Battle for the Busan Perimeter
| date | 4th / 5th August 15th to September 15th 1950 |
|---|---|
| place | Masan – Daegu – Yeongdeok / Pohang |
| output | North Korean attack canceled |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 70,000 infantry 40 T-34 tanks |
 45,000 infantry 47,000 infantry 525 aircraft
 |
| losses | |
|
approx. 50,000 |
|
The battle for the Busan Perimeter was fought during the Korean War between August 4 and September 15, 1950 between the armed forces of the United States or the United Nations Command and South Korea on the one hand and the North Korean People's Army . The Busan Perimeter was an area in the extreme southeast of Korea that was the only one that could never be occupied by North Korean troops. The line of defense, known as the “perimeter”, stretched for about 225 km and was named after the coastal city of Busan . Until the landing and the subsequent counterattack by UN troops near Incheon , the Busan perimeter served as the last line of defense against the North Korean advance southwards and an important bridgehead for supplies and reinforcements.
prehistory
After the initial defeats of the South Korean and US armies in the battles of Seoul , Osan and Daejeon , the Allied troops with the remaining units and material gathered around the southeastern port city of Busan . A line of defense ran from Masan in the southwest along the banks of the Nakdong River to the Sea of Japan north of Yeongdeok .
Troop lineups
The 24th Infantry Division of the US Army shared the defense of South Korea with the newly established South Korean Army and two newly arrived US Army divisions - the 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Division . On July 24th, the South Korean Army restructured itself into two corps and five divisions . The 1st Corps comprised the 8th Infantry Division and the Capital Division, the II Corps comprised the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions. A re-established 3rd Infantry Division was directly under the command of the South Korean armed forces. The headquarters of the II. Corps was at Hamchang, with the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions in the west-east line in front of it. The 1st Corps had its headquarters at Sangju with the 8th Infantry Division and the Capital Division also in a west-east line in front of it. The 3rd Infantry Division operated on the east coast of South Korea. Due to the large number of recruits and supplies, the ROK army was able to regain its pre-war strength of around 95,000 men.
The 25th US Infantry Division, with its three regiments (24th, 27th and 35th Infantry Regiment), commanded by Major General William B. Kean , arrived at Busan between July 10th and 15th. General Walker ordered the 25th Infantry Division to reinforce the South Korean Army's defense positions on the central mountain passes. The three regiments (5th, 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiment) of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived north of Busan near Pohang from Japan between July 15th and 22nd. The cavalry division took on the task of blocking the corridor between Daejeon and Daegu for the North Koreans.
In late July, both 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions withstood heavy North Korean attacks; but with high losses and signs of demoralization. On July 29th, General Walker, who thought this was shirking, with the backing of General Douglas MacArthur issued what the press called "hold or die" order to the US 8th Army . Walker stressed that there should be no further withdrawal. The 8th Army had previously bought time by giving away land, but was increasingly pushed towards the sea.
One of the major problems with the retreat was the amount of refugees moving through 8th Army lines. Their numbers were greater during July and August 1950 than at any other point in the war. In the second and third weeks of July, around 380,000 refugees moved into the remaining territory around Busan, which was controlled by the South Korean army. The North Korean Army often took advantage of the situation by launching attacks by a wave of refugees being driven across the Allied minefields. Only then did the North Koreans advance with infantry and tanks. The North Koreans were also able to break through the US lines several times by mingling with the refugees in traditional white clothing and carrying out surprise attacks on the US troops. The commanders of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions tried several times, unsuccessfully, to control the flow of refugees through fixed times and given routes. At the end of July, General Walker, in cooperation with the South Korean commanders, issued explicit rules on how to deal with the refugees for the US troops and the South Korean police. By the end of July, the South Korean government had set up 58 refugee camps, most of them in the area between Daegu and Busan. But despite these efforts, the flows of refugees continued to hamper the movements of US and ROK forces.
As the 8th Army approached the natural defensive position on the Nakdong River, the North Koreans intensified their attempts to isolate parts of this army. After the fall of Seoul in late June, the North Korean 6th Division crossed the Han River and moved rapidly south along the western network of coastal roads. The reconnaissance of the 8th US Army had lost track of the 6th Division. The only UN troops positioned southwest of Daejeon-Daegu-Busan Strait at the time were a few hundred survivors of the South Korean 7th Infantry Division, as well as scattered South Korean marines and local police forces. On July 21, General Walker learned that a North Korean unit, which he believed was the 4th North Korean Division, was operating in the southwest. Walker ordered the 24th Division, despite their losses of men and material after the Battle of Daejeon, to move as a blockade force to the region between Jinju in south-central Korea and Gimcheon . Two battalions of the 29th US regiment, until then stationed on Okinawa, as well as the 17th South Korean infantry regiment were supposed to strengthen the 24th division.
