Sequence of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001

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The chronological sequence of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , which killed a total of almost 3,000 people , is the subject of historical research .

The final report of the 9/11 Commission of July 22, 2004, which is based on many documents and testimony, and the book The Terror Timeline by Paul Thompson from August 2004, which is publicly available and collected in a collaborative Internet project, are considered important research contributions Sources . The joint effort formed the basis for public criticism of the victims' families of September 11th on the 9/11 commission report. Its information was included in later issues of the terror timeline .

All times follow Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), the daylight saving time in effect on the day of the attacks in New York.


The following were published as important data of the course of the day, among others:

Time event
7:59 Start of American Airlines Flight 11 (Boeing 767) from Boston to Los Angeles
8:14 Start of United Airlines Flight 175 (Boeing 767) from Boston to Los Angeles
8:19 Ground crew learns that Flight 11 has been hijacked.
8:20 Start of American Airlines Flight 77 (Boeing 757) from Washington, DC, to Los Angeles
8:41 Start of United Airlines Flight 93 (Boeing 757) from Newark to San Francisco
8:46 Flight 11 hits the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC 1). An accident is suspected. The people in the south tower are encouraged to stay at their place of work.
9:03 Flight 175 hits the south tower (WTC 2). This makes the attack clear to the authorities and observers. The evacuation of both WTC buildings is initiated.
9:31 In a brief address from Florida , US President George W. Bush calls the events in New York an "apparent terrorist attack on our country".
9:37 Flight 77 hits the Pentagon .
9:42 The FAA issues a take-off ban and landing order for all domestic flights in the United States. 4,500 aircraft have landed by 12:15.
9:45 The White House and the Capitol are evacuated.
9:59 The south tower collapses.
10:07 The hijackers crash Flight UA 93 near Shanksville.
10:28 The north tower collapses.
17:20 The WTC 7 collapses.
20:30 In a national speech, Bush announced extensive persecution of the perpetrators.

Procedure by FAA and NORAD

The civil Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the military North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) were responsible for handling hijacked aircraft in the USA . Their procedural protocols require that hijacked aircraft can be identified and that the chain of command of both authorities has enough time to take appropriate measures. The FAA flight control centers were expecting an emergency call from the pilots, which would also convey the position and altitude of the flight. In the event of broken radio contacts and failed transponder signals, they should first try to re-establish contact and then alert the FAA Operations Center in Herndon , Virginia . This then had to inform a coordinator at the FAA headquarters in Washington, DC , who could turn to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) of the Pentagon for help. This needed an order from the Minister of Defense to raise fighter jets to follow the hijacked aircraft and monitor their course. NORAD's northeast sector NEADS , in the area of ​​which all four flights were hijacked, had four ready-to-fly fighter jets to secure the airspace in 2001, two at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod , Massachusetts and two at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton , Virginia. The protocols did not provide for kills or forced landings. The case of suicide attacks with hijacked airplanes disappearing from the radar was ignored. The FAA and NORAD people involved therefore had to improvise on September 11, 2001. For example, the fighter jets flew routes over the Atlantic that came from the Cold War and were intended to repel Soviet bombers. In the course of the process, they only learned individual details of the four kidnappings and therefore often made belated, wrong or no decisions that were appropriate to the situation.

Flight AA 11 (WTC 1, north tower)

