Cartagena Agreement (1907)

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The meeting of kings Edward VII (front) and Alfons XIII. (behind) on April 8, 1907 in Cartagena prepared the Anglo-Spanish agreement.
Antonio Maura (left) with Alfons XIII.
Jules Cambon was considered to be the real originator of the exchange of notes

Identical diplomatic notes that were exchanged on May 16, 1907 between Great Britain and Spain and between France and Spain at the same time are referred to as the Pact, Entente, Agreement, Convention or Agreement of Cartagena ( Spanish Convenio de Cartagena ) . The agreements (Acuerdos de Cartagena) or declarations (Declaraciones de Cartagena) contained therein guaranteed or recognized and confirmed to each other and especially Spain vaguely the respective acquis and the spheres of interest in the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of Europe and Africa, while Spain the two Entente - Powers pledged to help maintain the peace or the status quo . The exchange of notes helped Spain from the environment of the Triple Alliance to be removed and the Triple Entente to approach.

background

Until 1902, Spain had been under the reign of Queen Mother Maria Christina and had been ruled by cabinets that had sought a more benevolent attitude towards Austria, Italy and Germany than towards France. Bismarck had rejected Spain's request to join the Triple Alliance, but Spain had joined the Mediterranean Entente through an agreement with Italy , but without having found allies to defend its colonies overseas. The distant overseas colonies had been lost to the USA and Germany as a result of the Spanish-American War , and Germany and Great Britain also showed interest in the Canaries , Fernando Póo and Spanish Guinea . Spain sought compensation in Morocco , for which it rivaled Germany and France.

After reaching the age of majority of Spain's King Alfonso XIII. Governments have been set up to seek (re-) rapprochement with France (and Great Britain). As early as 1903, Prime Minister Francisco Silvela had proposed to the French ambassador in Madrid, Jules Cambon , that Spain should join the Franco-Russian alliance if the allies guaranteed Spain's remaining property. The successor governments coordinated the Morocco question, which was particularly important for Spain, with France in 1904 and with Great Britain at the Algeciras Conference in 1906 . In addition, Alfons had been married since 1906 to a niece of the British King Edward VII , who campaigned among the royal houses of Europe for support for the Anglo-French Entente cordiale and (allegedly) for the isolation of Germany.

Great Britain was mainly concerned with the recognition of its rule over Gibraltar , while France wanted to prevent the establishment of a German naval base in the Balearic Islands . British negotiators such as Francis Bertie and State Secretary Charles Hardinge had already held preliminary negotiations with the Spanish ambassador in London, Wenceslao Ramírez de Villaurrutia, since December 1906. Jules Cambon, whose brother Paul Cambon was the French ambassador in London at the same time, had been negotiating with representatives of the Spanish government since January 1907 at the latest. Antonio Maura was appointed Spanish Prime Minister by Alfons in January 1907 . Initially, the British Foreign Minister Edward Gray sought a British-Spanish agreement (similar to the Franco-Spanish agreement), and later the French Foreign Minister Stéphen Pichon and the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau favored a tripartite agreement. Alfons, in turn, proposed a purely British-Spanish agreement in which Great Britain undertook to protect the Spanish acquis, but was allowed to use the Spanish ports in the event of war. Negotiations initially threatened to fail because of the proposal made by Alfons himself on March 16 to establish the neutrality of Spain in a treaty. On March 25th, Cambon presented a compromise proposal that took into account the Spanish wishes, in which Harding was also able to accommodate the British wishes on March 28th.

From April 8 to April 10, 1907, Eduard, the Queen , Sea Lord John Fisher and Hardinge met in Cartagena, Spain, with Alfons, Maura, Villaurrutia, Foreign Minister Manuel Allendesalazar and Navy Minister José Ferrándiz . Madrid seemed too unsafe to visit.

content

The Spanish-British and Spanish-French agreements reached by the negotiators in Cartagena on May 16, 1907 were declarations of intent, not agreements. Although clearly formulated guarantees and obligations were avoided as well as specific names of possessions, Spain guaranteed Great Britain the possessions of Gibraltar and Malta and France the possessions of Algeria and Tunisia. In return, Great Britain and France spoke out in favor of maintaining Spanish rule over the Balearic Islands and the western Mediterranean, as well as over the Canary Islands and the Atlantic coastal areas of Africa . Spain undertook not to cede or even lease any islands or ports to other powers. The three powers also mutually recognized their respective claims and interests in Morocco and North Africa. Corresponding identical notes were exchanged between the British Foreign Minister Edward Gray and the Spanish Ambassador in London, Wenceslao Ramírez de Villaurrutia, and between the French Foreign Minister Stéphen Pichon and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Fernando León y Castillo. The notes were presented to the governments of Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Japan and the USA. Pichon assured that the agreements were aimed solely at consultations on a common approach to maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic and were peaceful in nature.

