Conspiracy theories for the attack on Pearl Harbor

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US propaganda poster calling for revenge for Pearl Harbor

Conspiracy theories about the attack on Pearl Harbor cast doubt on the fact that the Japanese attack on the US fleet on December 7, 1941 took the US completely by surprise. They claim that the US government and / or parts of the US military were aware of the planned attack in good time, but deliberately did not take any action against it. They wanted to get the approval of the US public unwilling to go to war for the United States to join the Second World War on the following day. The US historians Charles A. Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes developed this and similar conspiracy theses shortly after 1945. Their claims are also based on the evaluation of the results of a parliamentary committee of inquiry at the time. They are viewed as history revisionists .

History of the attacks

A large majority of the US population rejected US intervention in the ongoing war against Germany and Italy in Europe until the spring of 1941: On January 9, 1941, according to a regularly conducted Gallup poll, 88% of US Americans were against it.

Franklin D. Roosevelt won the presidential election in 1940 with the promise to keep the US out of the "European war". With its lending and leasing law , however, the US began to support the Allies with arms deliveries and sealed off the Chinese market to increase economic pressure on Japan. There was a tough ideological argument about this in 1940/41 with the Isolationists on the America First Committee . Some interpreted this law as a violation of international law in favor of Great Britain, the purpose of which was to intentionally provoke acts of revenge. On July 22, 1941, Admiral Richmond K. Turner Roosevelt warned that the cessation of US oil supplies to Japan would provoke a Japanese attack on the Philippines and embroil the US in a Pacific war. On July 25, 1941, Roosevelt had the oil deliveries stopped.

Conspiracy theses

Findings from previous US Army maneuvers

As evidence of a conspiracy by the US government and its military, the representatives of conspiracy theses cite a joint maneuver by the United States Army and United States Navy to defend Hawaii in 1932. This is said to have anticipated the Japanese attack in 1941 in almost every detail. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell , commander of the attacking forces, did not send the aircraft carriers Saratoga and Lexington assigned to him to support his slow battleships in accordance with orthodox military doctrine, but sent them ahead of the battle fleet at top speed. In bad weather, they managed to take an attack position north of Hawaii unnoticed. On February 7th (like December 7th, 1941 a Sunday and the 7th of a month) they first attacked the airfields and then the warships of the completely surprised defenders lying in the harbor. The referees of the maneuver rated the attack as a “total success”: the airfields were completely shut down, numerous hits on the ships, not a single plane of the defenders could take off. The New York Times reported that the defenders had still not managed even 24 hours after the attack to locate the attacking aircraft carriers. Japanese media also reported on the maneuver, and the similarity of the two attacks is considered an indication that the Japanese planners were familiar with the maneuver. In evaluating the maneuver, however, the US Navy did not draw any major consequences from the process; the high command, which had almost entirely emerged from the battle fleet, assessed the maneuver results as "unrealistic". The same applies to an "attack" under Admiral Ernest J. King with an aircraft carrier in 1938.

Discussions about the sense of moving to Pearl Harbor

When President Roosevelt ordered the fleet to be moved from the west coast of the United States to Pearl Harbor, Admiral James O. Richardson protested strongly and repeatedly. Richardson thought the transfer was nonsensical, as the Pacific Fleet, according to the plans for a war against Japan ( War Plan Orange ), should wait for the Atlantic Fleet to arrive before moving west. Whether she was waiting in San Diego or Pearl Harbor, in his opinion, made little difference. Logistically, however, the fleet was more difficult to supply in Pearl Harbor, as the supplies first had to be brought to Hawaii by ship. In their home base in San Diego, however, the fleet could simply be supplied via the railroad. The same was true for troop vacations: from San Diego, the soldiers could visit their families during their vacation, but the overseas stationing in Pearl Harbor made this impossible, as there was no time to travel to and from the USA within a vacation. The repeated protests eventually led to Richardson being replaced and replaced by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel . However, this argument overlooks the fact that the aim of the US leadership in relocating the fleet to Hawaii did not serve to prepare for war, but was primarily of a political and strategic nature: to put pressure on Japan to cease its aggressive expansion policy.

