First Punic War

The inscription on the Fasti triumphales lists the persons who were granted a triumph and the achievements for which they were awarded. Here is a fragment of these Fasti with the victors of the First Punic War (Rome, Capitoline Museums )

The First Punic War (Latin: Bellum Punicum primum ), also the First Roman-Punic War , was between Carthage and Rome from 264 to 241 BC. And was essentially a battle for Sicily . It was the first of three wars between the two empires and the longest war Rome had fought until then. With the conquest of Sicily, Rome rose from a regional power on the Italian peninsula to a major power in the Mediterranean region. The opponent of war, known by the Romans as the Punier ( Puni or Poeni) called Carthaginians, were initially able to assert themselves as a political actor in the western Mediterranean region despite great losses.

The war began when Rome was in 264 BC. Came to the aid of the Mamertines of Messana and intervened in Sicily. The west of the island was ruled by Carthage. Syracuse made peace with Rome the following year and became an important ally as the war continued. After the victory in the Battle of Agrigento in 262 BC. BC Rome planned to drive the Carthaginians completely from Sicily. A separate fleet was built for this purpose. The new weapon of the boarding bridges made up for the Roman deficits in maneuvering . The victory in the naval battle of Mylae was the consequence and, above all, psychologically important. Step by step, Rome expanded its activities into the Strait of Sicily . The crossing to North Africa 256 BC. Was the next logical step. After initial successes, the invaders suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Tynes (255 BC). The survivors were evacuated from the Roman fleet, which was enlarged by numerous captured Carthaginian ships after their sea victory at Cape Hermaion. On the way back to Rome, the majority of this fleet sank in a severe storm. After further losses, shipbuilding was stopped by the state, but a private Roman pirate war continued. In 242 a new Roman fleet was privately financed and manned by volunteers who had experience from the privateer war. The consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus achieved the decisive victory with this fleet in the spring of 241 at the Egadi Islands by attacking a large Carthaginian supply convoy in heavy seas. Afterwards Carthage asked for peace, renounced Sicily and made high reparations payments, which were additionally tightened by Rome .

Situation before the start of the war

Balance of power in the western Mediterranean after the First Punic War

The Empire of Carthage was an amalgamation of Phoenician cities and trading posts against Greek expansion into the western Mediterranean. The island of Sicily , the western part of which Carthage was able to hold against all Greek attacks, was particularly fought over . On the eve of the conflict with Rome, the Carthaginians' core area comprised the north coast of Africa in what is now Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, as well as western Sicily, the islands of Sardinia and Corsica and the southeast coast of present-day Spain. It was characterized by the strong orientation towards the sea with weak control over the hinterland. Jochen Bleicken describes Carthage's elite with older research as a “merchant aristocracy”; the army consisted to a large extent of mercenaries (Libyans, Iberians, Celts, Greeks). Walter Ameling questions this thesis: above all as rowers in the fleet, but also as aristocratic foot soldiers and as chariots fighters, numerous Carthaginians were themselves involved in the wars that their empire waged. That implies military training even in peacetime and a military ethos of Carthaginian society.

The question of which treaties existed between Rome and Carthage before the beginning of the First Punic War is controversial in research and is also influenced by the overall picture that the respective historian draws of the Carthaginian or Roman elite: Was the Carthaginian nobility as “Merchant aristocracy” mainly aimed at opening up new markets and trade advantages, or did it have a military self-image? Was the Roman nobility a meritocracy , in which consuls had to legitimize themselves through military success, and were therefore inclined to adventure? In contrast, what role did legal considerations play in the decisions of the Senate?