Time flight FAA and NORAD Deviating information
6: 00-6: 45 Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari fly from Portland, Maine to Boston . Atta's luggage is being held at the airport due to a CAPPS report (entry as a suspect for additional baggage checks).
6: 52-6: 55 Atta telephoned Marwan al-Shehhi for the last time .
Until 7:40 Atta, Omari, Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri check in and board flight AA 11 in Boston .
7:59 Flight AA 11 takes off.
Until 8:14 am Flight AA 11 ascends to an altitude of 26,000 feet.
8:14 The pilot does not respond to Boston Flight Control instructions to ascend to 35,000 feet. At this time the kidnapping is assumed.
8:19 Flight attendant Betty Ong informed the AA airline office by phone: A passenger and two flight attendants were stabbed to death and pepper spray had been sprayed. They think the flight is being hijacked. According to the FAA's daily report on September 11, 2001, a hijacker shot and killed passenger Daniel M. Lewin at 8:20 am. The FAA denied this in 2002; Lewin was stabbed. According to FAA official Bogdan Dzakovic, the FAA deceived the 9/11 commission by denying the kidnappers' firearms use without justification, which their initial report provided.
8:21 The transponder is switched off. The AA office informs the AA operations center of the abduction. The FAA inspector informs his boss; this instructs him to follow the standard procedure in the event of loss of contact. Neither of them suspect a kidnapping so far. According to initial reports, the transponder was switched off 8:13, after the controller 8:20, after the NEADS officer Robert Marr 8:30. Flight control immediately suspected a kidnapping, but only informed other FAA centers after 5 minutes and NORAD after 20 minutes.
8:23 The flight controller in Boston tries in vain to reach the cockpit.
8:25 Atta orders the passengers to stay calm. Flight attendant Amy Sweeney informs the AA office of an injured person on board. The flight controller recognizes the kidnapping by Atta's announcement and reports it to his boss.
8:26 Ong reports that the plane is flying "erratically".
8:27 Flight 11 turns south. Sweeney reports on a dead passenger, two injured flight attendants, unsuccessful attempts to contact the cockpit; the kidnappers had a bomb.
8:28 FAA Boston informs FAA Herndon. This informs the flight control centers in New York, Cleveland and Indianapolis.
8:29 AA informs the FAA of the kidnapping.
8:32 FAA headquarters in Washington hears about this but does not inform the military.
8:34 FAA Boston first calls the air force base in Atlantic City , which was dissolved in 1998 , then Otis in Cape Cod. The reception and outcome of the first call are unclear. Two fighter jets are flying exercises in Atlantic City, land after 9:03, are equipped with new missiles, fly to Washington DC after 10:03 and arrive there around 11:00. If the FAA call received, they could have reached New York City before flight AA11.
8:37 A NEADS officer in Otis receives the call. When asked whether the kidnapping was part of a military exercise that was currently taking place, the caller confirmed: No, this was real. This is the first news of that day to the US military about a hijacked flight. The time of the call is unclear: a news channel calls 8:31, the FAA 8:34, NORAD 8:40. The 9/11 report follows the NEADS log entry.
8:38 Ong reports erratic flight behavior again. Sweeney reports seat numbers, looks, and English skills of three kidnappers. The aircraft is in a rapid descent. Otis: Colonel Robert Marr requests and receives General Larry Arnold's permission to launch two F-15 fighter jets. Then Arnold informs the NORAD headquarters. Responsible NORAD personnel believe in a military exercise. However, officers pass on the start order.
8:41 Sweeney said the passengers believed there was a medical emergency. The other flight attendants are busy with medical aids. Flight control assumes the hijackers want to land in New York City and instructs other flights to evade.
8:44 Sweeney reports that the plane is flying far too low. Telephone contact with her and Ong breaks off.
8:46 The two fighter jets receive the order to take off, but no destination information. NEADS tries to locate Flight AA 11 using the primary radar. The two pilots have known about the hijacking since the FAA called directly at 8:34 am and have been ready to take off since 8:40 am.
8:46:40 The plane hits WTC 1. All 81 passengers, including 5 hijackers, and an unknown number of people in WTC 1 die.
8:48 FAA New York is still looking for flight AA 11 because it was not noticed or was not linked to the aircraft it was looking for.
8:50 NEADS learns of the impact, but not that it was flight AA 11.
8: 53-9: 13 The fighter jets take off and fly along the Atlantic coast away from New York City due to the lack of a destination.