Alleged knowledge of Japanese radio messages before the attack

The assumption of the “bogus reason for war” is based on the fact that the encryption of various Japanese radio codes had been cracked before the attack: Purple, the highest diplomatic code, J-19 and PA-K2, two other diplomatic codes, and JN-25 , the Japanese naval code. As of July 25th (see above), further intelligence information should no longer have been passed on to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. There is also speculation about an alleged information blockade of the established secret services against the OCI , which consists of civilians - for example by J. Edgar Hoover (FBI), who saw his sovereignty over the secret service activities curtailed, and the army (more precisely the " G-2 "), who mistrusted the "civilians". An investigation was subsequently carried out against Admiral Kimmel due to negligence in defense measures. He defended himself by saying that important information had not been made available to him before the attack. His rehabilitation was discussed several times up to the Congress. What speaks against this alleged evidence of a conspiracy, however, is firstly that Japan had redesigned and refined the Navy's military encryption system in December just before the attack to such an extent that it drove the American cryptologists to despair. Only a small fraction could be deciphered in such a short time that the content was meaningful to use. Some sayings were not even deciphered until after the end of the war. According to the official version, it was not until the spring of 1942 that the Japanese naval sayings were deciphered with some degree of certainty and in a short time, just in time for the Midway battle. Second, the Americans were only able to read Japan's diplomatic - that is, non-military - radio traffic without any major difficulties. In this radio communication between Japan and its embassies abroad, however, there was never any mention of a specific plan of attack on Pearl Harbor or any other location before December 7, 1941. There were only a few intercepted radio messages from which Pearl Harbor could theoretically have been indirectly derived as a target in the event of a Japanese attack, which the respective decision-makers on the US side did not recognize. Other radio messages from which the attack could have been derived more clearly were only available in Washington after the attack in a deciphered and translated version due to the above-mentioned bottlenecks.

The US radio reconnaissance suspected the preparation of a major military operation based on the conspicuous patterns of the Japanese radio traffic and the unscheduled change of call sign of the Japanese Navy on December 1st. The aim, however, was by no means clear - it could be an attack on the British and Dutch colonies (which was suspected) as well as an attack on the Philippines or further troop transfers to Indochina (which were considered unlikely). On November 24th and 27th, the Chief of Naval Operations , Admiral Harold R. Stark , sent war warnings to all commanders in the Pacific, informing them that aggressive action by Japan was to be expected in the next few days. Malaysia , Thailand , the Philippines, Borneo and Guam were named as possible targets for a Japanese attack . All commanders in the Pacific were instructed to take appropriate measures to prepare their troops for war.

Diary entry of the US Secretary of War

There is also an entry in the diary of the then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson from November 25, 1941 about a conversation with Roosevelt:

"The question was how to maneuver them into a position where they would fire the first shot without causing too much damage to us ... it was desirable to make sure that this was the Japanese (who fire the first shot) so that no one could have the slightest doubt who the aggressor was. "

However, it cannot be inferred from this quote that Stimson had any knowledge of an actual concrete plan of attack against Japan.

Questionable motivation for a conspiracy

The troops and ships stationed in Pearl Harbor were deliberately left in ignorance and were sacrificed in the attack in order to create the necessary acceptance among the US population for the US to enter the Second World War. The resulting US losses were accepted because Japan was unable to cause serious damage.

When assessing the attack by the Japanese, only the damage actually done is often considered, ignoring the fact that significantly greater damage would have been possible. Important repair and communication facilities for the Pacific Fleet were located in Pearl Harbor. Major repair work and maintenance could only be carried out here, the next capable bases could only be found on the west coast of the USA, which is over 4000 km away. In addition, the US Navy’s advanced oil supplies were stored in Pearl Harbor. If the Japanese had destroyed the port facilities and supplies, the US Navy would have been severely restricted in its freedom of movement over a very long period of time. Indeed, the destruction of the port facilities was planned as part of the attack. This was to be done in the course of a third attack as soon as the aircraft returned from the second attack were ready to take off again. However, since the second attack lasted longer than planned for various reasons and it was feared that the launched machines would not return before dark in a further attack, the Japanese commander Admiral Nagumo decided on the third attack despite violent protests from his officers (Landings in the dark were not common at this time and would have led to heavy losses). Since this decision was impossible to predict, the American planners, if they actually knowingly allowed the attack, would have assumed that they would likely lose the entire base.

