Ebro contract

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The Iberian Peninsula in the 3rd century BC Chr.

The Ebro Treaty was a treaty between the Carthaginian Hasdrubal and the Roman Empire in the run-up to the Second Punic War . In some ancient sources - with reference to the form of the contract as a general contract  - this is reproduced as the Hasdrubal contract , since it was concluded directly between the Carthaginian military leader Hasdrubal and Roman ambassadors.

The contract was signed between 227 BC. BC and 225 BC And thus well before the beginning of the Second Punic War. The exact year is controversial in research, but the period 226/225 is most frequently represented in the literature.

The treaty said that the border between the Roman and the Carthaginian sphere of influence in Iberia was the "Iber" and that Hasdrubal should not cross it with weapons. The question of which current river can be identified with the ancient Iber has not yet been clearly answered in research. It is also controversial whether a Sagunto clause existed, whether the treaty was ratified by Carthage, and what the exact causes of the war were that led to the outbreak of the Second Punic War. The Ebro Treaty is a fundamental point of contention in research into the causes of the Second Punic War and the "war guilt question" connected with it.

Prehistory and historical classification

After the defeat in the First Punic War in 241, Carthage lost Sicily to the Romans. In the turmoil of the mercenary uprising , in which the Libyan mercenaries turned against the North African state, the Romans occupied the proverbial granaries of Carthage, Sardinia and Corsica in 238 . The Carthaginians were unable to form any resistance to this breach of the Lutatius Treaty , they had to accept the additional loss of territory. In the following years Rome's sphere of influence expanded to the north of the Italian peninsula. Here the conflicts against the regional tribes about the Celtic War in Northern Italy came to a head. Carthage decided, under the leadership of Hamilkar Barkas, to compensate for the recent loss of territory through an intensive policy of conquest on the Iberian Peninsula.

The Romans observed the renewed expansion of their most important adversary in the western Mediterranean. As early as 231/230 a Roman embassy visited the Barkids and inquired about further plans for Iberia. The Romans were satisfied with the answer that the expansion was necessary in order to be able to settle the 241 negotiated reparations that were still outstanding .

Research problem

One problem with Carthage research is the widespread loss of Carthaginian sources and records. The contemporary tradition is predominantly Roman. Polybios is one of the most credible and, not least, most direct sources for the Ebro Treaty . However, it can be assumed that Polybius, who was abducted to Rome as a Greek hostage , was “not entirely free from practical constraints” in his remarks. The majority of the surviving texts -  Livy or Appian  - can be assigned to Roman annals . This is to be regarded as "anachronistic and misleading" as far as possible, since it tried to gloss over Roman history afterwards and therefore has to be considered critically in the evaluation. Methodically, the annalists proceeded in such a way that they offered their own interpretations of contracts and falsified geographical or chronological facts.

Content of the contract

Polybios sums up the content of the treaty in such a way that the Romans concluded a treaty with Hasdrubal, "in which there was no mention of the rest of Iberia, while the Carthaginians should not be allowed to cross the river Iber with warlike intentions." the Carthaginians unilaterally bound here and granted a defensive renunciation of their own expansion on the peninsula. In view of the impending Roman-Celtic conflict escalation, Hasdrubal gave no reason to do so. Zimmermann concludes that the Romans must have added their own offer to their contract request. This would have consisted in granting complete freedom of action in the area south of the river. This assumption is matched by the quote from Polybius: "In which there was no mention of the rest of Iberia." Bringmann offers a different interpretation of the Polybios passage; He formulated, ignoring the annalistic sources, that the treaty gave both sides a free hand and only refused the Carthaginians the warlike conversion of the Iber. This reading emphasizes the one-sided advantage for the Roman side, which on the eve of the confrontation in northern Italy wanted to persuade the Carthaginians to keep still. However, Polybios emphasized that the Romans had acted generously and avoided snubbing Hasdrubal.

To the location of the Ebro

Rivers of the Iberian Peninsula

Research disagrees as to where exactly the river , which was contractually referred to as the Iber , was located at that time or which river in Iberia is to be understood as the Iber river of the ancient springs. In addition to today's Ebro , the rivers south of Sagunto later named Júcar and Río Segura , but also called Iberus in Roman times, were localized by historians as alternative Iber variants. Polybius himself locates the river south and north of Sagunto. Another argument against the thesis of Sagunto as a city north of the river named in the Iber sources is that Polybius says that after Hannibal's victory over the Vakkäer on the upper Duero (south of the upper Ebro) no one would be on this side of the Iber besides Sagunto dared to stand against the Carthaginians. Most ancient sources also give the impression that Hannibal crossed the Iber for the first time after the destruction of Sagunto. However, knowing the location is important with regard to the Sagunto clause and the question of whether Sagunto was north of the Iber - which would make the clause superfluous - which river would then have to be crossed to besiege Sagunto, or whether Sagunto south, i.e. in the actual Carthaginian zone, and therefore a clause exempting Sagunto was drawn up.