Flight UA 175 (WTC 2, south tower)

Time flight FAA and NORAD
until 7:28 am Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi and Hamza al Ghamdi check in and board flight UA 175 in Boston.
8:14 Flight UA 175 takes off 14 minutes late.
until 8:33 The aircraft reaches the prescribed cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.
8:42 The pilots report to flight control about a "suspicious message" (Atta's announcement 8:25), which they picked up shortly after their take-off. FAA New York finds out about it.
until 8:46 The kidnappers attack with knives, pepper spray and a bomb threat. You kill both pilots and some flight attendants.
8:47 The hijackers change the flight's transponder code twice. The responsible inspector in Boston overlooks this because she is looking for flight AA 11.
8:51 You initiate a descent. The inspector notices the changed transponder code and tries unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft.
8:52 Passenger Peter Hanson reported to his father Lee Hanson by phone: The cockpit had been taken over and two people had been killed. The plane is moving strangely. Lee Hanson reported this to the police. A flight attendant reports to the UA office in San Francisco: Both pilots and a flight attendant were killed. Passengers confirm the details with on-board telephones from the rear seats.
8: 53-8: 56 The inspector informed a colleague and her manager that flight UA 175 was presumably hijacked. She arranges alternative courses for other flights and hands over their control to colleagues. She learns about the impact of an airplane in WTC 1 over the radio.
8:58 Flight UA 175 turns towards New York City. The manager wants to inform FAA Herndon, but is refused: They are looking for a hijacked aircraft and therefore do not want to be disturbed.
8:59 Passenger Brian David Sweeney telephones his wife and mother to inform him that the flight has been hijacked. Think of storming the cockpit to wrest control of the flight from the hijackers.
9:00 Peter Hanson calls his father Lee Hanson again: The kidnappers have now also killed a stewardess. Passengers get sick. The plane moves jerkily. He thinks they wanted to fly the plane into a building.
9:01 FAA New York informs FAA Herndon: Another plane has been hijacked, the military is needed. FAA New York tries to locate Flight UA 175 using the tower at John F. Kennedy Airport. Its controllers observe an approaching aircraft in rapid descent.
9:03 Flight UA 175 hits WTC 2. 65 passengers, including seven flight attendants and five hijackers, and an unknown number of building visitors die. FAA Boston informs FAA New England: They believe in several hijackings because of Atta's radio message ("We have some planes"). A second plane has just hit the WTC. All further flights in the region will be stopped. - FAA New York informs NEADS about the second hijacked aircraft.
9:05 FAA New York will stop all flights to, from, and across New York City. FAA Boston confirms Atta's radio message to FAA New England and Herndon, informs all of its flights about the impacts, warns of increased cockpit security and asks Herndon for an analog national warning. However, neither Herndon nor the airlines concerned are warning other flights.
9:08 The NEADS commander learns of the second WTC impact, orders contact with the FAA and orders fighter jets to Manhattan .
9:09 The two jets in Langley are made ready for take-off.
9:13 The two Otis jets are ordered to fly to Manhattan (115 miles away).
9:25 You arrive in Manhattan and fly a flight combat patrol over the city.

Flight AA 77 (Pentagon)

