunition bunkers were located in this area. There was a major explosion, which was followed by more. Parts of the bridge and chimney flew through the air, and the mast fell on turrets three and four. The Baleares remained idle with no electricity and quickly leaned over to port as fire broke out and detonated anti-aircraft ammunition and fuel tanks. Since Rear Admiral de Vierna had died in the explosion, the captain of the Canarias Rafael Estrada Arnaiz took command, accelerated to 29 knots and took a course of 190 ° (heading south ). The two remaining Spanish national cruisers Almirante Cervera and Canarias left the sinking Baleares and departed with the merchant ships. The Republican cruisers also withdrew after their success and reached Cartagena at 7:50 a.m.

The rescue of the survivors

Destroyer Kempenfelt

The British destroyers HMS Boreas and HMS Kempenfelt (later HMCS Assiniboine ), which were on neutrality patrols, were 40 nautical miles away at the time of the battle and were approaching the burning Baleares at full speed . An attempt to take the survivors directly from the sinking cruiser failed because of the strong list. At 5:10 a.m. on the morning of March 6, 1938, the Baleares sank . A short time later, the British destroyers HMS Brilliant and HMS Blanche reached the sinking site.

At 7:20 a.m., the Spanish national cruisers reappeared and began taking over the wounded. No boats were launched from the Canarias in anticipation of a Republican attack . In fact, at 8:58 a.m., nine Tupolev SB-2s attacked the ships, killing one crew member and wounding four on the Boreas . After the attack, the British ships and the two Spanish cruisers ran together to Palma de Mallorca, where they put the shipwrecked on land.

The British managed to take on 435 men. 785 sailors died in the sinking of the Baleares , including Admiral Vierna, only three bodies could be recovered.

The wounded reached Palma de Mallorca on March 6, 1938 at 3:45 p.m. aboard Canarias , Almirante Cervera and the British Kempenfelt . They were distributed to various hospitals and barracks in Mallorca and showed almost exclusively burns, caused by the fire that had broken out. Four wounded died in hospitals.

Consequences of the battle

Donation stamp in memory of the Baleares . The proceeds went to the Navy's orphan school.

Admiral Vierna had decided after the first contact with the Republican fleet to protect the war-essential merchant ships according to his instructions. At night, heavy cruisers were at a disadvantage compared to the fast, agile destroyers, as they could not bring the superior firepower and range of their guns to bear due to the limited visibility. The attempt to seek combat without protecting the cruisers against torpedo attacks by the enemy destroyers was therefore not an option for him, nor was leaving the steamships behind, so as not to risk his cruisers. Vierna has been criticized for using the flares; this procedure was generally recognized and recommended at the time, as there were neutral warships in the zone.

The use of light signals for communication was a mistake as it warned the opponent and gave him the initiative.

Ubieta was accused of not taking advantage of the victory and not taking the opportunity to completely destroy the enemy fleet. His destroyers had only four torpedoes left and he was unaware of the presence of the merchant ships. Nevertheless, the Soviet naval adviser Pitercki asked Ubietas to be replaced. The threat to resign from fleet commissioner Bruno Alonso prevented this.

The loss of the Baleares was partially offset by the re-commissioning of the already decommissioned cruiser Navarra in August 1938. Although the Battle of Cabo de Palos was the largest naval battle of the Spanish Civil War, its outcome had no influence on the course of the war. Despite their superior fleet and this victory, the lack of officers prevented the Republican side from taking advantage of these advantages.

The wreck of Baleares is now at 37 ° 52 '18 " N , 0 ° 52' 0" O in 2515 meters depth on rocky ground. 37.871666666667 0.86666666666667 -2515

Awards

National Spanish

Cross of the Ferdinand Order

On the national side of Spain, three individual Medallas Militares were awarded in 1943 . The first went to Manuel Cervera Cabello, the others received posthumously from the ship's doctor of the Baleares Magín Pallarés Uge and Juan J. Sarriá Guerrero, who both died when the ship went down. As early as 1938, the occupation of the Baleares was awarded the collective Medalla Militar. The Ferdinand Order was awarded once posthumously.

In 1960, the widow of Captain McGregors in London was given the Cruz del Mérito Naval for the services of her husband as the captain of the Kempenfelt .

Republican

The Placa Laureada de Madrid

The battle was one of the few victories of the Republican Navy, so an award for Luis González Ubieta was only logical. In the absence of the Ferdinand Order , it was given its republican counterpart, the Placa Laureada de Madrid . This award was only given to two other people during the civil war. For them, Leocadio Mendiola, the commander of the planes that had flown the attack on the surrender of the wounded, was also provided. However, the documents were lost in an air accident when they were sent to President Manuel Azaña in Paris for signature .