The first Carthaginian-Roman treaty (around 508/507 BC) and the second treaty between the two empires (348 BC) were not agreements on an equal footing; rather, Carthage was in the clearly stronger position. In the first treaty, Rome accepted a ban on its warships off the North African coast, while Carthaginian ships were allowed to operate freely off the coast of Lazio and only Latin cities under Roman sovereignty were protected from their pirate actions. The west of Sicily, controlled by Carthage, appears as a kind of free trade area; Carthage promoted Roman trade here. According to Klaus Zimmermann , the second contract came about at the request of the Romans. It reflects the situation of Rome, which was tied up in struggles for supremacy in central Italy. Apparently, it was desired that Carthage, as a foreign power, would act in Lazio in a way that would harm Rome's opponents. As far as it was not directly under Roman control, Rome abandoned Lazio to Carthaginian attacks and thus weakened the independent cities of Lazio, which were not even safe from Carthaginian piracy by a peace treaty with Rome. Carthage, on the other hand, only opened its own metropolis and western Sicily to Roman trade, thus excluding any kind of Roman presence in a large part of its territory. Rome must have been interested in replacing the provisions of this treaty with a better agreement once it was freed from its military predicament. This apparently happened in the late 4th century. Titus Livius wrote that the alliance with Carthage in 306 BC Chr. Was renewed for the third time, but he seems to count the contract of 348 as the first contract, so that between 348 and 306 a further contract would have to be assumed, about the content of which nothing is known.

Since the end of the 4th century there was probably an agreement between Rome and Carthage defining the Strait of Messina as the border between both spheres of influence. Sicily therefore belonged to Carthage. The existence of this so-called Philinos contract (306 BC) was disputed by the fundamentally pro-Roman ancient historian Polybius with the argument that he had not seen such a contract in the Roman archive ( Aerarium ); However, Polybios also mentioned that he did not research the archive himself, but that documents were presented to him. It seems obvious that a treaty which so blatantly wronged the Roman intervention in Messana could later have disappeared from the archives. For historians who doubt the existence of the Philinos Treaty (and thus follow the description of Polybius), a contractual stipulation of the areas of influence of Rome and Carthage is "too good to be true" (Dexter Hoyos).

In 279/78 there was another treaty between Rome, now a regional power in central Italy, and Carthage. Pyrrhus of Epirus had defeated two Roman armies in southern Italy; now he was asked by Syracuse to intervene in Sicily. A pact between Pyrrhus and Rome would have given Pyrrhus a free hand to intervene in Sicily on behalf of the Greeks. In order to dissuade Rome from such a separate peace, Carthage offered Rome the support of its fleet. Rome agreed and in this way avoided having to make peace on the terms of Pyrrhus after two defeats of its own. What is remarkable about the Pyrrhos Treaty is that it reaffirmed the provisions of a previous treaty. If the treaty of 306 had been a fiction of the philosopher, Rome 279/78 would have agreed to the provisions of 348 - difficult to imagine given the meanwhile increased importance of Rome. The treaty of 279/78 presupposes that Rome and Carthage had already agreed on a boundary between their spheres of interest, which is also an indication of the historicity of the Philinos treaty.

The Roman Empire ruled since the victory over Pyrrhus in 275 BC. BC Lower Italy. At first there was no conflict of interest for the land power Rome with the sea power Carthage, with which it had been allied several times against the Greeks, including in the Pyrrhic War. However, the supremacy of Rome over the Greek cities of southern Italy tended to lead to Rome taking over the interests of these cities and thus the opposition to Carthage.

The way to war

Messana between Syracuse, Carthage and Rome

The occasion of the First Punic War was that the Romans in 264 BC. Came to the aid of the Mamertines who lived in Messana (Messina) . The Mamertines were former Italian mercenaries who had gained control of the city by killing or driving out the previous inhabitants. Later they got into a regional conflict with Syracuse , the most important city of the Greeks living in eastern Sicily. The ruler of Syracuse at this time was Hieron II , who defeated the Mamertines in 270/269 in the Battle of Longanos. The most important ancient source on the Punic Wars, Polybius, describes the consequences as follows:

“The Mamertines, who had suffered a devastating defeat, took refuge partly under the Carthaginians and took their castle under their protection, partly they sent envoys to Rome, offered to surrender the city and asked them to help them as relatives. "

- Polybios : Histories 1.10.1.

