Gia Long

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Gia Long
Emperor of Vietnam
caption
Emperor Gia Long
PredecessorTây Sơn Dynasty
SuccessorMinh Mang
Names
Nguyễn Phúc Ánh
DynastyNguyễn Dynasty

Emperor Gia Long (Hán tự: 嘉隆; 1762–1820), born Nguyễn Phúc Ánh (Hán tự: 阮福映, often referred to simply as Nguyễn Ánh), was an emperor of Vietnam. Unifying what is now modern Vietnam in 1802, he founded the Nguyễn Dynasty, the last of the Vietnamese dynasties.

A nephew of the last Nguyễn Lord who ruled southern Vietnam, Nguyễn Anh was forced into hiding in 1777 as a fifteen year old when his family were slain in the Tay Son revolt. After several changes of fortunes in which his loyalists regained and again lost Saigon, he befriended the French Catholic priest Pigneau de Behaine. Pigneau championed his cause to the French government and managed to recruit volunteers when this fell through to help Nguyen Anh regain the throne. From 1789, he regained the ascendancy and began his northward march to defeat the Tay Son and moved eventually by 1802 to the border with China, which had previously been ruled by the Trinh Lords. When this was over, he had reunited Vietnam after centuries of feudal warring with a greater land mass than ever before, stretching from China down to the Gulf of Siam. Gia Long's rule was noted for its Confucian orthodoxy. He repealed the Tay Son reforms and used a classical Confucian education and civil service system. He moved the capital from Hanoi south to Huế as the country's populace had also moved south over the preceding centuries, and built up fortresses and a palace in his new capital. Using French expertise, he modernised Vietnam's defensive capabilities. In deference to the assistance of his French friends, he tolerated the activities of Roman Catholic missionaries, something that was increasingly restricted under his successors. Under his rule, Vietnam strengthened its military dominance in Indochina, expeling Siamese forces from Cambodia and turning it into a vassal.

Early years

File:Quangtrung.gif
Nguyễn Huệ, Gia Long's rival for the throne.

His uncle, Nguyen Phuc Thuan,[1] lost his throne as feudal lord of southern Vietnam during the Tay Son rebellion led by the brothers Nguyen Hue, Nguyen Nhac and Nguyen Lu in 1777.[2] Nguyen Phuc Anh was the most senior member of the Nguyen family to have survived the Tay Son victory and conquest of Saigon in 1777.[3] His uncle was killed in the Tay Son victory.[4][5] Nguyen Anh fled to Ha Tien in the far south of the country, where he met Pigneau de Behaine,[6][7][8] a French priest who became his adviser and played a large part in his rise to power.[8] They escaped to the island of Pulo Panjang in the Gulf of Siam.[3][9] Pigneau had hoped that by playing a substantial role in a Nguyen Anh victory, he would be able to gain important benefits in expanding the Catholic presence in Asia.[10]

In late 1777, the main part of the Tay Son army left Saigon to go north, and Nguyen Anh stealthily returned to the mainland, rejoining his supporters and reclaimed the city.[11] This was in large part due to the efforts of a supporter Do Thanh Nhon, who had organised a new army for the Nguyen.[12] This army was supplemented by Cambodian mercenaries and Chinese pirates.[13] The following year, Nhon repelled further Tay Son troops from Gia Dinh province, and destroying the Tay Son naval fleet. With the situation optimistic, Nguyen Anh sent a mission to Siam to propose a treaty of friendship. This was derailed in 1779 when the Cambodians held an uprising against their pro-Siamese leader Ang Non. Nguyen Anh sent Nhon to help the uprising, which saw Ang Non defeated decisively and executed.[12] Nhon returned to Saigon with high honour and concentrated his efforts on improving the Nguyen navy. Further forces were sent in 1781 to prop up the Cambodian regime against Siamese armies.[12][4]

Then, Nguyen Anh had Nhon murdered, although the reason is unknown, it was postulated to be due to that Nhon's fame had overshadowed him. This was purported to have caused the Tay Son brothers to celebrate upon hearing of Nhon's execution, as he was the commander that they feared the most. Nhon's forces rebelled, weakening the Nguyen army, and within a few months, the Tay Son had recaptured Saigon mainly on the back of naval barrages.[12][13] Nguyen Anh was forced to flee to Ha Tien, and then onto the island of Phu Quoc, as some of his forces continued to resist in his absence.[14]