It is doubtful whether Washington would have been willing to willingly take such a massive risk. In addition, another Japanese attack in the afternoon would have found the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise , which has now arrived , which also calls into question the thesis of the aircraft carriers deliberately removed from the port.

Composition of the fleet

At the time of the attack there were only old battleships and not a single aircraft carrier in the harbor , which meant that the damage to the USA was limited from the outset. A few days before the attack, Admiral Halsey had left Pearl Harbor on November 28, 1941 with an aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. Another carrier, three heavy cruisers and five destroyers followed on December 5th. On the same day, a third squadron consisting of a heavy cruiser and five minesweepers left the port. From this the thesis is derived that the US Navy, knowing the impending attack, brought all valuable ships to safety. The units left behind were therefore obsolete ships of little use, the sinking of which meant no major loss.

However, if one compares the units lying in Pearl Harbor with the remaining units of the US Navy, a different picture emerges: In December 1941 the US Navy had a total of 17 battleships. Ten of them were built before or during World War I , four of which ( Nevada , Oklahoma , Pennsylvania , Arizona ) were located in Pearl Harbor. The oldest battleships, Arkansas , New York, and Texas , built before World War I , were in the Atlantic. Another five battleships were built after the First World War until the Washington Naval Treaty was signed in 1922. All war experience had already flowed into these Tennessee and Colorado class ships . After several modernizations, their artillery and armor were also considered to be the most modern battleships in the world at the time, such as the British King George V , in 1941 . -Class or the German Tirpitz , equal. All five units were assigned to the Pacific Fleet, one (the Colorado ) was at the time of the attack on the west coast for armament in the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . The last two battleships in the U.S. Navy were the two North Carolina- class units . These were the first battleships built after 1922 and were not completed until 1941. At the time of the attack, however, they were still being tested and their crew was being trained and were considered not yet ready for use. Thus, despite their age, the eight battleships lying in Pearl Harbor were the more modern and powerful half of the US battle fleet. They were on a par with the Japanese battle line, which consisted of eight ships built during the First World War and two ships built until 1922.

The more modern units of the other ship types were also in port. The two heavy cruisers lying in port were ships of the newer New Orleans class , while the older Pensacola and Northampton class cruisers had been assigned as escorts to the aircraft carriers . Of the six light cruisers, only two belonged to the old Omaha- class , while the other four ships were new units of the Brooklyn- class . These were the youngest cruisers in the US Navy; none of these four ships were more than three years old. A similar picture emerges with the destroyers. Of 30 ships, 26 belonged to the modern Mahan, Porter and Farragut classes built in the 1930s.

There are also plausible explanations for the absence of the aircraft carriers on the day of the attack. The aircraft carrier Enterprise was scheduled to arrive on December 6th, having transported a squadron of fighters to Wake Island (a task that was not unusual at the time for an aircraft carrier). However, his association had to walk through a storm en route, resulting in a 24-hour delay and not arriving until the afternoon of the 7th. The Lexington transported another fighter squadron to Midway with three cruisers and five destroyers. Since the relocation of the two squadrons should be kept secret if possible, the porters were officially on training missions. Partly this camouflage story has held up to this day; Quite a few articles and books still state that the porters left port to practice shortly before the attack (the Lexington left on December 5th). However, at least for the Enterprise, participation in an exercise with the first battleship division ( Arizona , Nevada and Oklahoma ) had been planned in this period. The exercise then took place without them, and the battleships returned to Pearl Harbor on December 5th.

The last of the three carriers of the Pacific Fleet, the Saratoga , was en route to San Diego after a shipyard in Bremerton.

Bearing in the Japanese carrier association at sea

Another thesis suggests that the Japanese naval unit on its way to Hawaii did not observe the radio silence ordered and could therefore be targeted by the secret services.

The alleged breaking of the radio silence by the Japanese attack group could not be proven by the critics of the official thesis. The examination of all known radio documents by several independent experts, however, came to the conclusion that the US radio surveillance had not recorded any radio signals that could have been assigned to the attack group.