There were five years between the defeat and the request for help; the causality suggested by Polybios is therefore questionable. Polybios writes in the quoted passage that there were two parties among the Mamertines (“partly ... partly”), one of which gave the Acropolis of Messana to the Carthaginians, while the other offered control of the city to the Romans. But it is difficult to imagine that the Mamertines sent two embassies to Carthage and Rome at the same time in an emergency, and so there is a tendency in research to correct Polybius.

Carl Neumann's solution was adopted by many historians: The Carthaginian general Hannibal persuaded the Mamertines to take on a Carthaginian garrison, which resulted in Hieron II losing the fruits of his victory on Longanos. No sooner had Hieron retreated to Syracuse and Hannibal left the port of Messana, than the Mamertines got rid of “the weak garrison by cunning or force ...” and Hieron then resumed the siege of Messana. After wild internal disputes, the Mamertines decided to ask Rome for help. But while the Senate in Rome was still discussing, the pro-Carthaginian party in Messana entered into negotiations with the Carthaginian Admiral Hanno, who knew how to “thwart the connection of the city to Rome”: Messana took on a Carthaginian occupation for the second time, and the pro-Roman party among the Mamertines gave in, intimidated. So Neumann made two successive occupations of the Acropolis out of a Carthaginian occupation of the Acropolis, without any reference in ancient tradition.

Alternatively, Matthias Gelzer and Johannes Hendrik Thiel are of the opinion that two simultaneous Mamertine embassies to Carthage and Rome are a fiction with which Polybius, or his source Quintus Fabius Pictor , relieved the Roman nobility. For when Messana was under the control of Carthage, a request for help from the Mamertines in 264 meant that they wanted to get rid of the Carthaginian occupation with the help of the Romans, and Rome did not intervene to fend off Syracuse and forestall the Carthaginians, but “to get Carthage out of its own To oust the position of Messana's protecting power, which it had held since 269. "

Jochen Bleicken suggests another solution : after the defeat on the Longanos, the Mamertines requested a Carthaginian garrison, which they later urged to withdraw. As a result, Messana was besieged jointly by Syracuse and Carthage in 264 and asked for Roman help. Accordingly, there was no Carthaginian occupation in Messana when Roman troops arrived there.

Senate, consuls and people's assembly as political actors in Rome

According to Polybius, the Roman decision to accept the request for help and intervene in Sicily came about in an unusual way. The Senate had long and inconclusive discussions.

"But the people, ruined by the previous wars ... decided to help (the Mamertines), on the one hand because of the advantages that a war ... had for the common good, but also because the consuls promised each individual safe and large profit."

- Polybios : Historien 1.11.1f.

Historians interpret this passage differently. For Klaus Zimmermann , the Senate was the political actor who had to decide on an intervention in Sicily, and if Rome intervened, a majority in the Senate was in favor. The legal dubiousness of this military undertaking (emphasized by the war-critical minority in the Senate) is the reason why the People's Assembly was brought into play:

• Either the Senate had a suitably prepared people's assembly resolve the war.
• Or the Roman historian Quintus Fabius Pictor, in view of the costly war, put the responsibility for it on the plebs and their desire to steal booty; a representation that Polybius followed uncritically.

Bruno Bleckmann , on the other hand, considers it historical that the Senate was reluctant to intervene in Sicily. He reconstructs the political processes as follows: The two consuls , and here in particular Appius Claudius Caudex , succeeded in getting Rome to accept the Mamertines' request for help against the Senate with the help of the people's assembly. The second consul, Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, besieged Volsinii , and Appius Claudius was looking for an equally prestigious and important command. The people's assembly - so it can be assumed - stipulated in 264 that the Mamertiner aid was the official task (provincia) of one of the two consuls. That the Senate hesitated is understandable because a large part of the Roman army was tied up in the siege of Volsinii.