The crews were collectively awarded a specially created award, a special form of the Distintivo de Madrid. It consisted of the coat of arms of Madrid embroidered in gold and silver.

filming

As early as 1940 the production of a propaganda film about the history of the Baleares began. It was called "El Crucero Baleares" and was produced by the Spanish subsidiary of the RKO , Radio Films . The film was shot in Madrid, Vigo , Ferrol, Cádiz , San Fernando and Cartagena. The ship scenes were filmed on the sister ship of the Baleares , the Canarias . Special effects were used for the downfall, and recordings of maneuvers and archive images of the Skagerrak Battle were also used for the battle scenes. The recordings began in October 1940 and ended in early March 1941. The premiere party was scheduled for April 12, 1941 at the Cine Born in Madrid. Survivors were invited, newspapers announced the premiere, and the film was advertised with programs and posters. The state censorship had already approved the film, apart from minor complaints. Everything went according to plan until the film was shown in a private screening to a group of senior officers at the Ministry of Navy two days before its premiere. After the screening, an agreement was reached, without giving any reason, to ban the film and to collect and destroy all copies. This process became one of the most spectacular cases of self-censorship in post-war Spain. The reasons for this approach were manifold: the officers were not the implementation of the Spanish Nationalist revolt in the navy and the heroic death of the sailors of the Baleares agree. The fact that the history of the Baleares was provided with an extensive romantic plot and that the incident was only a short time ago were probably reasons.

monument

Monument to the Baleares in Palma de Mallorca

Just nine days after the sinking of the Baleares , the newspaper "La Ultima Hora" demanded a memorial to commemorate the sunk cruiser and a fundraising campaign was launched. The donors were named in the newspaper and came from Germany and Italy, among others. A tender was held, which was won by the Mallorcan architects Francisco and José Roca Simó and the sculptor José Oertells Cabanellas. The budget was 100,000 pesetas . The monument was built in Sa Feixina Park in the center of Palma de Mallorca and was inaugurated on May 16, 1947 in the presence of Franco. It stands on a 400 square meter platform and consists of a 22 meter high column at the top of which a spotlight forms a large cross with its rays. Originally a three-meter-high sculpture of a sailor hugging an anchor with a raised right arm stood on this column. This disappeared under unexplained circumstances and is no longer available today.

The memorial has repeatedly been the victim of politically motivated vandalism. The first few times it was repaired, but today it is in poor condition. In 1995 there were disputes about the future of the monument in the state and local election campaigns and a number of suggestions as to what should be done with it. It is still in its original place in a damaged condition.

There are, or were, other monuments to the Baleares in Llerena , in the Naval Museum in Madrid, in San Sebastián and in Algeciras .

References

literature

Antony Beevor : The Spanish Civil War. Bertelsmann, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-570-00924-6 .
Bruno Alonso: La Flota Republicana y la Guerra Civil de España. (Memorias de su Comisario General) (= España en armas. 7). Espuela de Plata, Sevilla 2006, ISBN 84-96133-75-3 .
Ricardo Cerezo Martínez: Armada Española, Siglo XX. Volume 4: La guerra civil en la mar. Part 2. Ediciones Poniente, Madrid 1983, ISBN 84-85935-17-9 .
Jeroni F. Fullana, Eduardo Connolly, Daniel Cota: El crucero "Baleares" (1936–1938) (= Llibres de la nostra terra. 44). Lleonard Muntaner, Palma de Mallorca 2000, ISBN 84-95360-02-0 .
Helmut Pemsel : Command of the Sea. A world maritime history from the beginnings of seafaring to the present. Volume 2: 1850 to today. Bernard & Graefe, Koblenz 1985, ISBN 3-7637-5420-2 .
Diego Quevedo Carmona: March 1938. Hace 60 Años: El Hundimiento del Crucero "Baleares". In: defensa. revista internacional de ejercitos, armamento y tecnología. No. 239, 1998, ISSN 0211-3732 , pp. 60-64.
Hugh Thomas : The Spanish Civil War. Revised and updated edition. Modern Library, New York NY 2001, ISBN 0-375-75515-2 .

Web links

Battle of Cabo de Palos on RevistaNaval.com (Spanish)
History of the cruiser Baleares (Spanish)

Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b ^c Quevedo Carmona: Hundimiento . P. 66.
^ Thomas: Spanish p. 776.
^ Beevor: The Spanish Civil War. P. 370.
^ Pemsel: Maritime rule. P. 516.
^ Pemsel: Maritime rule. P. 509.
↑ Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero chapter Flota Republicana .
^ Thomas: Spanish p. 759.
↑ Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero in the chapter La Batalla del Cabo de Palos . P. 1.
↑ Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero in the chapter Flota Nacional .
↑ ^a ^b Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero in the chapter La Batalla del Cabo de Palos .
↑ Alonso: Flota . P. 106.
↑ ^a ^b Cerezo: Armada . P. 196.
↑ Thomas: Spanish . P. 910.
↑ Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero in the chapter CONDECORACIONES .
↑ Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero in the chapter EL CRUCERO BALEARES Y EL CINE .
↑ The film historian Carlos Fernández Cuenca quotes from: Fullan / Cota / Connolly: Crucero in the chapter EL CRUCERO BALEARES Y EL CINE .