Time flight FAA and NORAD
7: 15-7: 50 Khalid al Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Hani Handschur , Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi check in and board Flight AA 77 at Washington Dulles International Airport . Two metal detectors hit Nwaf al Hazmi, but the hand controls found nothing.
8:20 Flight AA 77 takes off from Washington (region) 10 minutes late.
Until 8:46 The aircraft reaches the prescribed cruising altitude of 35,000 feet.
8:51 Last routine radio message from the pilots.
8: 51-8: 54 Attack of the kidnappers with box knives. All passengers must gather in the tail section of the aircraft.
8:54 The plane changes course to the south.
8:56 The transponder is switched off. FAA Indianapolis, unaware of previously hijacked flights, detects course change and disappearance of flight AA 77 from radar. Multiple unsuccessful contact attempts.
9:00 AA Vice President Gerard Arpey learns of the loss of contact and orders a start ban in the northeast sector of the USA.
until 9:05 FAA Indianapolis does not receive the flight's primary radar signals because they are too weak and the software does not process them. The responsible controller searches unsuccessfully along the projected and changed course. He believes in technical problems and a crash.
9:05 Flight AA 77 appears east of the last known position on Indianapolis' primary radar. Because the controller and two managers are looking for the primary signals to the west of it and do not allow any other controllers to be searched, they cannot find them.
9:08 FAA Indianapolis informs Langley Air Force and West Virginia Police of the missing aircraft and requests a search for a crash.
9:09 FAA Indianapolis Informs FAA Regional Center of Loss of Contact with Flight AA 77.
9:10 Flight AA 77 leaves the Indianapolis control area unnoticed and enters Washington DC airspace. AA headquarters believe Flight AA 77 hit WTC 2. When it realizes the mistake, it issues a nationwide start ban.
9:12 Passenger Renee May calls her mother Nancy May: The plane was hijacked by six people. The parents alert AA.
9: 16-9: 17 Passenger Barbara Olson tells her husband Ted Olson about the kidnappers' box cutters. They would have gathered all the passengers in the rear of the plane and not noticed their call. Ted Olson tries unsuccessfully to contact Attorney General John Ashcroft .
9:18 Barbara Olson calls her husband again: The pilot reported the kidnapping. The plane was flying low over houses, according to another passenger to the northeast. Ted Olson tells her about the two plane crashes in the WTC.
9:20 FAA Indianapolis learns of other hijacked aircraft through FAA Herndon and now doubts the crash of Flight AA 77. FAA Herndon informs other flight control centers, but not NORAD, of this missing flight.
9:21 FAA Boston erroneously reports to NEADS: According to FAA Herndon, the AA 11 aircraft is still in the air, flying to Washington DC and is probably somewhere over New Jersey or further south. It was hijacked and not identical to one of the planes that hit the WTC.
from 9:21 Some flight control centers, including Dulles Terminal and AA, are looking for flight AA 77. Nobody is considering or seeking military assistance.
9:23 The local NEADS commander, after consulting his superior, orders the two jets to disembark in Langley and fly to Washington DC.
9:24 FAA Indianapolis informs FAA headquarters that Flight AA 77 is missing.
9:25 FAA headquarters are considering a nationwide take-off ban because of the WTC strikes and the Attas radio call at 8:25 am. FAA Herndon issues it.
9:29 Flight AA 77's autopilot is turned off. The plane flies 7,000 feet and is still approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.
9:30 The jets from Langley take off and are sent to Baltimore to intercept the mistakenly assumed Flight AA 11 off Washington DC. NEADS decides to keep the two jets from Otis over Manhattan.
9:32 Flight Control in Dulles spots a flying object (later identified as Flight AA 77) on radar flying at high speed southeast and informs Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport . He instructs an unarmed National Guard transport plane that has just taken off to follow the flight. The pilot finds him and identifies a Boeing 757. FAA personnel at both airports inform the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft is approaching the White House.
9:34 Flight AA 77 is five miles from the Pentagon and begins to turn 330 degrees. At the end of the turn it has dropped to 2,200 feet and is heading for the Pentagon. NEADS asks about flight AA 11 at FAA headquarters and happens to find out about the missing flight AA 77.
9:36 FAA Boston reports to NEADS: An unidentified aircraft is approaching Washington DC and is located six miles southwest of the White House. The NEADS commander orders the Langley jets there and learns that they have not flown to Baltimore, but over the ocean. They had not received any destination information at takeoff, otherwise they flew east first and the pilot and an FAA controller had misinterpreted the order accordingly.
9:37:46 The plane hits the Pentagon at about 530 mph. All 58 passengers, including the hijackers as well as both pilots, four flight attendants and numerous people die in the Pentagon.
9:38 NEADS loses the flight's primary radar signal. The jets are still 150 miles away. The pilot of the transport aircraft sees the impact and reports it to the airport tower.
9:41 FAA Boston erroneously reports to NEADS that Flight Delta 1989 to Las Vegas (like AA 11 and UA 175 a Boeing 767 launched from Logan Airport) may have been hijacked. FAA Cleveland, Herndon, and Washington DC are watching the flight broadcasting normal transponder signals. NEADS orders several fighter jets to intercept the flight. Many more allegedly hijacked flights were reported that day.
9:42 FAA Herndon learns of the strike into the Pentagon. National Operations Manager Ben Sliney issues a nationwide landing order that is complied with without incident.