In October 1782, the tide shifted again, when forces lead by Nguyen Man, Nguyen Anh's brother, managed to drive the Tay Son out of Saigon. Nguyen Anh returned to Saigon, as did Pigneau.[14] The hold was tenuous, and a counterattack by the Tay Son in early 1783 saw a heavy defeat to the Nguyen, with Nguyen Man killed.[14][4] Nguyễn Anh again fled to Phu Quoc, where his hiding place was discovered.[14] He managed to escape the pursuing Tay Son fleet to Koh-rong island in the Bay of Kompongsom. Again, his hideout was discovered and encircled by the rebel fleet. However, a typhoon hit the area, and he managed to break the encirclement and travel to another island amidst the confusion.[14][13] In early 1784, Nguyen Anh went to seek Siamese aid, which was forthcoming, but the extra 20,000 men failed to make an impact on the Tay Son control.[15] He became a refugee in Siam in 1785.[14][16] To make matters worse, the Tay Son regularly raided the rice growing areas of the south during the harvesting season, confiscating the Nguyen's supply of food.[6] Nguyen Anh came to the conclusion that using any military benefit from using Siamese aid would generate a backlash among the populace due to Vietnamese attitudes towards Siam.[7]

Pigneau and French assistance

Portrait of Prince Canh, the eldest son of Gia Long, in France, 1787.

Nguyen Anh then asked Pigneau to appeal for French aid, and pledged to allow Pigneau to take his son Canh with him.[14][10][17] This came after he had considered enlisting English, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish assistance.[18] Pigneau had advised against Nguyen Anh's original plan to seek Dutch aid from Batavia, fearing that Protestant aid would disadvantage the interests of Catholicism.[10] Pigneau left in December,[14] arriving in Pondicherry in February 1785 with Nguyen Anh's royal seal. Nguyen Anh had authorised him to make concessions to the French in return for military assistance.[19] The French administration in Pondicherry led by acting governor Coutenceau des Algrains, was conservative in outlook and was resolutely opposed to intervening in southern Vietnam.[20][19] In addition, he was denounced by Spanish Franciscans in the Vatican, and he offered to transfer his political mandate to Portuguese forces. The Portuguese had earlier offered Nguyen Anh 56 ships to use against the Tay Son.[21] In July 1786, after more than a year of fruitless lobbying in Pondicherry, Governor de Cossigny allowed Pigneau to travel back to France to ask the royal court directly for assistance.[20][22][17] Arriving in February 1787 at the court of Louis XVI in Versailles, Pigneau had difficulty in gathering support for a French expedition to install Nguyen Anh on the throne.[20] This was due to the poor financial state of the country prior to the French Revolution. Pigneau was helped by Pierre Poivre who had been involved previously in French interests in Vietnam.[20][23] Pigneau told the court that if France invested in Nguyen Anh and acquired a few fortified positions on the Vietnamese coast, then France would have the capability to "dominate the seas of China and of the archipelago", and with it the control of Asian commerce.[23] In November 1787, a treaty of alliance was concluded between France and Cochin China in Nguyen Anh's name. Pigneau was named as the "Royal Commissioner of France for Cochinchina".[23][17] Four frigates, 1,650 fully equipped French soldiers and 250 Indian sepoys were promised in return for the cession of Pulo Condore and Tourane (Da Nang),[20][17] as well as tree trade to the exclusion of all other countries.[4][22][17] However, the free exercise of Christianity was not allowed.[23][17] However, Pigneau found that Governor Mathew Conway of Pondicherry was unwilling to fulfil the agreement;[24][22] Conway had been instructed by Paris to determine when to organise the aid, if at at all.[24][17] Pigneau was forced to use funds raised in France and enlist French volunteers and mercenaries.[20][16][24][25] He also managed to procure several shipments of arms and munitions from Mauritius and Pondicherry.[6]

Meanwhile, Nguyen Anh had stayed in Siam with a contingent of troops until August 1787. His troops served in the Siamese war against Bodawpaya of Burma.[26][4] When the Tay Son, having consolidated their hold in southern Vietnam, decided to move north to unify the country, the withdrawal of troops from the Gia Dinh garrison had weakened them.[26][21] This was compounded by reports that Nguyen Lu was under attack near Qui Nhon from his brother Nguyen Nhac, and that troops were being evacuated from Gia Dinh by their commander Dang Van Tran to defend Nguyen Lu. Exploiting this weakness, Nguyen Anh assembled his forces at home and abroad to prepare for an offensive.[7]

Nguyen Anh secretly left Siam to return to southern Vietnam, but his attempt to capture Gia Dinh failed. He then captured My Tho, making it the base of his operations, and rebuilt his army. After a hard fight, his forces captured Saigon on September 7, 1788.[26] Eventually, four vessels were assembled to sail to Vietnam from Pondicherry, arriving in Saigon on July 24, 1789.[27] The forces helped to consolidate southern Vietnam under Nguyen Anh's control.[26][4][28] The exact magnitude of foreign aid and the importance of their contribution to Gia Long's success is a source of dispute. Earlier scholars asserted that up to 400 Frenchmen enlisted,[20][16][29][25] but more recent work has asserted that less than 100 soldiers were present and around a dozen officers.[30][31]

