Battle of Zallaqa
Representation by Alfredo Roque Gameiro (1899).
| date | October 23, 1086 |
|---|---|
| place | near Sagrajas |
| output | Defeat of the Christian army |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| unknown | unknown |
| losses | |
|
unknown |
high |
The battle of Zallaqa (معركة الزلاقة, translit. Maʿrakat az-Zallāqa; in older texts also Zallacca , today Sagrajas in the province of Badajoz , Extremadura , southern Spain near the border with Portugal ), also the battle of Sagrajas , was a military conflict between the armies of the North African Almoravids -Herrschers Yusuf ibn Tashfin and King Alfonso VI. of Castile . It took place on October 23, 1086 and ended with the victory of the Almoravids.
prehistory
Al-Andalus had disintegrated into various small Taifas (small kingdoms or city-states) since the fall of the Caliphate of Córdoba about 60 years earlier , which marked the rise of the Kingdom of Castile , which had been strengthened under King Ferdinand the Great , to a regional great power, to which most of the Muslim small kingdoms had to pay tribute , had favored.
In 1086, some Taifans asked the North African Berbers for help in the fight against Alfonso VI, who had achieved considerable success in previous years and conquered a number of Muslim areas for Castile. The immediate reason for the call for help was in particular the capture of Toledo , which had previously been ruled by the Taifen dynasty of the Dhun Nunids , by the Castilians in May 1085. Yusuf ibn Tashfin followed the call of three Andalusian rulers (including Abbad III. Al- Mutamid von Sevilla ) and crossed with an army from Morocco to Andalusia . He marched with his troops to the north, towards the Castilian-ruled areas and cities. His army had meanwhile been reinforced by contingents from all over Moorish Spain.
King Alfonso VI of Castile decided (according to tradition, contrary to the advice of El Cid ) to face the enemy in open battle and not to wait until the Moors began to siege fortified places. In October 1086 the hostile armies met. The Moorish army outnumbered the Christian one. Before the fight, the two leaders exchanged messages, Yusuf ibn Tashfin offered the enemy three options: to Islam to convert , tribute ( jizya ) to pay or fight.
The nature of the battlefield, a wide plain in Extremadura, did not offer either of the two armies any particular advantages or disadvantages, but the Moorish army had the Guadiana River behind them, which would have made it difficult for them to retreat to the fortified city of Badajoz .
Course of the battle
The fight began on Friday around sunrise with the attack of the Castilians.
Yusuf ibn Tashfin had divided his army into three groups: The first comprised the taifa empire and was led by al-Mutamid. The second consisted of Berbers led by Yusuf himself. The third group allegedly consisted of a smaller contingent of black African warriors who were armed with "Indian swords" and long spears. The medieval sources are uncertain, however, and it is possible that the later mention of black Africans is an anachronism or confusion with the black-clad elite fighters of the Almoravids.
According to the Muslim chronicler Abu Bakr al-Turtushi, the tactical deployment of Yusuf's troops was as follows: In the front row were soldiers with shields and long lances. They propped the shaft of their lances in the ground behind them and held them kneeling on their shoulders towards the enemy. Immediately behind it were warriors with shields and throwing spears, behind them archers, behind them the cavalry , for whose counter-attacks the infantry formed alleys if necessary.
The fight dragged on into the afternoon. The Castilians were initially able to push back the contingents of the Taifa empires, but came to a standstill again due to the numerical superiority of the Almoravids. Finally, Yusuf's contingent managed to carry out a flanking maneuver and encircle the Christians. Alfons' soldiers panicked and began to lose ground; when Yusuf sent the third group into battle against the weakened enemy, the battle was over. The losses among Alfonso's men were devastating, many were killed while fleeing, and apparently many Christian prisoners were also executed after the battle. According to tradition, only 100 knights managed to return to Castile. King Alfonso VI was wounded in the foot, but was able to escape under cover of night.
Troop strengths and losses
Figures from contemporary chroniclers are mostly inadequate, often dramatically exaggerated and only to be viewed with the utmost skepticism. Muslim authors put the size of the Moorish army at 500 or 12,000 men, or 20,000 light riders, and estimate the Christian at 40,000, 60,000 or 80,000 horsemen and 200,000 foot soldiers. The number of Christians killed is given by them as 10,000, 54,000 or 300,000 men. The US historian Reilly estimates the size of the Castilian army at 2,500 men, consisting of maybe 750 heavily and 750 lightly armored knights as well as around 1,000 squires and foot soldiers.
In the absence of detailed records, it is now impossible to determine the exact troop sizes and losses. The provable army sizes at that time fluctuated between 1,000 and 10,000 men, in the battle of Zallaqa only 3,000 to 5,000 men were possibly involved on both sides.
consequences
Yusuf ibn Tashfin then withdrew to his capital Marrakech because his heir to the throne had died and he had to defend the claims of his dynasty. There was no significant loss of territory by the Castilians. The victory was initially not used consistently by the Almoravids, as Yusuf ibn Tashfin apparently did not seriously consider incorporating Muslim Spain into his empire at the time. The defeat weakened the power of Castile and temporarily stopped its expansion. Their weakness and the political dependency into which the typhoon princes had put themselves through their request for protection prepared the ground for the Almoravid expansion on the Iberian peninsula that followed over the next few decades .
Trivia
The battlefield became الزلاقة / az-Zallāqa , "slippery ground", supposedly because the warriors kept slipping due to the enormous amounts of blood spilled.
After the battle, the Almoravids had a tower built from the skulls of the fallen Christians, comparable to the later skull towers on the island of Djerba (Borj el-Kebir), the skull towers of Akbar I in India or the Ćele Kula in Nis.
literature
-
Colin Smith (Ed.): Christians and Moors in Spain. Aris & Phillips, Warminster.
1st volume: 1988, ISBN 0-85668-411-2 .
2nd volume: 1989, ISBN 0-85668-448-1 .
3rd volume: 1992, ISBN 0-85668-450-3 . - Franco Cardini : Europe and Islam. Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-51096-5 .
- Joseph F. O'Callaghan: Reconquest and crusade in medieval Spain. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia PA 2004, ISBN 0-8122-1889-2 .
Web links
Notes and individual references
- ↑ a b Cf. O'Callaghan: Reconquest and crusade in medieval Spain. P. 143.
- ↑ See O'Callaghan: Reconquest and crusade in medieval Spain. P. 141.
- ↑ This calculation probably only counted (noble) "knights" and no other fighters.
- ↑ See O'Callaghan: Reconquest and crusade in medieval Spain. P. 141f.
- ↑ Many chroniclers made their own victory appear more brilliant with exaggerated numbers of defeated enemies, or tried to put their own defeat into perspective with exaggerated numbers for the superiority of the enemy.
- ↑ Bernard F. Reilly: The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, 1065-1109. Princeton University Press, 1988. pp. 187f.
- ↑ a b Cf. O'Callaghan: Reconquest and crusade in medieval Spain. Pp. 144-146.