UR-100

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UR-100 pulled by a MAZ-537 in its starting canister

The UR-100 ( GRAY index : 8K84 ; Soviet contract designation: RS-10; DIA code: SS-11 ; NATO code name : Sego ) was an ICBM that was developed, built and stationed in the Soviet Union . It was the backbone of the Soviet Army's Strategic Missile Forces in the 1970s . The last specimens were taken out of service by the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia by 1994 . The UR-100N , a further development, is currently still in use (as of 2019).

development

In April 1962, the Soviet government decided to develop the second generation of ICBMs, which should replace the defective systems of the first generation, the R-16 (SS-7 Saddler) and the R-9 (SS-8 Sasin) . The resolution envisaged the development of four missile types: a light solid-propelled missile as a counterpart to the American Minuteman , which was to be stationed in large numbers; a heavy rocket as a counterpart to the US Titan ; a superheavy missile to carry warheads with an explosive force of more than 50 MT and an orbital missile that was supposed to make it possible to bypass the north-facing American early warning radars. The OKB-1 was commissioned by Sergej Koroljow with the development of the light solid-driven ICBM . However, this program ( RT-2 ) encountered major technical hurdles, and the negative experience with Korolyov's previous ICBM projects (the R-7 and R-9) led to two parallel projects for a light missile with liquid fuel at the design offices SKB-586 under Michail Jangel (R-38) and OKB-52 under Vladimir Tschelomei (UR-100). The development of the UR-100 was approved on March 30, 1963. The R-38 program was terminated because Jangel's design office should concentrate on developing the heavy-duty R-36 .

The development of the UR-100 proceeded without major problems, in contrast to the RT-2. The flight test program for the UR-100 began at the Baikonur (Tjuratam) test site nearly a year before that of the RT-2 on April 19, 1965, and ended on October 27, 1966. The UR-100 was deployed in 1966. Over the next 6 years, a total of 990 missiles were deployed at 11 locations in the Soviet Union, mainly along the Trans-Siberian Railway . In contrast, only 60 missiles were deployed by the RT-2 from 1971 onwards.

Due to the steadily deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in the 1960s , the strategic missile forces were commissioned in 1968 to develop a war plan in the event of a conflict with China. This posed a problem for the missile troops, as the control systems of the missiles at that time often did not allow rapid reprogramming of target coordinates or important targets were below the minimum range of many Soviet ICBMs. Therefore, in July 1968, two test flights of UR-100 missiles with flight ranges of only 925 km and 1100 km respectively were carried out to test them against targets at a relatively short distance. The last two divisions of UR-100 missiles deployed were aimed at targets in China. In addition, the UR-100 missiles also took on a medium-range role against targets in Europe and Japan.

At the end of the 1960s, a study in the Soviet Union, in which Jangel's design office was involved, led to heated disputes within the Soviet defense apparatus, which also found the second-generation strategic missiles to be inadequate. The associated fighting between the participating ministries, development offices, the Politburo and the Soviet General Staff is also referred to as a “minor civil war”. As a result, there was a tender for a successor system for the UR-100, in which SKB-586 (Jangel) and OKB-52 (Tschelomei) participated. The latter office came up with two designs, the UR-100N (a completely new development, despite the similar name), and an improved version of the UR-100, the UR-100K. Jangel's office started with the MR UR-100 . Although the original plans were to commit to a model after the design phase, the competition for all three missiles was extended into the flight test phase. In the end it was decided to include all three systems in the armament. You should gradually replace the basic version of the UR-100.

After the UR-100 reached its maximum stationing number of 990 rockets in 1971, the decommissioning of rockets and the modification of the silos for the stationing of the successor models began as early as 1972. The UR-100K rocket was around 8 t heavier than the basic version and was deployed in two sub-variants, a version with a single warhead and one with three multiple warheads (not individually controllable). The UR-100K was the first Soviet ICBM to have decoys to overcome missile defense systems. The single warhead variant of the UR-100K was stationed from 1974 and reached its maximum number of 200 missiles as early as 1975. The multiple warhead variant followed from 1975 and reached its maximum stationing number of 220 missiles in 1976. In addition, 120 rockets of the UR-100U model, which also carried three warheads, were also stationed from 1975.