Consolidation of southern Vietnam

The French officers were used to train the Nguyen Anh's armed forces and introduce their technological expertise to the war effort. The navy was trained by Jean Marie Dayot.[26]Dayot supervised the construction of bronze-plated naval vessels.[30] Olivier de Puymanel was responsible for training the army and construction of fortifications.[26][32][25] He taught the troops methods of manufacturing and using European-style artillery and introduced European infantry formations and tactical methods.[30] Pigneau and other missionaries acted as business agents for the Nguyen, purchasing munitions and military supplies.[22] Pigneau served as an advisor and de facto foreign minister to Nguyen Anh until his death in 1799.[33][32] On Pigneau's death in 1799,[25] Gia Long's funeral oration described him as "the most illustrious foreigner ever to appear at the court of Cochinchina".[34] He was buried in the presence of the crown prince, all mandarins of the court, the royal bodyguard of 12,000 men and 40,000 mourners.[34][35]

Fortifications

Layout of the original citadel.
Main article: Citadel of Saigon

Following the recapture of Saigon, Nguyen Anh went about consolidating his power base and preparing to destroy the Tay Son. His enemies had regularly raided the aread and confiscated the rice harvest. One of Nguyen Anh's first actions was to use the military knowledge of the French officers by asking them to design and oversee the construction of a modern European-style citadel for Saigon. The citadel was designed by Theodore Lebrun and de Puymanel and 30,000 people were mobilised for its construction in 1790.[36] The townfolk and their mandarins were heavily taxed for the work, and the labourers were worked to the extent that it provoked a revolt. The stone citadel eventually had a perimeter measuring 4,176 metres in a Vauban model.[36] The citadel was bordered on three sides by pre-existing waterways, increasing its defenseive capacity.[37] Following the construction of the citadel, the Tay Son never against attempted to recapture the city—the building gave Nguyen Anh a further psychological advantage over his opponents.[38] Nguyen Anh took a keen personal interest in fortifications. He ordered his French advisers to travel to France and bring back several books, including the latest scientific and technical studies on fortifications.[39]

Agrarian reform and economic growth

With the southern region secured, Nguyen Anh began to undertake agrarian reforms.[40] Due to Tay Son naval raids on the rice crop using vessels on inland waterways, the area had been suffering long term rice shortages.[41] Although the land was extremely fertile, the region was agriculturally underexploited because it had only been occupied by Vietnamese people relatively recently. Furthermore, the agricultural economy had significantly deteriorated during chaos of the warfare with the Tay Son. Nguyen Anh's agricultural reforms were based on the extension to the south of a traditional organisational form for agricultural expansion, the don dien, which is translated as a military colony. These were first used during the 15th century reign of Le Thanh Tong in the southward expansion of Vietnam. The state supplied military units with agricultural tools and grain for nourishment and planting. They were assigned land that they were to defend, clear and cultivate and had to pay some of their harvest as tax. In the past, a military presence was needed because the land was being seized from non-Vietnamese who had being conquered. Under Nguyen Anh's rule, a military presence and defensive weaponry was not needed, but the basic model remained. They were granted fallow land by the state, and they given agricultural equipment, work animals, and grain required to work them. After several years, they were required to pay grain tax of grain. The program resulted in large amounts of previously idle land being brought under cultivation. Large surpluses of grain, taxable by the state, were thus generated.[40]

By 1800, the increased agricultural productivity allowed Nguyen Anh to support an army of more than 30,000 soldiers and a navy of more than 1,200 vessels. The surplus from the state granary was to European and Asian traders to facilitate the importation of supplies for military purposes, in particular iron, bronze, and sulfur. The government also purchased castor sugar from local farmers and traded it for arms from European manufacturers.[10] The food surplus allowed Nguyen Anh to engage in welfare initiatives to improve morale and loyalty among his subjects, thereby increasing his support base. Surplus grain was stored in granaries built along the northward route out of Saigon, following the advance of the Nguyen army into Tay Son territory. This allowed his troops to be fed without having from southern supplies, rather than eating into the supplies of those areas that he was attempting to conquer on win over. Newly acquired regions were given tax exemptions and all Tay Son military and civilian mandarins were appointed to equivalent positions with the same salary in the Nguyen administration if they surrendered.[10]