The striving of the consuls for prestige, a recurring motive in the further course of the war, is a consequence of the political system of the (middle) Roman Republic, which can be characterized as " meritocracy ": Rule is founded on merit. According to Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, ​​the consuls did not act out of personal vanity, but as representatives of their families; they lived on the merits of their ancestors, which were ascribed to them as “credit”, but it was expected that they would contribute to the prestige of their families through their own feats. A good name could fade if the " symbolic capital " was not renewed through countable honors. Members of the political ruling class ( nobility ) competed for these honors .

Hans-Joachim Gehrke points out that in a triumph not only the triumphator and the soldiers involved were celebrated, but the entire society celebrated itself and religiously ensured that Rome's wars always ended victorious. That was a strong motive for the population to continue the war even after severe defeats, because it was already anticipated that Rome would triumph in the end.

Ancient War Guilt Discussion

Behind the report of Polybius, Eberhard Ruschenbusch asks how his two informants, Quintus Fabius Pictor and Philinos, assess the question of war guilt. He emphasizes that the question of guilt, according to ancient understanding, was not based on how the Roman intervention in Sicily took place in detail, but on whether it was fundamentally legitimate. Philinos raised a double accusation against Rome: The crossing of the Strait of Messina was a breach of contract, because Sicily was contractually defined as Carthage's sphere of interest, and (a secondary argument) the Roman help for the Mamertine robber state was immoral. Fabius did not deny the authenticity of the Philinos contract, according to Ruschenbusch, but claimed that Carthage broke the contract first and that Rome was therefore no longer bound by the contract. Against the moral argument of Philinos, Fabius put the strategic argument that Rome was threatened in its existence by the alleged expansion of Carthage and therefore had to prevent Carthage from controlling all of Sicily.

From these considerations it follows for Ruschenbusch: There was no interest in clarifying the war guilt through the description of the military actions. Rather, the description of the course of the war in the models of all ancient authors (Dio-Zonaras, Polybios, Diodor) was broadly consistent, not in the details. While Dio-Zonaras offered a coherent course of events, Polybios had tightened the course of the First Punic War, which was only a secondary topic in his historical work, so much that its presentation was misleading. A comparison with Dio-Zonaras and Diodorus helps here.

Roman expansionism

Polybius followed his source, Quintus Fabius Pictor, and presented Carthage as a threat to Rome on the eve of the First Punic War. An actually defensive Rome fought against the encirclement by Carthage with a preventive attack. But the Carthaginians neither ruled large parts of the Iberian Peninsula in 264, as Polybius claims at this point, nor did they control almost all of Sicily. Rather, the Iberian Peninsula was a region where Carthage expanded after its defeat in the First Punic War to compensate for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. That Carthage would have largely controlled both the territory of modern Spain and Sicily on the eve of the First Punic War is therefore an anachronistic combination of territories that Carthage ruled at different times. Carthaginian politics also gave the Senate of Rome no reason to feel threatened; on the contrary, Carthage signaled that it accepted the Roman expansion of power in southern Italy.

After the conquest of southern Italy, Bruno Bleckmann sees Rome as part of a movement of expansion that developed its own dynamic; that this extension of southern Italy encroached on Sicily and not z. B. to Northern Italy, can be explained partly by historical coincidence, partly by the expectation of rich booty. The intervention in favor of the Mamertines could have appeared as a locally limited military measure without great risk.

Klaus Zimmermann also sees Roman expansionism as the cause of war, since war successes of the upper class brought "career building blocks" to common soldiers. But Rome wanted to wage just wars and ascribe responsibility for his own defeat and the resulting consequences to the enemy.

The military conflicts

From the conflict over Messana to the sea battle of Mylae (264–260 BC)

A 264 BC The didrachm of the Messana Mint , coined in the 4th century BC, shows Minerva with a Corinthian helmet on the obverse , an eagle on a bundle of lightning on the reverse, next to it a sword, and on the obverse and reverse the inscription ROMANO [RVM], "Belonging to the Romans."

According to Polybios, the crew sent by Carthage had already arrived in Messana while the decision was being made in Rome. However, the Roman side was not involved in their withdrawal, shortly before the arrival of the Roman legions:

"But the Mamertines drove out the Carthaginian commander, who was already in possession of the castle, partly through intimidation, partly through cunning, called Appius and handed over the city to him."

