23-F

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The coup of 23 February 1981 was a failed attempt by sections of the Civil Guard and the military , the democracy in Spain to end and a renewed dictatorship to build. In Spain it is colloquially called 23-F for the date or El Tejerazo after one of the participants.

The cause was the frustration of parts of the army and the supporters of Francisco Franco over the reforms that had been under way since the death of the dictator as part of the Transición in Spain towards a modern, democratic constitutional state, the economic situation of the country and the problem of terrorism.

The coup failed because of the resolute demeanor of King Juan Carlos I , who, in his role as commander in chief of the Spanish armed forces, in a uniform televised speech, six hours after the start of the coup attempt, ordered the members of the army back to the barracks and was clearly in favor of the democratic process and pronounced the Spanish Constitution . His personal intervention not only undermined the coup, but also decisively consolidated the young Spanish democracy and the public role of King Juan Carlos.

prehistory

After Franco died, Juan Carlos, as the successive head of state, and Adolfo Suárez, appointed by him in 1976 and democratically elected Prime Minister in 1977, began to introduce democracy in Spain. In 1978 a new, democratic constitution was passed. During the transition , the young monarchy fought against an economic crisis - 16% inflation, 20% unemployment and increasing capital flight - and increasing terrorist attacks by ETA and FRAP .

In addition, right-wing forces, which were recruited from the right-wing extremist Falange , which belonged to the former Unity Party and were led by former beneficiaries of the Franco regime , held conspiratorial meetings. But they openly threatened the government, weakened by the crisis. With the so-called Operation de Gaulle they wanted to establish a "government of national salvation". This should be led by General Alfonso Armada , the former Secretary General of the King. Almost all high-ranking politicians in the country, including those from the PSOE , were involved in these considerations . The king, too, expressed himself ambiguously to the elected government; B. in the Christmas address to the Spanish people in 1980. Javier Cercas speaks of the resulting “placenta of the coup”.

In order to forestall a “hard” coup in Chile in 1973 or Turkey in 1980 , a “government of national salvation” should be formed from all parties (with the exception of the communist party) under the leadership of a military to keep the country for a few years to stabilize and then possibly return to democracy. According to witness statements, Armada assured the conspirators that the king would back them up and, when the two later staged a coup, tried to convince the monarch that only he could save the situation. How exactly the two projects crossed has never been fully clarified.

Adolfo Suárez resigned as Prime Minister of Spain on January 29, 1981 . Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was to be elected as his successor on February 23, 1981 .

course

Coup

Parliament hall (photo from 2015)

To 18:23 Lieutenant Colonel stormed Antonio Tejero with two with machine guns armed Hundreds of Civil Guard the Parliament , which was currently in the election of the new Prime Minister, and interrupted the session. The world press photo of 1981 was taken, which shows how putschist Antonio Tejero is standing at the lectern with a pistol in hand.

The event was broadcast live on the radio .

TV cameras captured the tumult as the vice-president of the government, Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, rushed to the lectern, demanded an explanation and, as lieutenant general and senior military officer present, sharply called on the coup plotters to lay down their arms. To ensure peace, the coup plotters ordered the MPs to lie down on the ground (“al suelo”) and shot several MP volleys in the air. Thereupon the MPs ducked behind their desks, only three remained standing or sitting in their seats: Vice President Mellado, the still executive Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez and Communist leader Santiago Carrillo , who smoked a cigarette apparently unimpressed.

About ten minutes after the storm, the MPs were allowed to sit up again. A captain of the Guardia Civil came to the lectern and announced:

"Good evening! Nothing will happen to you. We are waiting until the appropriate military authority is here. They will then determine what happens next and tell us. Don't worry. I don't know whether it will take a quarter of an hour, 20 minutes or half an hour - I don't think much longer. The competent - of course military - authority will then determine what should happen. Nothing will happen to you, so please rest assured. "

Shortly after the storming of parliament, the commander of the III. Military Region (Valencia), General Milans del Bosch announce a decree on the radio that practically declared a state of emergency in the region . It started with the opening sentence:

“I, Jaime Milans del Bosch y Ussía, Lieutenant General of the Army and Commander of the III. Military region, in view of the events that are taking place in the capital of Spain at this point and the vacuum of power that has arisen, I announce that it is my duty to maintain order in the military region under my command pending instructions from His Majesty the King, and hereby have: "

At the same time, tanks took to the streets of Valencia and motorized units occupied strategic points in the city.