Naval buildup

Nguyen Anh used his new base to set about redressing the inferiority of his navy, which had been much smaller than the Tay Son fleet and therefore unable to stop Tay Son rice raids.[41] Nguyen Anh had made his first attempt at acquiring modern naval vessels in 1781, when on the advice of Pigneau, he chartered Portuguese vessels of European design, complete with their crew and artillery. This first experience was disastrous. For unknown reasons, two of the vessels fled the battle against the Tay Son, while angry Vietnamese soldiers killed the seamen of the third.[41] In 1789, Pigneau returned to Vietnam from Pondicherry with two vessels carrying supplies. These ships stayed on in the Nguyen service. Their original French and Indian crew, were over time replaced by Vietnamese under the command of French officers. These vessels became the foundation for an expanded military and merchant Nguyen fleet. Nguyen Anh chartered and purchased more European vessels to reinforce Vietnamese-built ships. Vietnamese traditional galleys and small sailing boats were the majority of the fleet. By 1794, two European vessels were operating together with 200 Vietnamese boats against the Tay Son near Qui Nhon. In 1799, a British trader by the name of Berry reported that the Nguyen fleet had departed Saigon along the Saigon River with 100 galleys, 40 junks, 200 smaller boats and 800 carriers accompanied by three European sloops.[41] In 1801, one naval division was reported to have included 9 European vessels armed with 60 guns, five vessels with 50 guns, 40 with 16 guns, 100 junks, 119 galleys and 365 smaller boats.[41]

Most of the European vessels had in fact been built in the Nguyen shipyard that Nguyen Anh had set up in Saigon. Nguyen Anh took a deep personal interest in the naval program, directly supervising the work, spending several hours a day at the dockside. One witness noted that "One principal tendency of his ambition is to naval science, as a proof of this he has been heard to say he would build ships of the line on the European plan."[42] By 1792, fifteen frigates were under construction, with a design that mixed Chinese and European styles, equipped with 14 guns. The Vietnamese learned European naval architecture by dismantling an old European vessel into its separate components, before rebuilding it so that Vietnamese shipbuilders could learn the facets of European shipbuilding. They then applied the knowledge to create replicas of the boats Nguyen Anh himself learned the naval carpentry techniques and was said to be adept at it, as well as learning about navigational theory from the French books that Pigneau translated, particularly Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie. The Saigon shipyard was widely praised by European travelers.[42]

Despite his extensive consultation with the French officers on matters of military technology, Nguyen Anh kept his inner military strategic circle limited to Vietnamese. The Frenchmen decried his refusal to take their advice in regard to strategic issues. Chaigneau, reported that the Europeans continually urged Nguyen Anh to take the initiative and launch bold attacks against the Tay Son installations. Nguyen Anh refused, preferring to proceed slowly, consolidating his gains in one area and strengthening his economic and military base before attacking another. Over time, Nguyen Anh gradually reduced the military role of his French allies on the battlefield.[30] In the naval battle at Thi Nai in 1792, Dayot had led the Nguyen naval attack, but by 1801, a seaborne offensive in the same area was led by the Nguyen Van Tuong, Vo Duy Nguy and Le Van Duyet, with Chaigneau, Vannier, and de Forsans in supporting positions only. The infantry attack on Qui Nhon in 1793 was conducted, according to Nguyen historiography, in cooperation with "Western soldiers".[30] The same source records that by 1801, Nguyen operations in the same area were directed by native generals, whereas Chaigneau and Vannier were responsible for organising supply lines.[30]

Unification of Vietnam

Vietnamese "Tirailleur" soldiers of Nguyen.

In 1792, the last of the Tay Son brothers, Quang Trung, who had been recognised as Emperor by China, died, and Nguyen Anh move northwards to attack.[33] By now, the majority of the original French soldiers, who were estimated to be less than 80, had left.[30] One estimate listed only a handful of soldiers and 12 officers.[31] The majority of the fighting occurred near places such as Nha Trang and Qui Nhon in the vicinity of Binh Dinh Province, the home region and stronghold of the Tay Son.[7][6]

Nguyen Anh began using his expanding naval fleet to raid Tay Son territory. On an annual basis, his fleet left Saigon and sailed northward during June and July, carried by southwesterly monsoonal winds. The naval offensive was reinforced with infantry campaigns. His fleet would then return south when the monsoon reversed, on the back of northeasterly winds.[38] The large European wind-powered vessels gave the Nguyen navy a substantial artillery advantage. Combined with traditional galleys and a crew that was highly regarded for its discipline, skill and bravery,[43] the Nguyen fleet inflicted hundreds of losses against the Tay Son in 1792 and 1793.[43]

In 1794, after a successful campaign in the Nha Trang region, instead of retreating south before the monsoon reversed, Nguyen Anh ordered de Puymanel to build a citadel at Duyen Khanh, near Nha Trang. A Nguyen garrison was established there under the command of Nguyen Anh's eldest son and heir, Nguyen Canh, assiste by Pigneau and de Puymanel. The Tay Son laid siege to Duyen Khanh in May 1794, but the Nguyen held out. Shortly after the siege ended, Nguyen reinforcements arrived from Saigon and resumed attacking operations. This was the first time that the Nguyen army was able to operate in the Tay Son heartland during the unfavourable season. The defensive success of the citadel was a powerful psychological victory for the Nguyen, showing their ability to penetrate Tay Son territory throughout the seasons.[38]