In favor of the Ebro as a contract flow, Bringmann speaks out in such a way that the Carthaginian sphere of influence was below the Segura at the time the contract was signed and the Romans, Hasdrubal, would have allowed an immense area for further expansion. This position would find its equivalent in the sources in Polybius, who spoke of an understanding action by the Romans against the Barkids. Bleicken emphasizes the Roman safeguarding of interests in favor of Massalia , which had numerous trading establishments in southern Gaul and northern Spain. At that time, Massalia provided the Romans with information about the Carthaginian expansion in Iberia. The Romans protested - if you follow Polybius - against Hannibal's attack on Sagunto, but not against crossing the Iber border.

The Sagunto Clause

In terms of architecture, there are only a few structural remains today that trace a picture of ancient Saguntum. The photograph from 1870 shows the Roman theater of Saguntum.

The existence of this clause is controversial because, like the crossing of the Ebro, the Romans regard it as an occasion for war. According to the Romans, Sagunto was a Roman ally and was not allowed to be attacked by the Carthaginians. The occupation by Hannibal in the year 219 BC According to this reading , BC would be a breach of contract. According to the sources, however, the Romans waited a long time before coming to the aid of Sagunto, which gives the impression that Sagunto was no ally after all. The Carthaginians may not have legally recognized the Ebro Treaty and thus the regulations of the Lutatius Treaty of 241 BC applied to them. This explicitly protected Roman allies from Carthaginian influence, but Sagunto was demonstrably not an ally at the time of the Lutatius Agreement. As early as 1975, Bernhardt summed up based on the state of research at the time that Sagunto was not federated with Rome, but only had the status of an "Amicitia et societas relationship". From this point of view, the question arises to what extent the regulations of the Lutatius Peace also apply and should be applied to new allies of the Roman Empire.

What is certain is that Saguntum was in contact with Rome 241 - Rome had taken on arbitration duties. However, a formal alliance is questionable, which is why the corresponding clause of the Lutatius Treaty is not applicable. But the city had the status of an amicus populi Romani - a recognized and friendly city. It is unclear when Sagunto made closer contact with the Romans, this point in time is estimated between the Lutatius Treaty and until after the conclusion of the Ebro Treaty - Bleicken tends more towards the latter. He also doubts that the city would ever rise to the rank of socius populis Romani - allies. Presumably, the relationship with Sagunto was later upgraded by the Romans in the conversations that preceded the war through the Roman annals. In view of the unclear legal status of Sagunt and the Roman hesitation during the siege, which fell into a foreign policy phase that was problematic for Rome - renewed conflicts with the Celts in northern Italy and the beginning of the war against Illyria  - Bleicken speculates that Massalia , the Romans, were standing Drew attention to the increase in power of the Carthaginians in Iberia. This justifies the Roman intervention with its own power-political ambitions.

After Bringmann stated that in his opinion Sagunt is south of the Iber , he describes his model of the Sagunt clause. The classification of the city by Polybius north of the Iber is a result of the strong influence of the legal position of Roman politics. After Hannibal greatly expanded the Carthaginian area of ​​interest over the summer of 220, the Romans reacted in the winter of 220/19 with a group of negotiators. Hannibal ignored this diplomatic resistance to his expansionist policy. Then he conquered Sagunto after a long siege in order to thwart the Roman argument, the appeal to an existing protection relationship against the Saguntinians. Hannibal saw both the weak legal position and the military position of Rome, which was weakened by ongoing border conflicts. He consciously risked an intervention that failed to materialize. "Hannibal had thus exposed the Roman demarche of 220/19 as a diplomatic bluff."

In his remarks on the Ebro Treaty, Polybios did not mention any Saguntary clause, but did mention it later when it came to the question of war guilt. It is possible that this clause was an invention to dismiss the war guilt from the Romans. Another thesis is that the Saguntines attacked an ally of the Carthaginians who had been helped. If so, the attack by the Romans was not mentioned in their historiography (only the war winner was allowed to write histories); the hesitation on their part could also be explained, since Sagunto had waged a war of aggression. However, this thesis does not find support in ancient sources.

On the question of ratification

The question of whether Hasdrubal, as an independent ruler in the Iberian region and without the consent of the Carthaginians, negotiated with the Roman envoys, whether it was a general treaty that did not have to be ratified in Carthage, or whether it was concluded in the presence of Carthaginian councilors and therefore not ratified had to be is unclear. It is important because, according to Livy, Carthage had not ratified the treaty and therefore regarded it as invalid, which means that the Carthaginians had not breached the treaty and were therefore not guilty of the outbreak of war. This Livy passage refers to the assumption that it was a general contract between Hasdrubal and Rome, which would have remained binding neither for Hannibal nor for Carthage. The Carthaginian government later disavowed the Barkids, neither on the Ebro nor on the Sagunto question. Obviously, she started from the better legal arguments. After the Roman diplomats were unable to present their legal opinion convincingly in winter 220/19, Rome did not react after the fall of Sagunts, but only after crossing the Ebro. The Carthaginians did not comply with the following Roman demand for Hannibal's extradition, as it was a general treaty concluded with Hasdrubal, which not only lacked ratification by the Carthaginian people's assembly, but which also became obsolete upon his death, according to Bringmann.