On July 23, the North Korean 4th Division moved south with the aim of assisting the 6th Division in encircling the left flank of the UN forces and advancing on Busan. By the end of July, the 4th Division had advanced as far as the Anui and Geochang area, about 80 km southwest of Daegu. On July 25 and 26, the two battalions of the 29th US Regiment were driven back by the 6th North Korean Division, located about 40 km west of Jinju. It was not until July 31 that the US 8th Army really became aware of the presence of the 6th Division after it had captured Jinju and a battalion of the 29th Regiment and the 19th regiment of the 24th Division had to retreat eastwards. The 8th US Army put the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division, which had previously been held in reserve, in motion to reinforce the American units in the Jinju Corridor. The 24th and 25th Divisions, supported by the 17th South Korean Regiment, were finally able to slow the advance of the North Korean 4th and 6th Divisions at what would later become the southernmost sector of the Busan perimeter. On August 3, the US and South Korean units finally averted the danger of a direct advance by the North Koreans as far as Busan.
Defense Positions
On August 1, the 8th Army issued a general directive to all UN ground forces for the planned retreat to the east across the Nakdong River. The UN units should then set up a main line of defense behind what is now known as the Busan Perimeter. The goal was to end further withdrawal and stop the North Korean Army while the US Army could build up its forces to launch a counter-offensive. The Busan Perimeter, established by the US and South Korean forces on August 4, encompassed a rectangular area about 160 km from north to south and about 80 km from east to west. The Nakdong River formed the western boundary, except for the southernmost 15 miles, where the Nakdong turned east after its confluence with the Nam River. The sea formed the eastern and southern borders, while in the north an irregular front line ran through the mountains from Waegwan to Yeongdeok. From the southwest to the northeast, the line was held by the 25th and 24th Infantry Divisions, the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division, the 1st South Korean Infantry Division, the 6th and 8th South Korean Infantry Divisions, the Capital Division, and the 3rd South Korean Infantry Division. From south to northeast, the North Korean forces facing UN forces were: the 83rd Motorized Regiment, the 105th Armored Division, the 6th Division, the 8th Division, the 12th Division, the 5th Division, and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment .
The UN troops were initially outnumbered by the North Koreans, but they had clearly superior artillery and ammunition. This would prove crucial in the crucial hours at the start of the battle. The 5th US Infantry Regiment from Hawaii and the gradually arriving 2nd US Infantry Division then gradually reinforced the US troops. A third major reinforcement arrived on August 2nd in the form of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade with about 4,700 men on the Korean Peninsula . From this point on, the UN combat troops outnumbered the North Korean troops with 92,000 versus 70,000 men.
Course of the battle
North Korean attack
The North Koreans had four different routes of advance towards Busan, which could lead to the defeat of the US and South Korean troops. In August these were all trodden simultaneously. The starting points were the confluence of the Nam and Nakdong Rivers, the bulge of the Nakdong River on the rail and road lines to Mityang, through Gyeongju and the corridor in the far east and through Daegu. In the first week of August, General Walker decided to launch the first American counterattack of the war in the Jinju-Masan Corridor. One of his goals was to break a suspected concentration of enemy units near Daegu by forcing North Korean units to be diverted south. On August 6, the US 8th Army issued the operational orders for the attack by Einsatzgruppe Kean, named after the commander of the 25th Division. This consisted of the 25th Division, parts of the 27th Infantry Regiment and a field artillery battalion, reinforced by the 5th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The plan was for the troops to move west from their positions at Masan , take the Jinju Pass and secure the front line as far as the Nam River. Task Force Kean launched its attack on August 7, but got caught up in a simultaneous advance by the 6th North Korean Division. After a week of fierce fighting, neither side had made any significant progress. Even so, the US 8th Army had started its first offensive in Korea and successfully stopped the advance of an enemy division.
Nakdong bulge
11 km north of the point at which the Nakdong River turns east and flows into the Nam River, the Nakdong turns in a wide arc to the west opposite Yongsan . This bow was named Nakdong-Bulge by the American troops during the heavy fighting in August and September. On August 6, the 4th North Korean Division crossed the Nakdong near Pohang with the aim of advancing to Yongsan, about 16 km to the east. The 24th Division defended this sector. Their commander, John H. Church, who had succeeded General Dean, formed Task Force Hill to defend the Nakdong Arch. Despite the efforts of Task Force Hill, the North Korean 4th Division had penetrated the area around Yongsan by August 1. As a result, General Walker also used the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division, the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in battle.