Heavy fighting occurred at the fortress of Qui Nhon, until it was captured in 1799 under Nguyen Canh's forces.[26][25] The city was recaptured quickly, and not regained by the Nguyen until 1801.[33][32] The firepower of the navy played decisive role in the ultimate recapture of the city, reinforcing a large land attack.[43] After the capture of the Tay Son stronghold, the fall of the Tay Son led by Quang Trung's son Quang Toan came quickly. In June, the central capital of Hue fell and Nguyen Anh was crowned himself as Emperor Gia Long.[33][25] He then overran the north, with Hanoi captured on July 22, 1802.[44] After a quarter century of continuous fighting, he had unified what is now modern Vietnam,[33] and elevated his family to a position never previously occupied.[33] He became the first Vietnamese ruler to preside over territory from China to the Gulf of Siam.[10] Vietnam had never occupied a larger landmass and was in a stronger military position than it ever had been in the past. Gia Long's request for Chinese recognition was quickly fulfilled.[33][45] Due to the failure of the French government to honour the treaty signed by Pigneau, Gia Long was not bound to honour his obligations to cede territory and trading rights.[46]

Rule

Gia Long's rule was noted for its Confucian orthodoxy.[47] Upon toppling the Tay Son dynasty of Quang Trung, he subsequently repealed their reforms and used a classical Confucian education and civil service system. He moved the capital from Hanoi south to Hue as the country's populace had also moved south over the preceding centuries, and built up fortresses and a palace in his new capital. Using French expertise, he modernised Vietnam's defensive capabilities. In deference to the assistance of his French friends, he tolerated the activities of Catholic missionaries, something that was increasingly restricted under his successors. Under his rule, Vietnam strengthened its military dominance in Indochina, expelling Siam from Cambodia and turning it into a vassal. In spite of this, he was relatively isolationist towards European powers.

Administrative structure

During the war era, Nguyen Anh had maintained an embryonic bureaucracy in an attempt to prove his ability to rule to the people. Due to the constant warfare, military officers were usually the most prominent members of his inner circle.[48] This dependence on military backing manifested itself during his reign.[48] Vietnam was divided into three administrative regions. The old patrimony of the Nguyen formed the central part of the empire, with nine provinces, five of which were directly ruled by Gia Long and his mandarin system from Hue.[48][33]

The central administration at Hue was divided among six ministries: Public affairs, finance, rites, war, justice and public works. Each was under a president, assisted by two deputies and two or three councillors.[33] Each of these ministries had around 70 employees assigned to various units.[48] The heads of these ministries formed the Supreme Council. A treasurer general and a Chief of the Judicial Service assisted a governor general who was in charge of a number of provinces.[49] The provinces were classified into tran and dinh. These wer ein turn divided into phu, huyen and chau.[49] All important matters were examined by the Supreme Council in the presence of Gia Long. The officials tabled their reports, resulting in discussion and decision-making. The officials involved in the Supreme Council were selected from the high-ranking mandarins of the six ministries and the academies.[48]

Gia Long handled the northern and southern regions of Vietnam gently, not wanting them to be jarred by rapid centralisation after centuries of division.[48][50] Tonkin, with the administrative seat of its imperial military protector (tong tran)at Hanoi had thirteen provinces, and in the Red River Delta, the old officials of the Le administration continued in office. In the south, Saigon was the centre of the four provinces of Cochinchina, as well as the seat of the military protector.[33][51] The citadels in the respective cities directly administered their military defense zones. This system allowed Gia Long to reward his leading supporters with highly powerful positions, with almost total authority in ordinary administrative and legal matters. This system persisted until the 1831–32, when his son Minh Mang centralised the national government.[51]

Gia Long was not regarded as being innovative in his attempts to re-establish a stable administration after centuries of civil war. He used the traditional administration framework.[49][52] When Gia Long unified the country, it was described as Maybon as being chaotic: "The wheels of administration were warped or no longer existed; the cadres of officials were empty, the hierarchy destroyed; taxes were not being collected, lists of communal property had disappeared, proprietary titles were lost, fields abandoned; roads bridges and public granaries had not been maintained; work in the mines had ceased. The administration of justice had been interrupted, every province was a prey to pirates, and violation of law went unpunished, while even the law itself had become uncertain".[49]