At around 7.40 p.m., Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, opposition leader Felipe González ( PSOE ), Deputy Prime Minister Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, Alfonso Guerra (Vice Secretary-General of the PSOE), Defense Minister Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún and Communist leader Santiago Carrillo were brought out of the parliament without the announcement of the Plenary Council's assembly became where they were taken. These six politicians were held separately from the other MPs until they were released the next day.

Countermeasures

Since the entire cabinet was in parliament and was therefore unable to act, a power vacuum arose that was absorbed from two sides: on the one hand by the king and the general secretary of the royal family Sabino Fernández Campo, on the other hand the state secretaries of the government met as a provisional cabinet , headed by the Secretary of State for the Civil Guard and the National Police, Francisco Laína.

The putschists had assigned an essential role to the Brunete armored division stationed in and around Madrid , whose units were to move out and occupy strategically important points in the capital. The conspirators included some staff officers from the division and their former commander, General Luis Torres Rojas . The commander of the division, General José Juste Fernández, was on the way to a maneuver near Saragossa on February 23 . Torres Rojas, on the other hand, had left his post in La Coruña on the pretext of having personal affairs in Madrid. In fact, however, he was present at the division's headquarters on February 23, practically taking over command and having preparations for the deployment of the troops.

When General Juste found out about unusual events in his division (the soldiers had been prohibited from leaving the barracks after work without his knowledge), however, he returned to headquarters. The conspirators informed him that they had the support of the king and general Alfonso Armada, who at that moment was "on the side of the king". Armada was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and was known to be a personal friend of the King.

Juste then called the Royal Palace (the Palacio de la Zarzuela ) and asked for General Armada, to which Sabino Fernández Campo replied that he was not there and was not expected - after he had learned about the proceedings in Parliament . This made it clear to Juste that King Juan Carlos did not support the coup. He had the preparations for the deployment of the troops suspended. At the same time, the commander of the 1st Military Region (Madrid), General Guillermo Quintana Lacaci , had also issued corresponding orders directly to individual units of the division. In addition, the Zarzuela warned that Alfonso Armada might be involved in the conspiracy, so that the king refused Armada's telephone offer to come to the palace.

Because of these circumstances, most of the armed forces in Madrid remained in the barracks. There were only two notable exceptions to this:

  • At around 7.45 p.m., a troop of around 40 soldiers under the command of a captain occupied the broadcasting center of Radiotelevisión Española (RTVE) in Pozuelo de Alarcón near Madrid. Of the journalists were required to continue the ordinary TV (but without news programs) and radio Militärmärsche to play what then happened. At around 9.15 p.m., the soldiers left the transmitter after several telephone calls with higher-level commanders. Then it was announced over the radio that the station had been briefly occupied by the military and that it could now freely report on the events in Madrid and in the country. Only now could two television crews be ordered to the Zarzuela Palace to record a statement by the king there and broadcast it later on television.
  • At about 1 a.m. that night, Major Ricardo Pardo Zancada, a staff officer in the Brunete division, drove up to the Parliament building with about 100 military policemen and joined Lieutenant Colonel Tejero.

At the beginning of the coup, the king assured himself of the loyalty of the High Command of the Armed Forces ( Junta de los Jefes de Estado Mayor ), in particular the Commander in Chief of the Army, General José Gabeiras Montero. In addition, the king and his staff contacted the commanders of the nine military regions and the military governors in the provinces personally by telephone. The king was personally acquainted with many of these military men. The importance of these activities was not primarily based on the fact that the king is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces under the constitution , but rather that it was made clear that the conspirators were not acting on behalf of the king as they claim.

At around 9:10 p.m., a short statement read by Interior Secretary Francisco Laína was broadcast on television:

As a result of the violent acts that took place in the Parliament building, a situation has arisen in which the normal activities of the Council of Ministers, whose members are imprisoned in Parliament, are not possible. In these circumstances, the State and Undersecretaries of State of the various ministries, on the instructions of His Majesty the King, have met for an indefinite session to guide the government of the country through the civil authorities and in close contact with the Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor , which also has met to guarantee. According to the information available to us, who are temporarily entrusted with the political leadership of the country on behalf of the government, there is absolute calm throughout the national territory and a quick solution can be expected for this situation in which there has been a temporary interruption of parliamentary activity . Those who at this moment have temporarily assumed full civil and military power under the direction and approval of His Majesty the King can assure their compatriots that violent actions will lead to the democratic coexistence longed for by the people, which is expressed in the constitution the protection of which civil and military officials have undertaken by oath not to destroy.