General Church led the coordinated attack by Army and Marine Corps forces on August 17th. On August 18, the American troops had decisively defeated the North Korean 4th Division, which had lost about half of its original strength of 7,000 men.
About 30 km south of Pohang on the east coast of the Busan perimeter was the important railway and road center of Gyeongju in the triangle of Daegu-Pohang-Busan. The capture of Pohang and the nearby Yeonil Airport , used by the Far East Air Force, would have opened a natural and essentially undefended corridor for the People's Army from North Korea to Gyeongju and Busan. General Walker had poorly secured the eastern corridor due to the greater threat on the western sectors of the front, and he doubted that the North Koreans could launch a major successful attack through the pathless mountains. In early August, the North Koreans almost belied Walker's assessment when three divisions - the 5th, 8th and 12th Divisions - and the independent 766th Infantry Regiment launched a heavy attack against the South Korean defenders. On August 12, the North Koreans stood in front of Pohang and threatened the Yeonil airport. The North Korean 5th Division cut off the South Korean 3rd Division above Pohang, and forced their evacuation south by sea. General Walker reinforced the South Korean troops with parts of the 2nd US Infantry Division. On August 17th, the South Korean troops and the 2nd Division succeeded in stopping the enemy's advance on Pohang. One of the main factors for this was the lack of supplies from the North Koreans due to the difficult mountainous terrain.
The Nakdong Valley's natural corridor from Sangju to Daegu was another main line of attack by the North Koreans. All available troops gathered in an arc around Daegu at the beginning of August - from south to north these were the 10th, 3rd, 15th, 13th and 1st Divisions, as well as parts of the 105th Armored Division. Opposite the North Koreans were the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 1st and 6th Divisions of the 2nd South Korean Corps. The North Koreans crossed the Nakdong River in several places along the arc of Daegu during the second week of August. When several enemy artillery shells struck Daegu on August 18, the South Korean President Syngman Rhee ordered the relocation of the provincial government to Busan. The North Korean 1st and 13th Divisions posed the greatest threat as they advanced into Daegu via highways from the north and northwest. General Walker moved the 23rd and 27th Infantry Regiments directly from the defenses of the Nakdong Arch to reinforce the South Korean 1st Division, which faced the North Korean 1st and 3rd Divisions in their sector. Although the North Korean 1st Division was able to advance up to 14 km on Daegu, the combined efforts of the South Korean 1st Division and the 23rd and 27th US Infantry Regiments succeeded in preventing an advance into Daegu.
Troop reinforcements
Although the People's Army of North Korea threatened the US and South Korean troops in the Busan perimeter in August 1950, the defenders successfully withstood the enemy attacks and were able to continually raise more troops to counterattack. The Far East Air Force had won air sovereignty early in the war and continually influenced the outcome of the battles through a large number of missions in support of the ground forces, a total of 4,635 in July and 7,397 in August. By the end of August, there were more than 500 medium-weight US tanks in the Busan perimeter. The tanks in the tank battalions were evenly composed of M26 Pershings and M4 Shermans , with the exception of one battalion, which was already equipped with the newer M46 . On September 1, the United Nations commanded 180,000 men in Korea. 92,000 were South Koreans and the rest were mostly Americans and the 1,600-strong 27th British Infantry Brigade. In August, the North Koreans fought on the Han River with sustained frontal attacks, flanking and infiltration. When the US 8th Army stabilized the front line at the Busan perimeter, these tactics no longer worked, and only frontal attacks, penetrations and immediate exploitation of the situation were possible. General MacArthur and General Walker met by harnessing their strengths: internal lines of communication, superior artillery force, and a strong air force. On September 1, the North Koreans had assembled a 98,000-strong force for a massive offensive against the Busan perimeter. However, they faced fundamental problems, as a third of their soldiers were made up of forcibly recruited and untrained South Koreans. They also had a shortage of handguns and only enough food for one or two meals a day at most.
September 1950
As in August, General Walker faced the same threats at the same point in the Busan perimeter at the beginning of September: in the east near Pohang through the possible crossing of the corridor between Daegu and Pohang, north of Daegu, where the enemy had made frightening terrain gains on Nakdong Arch and in the Masan area to the south. As during the fighting in August, Walker maintained his tactic of moving troops from one threatened penetration by the enemy to the next. In early September the South Korean 3rd, Capital, 8th, and 6th Divisions held the extreme eastern front line against the North Korean 5th, 8th, 12th, and 15th Divisions. Major General John B. Coulter, the newly appointed Deputy Commander of the 8th US Army took command of the US forces in the Eastern Sector and deployed the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division in support of the South Korean divisions. On September 7th, General Church replaced Coulter as the American commander of the Eastern Sector after General Walker had ordered the entire 24th Division to support the South Koreans. A combination of ground skirmishes, mainly by the South Koreans, along with air support by the Americans and sea-based artillery fire, inflicted heavy losses on the North Korean divisions. The North Korean 1st, 3rd and 13th Divisions increased their attacks north of Daegu against the 1st US Cavalry Division, which General Walker ordered on September 5th to move the headquarters of the 8th Army from Daegu to Busan. The 1st Cavalry Division was largely able to withstand the North Koreans' advance, but fighting continued until mid-September.
