Foreign Policy of Georgia

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Diplomatic Relations of Georgia:
  • Diplomatic relations established
  • No diplomatic relations established
  • Diplomatic relations broken
    • States in which Georgia has embassies

    The foreign policy of Georgia aims the independence to get the state. Georgia has been a plaything of foreign interests and aspirations for centuries. Since ancient times it has been successively colonized , conquered or annexed by Greeks , Romans , Arabs , Persians , Mongols , Ottomans and Russians . The country was only sovereign from the 13th to the 6th century BC. BC, from 978 to 1403 and from 1918 to 1921 .

    The Foreign Minister of Georgia has been Mikheil Janelidze since December 30, 2015 .

    Memberships

    Georgia is a member of the following international organizations:

    Relations with post-communist states

    Along with Ukraine and Azerbaijan , Georgia has a special relationship with the New Friends of Georgia group : Estonia , Latvia , Lithuania , Poland and Romania support and consult Georgia in its desire to join the European Union and NATO. On the occasion of the revival of the GUAM in April 2005, President Saakashvili spoke of the re-establishment of a Baltic-Black Sea framework of stability .

    Relations with Russia

    In 1991 Georgia broke away from the Soviet Union . In Russia in particular , strong political groups still regard Georgia as a treacherous vassal state to this day . They are based on the history of the past 200 years, during which Georgia belonged almost continuously to the Russian Empire and later to the Soviet Union.

    Immediately after Georgia was founded in 1991, Russia supported separatist movements in Abkhazia , South Ossetia and Adjara . The states that were subsequently dependent on Russia are a means of pressure that can be used to influence Georgian domestic politics at any time. The pressure can be increased at will, since Russia has its own military stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 1994 Russia was able to urge Georgia to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and to guarantee Russian bases in the Georgian cities of Batumi and Akhalkalaki (see Group of Russian Armed Forces in Transcaucasia ).

    Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated dramatically at the end of September 2006 when the Georgian authorities suspected four officers of espionage for the Russian Federation, arrested them and turned them over to an OSCE mediator. Russia then imposed a blockade on all road, sea, rail and air connections to Georgia. In December 2007 Russia asked Georgia to heed its "legitimate arguments". According to the RIA Novosti, this included Georgia's foreign policy neutrality, no NATO bases and unlimited economic activities by the Russian state in the Caucasus republic.

    In August 2008 military clashes with Russia and South Ossetia broke out in the 2008 Caucasus conflict . The Russian armed forces penetrated deep into Georgian territory, destroyed air force and naval bases, interrupted the main traffic arteries, and occupied the cities of Gori and Poti . Although the EU Council Presidency negotiated a withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia, it was only partially implemented by the beginning of October 2008. On August 29, 2008, Georgia broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. Since August 2009 Georgia is no longer a member of the CIS.

    After the “ Georgian Dream ” party came to power in 2012 and Mikheil Saakashvili resigned as president in 2013, Tbilisi a. a. In the economic area, a cautious thaw in Georgian-Russian conditions. Moscow lifted the trade embargo imposed in 2006 on the most important Georgian export goods, wine and mineral water. Conversely, Georgian imports from Russia increased significantly. The atmosphere for discussion shifted from the confrontational to the cooperative level. The Georgian Special Envoy for Russia Zurab Abashidze and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Sarasin played a key role in the policy of détente . Two major areas of tension at the political level continue to weigh on interstate relationships. On the one hand, Moscow is promoting ever closer integration of the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the Russian Federation. The Russian leadership decided on strategic partnerships with both de facto states in 2014 and 2015, which in Tbilisi was classified as “creeping annexation”. On the other hand, even under the new government, Georgia did not want to deviate from its previous pro-European integration course. He is still eyed with suspicion in the Kremlin.

    From 2008 to January 2018 there were 42 rounds of consultations in Geneva on security and stability in the Caucasus. Georgia does not want to conclude any agreements with the breakaway regions, while Russia simply denies being a party to the conflict. During the consultations, the two countries mostly limited themselves to mutual blame under the eyes of the USA, the EU, the OSCE, the UN and representatives of the breakaway regions. As early as 2011, however, Georgia had assured itself that it would create neutrally monitored trade corridors in return for giving up its veto against Russia joining the WHO. This is because Georgia and Russia do not share a direct winter-safe border. It was only when trade between Russia and Georgia increased in 2017 that there was a first step towards two possible corridors.

    In 2019, the use of the "wine weapon" became an issue again after the Russian government banned the export of wine to Russia from 2006 to 2013. The catalyst for the deterioration in relations were protests in Georgia after a speech by a Russian communist at a conference of the Interparliamentary Assembly of Orthodoxy in the Georgian Parliament.

    Relations with Armenia

    Relations between the two countries are essential for Armenia because Georgia, as the only land connection with Russia, is extremely important for Armenian trade. Relations suffer from political instability in Georgia since independence. In addition, almost all of Armenia's exports, which are made by ship, go through the Georgian Black Sea ports. This de facto monopoly position repeatedly leads to excessive prices.

    When it comes to security issues, both countries are sticking to opposing approaches. While Georgia is striving for NATO membership, Armenia belongs to the Russian-dominated organization of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO). The positions with regard to the settlement of ethno-territorial conflicts under international law are also different. Georgia advocates maintaining the territorial integrity of the states (meaning Abkhazia and South Ossetia), while Armenia advocates the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination (keyword Nagorno-Karabakh).