Published notes

Edward Grey's Note to de Villaurrutia Note from de Villaurrutia to Edward Gray Note from León y Castillo to Stéphen Pichon Stéphen Pichon's note to León y Castillo
Animated by the desire to contribute in every possible way to the maintenance of peace, and convinced that the preservation of the territorial status quo and the rights of Great Britain and Spain in the Mediterranean and that part of the Atlantic Ocean which washes the shores of Europe and Africa must materially serve this end, and is, moreover, to the mutual advantage of the two nations bound to each other by the closest ties of ancient friendship and of community interests.
The Government of His Britannic Majesty desire to lay before that of his Catholic Majesty the following declaration of policy, in the confident hope that it will not only still further strengthen the good understanding so happily existing between them, but will also promote the cause of peace .
The general policy of the Government of His Britannic Majesty in the regions defined above is directed to the maintenance of the territorial status quo, and the in pursuance of this policy they are firmly resolved to preserve intact the rights of the British Crown over its insular and maritime possessions in these regions.
Should circumstances arise which, in the opinion of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, would alter, or tend to alter, the existing territorial status quo in the said regions, they will communicate with the Government of His Catholic Majesty in order to afford them the opportunity to concert, if desired, by mutual agreement the course of action which the two powers shall adopt in common. 		Animado del deseo de contribuir por todos los medios posibles a la conservación de la paz, y convencido de que el mantenimiento del statu quo territorial y de los derechos de España y de la Gran Bretaña en el Mediterráneo y en la parte del Atlántico que baña las costas de Europa y de Africa debe servir eficazmente para alcanzar ese fin, siendo al mismo tiempo beneficioso para ambas naciones, unidas además por los lazos de secular amistad y por la comunidad de intereses;
El Gobierno de Su Majestad Católica desea poner en conocimiento del Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica la declaración cuyo tenor sigue, con la firme esperanza de que contribuirá, no solamente a afianzar la buena inteligencia que tan felizmente existe entre servos Gobi tern causa de la paz:
La política general del Gobierno de Su Majestad Católica en las regiones arriba indicadas tiene por objeto el mantenimiento del statu quo territorial, y, conforme a tal política, dicho Gobierno está firmemente resuelto a conservar intactos los der Española de la Corona sobre sus posesiones instilares y marítimas situadas en las referidas regiones.
En el caso de que nuevas circunstancias pudiesen modificar o contribuir a modificar el statu quo territorial actual, dicho Gobierno entrará en comunicación con el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica, a fin de poner a ambos Gobiernos en condiciones de concertarse, si lo juz a las medidas que hubieran de tomarse en común. 		Animado del deseo de contribuir por todos los medios posibles a la conservación de la paz, y convencido de que el mantenimiento del statu quo territorial y de los derechos de España y de Francia en el Mediterráneo y en la parte del Atlántico que baña las costas de Europa y de Africa debe servir eficazmente para alcanzar ese fin, siendo al mismo tiempo beneficioso para ambas naciones, unidas además por los lazos de secular amistad y por la comunidad de intereses;
El Gobierno de Su Majestad Católica desea poner en conocimiento del Gobierno de la Republica Francesa la declaración cuyo tenor sigue, con la firme esperanza de que contribuirá, no solamente a afianzar la buena inteligencia que tan felizmente existe entre a servos Gobiern causa de la paz:
La política general del Gobierno de Su Majestad Católica en las regiones arriba indicadas tiene por objeto el mantenimiento del statu quo territorial, y, conforme a tal política, dicho Gobierno está firmemente resuelto a conservar intactos los der Española de la Corona sobre sus posesiones instilares y marítimas situadas en las referidas regiones.
En el caso de que nuevas circunstancias pudiesen modificar o contribuir a modificar el statu quo territorial actual, dicho Gobierno entrará en comunicación con el Gobierno de la Republica Francesa, a fin de poner a ambos Gobiernos en condiciones de concertarse, o si lo juzgano a las medidas que hubieran de tomarse en común. 		Animé du désir de contribuer par tous les moyens possibles à la conservation de la paix et convaincu que le maintien du statu quo territorial et des droits de la France et de l'Espagne dans la Méditerranée et dans la partie de l'Atlantique qui baigne les côtes de l'Europe et de l'Afrique doit servir efficacement à atteindre ce but, tout en étant profitable aux deux nations qu'unissent d'ailleurs les liens d'une amitié séculaire et la communauté des intérêts;
Le Gouvernement de la République Française desire porter à la connaissance de Sa Majesté Catholique la déclaration dont la teneur suit, avec le ferme espoir qu'elle contribuera non seulement à affermir la bonne entente qui existe si heureusement entre les deux Gouvernements, mais also a servir la cause de la paix:
La politique générale du Gouvernement de la République Française dans les régions susindiquées à pour objet le maintien du statu quo territorial et, conformément à cette politique, ce gouvernement est fermement résolu à conserver intacts les droits de la République ses possessions insulaires et maritimes situées dans les dites régions.
Dans le cas ou se produiraient de nouvelles circonstances qui, selon l'opinion du Gouvernement de la République Française, seraient de nature ou à modifier ou à contribuer à modifier le statu quo territorial actuel, ce Gouvernement entrera en communication avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique, afin de mettre les deux Gouvernements en état de se concerter, s'il est jugé desirable, sur les mesures à prendre en commun.