Towards the end of August, the People's Army of North Korea also planned a blow to the south of the Busan perimeter against the 2nd and 25th US divisions. The North Korean 6th Division was to attack through Haman and Masan and capture Kimhae, 15 miles west of Busan. The 7th Division should strike north of the Masan Main Road, advance to the Nakdong River and wait there for the 6th Division on its right and the 9th Division on its left flank, and then lead the attack towards Busan. The 25th Division held the southernmost sector, which stretched from the confluence of the Nakdong and Nam Rivers to the coast, while the 2nd Division was stationed north of the 25th on the other side of the Nakdong. The North Korean 9th Division faced the 2nd Division at the Nakdong Arch and had the goal of conquering the cities of Miryang and Samnangjin and at the same time severing the connection of the 8th US Army between Busan and Daegu. In the first week of September the 9th Division entered the Nakdong Arch as far as Yongsan, but a counterattack by the 2nd Division along with the 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade threw them back across the Nakdong River. The 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division repulsed the North Korean 2nd Division 10 km north of Yongsan near Changnyong. At the same time, the 6th and 7th North Korean divisions began heavy attacks against the 25th US division. Despite the enemy intrusion into the sector of the 25th Regiment, the 25th Division was able to repel the offensive of the People's Army of North Korea in the south. The front line on the Nakdong River was held and the Busan perimeter was secured.
consequences
The US changed its Korean doctrine to a major strategic judgment within a few months in 1950. For the US, this meant active involvement in a major armed conflict. The 591,000-strong US Army had focused on the Soviet threat to Western Europe and its role as the occupying power in Europe and the Far East. The four divisions under MacArthur's Far East Command performed primarily occupation duties, and their actual combat readiness was still below the low official estimate. Each of MacArthur's divisions were about 7,000 men below the nominal strength of 18,900 men and had not received any new equipment since World War II. MacArthur did not fully support the build-up of the South Korean army and only suggested increasing it in 1948. When the South Korean Defense Minister asked the US for M26 Pershing tanks in 1949, the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) argued that roads and terrain would not allow tank operations in Korea - given the later use of Soviet T34 tanks in Korea clear misjudgment. When USAFIK withdrew from South Korea in 1949, it handed over weapons and equipment for around 50,000 men to the South Korean army, but these were not suitable for repelling armored attacks.
The US had failed to predict the North Korean invasion, and KMAG was mistaken in believing that the South Korean army could withstand such an invasion if the worst came to the worst. Even so, at the moment of the attack, the US decided to intervene on the South Korean side. President Truman authorized the use of the Air Force and Navy at an early stage, as well as a gradual expansion of ground operations. The Battle of Osan underscored the need for adequate combat training in the interaction of tanks and air forces in combat operations.
MacArthur underestimated North Korea's ability and determination, but realized his mistake when he concluded that it would take more than four divisions to defeat the enemy. The combined efforts of US and South Korean forces, led by General Walker, aided by air and sea superiority, slowed the North Korean advance south and resulted in a difficult but successful defense of the Busan perimeter. The fighting was intense, as the US casualties in mid-September 1950 showed - 4,599 killed, 12,058 wounded, 401 confirmed arrests and 2107 missing. North Korean casualties were also high - both in soldiers and tanks. With MacArthur's "hammer on the anvil", the difficult weeks of retreat and death were soon over: With the breakout from the Busan perimeter and the landing at Incheon by the 1st US Marine Division and the 7th US Infantry Division in the third week of September.
literature
- Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu United States Army in the Korean War. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1961.
- Blair, Clay . The Forgotten War: America in Korea. New York: Time Books, 1988.
- Collins, J. Lawton. Was in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
- Dean, Major General William F. General Dean's Story. New York: Viking Press, 1954.
- Edwards, Paul M. The Pusan Perimeter, Korea, 1950: An Annotated Bibliography. Westport, Conn .: Greenwood Press, 1994.
- Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.
- Schnabel, James F. Policy and Direction: The First Year . United States Army in the Korean War. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1972.