- Polybios : Histories 1.11.4.

Klaus Zimmermann follows Dio-Zonaras against Polybius and reconstructs the Roman capture of Messana as a successful coup of an advance command: the military tribune Gaius Claudius convened a popular assembly in Messana, ie Rome acted as a mediator in the conflict with Syracuse. The Carthaginian commander Hanno took part, and when he did not want to meet the demands, he was imprisoned by the Roman side. With this leverage, the Roman advance command forced the Carthaginian garrison to leave Messana. The Carthaginians demanded the withdrawal of the Romans from Messana through a herald; and when the ultimatum passed, the Carthaginian siege of the city began.

Dieter Flach and Christine Schraven develop a different scenario: There was no Carthaginian occupation in Messana at the time of the Roman resolution, but while a Roman advance command under the military tribune Gaius Claudius was on its way to Messana, events there precipitated: Syracuse troops were about to To conquer Messana, and in dire straits a nearby Carthaginian fleet came to the aid of the Mamertines. Claudius now had to improvise and decided to drive the Carthaginian garrison out of Messana as an occupation force, which he succeeded.

From Messana to Syracuse

Theater of war Sicily 264–260 (gray: Carthage, green: Syracuse, magenta: Rome)

Coin minted by Hieron II depicting a Syracuse chariot

Appius Claudius Caudex then advanced with an army of two legions on Rhegion to relieve the besieged Messana. Syracuse and Carthage joined forces (surprisingly for the Roman side) to prevent a Roman advance into Sicily. During the night the legions crossed over to Sicily with a fleet that was hastily assembled. Claudius took advantage of the fact that the new allies operated separately and was able to blow up their siege ring around Messana. Hieron had probably not suffered any heavy losses, but for strategic reasons he withdrew with his troops into the mountains and then as far as Syracuse.

For the Roman battles with the Carthaginians, the representation of Dio-Zonaras is preferable to Polybius . Accordingly, the Carthaginians holed up on a peninsula near Messana. Since they were supplied by their own fleet, they could not be starved, and Claudius did not dare to attack them. His temporary command expired in a few months without winning any clear victory or booty. He therefore decided to make a quick advance on Syracuse , even though he had opposing troops behind him. Syracuse was strongly fortified and was able to repel several Roman attacks. Claudius' risky approach appears to have been aimed at intimidating the Syracusans in order to reach a peace deal with either Hieron or the opposition party. Hieron managed to hold off the Romans, and Claudius retired to winter camp in Rhegion, which ended his term of office.

Claudius had successes in Sicily that did not justify triumph , and overall he left an unresolved situation. The consuls of the following year, Manius Valerius Maximus Corvinus Messalla and Manius Otacilius Crassus , were sent to Sicily with two consular armies and four legions, respectively: 18,000 men, reinforced by auxiliary troops of the allies. They met with little resistance. In the north-east of the island, most of the cities surrendered to the Roman supremacy without a fight. Valerius and Otacilius acted partly together, but partly also independently of each other (if only for reasons of easier troop supply); Valerius succeeded in driving out the entrenched Carthaginians near Messana and thus liberating the city, which earned him the title of Messalla. Hieron II got so on the defensive by the Roman successes that he offered a peace treaty. The Roman side recognized the advantage of having its own supply base in Sicily in the war with Carthage, and so Hieron received moderate conditions: he had to release his Roman prisoners and pay 100 talents, 25 of them immediately. For this he received the status of friend and ally and remained ruler of Syracuse and some Syracuse cities in eastern Sicily. He had to cede the cities that he had conquered from the Mamertines, and they were probably accepted into an amicitia relationship by Rome . Thus a network of relationships developed between Sicilian cities and Rome, which offered new potential for conflict with Carthage: It was no longer just about Messana.