In addition, Japanese officers who were responsible for communications on board the attack group confirmed that strict radio silence was maintained. Most of the radio operators had even been left behind in Japan to camouflage false radio traffic, and the transmitters on board the ships of the attack group had been rendered inoperable by removing important parts to prevent the radio silence from being accidentally broken.

Other abnormalities

Long before September 11, 2001, Harry Thürk had accused the USA of rather negligence than conspiracy, more negligence than intent - but also "political underhandedness" and military arrogance. In his publication Pearl Harbor - The Story of a Robbery , referred to as a “factual report” , as early as 1965 he pointed out numerous “strange circumstances”, events and contexts that made him doubt the official account. However, the works of renowned naval historians contradict Thürk's conclusions:

  • Drastic cuts in gasoline deliveries just a few months before the raid and raw material shortages caused by other US sanctions have forced Japan “to consider it impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations,” according to the note given by Japan to the US at the start of the war handed over. The reason for this and previous embargoes were the Japanese war of aggression against China and the occupation of French Indochina as part of Japan's general preparations for war.
  • Chief of Staff George C. Marshall telegraphed on October 27, 1941 top secret only a limited group of Pacific officers: "If hostilities can not be avoided, the US prefer to let Japan run the first hostile act." This suggests, however, do not derive knowledge of a specific plan of attack.
  • Contrary to the rules, a final warning to the US fleet was not telegraphed with the usual urgency note on the morning of the attack; Instead of Hawaii, other presumed targets (Philippines or Singapore) were mentioned. The suspicious blocking period for the negotiations and the precisely determined delivery date (not before December 7, 1941 1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time) of the last part of a note that had already been prepared and decrypted by the US secret services on December 6, 1941 would have a final, unmistakable sign for the imminent start of the war, as well as the burning of documents in the Japanese embassy. In fact, although the US was already aware of the general Japanese preparations for war and specific plans to attack targets in Southeast Asia, it was not aware of the intention to attack Pearl Harbor. The mentioned final Japanese 1:00 p.m. Note also did not contain any concrete information as to when, where and against which opponents the Japanese would now proceed in the Pacific. Nevertheless, on the morning of December 7th, immediately after the Japanese 1 p.m. embargo became known, those responsible in Washington decided to warn all units in the Pacific of possible Japanese hostilities at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. The warning message reached those responsible in Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack began due to various transmission mishaps.
  • It is also argued that secret signals from Japan via radio (e.g. "east wind, rain" for the start of the war with the USA) were known to the Americans. Conspiracy theorists claim that these were actually broadcast on December 4th and bugged by US agencies. In truth, however, only the Japanese code "west wind, clear", which stood for hostilities with Great Britain, was intercepted, and this after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
  • The naval reconnaissance service had alerted Kimmel that all Japanese aircraft carriers had already left a few weeks before the attack and had since disappeared. Instead, Japanese submarines had been identified off Hawaii five weeks before the attack. However, the work of historians shows that the US did not know the exact position of most of the Japanese porters, and sophisticated deception made it appear that they were still in Japanese waters.
  • Already four months before the attack, the commander of Hickam Field, Colonel William Farthing, had warned the War Department in a memorandum that Pearl Harbor's lack of defense readiness would almost tempt Japanese aircraft carriers approaching from the North Pacific to attack in the morning hours (precisely from this direction and at this time of day the attack actually took place).
  • Kimmel also informed Washington several times of Hawaii's lack of preparedness to defend against a surprise attack, most recently on December 6, 1941.
  • In addition to old battleships (such as the "Utah"), there were also numerous outdated aircraft on Hawaii, such as B-18s and the PBY flying boats, which Thürk wrongly described as outdated, but are actually ultra-modern . Of the only twelve modern B-17 bombers in Hawaii, only half were operational. The twelve other B-17s deployed as reinforcements on December 7th were also not yet equipped for warfare. In fact, these bombers were not intended for Pearl Harbor, but for the Philippines. So they were unarmed, because on the long route from California to Hawaii fuel had to be saved by reducing weight.
  • According to an anti-sabotage instruction issued by Army General WC Short on December 6, 1941, most of the combat-capable aircraft were neither refueled nor ammunitioned and were huddled but clearly visible on the runway edge instead of in the hangars.
  • The planned return of the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" on December 7, 1941 was delayed by a few hours due to a break. Although she was near Pearl Harbor again at the time of the attack, the "Enterprise" did not intervene in the fight, but turned away again. According to Thürk, the "Enterprise" was 300 kilometers west of Oahu at the time of the attack, while the Japanese were waiting 190 kilometers to the north for their aircraft to return and had even expected a possible US counter-attack. According to research by historians, incorrect reports about Japanese ships south of Oahu were the reason for this at first sight strange reaction.