Foreign military relations

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Cambodian empire had been in decline as the Vietnamese had migrated south into the Mekong Delta and displaced what had been Cambodian territory.[53] Cambodia had been periodically subjected to invasions by both Vietnam and Siam. Cambodia lurched between both poles of domination as dictated by the internal strife of her two neighbours.[54] In 1796, Ang Eng, a pro-Siamese king had died, leaving Ang Chan, who had been born in 1791.[55] When Gia Long unified Vietnam, Eng was given investiture by Siam in order to hold out Vietnamese influence.[55] In 1803, a Cambodian mission paid tribute to Vietnam in attempt to placate Gia Long. This became an annual routine.[55] In 1807, Ang Chan requested investiture as a vassal of Gia Long.[56] Gia Long responded by sending an embassy bearing the book of investiture together with a seal of gilded silver. In 1812, Ang Chan refused a request from his brother to share power, leading to a rebellion. Siam sent forces in order to support the rebel prince, hoping to enthrone him and wrest influence from Gia Long over Cambodia.[56] In 1813 Gia Long responded by sending a large force that forced the Siamese and the rebel prince Ang Snguon to leave Cambodia. As a result, a Vietnamese garrison was permanently installed in the citadel at Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. From then on, Siam did not attempt to regain control of Cambodia during Gia Long's rule.[56][57]

Napoleon's aims to conquer Vietnam as a base to challenge British supremacy in India never materialised,[58] having been occupied by extravagant military ambitions on mainland Europe.[56] France was the only country with permanent spokesmen in Vietnam during his reign.[58]

Trade relations

Pigneau's aborted deal with France allowed Gia Long to not open his country to western trade.[47][59] Gia Long was generally disinterested in trade.[60] In 1804, a British delegation attempted to negotiate trade privileges with Vietnam. It was the only offer of trade until 1822, such was the European disinterest in Asia during the Napoleonic Wars. He had purchased arms from British firms in Madras and Calcutta on credit. This revived British interest in Vietnam and in 1804,[61] the British East India Company sent J W Roberts to Hue. His presents were turned away and no commercial deal was concluded. He asked for exclusive right to trade with Vietnam and also the cession of the island of Cham near Faifo to the United Kingdom.[61] Further approaches from The Netherlands were turned away, attributed to the influence of the French mandarins.[62] He tried to secure friendly relations with every European power by granting favours to none.[63][35] In 1817, the French Prime Minister Armand-Emmanuel du Plessis dispatched the Cybele, a frigate with 52 guns to Tourane (now Da Nang) to "show French sympathy and to assure Gia Long of the benevolence of the King of France".[58] The captain of the vessel was turned away on ground of protocol, not carrying a royal letter from the French king.[58][64]

Gia Long kept four French officers in his service after his coronation: Philippe Vannier, Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau, de Forsans and the doctor Despiau. All became mandarins of high rank.[56] Gia Long treated them well. They were given 50 bodyguards each, ornate residences and were exempt for having to prostrate before the emperor.[65][66][35] Recommendations from Pondicherry to Napoleon Bonaparte suggesting the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam were fruitless due to the preoccupation with war in Europe.[56][35] In 1817, French merchants from Bordeaux began trading with Vietnam after the efforts of the Duc de Richelieu, minister to Louis XVIII.[67]

Domestic policies and capital works

Gia Long abolished all large landholding by princes, nobles and high officials. He abolished the 800-year old practice of paying officials and of rewarding or endowing nobles with a portion of the taxes from a village or group thereof.[68] He repaired highways and built new ones, and restored the north south highway from Saigon to Lang Son.[69] He organised a postal service to operate on the highways and organised public storehouses to alleviate starvation in drought years. Gia Long enacted monetary reform and implemented a more socialised agrarian policy.[69] However, the growth in population outstripped the growth in land clearing and cultivation.[70] There was little emphasis on technological innovation in agriculture, so the only improvements in productivity were being derived from increasing the amount of cultivated farmland.[71]

Although the war in Vietnam was over, Gia Long decided to add to the two citadels that had been built during the war under the direction of French officers. Gia Long was convinced of their effectiveness and during his 18-year reign, a further 11 citadels were built throughout the country.[38] The majority were built in the Vauban French style, with pentagonal or hexagonal geometry, while a minority, including the one in the capital Hue was built in a four-sided traditional Chinese design. The fortresses were built at Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Bac Ninh, Ha Tinh, Thai Nguyen and Hai Duong in the north, Hue, Quang Ngai Khanh Hoa and Binh Dinh in the center, and Vinh Long in the Mekong Delta. The building was at its most intense in the early phase of Gia Long's reign—only one of the 11 citadels were built in the last six years of his rule.[72] Puymanel and Lebrun had left Vietnam before the end of the war, so the citadels were built by Vietnamese engineers who designed and oversaw the construction. The Citadel Supervision Officer was created under the Ministry of War to be responsible for the work, underlining the importance that Gia Long placed on the fortifications.[73] Gia Long's fortifications program was marred by allegations that people worked all day and part of night in all weather condition building fortifications for capital works,[74] and that as a result, land went fallow. Complaints of mandarin corruption and oppressive taxation were often levelled at his government.[75] Following his coronation, Gia Long reduced the size of his naval fleet and by the 1810s, only two of the European-style vessels were still in service. The downsizing of the navy was mainly attributed to budgetary constratins caused by the large amount of spending on fortifications and transport links such as roads, dikes and canals. However, in 1819, a new phase of shipbuilding was launched, with Gia Long personally supervising the shipbuilding yards.[43]