Historical evaluation of the contract

Zimmermann rejects opinions that denounce Carthaginian politics as revanchist after the First Punic War . Hasdrubal accepted without a need to define the spheres of interest and signaled his renunciation of support for the Celtic opponents of Rome by accepting the Ebro border. Bringmann adds that the meaning of the contract is to be sought in the circumstances of the time. Rome planned its war against the Celtic tribes of northern Italy in 226/225. The main aim of the treaty was to prevent the Carthaginians from receiving military assistance. On the other hand, neither of the two contracting parties was able to establish “friendly or even contractual relationships with Iberian or Celt-Iberian tribes”. To this end, Rome extended previous treaties from nautical restrictions to the land border of the Iber. In this way Rome took account of the change in the Carthaginian army, which with the loss of its islands no longer needed to maintain a large fleet. Ultimately, this was one of the reasons why Hannibal attacked Italy over the Alps and did not translate in the Mediterranean.

Causes and occasions of the Second Punic War

Route of the Hannibal train from Sagunto over the Ebro and the Alps to Italy

It is questionable which details of the tradition are correct, because each interpretation gives a different reason for war. The Ebro Treaty probably played the decisive role here. However, it is possible that both parties sought war and the winner later continued the history and blamed Carthage for the war. It is conceivable that Carthage sought revenge for the humiliation of the lost First Punic War and the consequences of it, the recent loss of the two islands of Sardinia and Corsica and the associated payment, and prepared for the war with the help of the funds raised in Iberia .

literature

  • Pedro Barceló : Rome and Hispania before the outbreak of the 2nd Punic War . In: Hermes 124, 1996, pp. 45-57.
  • Peter Bender : Rome, Carthage and the Celts . In: Klio 79, 1997, pp. 87-106.
  • Klaus Bringmann : The Ebro Treaty, Sagunto and the way to the Second Punic War . In: Klio 83, 2001, pp. 369-376.
  • Fritz Moritz Heichelheim : New Evidence on the Ebro Treaty . In: Historia 3, 1954, pp. 211-219.
  • Krešimir Matijević : The Ebro Treaty and Responsibility for the 2nd Punic War . In: Gymnasium 122, 2015, pp. 435–456.
  • Ralf Urban : Rome's Gaul War 225–222 BC And the Ebro Treaty . In: Klaus Geus, Klaus Zimmermann (eds.): Punica - Libyca - Ptolemaica. Festschrift for Werner Huss , Leuven 2001, pp. 277–288.
  • John Serrati: Neptune's Altars. The Treaties between Rome and Carthaga (509-226 BC) . In: The Classical Quarterly 56, 2006, pp. 113-134.
  • Klaus Zimmermann : Rome and Carthage . 2nd edition, Darmstadt 2009.

Individual evidence

  1. a b See Bringmann, p. 369.
  2. Zimmermann, p. 43; Bringmann, p. 369.
  3. Christian Baldus : "Vestigia pacis": The Roman Peace Treaty as Structure and Event , p. 329. In: Historia : Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte , Volume 51, Issue 3, 2002, pp. 298–348. This question was already discussed before 1932. See: Walter Otto : An ancient war guilt question, the prehistory of the 2nd Punic War . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 145, Issue 3, 1932, pp. 489-516.
  4. Zimmermann, p. 42.
  5. Quoted from Zimmermann, p. 2.
  6. Brinkmann, p. 374.
  7. Quoted from Polybios 2.13.7, here quoted from the translation by Zimmermann, p. 43.
  8. Zimmermann, p. 44.
  9. Bringmann, p. 369 f.
  10. a b Bringmann, p. 371
  11. Pedro A. Barceló: Hannibal , p. 27f . Beck 1998
  12. Brinkmann, p. 375. To the north this can be found in Polybios III 14.9 and to the south in III 30.3.
  13. Polybios: Historien 3,14,9.
  14. Polybius: histories 2.13.5f
  15. Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic . 6th edition. Munich 2004, p. 45.
  16. Polybius: Histories 3.15.5
  17. Bringmann, p. 371f
  18. Livy 21:18
  19. ^ Rainer Bernhardt : The development of Roman Amici et Socii to Civitates Liberae in Spain , p. 414. In: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte , Volume 24, Issue 3, 1975, pp. 411-424.
  20. Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic . 6th edition. Munich 2004, p. 156.
  21. Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic . 6th edition. Munich 2004, p. 159f.
  22. Brinkmann, p. 372 f.
  23. Quoted from: Brinkmann, p. 372.
  24. Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic . 6th edition. Munich 2004, p. 157 f.
  25. Brinkmann, p. 372.
  26. Zimmermann, p. 45.
  27. Information from: Brinkmann, p. 370.
  28. Zimmermann, p. 116