The main purpose of this declaration was to signal to the population that, despite the extraordinary circumstances, the country was not without civil political leadership.

Laína also got in touch with political parties and trade unions and asked to remain calm, as there were fears that mass demonstrations or the like could give as yet undecided military officials the excuse to intervene.

On Laína's orders, the Commander-in-Chief of the Guardia Civil, General José Antonio Aramburu Topete , went to the Parliament building. He ordered the Tejeros men on guard to get back on the buses. When Tejero appeared, he ordered him to surrender. Tejero said, however, that he would only take orders from Milans del Bosch. An extremely tense situation developed in which both Tejero and Aramburu used their service pistols . Eventually Aramburu withdrew.

A little later, the parliament building was surrounded by units of the Guardia Civil and the Policía Nacional. The Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General José Antonio Aramburu Topete (Guardia Civil) and José Antonio Saénz de Santamaría (Policía Nacional) as well as Mariano Nicolás (Civil Governor of Madrid) set up an operations center in the Hotel Palace near the Parliament building . The possibility of a storming of parliament was discussed, but this was refrained from because of the considerable number of expected victims.

Except in Valencia, no other garrisons had openly joined the uprising by midnight . For many, however, it was not entirely clear whether they were unreservedly on the side of the constitutional order.

Around midnight, General Armada appeared at the Palace Hotel and announced that he would talk to Tejero and look for a way out of the situation. The general then went to the parliament building and talked to Tejero. Here he asked - after most of the descriptions - Tejero to speak to the MPs. He wanted to propose to them a government under his leadership, with ministers from all major parties and the military. However, Tejero only wanted to accept a military junta , so Armada finally left parliament. Armada denied this content of the conversation until his death in December 2013.

As Armada left the building, Laína had Mariano Nicolás take him to his office, where he confronted the general. Armada was then allowed to return to his office in the Army General Staff , but remained under guard.

At 1:14 a.m., the king's televised address was broadcast in which he - in the uniform of the commander-in-chief - condemned the attempted coup and sided with democracy:

«Al dirigirme a todos los españoles, con brevedad y concisión, en las circunstancias extraordinarias que en estos momentos estamos viviendo, pido a todos la mayor serenidad y confianza y les hago saber que he cursado a los Capitanes Generales de las Regiones Militares, Zonas Marítimas y Regiones Aéreas la orden siguiente:
‹Ante la situación creada por los sucesos desarrollados en el Palacio del Congreso y para evitar cualquier posible confusión, confirmo que he ordenado a las Autoridades Civiles ya la Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor que tomen todas las medidas para mantener el orden constitucional dentro de la legalidad vigente. Cualquier medida de carácter militar que en su caso hubiera de tomarse deberá contar con la aprobación de la Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor. ›
La Corona, símbolo de la permanencia y unidad de la patria, no puede tolerar en forma alguna acciones o actitudes de personas que pretendan interrumpir por la fuerza el proceso democrático que la Constitución votada por el pueblo español determinó en su día a través de referéndum. »

“In view of the extraordinary circumstances that we are going through at these moments, I address myself with this short address to all Spaniards. I ask you all to be very careful and to have your trust. I also announce that I have issued the following order to the regional commanders of the land, sea and air forces:
“In view of the situation that has arisen as a result of the events in the House of Representatives and in order to meet any possible doubts, I confirm that I have instructed the civil authorities and the General Staff of the Armed Forces to take all necessary measures, within the framework of the law, to maintain constitutional order. Any military measures of any kind that become necessary require the approval of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. ”
The crown, as a symbol of the stability and unity of the fatherland, cannot in any way accept actions by people who try to disrupt the democratic process through the use of force is prescribed by the constitution, which the Spanish people adopted in a referendum. "

When the troops in Valencia did not withdraw after that either, the king turned again by telephone and telex to Milans del Bosch and ordered him to take the troops back to the barracks and to repeal his decree. The troops were then withdrawn from the streets of Valencia.