Social policy

In order to train and recruit officials for his government, Gia Long revived the Confucian court examinations that had been abolished by the Tay Son. In 1803, he founded the National Academy (Quoc Tu Giam) at Hue. Its objective was to educate the sons of mandarins and other meritorious students in the Confucian classical literature.[51] In 1804, Gia Long promulgated edicts that ordered the establishment of similar schools in the provinces, establishing guidelines to regulate their staff and curriculum. He appointed Directors of Education (quan doc hoc) to oversee the provincial education system and to aid the selection process for entrance examinations into the National Academy, beginning in 1802. The directors were assisted by Subordinate and Assistant Directors (pho doc hoc, tro-giao). Gia Long explained to his court in 1814 that the goal was to create a cadre of classically educated, politically loyal administrators:[51]

The schools are where men of talent can be found. Wanting to follow the example of the former kings, I have established schools in order that learned and talented men will arise and the state may thus employ them.[51]

In 1807, Gia Long opened the first civil service examinations to be held under the Nguyen Dynasty, being staged at regional level.[51] From then on, the training and selection process for the imperial bureaucracy was largely centred on examinations.[51] The curriculum for the examinations consisted of the "five classics and the four books",[51] which focused on Chinese history leading up to the Song Dynasty, while regarding other knowledge as being irrelevant.[76]

He promulgated a new legal code to replace the old penal code that had existed since the Hong Duc era of Le Thanh Tong in the 15th century.[76] Work started in 1811 under a group of scholars led by Le Van Thanh and in 1815, the Bo luat Gia Long (Gia Long Code) was issued.[76] Although Gia Long claimed that his new system was a mixture of the Le code and Qing Dynasty code of China, most scholars regard it as almost being a total copy of the Qing code.[76] It was later translated into French by Paul-Louis-Félix Philastre.[77][78] The code focused on strengthening the authority of the emperor, his mandarins, and the traditional family unit. In serious crimes and crimes against the state, collective punishment was meted out to the family of the convict, including the collective death penalty.[79]

Now that Vietnam was unified and the centre of gravity of the country was further to the south following centuries of southerly migration and conquest,[53] Gia Long moved the seat of government from Hanoi to Hue.[49] Gia Long rebuilt Hue into a fortress stronghold. It was a square of 2.5 km per side.[65] A 9 m rampart was cased with masonry and protected by protruding bastions, each defended by 36 guns.[65] The exterior was flanked by a moat. Moats and canals reinforced the inner and outer walls. The army included an eight hundred strong elephant war brigade.[65] The new capital city, protocol and court dress were all taken directly from Qing Dynasty styles. Gia Long built a palace and fortress that was intended to be a smaller copy of the Chinese Forbidden City in the 1800s.[80][35]

He respected the Catholic faith of his French allies and permitted unimpeded missionary activity out of respect,[81] mainly Spanish in Tonkin and French in the central and southern regions.[65] At the time of his death, there were six Christian bishops from Europe in Vietnam.[65] The population of Christians was estimated at 300,000 in Tonkin and 60,000 in Cochin China.[82] He however expressed dismay at the Catholic condemnation of ancestral worship, a basic tenet of Vietnamese culture.[83] Gia Long was also known for his disdain for Buddhism, which was the religion practiced by the majority. Despite its popularity among ladies of the court, Gia Long often restricted the activities of Buddhists.[84]

In August 1802 he retaliated against the captured Tay Son who had had executed his family in the 1770s. The surviving members of the family and its leading generals and their families were executed.[85] The remains of Quang Trung and his queen were exhumed and desecrated, and his son the last Tay Son monarch Quang Toan was bound to four elephants and torn apart.[86][25] He repealed the changes enacted by Quang Trung and reverted to the prior Confucian orthodoxy. This included restoring the civil service to the forefront of decision making ahead of the army, reversing Quang Trung's policy of putting science before the study of Confucian literature, and reversed education reform.[87]

Succession

Minh Mang, Gia Long's son and successor.