Relation to other conspiracy theses

Proponents of conspiracy theories on September 11, 2001 often assume a "Pearl Harbor plot" as a model for a similar conspiracy and argue with it. The explosion of the USS Maine in 1898, the sinking of the RMS Lusitania in 1915, the Tonkin incident in 1964, the destruction of the USS Liberty by the Israeli military in 1967 and the Operation Northwoods plan of 1962 are often used as parallels .

literature

Books that elucidate Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories

  • Chapter: Conspiracy or confusion? Churchill, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor. In: Richard J. Aldrich: Intelligence and the War against Japan. Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, pp. 68-91. ISBN 0-521-64186-1
  • Leatrice R. Arakaki, John R. Kuborn: December 7, 1941 The Air Force Story 1991, ISBN 0-912799-73-0
  • Donald E. Heidenreich Jr .: Pearl Harbor. In: Peter Knight (Ed.): Conspiracy Theories in American History. To Encyclopedia. Vol. 2. ABC Clio, Santa Barbara, Denver and London 2003, pp. 579-582.
  • John B. Lundstrom: The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway . Naval Institute Press, 1984, ISBN 978-0-87021-189-8 .

Books whose authors represent conspiracy theories

  • Harry Elmer Barnes: Perpetual war for perpetual peace. A critical examination of the foreign policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and its aftermath. Edited with the collaboration of WH Chamberlin, PL Greaves Jr, GA Lundberg. The Caxton press, Caldwell (Idaho) 1953. German as * Unmasked Hypocrisy (Eternal War for Eternal Peace) - Revision of American historiography. Foreword and collaboration by Herbert Grabert , Verlag KH Priester 1961. (Critical examination of American foreign policy since Franklin Delano Roosevelt)
  • Charles A. Beard : President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941. A study in appearances and realities. Yale university press, New York 1948. New edition with introduction by Campbell Craig, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick 2003, ISBN 978-0-7658-0998-8 .
    Beard is also trying to substantiate the thesis that the USA drove Japan into war on the basis of investigations by the parliamentary Pearl Harbor Committee. After the publication of this monograph, he was forced to resign from his offices in the historical associations
  • George Morgenstern: Pearl Harbor. Devin-Adair, New York 1947. German translation: Pearl Harbor 1941. An American catastrophe. Druffel - Vowinckel , Gilching 2012. ISBN 978-3-7766-1996-6
    An investigative committee of the American Congress dealt in 1945 with the Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, which led to the entry of the USA into the war. The material that was unearthed during this investigation was so incriminating on the Roosevelt administration that a Republican and a Democratic final report was presented. Morgenstern was an editor of the Chicago Tribune , one of the leading isolationist dailies in America at the time .
  • Gordon W. Prange: At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor . Penguin, 1991, ISBN 978-0-14-015734-5 .
  • Christopher Shores: Bloody Shambles Volume One. Grub Street, 1992, ISBN 978-0-948817-50-2
  • Robert B. Stinnett: Pearl Harbor. How the American government provoked the attack and killed 2,476 of its citizens. Zweiausendeins , Frankfurt am Main 2003, 565 p., 94 b / w illus., ISBN 3-86150-603-3 , ( review notes on pearl diver )

Documentary film

  • Attack on Pearl Harbor - The mystery of the first shot. Documentation, Germany, 2006, 52 min., Script and direction: Annette Baumeister, Florian Hartung, production: ZDF , summary by arte