Valerius now advanced into the Carthaginian western part of Sicily, where several cities surrendered or were conquered (particularly important: Segesta ) before the consuls withdrew to winter quarters. Bleckmann and Zimmermann believe that the campaign in the western part of the island laid the foundation for the escalation of the war. For example, Rome was now Segesta's protecting power and would not have left the city to a Carthaginian punitive action. Hans-Joachim Gehrke judges quite differently : The campaign into the Carthaginian epicracy in western Sicily was a demonstration of power, a foray, not the start of a long-term commitment there. From the Roman point of view, the war ended victoriously with the triumph of Valerius. "But it was precisely at this point that their intentions were overwhelmed by reality." The attempt to intimidate Carthage was counterproductive. Carthage was not ready to accept the Roman presence in Sicily and was arming itself. In response, Rome stepped up its warfare and the war escalated.

Roman conquest of Agrigento

So the Roman engagement in Sicily continued into the year 262. While Polybios writes that two legions fought there, this is unlikely according to Bleckmann, since both consuls were militarily active in Sicily; The course of the battle also makes it probable that a four-legion army was raised. The reason for this was that Carthage had chosen the Greek city of Agrigento ( Akragas ) on the Sicilian south coast as a base of operations in order to oppose the Roman expansion in Sicily from here. After Polybios, the Carthaginians gathered mercenary troops from Liguria, Gallia Cisalpina and Spain, Dio-Zonaras added the information that a Carthaginian fleet had been sent to Sardinia to tie up Roman troops to defend Italy. The two consuls succeeded in enclosing Agrigento , which was defended by Hannibal Gisko , and also cut off the port. Roman supplies were stored in Herbessos and thus prepared for the starvation of Agrigento. Carthage sent a relief army under Hanno, which destroyed the supply store in Herbessos and attacked the Roman army, weakened by hunger. However, it held up. Hieron, who had waited to see how the military situation developed, now provided logistical support to Rome. A second attack by Hannos could be repulsed and the relief army pushed back to Heraclea ( Battle of Agrigento ). Thereupon Hannibal Gisko broke out with part of the garrison from the besieged Agrigento and fled; he left the city to be sacked by the Romans. They sold all the residents into slavery; this set an example. The Roman army then withdrew to the winter camp in Messana.

The Marsala wreck found near the Aegadian Islands in 1971 (Museo archeologico Baglio Anselmi, Marsala)

Polybius writes that from now on the Romans planned to drive Carthage completely from Sicily. Indeed, all Roman land gains were unsecured while Carthage still had a base on the island; the previous Punic-Greek conflicts had shown this. The consuls of 261 tried to conquer one Sicilian city after another, but this land war did not bring any significant progress. When the consuls withdrew to winter quarters, only a Roman garrison remained in Segesta . The Carthaginian general Hamilkar used the strategic weakness of the Roman warfare in the winter of 261/60 to win back Sicilian cities and carry out attacks on the Italian coast with his fleet. In contrast to the Roman militia, his mercenary army did not fight in seasonal cycles. According to Zonaras, this experience led to a radical reorientation of Roman strategy the following year. The Senate decided at short notice to build a fleet in response to the Carthaginian attacks of winter 261/60. You needed ships to bring your own troops to Messana or Syracuse and to repel a Carthaginian attack on such a troop transport; the improvised and risky crossing of the Strait of Messina at the beginning of the war was not to be repeated. It is possible that the Roman shipbuilders studied the wreckage of a capsized Phoenician ship and used it as a model. The Punic wreck of Marsala shows what there was to be learned here. Apparently the Punians marked the ship's planks so that it could be put together like a kit; this made the Roman replica easier.

But it is also possible that Polybius exaggerated the inexperience of the Romans. Boris Rankov considers that Rome already had a fleet at the beginning of the war and was not completely dependent on its “seafaring allies” (socii navales) . The military historian Yann Le Bohec takes this thesis firmly: both Diodorus and Polybius condensed the alleged maritime ignorance of the Romans before the Punic War into anecdotes, and the later Roman successes in naval warfare then appear to these ancient authors as miracles. According to Le Bohec, Rome would not have ruled much of the Italian peninsula without warships, because to do so Rome had to be able to protect the long coastlines. If the treaties between Rome and Carthage speak of Roman merchant ships calling at Sicily or Carthage, it follows that whoever has such merchant ships also has warships. In 261, the Roman Senate decided not to build a new fleet, but to build a significantly larger navy.