    Relations with the West

    Until 1995, the West cared little about Georgia. Only Germany had a special relationship with President Eduard Shevardnadze , who, as Soviet foreign minister, had promoted German unity. Increased oil production in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan brought the state in the southern Caucasus back to the fore as a transit country for shipping the black gold in the mid-1990s. Georgia has since found itself in a geopolitically privileged position.

    Poster of the Georgian ruling party ENM

    Georgia is now supported by loans from the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ), the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development . The NATO concluded with Georgia a strategic partnership, and operates in Tbilisi representation. It became a member of the Council of Europe and belongs to the EU programs European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and TRASECA . Georgia has received US military aid since 1994 and has been represented in Iraq by 850 soldiers since 2004 . A 50-strong Georgian unit protected the UNO observer mission in Afghanistan .

    Georgia has been linked to NATO since October 29, 2004 through an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). In the plan, Georgia undertakes to reform its political, security and defense system in line with NATO standards. In September 2006 Georgia switched to a new level of cooperation with NATO, the Intensive Dialogue (ID). The membership of Georgia in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was rejected at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Germany had spoken out against the inclusion of Georgia in the MAP. It demanded that only those states should become NATO members in which there were no internal conflicts.

    The US has 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act set out a strong political, economic and security ties between the South Caucasus countries ... and to develop the West . US military instructors have been serving various programs in Georgia since 2002. On January 9, 2009, the United States and Georgia signed an agreement called the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. It outlines the areas of cooperation and reiterates US support for Georgia's territorial integrity and for Georgia's NATO membership.

    Relations with the European Union

    Georgia has long-term plans to join the European Union . In the Caucasus conflict in 2008 there were differences. President Saakashvili blamed the EU for the military conflict because it had not taken seriously his warnings about a Russian troop concentration on the Georgian border. Georgia joined the Eastern Partnership in May 2009 .

    Relations with Turkey

    Georgia, like Armenia, maintains good relations with Turkey , which are being expanded. When the AKP government came to power in Turkey in 2002, Georgian-Turkish relations experienced a strong boost. After Tbilisi, for its part, eased business conditions for foreign investors, there was a real rush of investments by Turkish companies in the Georgian economy. In 2005 the visa requirement between the two countries was abolished, in 2007 free trade agreements were concluded and in 2012 the passport-free travel arrangements were agreed.

    The Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tiflis-Erzurum gas pipelines, which have been in operation since 2006, as well as the Kars-Achalkalaki-Tiflis-Baku railway line, which was completed in 2016, can also be seen as signs of good relations.

    Relations with countries in the Near and Middle East

    Since 2006 Georgia has been expanding its ties to Iran and the Arab world . It ties in with its traditional role as a mediator between Orient and Occident . The presidents Saakashvili and Mahmud Ahmadinejad agreed on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2006 to intensify cooperation in the fields of energy, transport and industry. Kuwait gave Georgia loans to expand the road network.

    Georgian-Iranian relations deteriorated dramatically in 2008 after Georgian officials arrested and extradited several Iranian citizens on charges of smuggling, money laundering and other conspiratorial activities. Only after Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze apologized for this case in January 2010 during his visit to Tehran, both sides found their way back to normal.

    literature

    • David Aphrasidze: The Foreign and Security Policy of Georgia: On the Role of Small and Weak States in the New European Peace Order . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003, ISBN 3-8329-0351-8 .
    • Andro Barnovi: Russian stance in the Caucasus and the national security strategy of Georgia . Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif 2005, OCLC 61447847 .
    • Silke Kleinhanß: The foreign policy of Georgia. A failing state between internal partial failure and external opportunities . Lit, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-8258-0817-4 .
    • Dov Lynch: Why Georgia matters . (= Chaillot Paper. No. 86). Paris 2006. (Online, PDF, 643.6 KB) ( Memento of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive )

    See also

    Web links

    Individual evidence

    1. ↑ Philipp Ammon: Georgia between Statehood and Russian Occupation: The Roots of the Russian-Georgian Conflict from the 18th Century to the End of the First Georgian Republic (1921). Klagenfurt 2015.
    2. ↑ Federal Agency for Civic Education: Analysis: Relations between Russia and Georgia: From Confrontation to Cooperation? | bpb. Retrieved January 7, 2018 .
    3. ↑ NZZ . January 15, 2018, p. 4.
    4. ↑ Russia Threatens More Economic Pain in Standoff With Georgia , Moscow Times, June 24, 2019; "Moscow has in the past used bans on wine imports as a weapon in political disputes with Georgia."
    5. ↑ Georgian Wine Comes Back to Russia , July 11, 2013
    6. ↑ Сергей Минасян: Армения и Грузия: Новые ключевые отношения на Южном Кавказе? (PDF) In: www.ponarseurasia.org. September 2013, accessed October 6, 2017 (Russian).
    7. ↑ 2001-2009.state.gov (January 9, 2009): United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership , accessed February 27, 2011.
    8. ↑ civil.ge (January 9, 2009): Georgia, US Sign Strategic Partnership Charter , access February 27 2011th
    9. ^ Diba Nigar Göksel: Turkey-Georgia: Zero Problems? Ed .: The German-Marshall Fund of the United States. On Europa Series again. June 2013, p. 1 .
    10. ↑ Kornely K. Kakachia: Iran and Georgia: Genuine Partnership or Marriage of Convenience? (PDF) PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 186, September 2011, accessed January 28, 2018 .