Around five o'clock, Milans del Bosch also revoked the previous day's decree and telexed the revocation decree, which was broadcast on the radio around six, to the Zarzuela, which in turn forwarded it to all military regions. At the latest it was clear that no further military units would join the coup and that Tejero and Zancada were isolated with their people in the parliament building.

In the morning the occupiers of parliament showed the first signs of disintegration, as the building was briefly informed of what was going on in the rest of the country and the announced military authority had not appeared. Tejero tried to reach Milans del Bosch by phone, but he could now be denied. Negotiations then began on the terms of the coup leaders' withdrawal, with it being agreed that ranks from the lieutenant down would not be held responsible for their involvement.

At around 10:00 a.m. on February 24, 1981, the female MPs were first released. Finally, the remaining MPs were allowed to leave the building around noon. After that, Tejero and Zancada left with their people and were later arrested.

consequences

The day after the coup, the king warned politicians:

"A tough and open reaction against those responsible for the uprising is just as inadvisable as transferring this reaction to the armed forces and security forces in general."

The question of autonomies in Spain was postponed, as was military or police reform.

The leaders of the coup plotters were brought to justice and sentenced to up to 30 years in prison, although the involvement and identity of possible backers remained unclear. The last imprisoned coup leader, Tejero, was released early in 1996.

Until the coup, Juan Carlos was seen by many Spaniards as a puppet and pupil of Franco and was accordingly unpopular. Even during the crisis, he had often expressed himself ambiguously. After the attempted coup, his position was no longer questioned and a majority of the Spaniards openly admitted themselves to be supporters of the king (colloquially Juancarlists ).

A term that is often used in connection with the attempted coup is that of " elefante blanco " (German: "white elephant"). This denotes the “military authority” whose arrival was announced to the parliamentarians by the putschists, but which then did not appear. It has never been clarified who the “elephant blanco” the putschists were waiting for. The Spanish journalist Pilar Urbano, a numerarian from Opus Dei , put forward the thesis in a book published in 2014 that the “white elephant” meant King Juan Carlos I himself, who initially supported the coup and only during the occupation of parliament changed his mind. The Spanish parliament refuses to this day to release the files for action.

Trivia

Bullet holes still visible today in the ceiling of the parliament room

The phrase “ Ni está ni se le espera ” (German: “He is not here and is not expected”) has become a catchphrase in Spain , with which Sabino Fernández Campo answered General Juste's question whether Armada was im Zarzuela Palace was.

Some of the bullet holes in the ceiling of the plenary chamber from the submachine gun volleys can still be seen today. They were received in memory of the event. However, due to an accident, some of the holes were repaired during renovation work in 2013 and have therefore disappeared.

A scene in the 2014 Spanish animated film " Clever & Smart in a Secret Mission" (original: Mortadelo y Filemón versus Jimmy el Cachondo ) alludes to the coup attempt . In it, Fred Clever, disguised as an officer of the Guardia Civil and clearly recognizable as Antonio Tejero, orders the candidate of a reality TV show to lie down on the floor and shoots a gun twice into the ceiling of the TV studio.

During the night the son of Juan Carlos I and later King Felipe VI was there. at his father's side. This justified this with: "He should see how I do my job when everything is in question."

See also

literature

Web links

Wikisource: Juan Carlos I's speech  - Sources and full texts (Spanish)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c The king as the savior of democracy. Deutschlandfunk, accessed on March 26, 2015 .
  2. ↑ Javier Cercas: Anatomy of a moment: The night in which Spain's democracy was saved . 2011
  3. ↑ Manuel Pérez Barriopedro . worldpressphoto.org
  4. ↑ The events were not broadcast live on television, however, and the images were not broadcast until the next day.
  5. ↑ La celebración del recurso del 23-F . In: Ya , March 26, 1983, p. 10.
  6. ↑ Was the king the white elephant? , Leo Wieland, FAZ, April 3, 2014
  7. ↑ Felipe has to reinvent the monarchy. In: Der Tagesspiegel . Retrieved March 26, 2015 .
  8. ↑ Felipe of Spain: newcomer to the profession at 46. In: Süddeutsche.de. June 3, 2014, accessed June 19, 2014 .