The Roman lower class (in addition to the allies) provided a large contingent of rowers, and in the further course the rowers were repeatedly added from the lower class after the loss of the fleet. The Roman lower class was burdened much more heavily in the naval war than in the previous land war. In contrast to Athens, when recruiting rowing teams, Rome relied either on compulsion or on payment, but never on participation.

Consulate of Gaius Duilius

Inscription on the column base of the Columna rostrata built in honor of Duilius in Rome (reconstruction, Museo della Civiltà Romana )

According to Polybios, one of the two consuls, Gaius Duilius , had been commissioned with the land war in Sicily, while the other consul, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina in Italy, was responsible for building fleets (20 triremes and 100 pentenes ) and training the rowers. Scipio then crossed over to Messana with his advance command of 17 ships and was captured by the Carthaginians while attempting to conquer the island of Lipara . Dio-Zonaras presents the distribution of tasks in a completely different way. According to this, Duilius was in command of the fleet from the start and was busy building ships and training the teams in Italy; Scipio, on the other hand, was entrusted with the land war and had a small fleet to support it. In doing so, he tried to take the island of Lipara by surprise, exceeding his competencies, and was captured. As a result, the Romans were everywhere on the defensive, and Duilius hurried to the Sicilian theater of war.

These events are reported in the most detailed epigraphic document of the First Punic War, the Duilius inscription, which, of course, dates from the time of Augustus and, if authentic, is a copy of a contemporary monument to the victor of Mylae. According to the inscription, Duilius had built and equipped the fleet; His merit was therefore the equipping of the Roman fleet with boarding bridges (so-called Corvi ). The previous practice during a sea battle was that the ships tried to sink each other with a ram. Skillful turning maneuvers, which required an experienced crew, brought the ship into a suitable position in order to damage the opposing ship in the middle with one's bow. “The moment when the attacker gave up his distance while ramming was the chance for the ... Romans. If it was possible to fixate the enemy ship at that moment, its mobility would be over ”and the legionary soldiers on board forced the enemy crew to enter into close combat during boarding, in which they were defeated. The boarding bridges transformed the sea war into a "land war". Yann Le Bohec puts this assessment into perspective: on the one hand, the Carthaginians certainly had experience in land warfare, on the other hand, tactics of the Roman infantry could not really be used when boarding a ship. The Roman ships were built to accommodate a larger crew than their Punic opponents. That was an advantage when boarding.

The consul Gaius Duilius met Hannibal Gisko's fleet near Mylae . Because of the Roman inexperience in naval warfare, the Carthaginians proceeded carelessly and suffered heavy losses due to the new tactics of the boarding bridges. The Romans boarded 30 ships, including the Heptere Hannibal. This narrowly escaped capture. According to Klaus Zimmermann , the strategic value of this Roman victory was not too great, and Carthage was able to quickly replace the lost ships. But the psychological effect was significant. The new self-confidence of Rome as a sea power is expressed in the victory monument, the Columna rostrata on the forum.

From the Battle of Mylae to the withdrawal of Rome from Africa (260-255 BC)

Theater of war, Sicily 260–259

Elogium for Lucius Cornelius Scipio in the tomb of the Scipions on the Via Appia

A land war largely confined to Sicily had now expanded into a naval war; thus a new level of escalation was reached. The following three war years from 259 to 257 were dealt with relatively briefly by Polybius, which gives the impression that the Roman warfare stagnated, be it that the inexperienced Roman sailors were extensively trained and public opinion for the great project of an expedition to Africa had to be won ( Johannes Hendrik Thiel ), be it that the Roman strategy was purely defensive (John Francis Lazenby). But there are also indications from Polybius that the previous pattern continued on the Roman side: an aggressive, expansive foreign policy without a long-term strategy, mainly driven by the ambition of the consuls to gain as much prestige as possible during their term of office and therefore reckless.