Flight UA 93 (Shanksville)

Time flight FAA and NORAD
7: 03-7: 48 Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi and Ziad Jarrah check in and board flight UA 93 .
8:42 Flight UA 93 starts more than 25 minutes late due to the usual heavy morning traffic.
8:55 UA orders a nationwide take-off ban on UA ​​flights.
9:19 UA controller Ed Ballinger warns 16 airborne UA flights of possible cockpit intruders and refers to the two WTC strikes.
9:24 Ballinger's warning reaches the cockpit of Flight UA 93.
9:26 Pilot Jason Dahl asks for confirmation of the warning.
9:28 The kidnappers attack. The plane suddenly drops 700 feet. Mayday emergency call from a pilot. The other pilot yells "Get out of here". Several passengers report three kidnappers. The controller in Cleveland noticed the sinking of flight UA 93, heard screams and fighting noises over the radio and tried several times unsuccessfully to contact the pilots and get them to climb.
9:30 Several pilots from other flights confirm to the controller that they too heard the screams.
9:32 A kidnapper, probably Jarrah, calls on the passengers: “Stay seated. We have a bomb on board. ”The autopilot heading is changed to east. According to the voice recorder, the kidnappers silence a flight attendant in the cockpit. The inspector hears the call, tells the kidnappers to repeat it slowly and informs his supervisor.
From 9:32 At least ten passengers and two flight attendants report to family members, friends or colleagues with on-board and mobile phones about the kidnapping. Some report a bomb threat from the kidnappers, two people killed in the cabin corridor, one passenger killed. At least five callers learned of the WTC attacks. Two callers report that the kidnappers noticed the calls but did not seem to care. Five callers reported that the passengers tried to overpower the hijackers.
9:34 FAA headquarters hears about Jarrah's appeal.
9:35 FAA Cleveland informs FAA Herndon about this.
9:36 FAA Cleveland tells FAA Herndon that they will seek action from nearby military. Herndon declares himself responsible for it.
until 9:38 Flight UA 93 climbs to 40,700 feet. FAA Cleveland observed this, dodged several flights and asked the pilot several times if he could confirm a hijacking. No Answer.
9:39 Jarrah's second announcement with an incorrectly set cockpit radio: A bomb was on board, the plane was returning to the airport, you should remain seated. The inspector in Cleveland hears the announcement and asks Jarrah to confirm it. No Answer.
9:41 The transponder is switched off. The controller recognizes the course of UA 93 via the primary radar signal and visual contacts from other flight personnel.
9:46 FAA Herndon informs headquarters that flight UA 93 is 29 minutes away from Washington DC.
9:49 FAA Herndon suggests that headquarters seek military assistance. In the next 10 minutes someone would have to decide to launch fighter jets. Nevertheless, no FAA office informs NORAD about UA 93.
9:53 FAA Herndon reports to headquarters first that they have lost track of the flight, then after visual contact with another aircraft, UA 93 is still 20 miles northwest of Johnstown.
9:57 The passengers attack the hijackers. Several break off their call for this. According to the voice recorder, passengers are trying to break open the cockpit door. Jarrah waves the plane sideways to throw the attackers off balance.
9:58 Jarrah orders another kidnapper to block the cockpit door.
From 9:59 Jarrah drops the nose of the aircraft up and down to stop the attack. Loud knocking and bursting noises and calls can be heard on the voice recorder.
10:00:08 Jarrah asks, “Shall we end it?” One kidnapper replies, “No. Not yet. If they all come, we'll end it. ”The fight outside the cockpit door continues.
10:00:26 A passenger calls out: “Into the cockpit. Otherwise we will all die! "
10:01 Jarrah ends the violent flight maneuvers, says “Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest! ”And asks another kidnapper:“ Was that it? I mean, shall we bring it down? ”The other replies,“ Yeah, bring it down. ” Herndon reports to Headquarters that UA 93 has been seen flapping its wings.
10:02 A kidnapper yells: “Pull it down! Pull it down! ”Another shouts:“ Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!"
10:02:23 The plane rolls on its back and hits a field near Shanksville at 580 mph.
10:05 The National Guard transport plane reports black smoke 15 miles south of Johnstown.
10:07 The Langley jets arrive in Washington DC. Unbeknownst to the crash, FAA Cleveland informs NEADS of the last known location of UA 93.
10:08 FAA Herndon reports to headquarters: They have received a report of black smoke at UA 93's last known position. A crash is speculative.
10:10 The NEADS commander, without the knowledge of UA 93, explains to his fighter pilots that there is no clearance to fire at planes over the capital.
10:15 NEADS asks the FAA headquarters about flight UA 93 and learns of the alleged crash "somewhere near Camp David ".
10:17 FAA Herndon reports to headquarters that UA 93 is now believed to have crashed.


  • Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton (Eds.): The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Authorized Edition. WW Norton, New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-393-32671-0 ( book excerpt online ).
  • Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute: A Comprehensive Chronicle of the Road to 9/11 - and America's Response. ReganBooks, New York 2004, ISBN 0-06-078338-9 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline , 2004, afterword pp. 563-568; James Ridgeway (Village Voice, April 13, 2004): Timeline of Tragedy
  2. ^ (A&E Television Networks 2015): 9/11: Timeline of Events . - Only those points in time are listed which correspond to the information in the 9/11 Commission report.
  3. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense: FAA Mission and Structure - NORAD Mission and Structure - Interagency Collaboration
  4. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.1. Inside the Four Flights: Boarding the Flights: Boston: American 11 and United 175 - The Hijacking of American 11
  5. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.2. Improvising a Homeland Defense: American Airlines Flight 11: FAA Awareness - Military Notification and Response
  6. ^ Paul Sperry: AA official claims gun memo not draft , World Net Daily, March 7, 2002
  7. Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic to theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States , May 22, 2003; History Commons: (8:20 am) September 11, 2001: Israeli Special-Ops Passenger Possibly Shot or Stabbed by Hijackers
  8. ^ Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline , 2004, pp. 358 and 361; History Commons: (8:21 am) September 11, 2001: Boston Controller Suspects Something Seriously Wrong with Flight 11, but NORAD Not Notified ; Air traffic controllers recall events {11 September 2002}
  9. ^ Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline , 2004, p. 365 f .; History Commons: (8:34 am) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Calls Atlantic City Military Unit to Request Fighters; Outcome of Call Unclear
  10. ^ Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline , 2004, p. 367; History Commons: (8:37 am) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Notifies NEADS of Hijacking, against Normal Procedures; Accounts conflict over timing
  11. ^ Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline , 2004, p. 368; History Commons: (8:38 am) September 11, 2001: 'Hubbub' at NEADS Thought to Be Result of Exercise Scenario ; (8:38 am-8:43 am) September 11, 2001: NORAD Personnel Mistake Hijacking for Part of an Exercise
  12. ^ Paul Thompson: The Terror Timeline , 2004, p. 368; History Commons: (8:40 am) September 11, 2001: Fighter Pilots Unofficially Told to Get Ready to Scramble After Flight 11
  13. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.1. Inside the Four Flights: Boarding the Flights: Boston: American 11 and United 175 - The Hijacking of United 175
  14. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.2. Improvising a Homeland Defense: United Airlines Flight 175: FAA Awareness - Military Notification and Response
  15. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.1. Inside the Four Flights: Boarding the Flights: Washington Dulles: American 77 - The Hijacking of American 77
  16. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.2. Improvising a Homeland Defense: American Airlines Flight 77: FAA Awareness - Military Notification and Response
  17. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.1. Inside the Four Flights: Boarding the Flights: Newark: United 93 - The Battle for United 93
  18. 9/11 Commission Report: 1.2. Improvising a Homeland Defense: United Airlines Flight 93: FAA Awareness - Military Notification and Response