Suspected subsidiary agreements

There was nothing in the short notes to suggest a military convention or alliance. Nevertheless, Belgian diplomats ( Jules Greindl , Charles Lalaing ), Spanish MPs, Spanish newspapers and later also German World War II apologists suspected that the naval loans taken out by Spain immediately after the negotiations were related to secret additional clauses that went beyond the agreed consultations in the event of a crisis. According to this, Spain should have undertaken to develop and fortify its larger ports in such a way that they can accommodate strong British and French naval units in the event of a defense and to build and maintain a fleet sufficient to protect these ports. Above all, the participation of Sea Lord Fisher and Minister of the Navy Ferrándiz in the negotiations indicated this.

In fact, on June 1, 1907, the Maura government launched a fleet-building program named after Ferrándiz , which was approved on January 7, 1908 and supplemented by a further armament program in April 1908, including the expansion of the war ports of Cartagena, Ferrol and Mahón . Some of the new ships were to be built in UK shipyards and Spain should be able to take out UK and French loans to purchase these ships. A Spanish-British joint venture, the Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval (SECN), with shipyards in Ferrol and Cartagena, was founded in 1909 specifically for the construction of the other ships . Great Britain also pledged to help expand the port fortifications.

consequences

King Alfonso with President Poincaré in Cartagena in 1913 in front of the newly built battleship España (as part of the Ferrándiz program)

The aim of British diplomacy and the efforts of Edward VIII by Belgian diplomats as well as German authors of integrating Spain into a defense alliance and thus closing the geostrategic gap between Portugal and France has not been achieved - although Alfonso XIII. during his visit to Paris in May 1913, he campaigned for Spain to join the Triple Entente (which the then French President Raymond Poincaré did not mention in his memoirs) and during Poincaré's return visit to Cartagena in October 1913, the use of Spanish ports and even France in the event of war The prospect of transport of the French 19th Army Corps in Algeria over Spanish territory (which the Spanish government later refused, citing the weak railway network). Alfons is said to have hoped for certain compensations in favor of Spain (which was perhaps the reason why Poincaré did not mention it), such as a protectorate over Portugal, which had become unstable since the king's assassination and the establishment of the republic . Instead, the second Cartagena Declaration of 1913 only reaffirmed the Anglo-French-Spanish agreement of 1907, no more. The agreement secured France and Spain the protectorate over Morocco and the Entente powers at least the neutrality of Spain in this war. In the end, it actually contributed to the isolation of Germany, or at least to the decline in German influence in the Mediterranean region.

