Battle of the Arginus
Greek galleys in a modern presentation
| date | 406 BC Chr. |
|---|---|
| place | at the Arginus |
| output | Victory of the Athenians |
| consequences | Liberation of Mytilenes |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
Aristocrates , Diomedon , Protomachus, Thrasyllos ; Pericles d. J. , Erasinides , Aristogenes, Lysias ; Hippeus ; ( Theramenes , Thrasybul ); ( Konon ) |
Kallikratidas † |
| Troop strength | |
| 150 trireme (including 40 trireme at Mytilene) | 120 trireme (50 trireme at Mytilene) |
| losses | |
|
25 Trier, high team losses due to an upcoming storm |
77 Trier |
Sybota - Potidaia - Spartolus - Stratos - Naupactus - Plataea - Olpai - Tanagra - Pylos - Sphacteria - Corinth - Megara - Delion - Amphipolis - Mantinea - Melos - Syracuse - Miletus - Syme - Eretria - Kynossema - Abydos - Kyzikos - Ephesus - Chalcedon - Byzantium - Andros - Notion - Mytilene - Arginus - Aigospotamoi
The Battle of the Arginus was one of the last great fighting in the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404 BC). It was also the biggest sea battle the Greeks have ever fought. The Athenian fleet comprised 130 ships from Athens, 10 from Samos and 10 from the other allies (according to Xen. Hell. I 6.25). According to another account, there were 60 from Athens, 10 from Samos and 80 from the allies ( Diod. XIII 97.1).
A Spartan fleet under the command of the Kallikratidas had encircled the Athenian fleet on Lesbos, which was under the command of the Konon . Athens was able to build a new fleet with the last of its strength and send it north. When the Athenians approached the archipelago of the Arginus , Kallikratidas left 50 ships under the command of Eteonikos to guard the trapped at the port of Mytilene, and with the remaining 120 ships he drove towards the advancing relief fleet. He subordinated the left wing to the Theban Thrasondas, the right wing himself. He had appointed the strategist Klearchus to be his deputy in the event of his death, as foreseen by the augurs.
The numerical superiority made it possible for the Athenians to approach in two lines staggered one behind the other to compensate for the inexperience of their newly recruited teams and to prevent the Spartans from breaking through. The Athenian squadrons led from left to right in the first row Aristocrates , Diomedon , Thrasyllos , Protomachus and in the second row Pericles the Younger , Erasinides , Aristogenes and Lysias . In the center they had put the Sami allies under Hippeus and behind them some transport ships under the Nauarchs Theramenes and Thrasybul . The decision was made when Kallikratidas failed to break through and sank with the ship and helmsman in the tides.
The battle ended with a brilliant victory for Athens: the Spartans and their allies lost 77 Trieres , the Athenians only 25. The death of Kallikratidas meant that Lysander was again given the de facto supreme command of the Spartan fleet.
However, due to the onset of a storm, the Athenian commanders were no longer able to rescue the shipwrecked and dead. The strategists were reproached for this by the incited Athenian people's assembly and ultimately led to the Arginus trial.
Arginus process
The popular assembly instigated by Theramenes and others finally made six of the ten strategists - Perikles the Elder. J. , Diomedon , Lysias , Aristocrates , Thrasyllos and Erasinides - due to the failure to rescue the process (Konon was not charged, Leon had died at Mytilene, Protomachus and Aristogenes evaded the process and fled). The sources ( Xenophon Hell. I 7 and Diodor XIII 101-103) are, however, rather ambivalent with regard to the process: According to Xenophon, Theramenes is said to have been commissioned with the rescue of the castaways and dead; according to Diodorus, the blame was only placed on him, but also in other points the two representations are not congruent.
At first, the strategists were acquitted, but the next day the opinion had changed. Now they wanted to condemn all six strategists summarily to death. Opposition to this procedure (many, including Socrates , apparently considered it illegal, as separate procedures were usually provided) was shouted down: It was said that it would be bad if the people could not do what they wanted ( Xenophon , Hellenika, I 7). In the end, the six strategists charged were executed. The determined attitude of Socrates, who was a member of the committee for the implementation of referendums in connection with the process and vehemently opposed a condemnation, is testified by the historian Valerius Maximus ( Memorabilia 3,8,3)
The motivation for this trial, often referred to as a judicial scandal , was the shock suffered by the Athenian people after the loss of so many skilled seafarers. They also wanted, for the first time after the oligarchical overthrow in Athens in 411 BC. To bring the power of the popular assembly to full effect. The city harmed itself, because with the execution of the strategists the military leadership was lost. The consequences became apparent only a year later in the battle of Aigospotamoi . There was also a split in the demo due to the process .
See also
literature
- Antony Andrewes: The Arginousai Trial . In: Phoenix 28, 1974, pp. 112-122.
- Bruno Bleckmann : Athens' path to defeat. The last years of the Peloponnesian War . Teubner, Leipzig / Stuttgart 1998. ISBN 3-519-07648-9 .
- Paul Cloché: L'affaire des Arginuses . In: Revue historique 130, 1919, pp. 5-68 ( full text in Gallica ).
- Adalberto Giovannini : Xenophon, the Arginus Trial and the Athenian Democracy . In: Chiron 32, 2002, pp. 15-40.
- Andreas Mehl : For a new assessment of a judicial scandal. The Arginusen Trial and its tradition against the background of law and worldview in Athens at the end of the 5th century. v. Chr. In: ZRG 99, 1982, pp. 32-80.
- György Németh: The Arginusen Trial. The story of a political judicial murder . In: Klio 66, 1984, pp. 51-57.
- Karl-Wilhelm Welwei : Classical Athens. Democracy and Power Politics in the 5th and 4th Centuries . Darmstadt 1999, p. 235ff.
- G. Wylie: The battle of the Arginusae. A reappraisal . In: Civiltá classica e christana 11, 1990, pp. 234–249.