It was assumed that his grandson and son of Nguyen Canh would become the next Emperor, but in 1816, appointed Chi Dam, the son of his first concubine.[88] Gia Long chose him for his strong character and his deep aversion to westerners. Before his ascension, Minh Mang was reputed to have praised the Japanese for having expelled and eradicated Christianity from their country.[89] He told his son to treat the Europeans well, especially the French, but not to grant them any position of preponderance.[88]

Notes

  1. ^ Hall, p. 944.
  2. ^ Hall, p. 426.
  3. ^ a b Hall, p. 423.
  4. ^ a b c d e f Cady, p. 282.
  5. ^ Buttinger, p. 266.
  6. ^ a b c d Mantienne, p. 520.
  7. ^ a b c d McLeod, p. 7.
  8. ^ a b Karnow, p. 75.
  9. ^ Buttinger, p. 234.
  10. ^ a b c d e f McLeod, p. 9.
  11. ^ Buttinger, p. 233.
  12. ^ a b c d Hall, p. 427.
  13. ^ a b c Buttinger, p. 235.
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h Hall, p. 428.
  15. ^ Buttinger, p. 235.
  16. ^ a b c Cady, p. 283.
  17. ^ a b c d e f g Karnow, p. 76.
  18. ^ Buttinger, pp. 236, 266.
  19. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 236.
  20. ^ a b c d e f g Hall, p. 429.
  21. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 237.
  22. ^ a b c d McLeod, p. 10.
  23. ^ a b c d Buttinger, p. 238.
  24. ^ a b c Buttinger, p. 239
  25. ^ a b c d e f g Karnow, p. 77.
  26. ^ a b c d e f g Hall, p. 430.
  27. ^ Hall, p. 429–430.
  28. ^ Buttinger, pp. 239–240.
  29. ^ Buttinger, p. 266.
  30. ^ a b c d e f g McLeod, p. 11.
  31. ^ a b Mantienne, p. 521.
  32. ^ a b c Cady, p. 284.
  33. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Hall, p. 431.
  34. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 267.
  35. ^ a b c d e Karnow, p. 78.
  36. ^ a b Mantienne, p. 522.
  37. ^ Mantienne, p. 524.
  38. ^ a b c d Mantienne, p. 525.
  39. ^ Mantienne, p. 527.
  40. ^ a b McLeod, p. 8.
  41. ^ a b c d e Mantienne, p. 530.
  42. ^ a b Mantienne, p. 531.
  43. ^ a b c d Mantienne, p. 532.
  44. ^ Buttinger, p. 241.
  45. ^ Buttinger, p. 270.
  46. ^ McLeod, pp. 11–12.
  47. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 240.
  48. ^ a b c d e f McLeod, p. 15.
  49. ^ a b c d e Hall, p. 432.
  50. ^ McLeod, p. 3.
  51. ^ a b c d e f g h McLeod, p. 16.
  52. ^ Buttinger, p. 278.
  53. ^ a b Cady, p. 266.
  54. ^ Hall, pp. 432–433.
  55. ^ a b c Hall, p. 433.
  56. ^ a b c d e f Hall, p. 434.
  57. ^ Buttinger, p. 305.
  58. ^ a b c d Buttinger, p. 272.
  59. ^ Buttinger, pp. 270–271.
  60. ^ Buttinger, p. 271.
  61. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 307.
  62. ^ Buttinger, p. 308.
  63. ^ Buttinger, pp. 271–273.
  64. ^ Buttinger, p. 309.
  65. ^ a b c d e f Cady, p. 408.
  66. ^ buttinger, p. 268.
  67. ^ Hall, p. 435.
  68. ^ Buttinger, p. 279.
  69. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 312.
  70. ^ Buttinger, p. 280.
  71. ^ Buttinger, pp. 281–282.
  72. ^ Mantienne, p. 526.
  73. ^ Mantienne, p. 528.
  74. ^ Buttinger, pp. 281, 316.
  75. ^ Buttinger, p. 309.
  76. ^ a b c d McLeod, p. 17.
  77. ^ Buttinger, p. 314.
  78. ^ Cady, p. 408.
  79. ^ McLeod, p. 18.
  80. ^ Woodside, pp. 126–130.
  81. ^ Buttinger, pp. 241, 311.
  82. ^ Cady, p. 409.
  83. ^ Buttinger, pp. 310, 262.
  84. ^ Buttinger, p. 310.
  85. ^ Buttinger, pp. 235, 266.
  86. ^ Buttinger, p. 267.
  87. ^ Buttinger, p. 265.
  88. ^ a b Buttinger, p. 268.
  89. ^ Buttinger, p. 269.

References

  • Buttinger, Joseph (1958). The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. Praeger.
  • Cady, John F. (1964). Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development. McGraw Hill.
  • Hall, D. G. E. (1981). A History of South-east Asia. Macmillan. ISBN 0333241630.
  • Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. London: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
  • Mantienne, Frédéric (2003). "The Transfer of Western Military Technology to Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Case of the Nguyen". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 34 (3): pp. 519–534. doi:10.1017/S0022463403000468. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • McLeod, Mark W. (1991). The Vietnamese response to French intervention, 1862–1874. Praeger. ISBN 0-275-93652-0. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help)
  • Woodside, Alexander. Vietnam and the Chinese model: a comparative study of Vietnamese and Chinese government in the first half of the nineteenth century. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-93721-X.
Gia Long
 Died: 1820
Preceded by Emperor of Vietnam
1802–1822 		Succeeded by
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