The Cartagena Agreement, concluded in 1907, became obsolete when war broke out when Spain declared its neutrality without having discussed joint measures with the Entente partners. In terms of formal theory, however, it remained valid until April 26, 1915, when Great Britain and France - without consulting Spain - assured Italy in the London Treaty that the status quo in the Mediterranean would be changed. Unlike Italy, Portugal, Greece and Romania, Spain did not join the Entente powers during World War I. With the annexation of Italy (and Portugal) the importance of active support from Spain diminished; the Entente was satisfied with Spain's neutrality.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d Richard Konetzke : The Iberian States from 1875 to World War I (1875-1917) , In: Theodor Schieder (Ed.): Handbuch der Europäische Geschichte , Volume 6, Pages 518f and 533. Union Verlag Stuttgart 1973
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Enrique Rosas Ledezma: Las "Declaraciones de Cartagena" (1907) - Significación en la política exterior de España y repercusiones internacionales . Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea 2/1981, Madrid 1981 ( PDF)
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Pedro María Egea Bruno: Los Acuerdos de Cartagena y el Statu Quo en el Mediterráneo . In: Cartagena Histórica 22/2008, pages 26-37. Editorial Áglaya, Cartagena 2008 ( PDF )
  4. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Foreign Office : British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 , Part 7 (The Agadir crisis), pages XIX-XXII and 4–51. HM Stationery Office, London 1932
  5. ↑ a b c d Документы XX века: Картахенские соглашения 1907 и 1913 годов
  6. ↑ a b c K. A. Hamilton: Great Britain, France and the origins of the Mediterranean Agreements of 16 May 1907 , In: David John Moss, Cedric James Lowe: Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939 , pages 115-150. University of Alberta, Alberta 1984
  7. ↑ a b c Richard von Kralik : General History of the Modern Times from 1815 to the Present Fifth Volume (1900 to 1913), pages 368, 407, 733 Verone, Nicosia 2017
  8. ^ A b c d e f g h i Bernhard Schwertfeger : The Belgian documents on the prehistory of the World War 1885-1914 , third volume (The politics of King Edward VII and the Morocco crisis 1905-1907), pages 23f, 27ff, 190-196, 212ff, 216-219. Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin 1925 (cf. Bernhardt Schwertfeger: Official files for the history of European politics 1885-1914 , first supplement, Belgian files 1905-1914 , pages 74–81 and 92–101. Deutsche Verlagsgsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte , Berlin 1925)
  9. ^ A b c d Fernando García Sanz: Between Europe and the Mediterranean - Spanish-Italian Relations 1898-1922 , In: Raanan Rein (Ed.): Spain and the Mediterranean Since 1898 , pages 37-45. Routledge, New York 2013
  10. ^ A b c Douglas M. Gibler: International Military Alliances , Volume 2 (1648–2008), page 218. CQ Press, Washington 2008
  11. ↑ Antonio de la Vega Blasco: El Plan de Escuadra Maura-Ferrándiz , In: XXXVII Jornadas de Historia Maritíma , edition 57, page 22. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid 2008 ( PDF )
  12. ↑ Agustín Rodríguez González: Vida y obra de un marino regeneracionista - el almirante Ferrándiz , In: XXXVII Jornadas de Historia Maritíma , edition 57, page 62. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid 2008
  13. ↑ Francisco Javier Álvarez Laita: Implicaciones industriales del Plan de Escuadra Maura-Ferrándiz , In: XXXVII Jornadas de Historia Maritíma , edition 57, page 80. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid 2008
  14. ↑ GlobalSecurity.org: The Spanish Navy 1899-1918 - The Great War
  15. ^ A b c William L. Langer : Tribulations of Empire - The Mediterranean Problem , In: Council on Foreign Relations : Foreign Affairs , Part 15, Number 4, pp. 652f. New York 1937
  16. ↑ Francisco Javier Álvarez Laita: Retornos industriales de las inversiones de los planes de escuadra , In: Revista de Historia Naval , number 122, pages 9-30. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid 2013 ( PDF )
  17. ↑ José Antonia Ocampo Aneiros: La Historia Maritima en el Mundo - La historia vivida - La Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval , In: Revista de Historia Naval , number 129, pages 101-104. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid 2015 ( PDF )
  18. ^ Joseph Harrison, Alan Hoyle: Spain's 1898 Crisis - Regenerationism, Modernism, Postcolonialism , pp. 63ff. Manchester University Press, Manchester 2000
  19. ↑ Bernhard Schwertfeger: The Belgian documents on the prehistory of the world war 1885-1914 , fifth volume (warmongering and war armaments up to the threshold of the world war 1912-1914), pages 8, 86ff, 108ff. German Publishing Society for Politics and History, Berlin 1925
  20. ^ A b c Ron Carden: German Policy Toward Neutral Spain, 1914-1918 , pages 32-35. Routledge, New York 2014
  21. ^ A b c Raymond Poincaré : Memoirs , Part 2 (The outbreak of the catastrophe, 1913-1914), pages 122-125 and 164-169. Paul Aretz Verlag, Dresden 1928
  22. ↑ Javier Ponce: Spain , In: 1914-1918-online : International Encyclopedia of the First World War (see also Javier Ponce Marrero: Propaganda and Politics , In: Troy RE Paddock (Ed.): World War I and Propaganda , pages 293f. BRILL, Leiden / Boston 2014)

literature

  • Enrique Rosas Ledezma: Las "Declaraciones de Cartagena" (1907) - Significación en la política exterior de España y repercusiones internacionales . Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea 2/1981, Madrid 1981 ( PDF)
  • Pedro María Egea Bruno: Los Acuerdos de Cartagenay el Statu Quo en el Mediterráneo . In: Cartagena Histórica 22/2008, pages 26-37. Editorial Áglaya, Cartagena 2008 ( PDF )
  • Luis Miguel Pérez Adán: Los acuerdos de Cartagena y la inauguración del nuevo Palacio Consistorial (8 and 9 de abril de 1907) . Editorial Áglaya, Cartagena 2007.