Since the SALT I between the USA and the USSR, which was closed in 1972, froze the number of rocket silos for ICBMs in both countries, the newly developed RSD-10 (SS-20) took over the role against continental targets in Europe and Asia from 1976 onwards UR-100 missiles (and also gradually from the R-12 and R-14 missiles) so that one could use the maximum number of silos in the USSR for intercontinental targets in the US.

The retirement of the UR-100 began as described by the gradual replacement of the missiles by the UR-100K / U, UR-100N and MR-UR-100 from 1972. The basic variant was retired by 1984, with the last 100 missiles between 1980 and 1984 did not carry any warheads. The UR-100U was retired between 1979 and 1983. The UR-100K missiles remained in place the longest, with slow retirement between 1985 and 1994.

technology

The UR-100 missiles including the UR-100K and UR-100U versions were two-stage with storable fuel . They used asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel and nitrous oxide (NTO) as oxidizer in both stages . In addition to the R-36 missiles, they were the first Soviet missiles to use NTO as an oxidizer; the previous missiles used concentrated nitric acid .

Tschelomeis OKB-52 optimized the design for cheap mass production and used his experience in the aircraft industry. Likewise, the launch concept was taken from Tschelomei's experience in the development of sea-based cruise missiles: the rocket was packed in its launch canister at the factory and brought to the stationing location. In the canister she was let into the silo and refueled. The canister was then sealed to protect the missile from environmental influences. In this way it could be stored in the silo ready for use for several years, in contrast to only six months with the predecessor R-16. There was a space between the starting canister and the silo wall, through which the hot exhaust gases were discharged when the vehicle was started. To enable the quickest and cheapest possible deployment, the silos of the UR-100 were only slightly hardened against nuclear weapon explosions. They were designed up to an overpressure of 200  kPa .

status

In 1986 SS-11s were stationed in the Perm , Kostroma , Teikowo area , northeast of Lessosibirsk , east of Lake Baikal near Ulan-Ude , near Chita ( Chita-46 ) and near Novy Urgal in the Khabarovsk region . In the course of the START 1 agreement, all systems were decommissioned. The last system was scrapped in 1994.

Technical data of the UR-100

system UR-100 UR-100K UR-100U
Contract name RS-10 RS-10 RS-10
GRAY index 8K84 15A20 15A20U
DIA code SS-11 mod 1 SS-11 mod 2 SS-11 mod 3
NATO code Sego Sego Sego
Working time 1966-1984 1973-1990 1975-1983
drive 2 stages of liquid fuel 2 stages of liquid fuel 2 stages of liquid fuel
Fuel / oxidizer UDMH / NTO UDMH / NTO UDMH / NTO
length 16.70 m 18.90 m 19.10 m
Hull diameter 2,000 mm 2,000 mm 2,000 mm
Weight 42,300 kg 50,100 kg 50,100 kg
payload 760-1,500 kg 1,200 kg 1,200 kg
Warhead 1 RV nuclear 1.1 MT 1 RV nuclear 1.0 MT / 3 MRV nuclear 220 kT plus decoys 3 MRV nuclear 220 kT plus decoys
Operational range 11,000 km 12,000 km 10,600 km
Hit Accuracy ( CEP ) 1.4 km 0.96 km / 1.1-1.2 km 1.1-1.2 km

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c P. Podvig (Ed.): Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. MIT Press, 2004, ISBN 978-0-262-16202-9 .
  2. ↑ a b c d e S. J. Zaloga : The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword - The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000. Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001, ISBN 1-58834-007-4 .
  3. ↑ a b Pavel Podvig: The Window of Vulnerability That Was not: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s - A research note. International Security, Summer 2008, Vol. 33, No. 1: 118-138
  4. ↑ Nuclear Notebook: US and Soviet / Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008

literature

  • Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces by Frank vonHippel, Pavel Podvig
  • JANE'S STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS Edition 2003 Jane's Verlag
  • Land-based Soviet / Russian ballistic guided missiles DTIG - Defense Threat Informations Group, July 2005

Web links

Commons : UR-100  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files