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ cf. E.g. the critical review by Gerhard Krebs, an expert on recent Japanese history, of Stinnett's book in the literature list in Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens EV (NOAG) 2004
  2. ↑ Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 2, June 1941, Gallup And Fortune Polls, pp. 325f .:
    “If you were asked to vote on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote - to go into the war, or to stay out of the war? (Jan. 9, '41 - AIPO)
    Go in: 12%, Stay out: 88% "
    " (Mar. 20, '41 - AIPO) Go in: 17%, Stay out: 83% (p. 327, ibid .) " (Beginning of article)
  3. ↑ If the Nuremberg Laws were Applied ... chomsky.info
  4. ^ Congressional Investigation Report, July 26, 1946, p. 160
  5. ↑ Quoted from ENACTMENT OF PROVISIONS OF HR 5408, THE FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 ( Memento from May 12, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
  6. ↑ cf. B. The critical review by Gerhard Krebs, an expert in recent Japanese history, of Stinnett's book listed in the literature list
  7. ↑ Congressional Investigation Report of July 26, 1946, pp. 232ff. or p. 228ff.
  8. ^ War warning of November 27, 1941.
  9. ↑ Quoted from Robert Anton Wilson : The Lexicon of Conspiracy Theories. Piper , Munich 2002, pp. 299f.
  10. ^ Attack at Pearl Harbor, 1941. EyeWitness to History, www.eyewitnesstohistory.com (1997).
  11. ↑ The Fine Art of Provocation: The First Shot from Pearl Harbor. Studies of Time Issues, 2007
  12. ↑ Position of all ships in the US Navy on December 7, 1941.
  13. ↑ NavWeaps: Order of Battle. Composition of the fleet associations
  14. ↑ Article on the American porters at Pearl Harbor.
  15. ↑ Robert B. Stinnett: Pearl Harbor: How the American government provoked the attack and let 2476 of its citizens die. Zweiausendeins, Frankfurt 2003, ISBN 3-86150-603-3 , pp. 301ff. Stinnett especially refers to John Toland's Infamy. Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath. Doubleday 1982.
  16. ↑ Harry Thürk: Pearl Harbor - The story of a raid. Designed using foreign literature. 6th edition Berlin 1974, pp. 107, 155.
  17. ↑ Thürk, p. 13
  18. ↑ Thürk, p. 18
  19. ↑ Thürk, p. 107
  20. ↑ Christopher Shores: Bloody Shambles Volume One: First Comprehensive Account of Air Operations Over South-East Asia, December 1941-April 1942. Grub Street, 1992, ISBN 978-0-948817-50-2 .
  21. ↑ Thürk, p. 70
  22. ↑ Thürk p. 71
  23. ↑ Thürk, p. 68 and pp. 104-106
  24. ^ Gorgon W. Prange: At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. Penguin (Non-Classics), edition: Anniversary. (December 1, 1991)
  25. ^ Congressional Investigation Report, July 26, 1946, p. 223.
  26. ↑ Thürk, p. 51 and p. 67ff
  27. ^ Clyde G. Booker: Review of West Wind Clear: Cryptology and the Winds Message Controversy - A Documentary History. In: Cryptologia. 34, 2009, pp. 90-95, doi : 10.1080 / 01611190903409173 .
  28. ↑ Thürk, p. 50f
  29. ↑ a b Thürk, p. 53
  30. ↑ Prange p. 440
  31. ↑ Thürk, p. 92
  32. ↑ Thürk, p. 91 and p. 155
  33. ↑ Thürk, p. 121
  34. ↑ Leatrice R. Arakaki, John R. Kuborn: December 7, 1941 The Air Force Story. 1991, ISBN 0-912799-73-0 , pp. 72, 73.
  35. ↑ Thürk, p. 111
  36. ↑ Thürk, p. 131f
  37. ↑ Thürk, p. 74 and p. 133f
  38. ^ John B. Lundstrom: The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Naval Institute Press (July 1984)
  39. ↑ Stephen E. Atkins: The 9/11 Encyclopedia. 2nd edition, ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara / CDenver / Oxford 2011, p. 220 f .; Kathryn S. Olmsted: Real Enemies. Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11. Oxford University Presse, Oxford / New York 2011, pp. 16, 45 ff., 132 et al.

Coordinates: 21 ° 22 ′ 0 ″  N , 157 ° 57 ′ 0 ″  W.