Hamilkar used the winter of 260/259 to reverse the Roman land gains in Sicily. He conquered several cities, including Kamarina , and defeated part of the Roman troops at Therma, which were in winter camp. One of the two consuls of 259, Aquillius Florus, therefore received the unattractive task of a land war in Sicily. Although he could not prevent Hamilkar from fortifying Drepana ( Trapani at the foot of Mount Eryx) and thus creating a new Carthaginian base after the loss of Agrigento, he defended the Roman positions and was given a second term in order to allow renewed Carthaginian advances during the winter to prevent.

The consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio received the supreme command of the Roman fleet. He avoided meeting the still superior fleet of Carthage and pursued a project that could bring him maximum prestige: the conquest of new terrain. He set 259 BC. From Ostia or from Cosa to Corsica , an island with a relatively weak Carthaginian presence, and conquered Aleria . This was to be the basis for advances on the Carthaginian-controlled island of Sardinia . Sardinia was strategically interesting in several ways: From here Carthage could undertake forays into central Italy. Sardinia also provided soldiers for Carthage and supplied grain. Zonaras writes that Scipio encountered an outnumbered Punic fleet on the crossing to Sardinia, but that it got to safety without Scipio being able to take advantage of the situation. According to Bruno Bleckmann , reports of Scipio's land gains in Sardinia are to be judged as late inventions or confusions, rather Scipio landed near Olbia , but then returned to Italy without having achieved anything because he had too few foot soldiers for an expedition into the interior of the island. This version offered by Zonaras agrees with a (posthumous) ologium of Scipio, which emphasizes as his great deeds the conquest of Alesia, further successes in Corsica and the survival of a sea storm.

Theater of War Sicily 258–256

258 BC The two consuls of the year commanded the troops in Sicily - according to Polybius. Again, according to Bleckmann, Zonaras is preferable, which is confirmed by another source, the Fasti triumphales : According to this, Aulus Atilius Caiatinus led a large-scale offensive within the Sicilian land war that gained land in central Sicily, but was hasty. This is probably why Atilius got into trouble with Kamarina and had to be saved by Calpurnius Flamma. The fleet contingent assigned to Atilius was waiting here on the south coast, with which he set off on a prestigious expedition: the attack on Lipara. That his siege was unsuccessful is evident from the fact that Lipara was later used by the Carthaginians as a naval base. The information in Zonaras and in the Fasti triumphales can be combined as follows: Atilius' co-consul Gaius Sulpicius Paterculus conquered Sardinia quickly and easily. Encouraged by this, he dared a crossing to Africa. In thick fog he met the Carthaginian fleet led by Hannibal Gisko , sank some ships, whereupon Hannibal fled with the others. Hannibal ordered the ships to be left empty on the coast, as there was no suitable port, and withdrew with the troops by land to Sulci on the southern tip of Sardinia. Here he was killed in a mutiny. Sulpicius now went plundering through Sardinia, but was defeated by Hanno.

The most important event in the generally rather quiet year of war 257 BC. Was the Roman victory in the sea battle at Tyndaris. Although both consuls were involved, the victory was attributed to Gaius Atilius Regulus , probably because he was in command. The triumph (triumphus navalis) probably celebrated him not so much for the success at Tyndaris and more for his subsequent, rich forays into the Strait of Sicily , especially the plundering of Malta mentioned by Orosius . With the ventures in the Strait of Sicily, the Roman fleet had moved ever closer to the North African coast, and a crossing to Africa was the logical next step. Both consuls of the year 256, Lucius Manlius Vulso Longus and Marcus Atilius Regulus , united their fleets, which guaranteed the numerical superiority over any Carthaginian fleet.

Africa expedition

The sea ​​battle at Cape Ecnomus is presented in great detail by Polybios, and only briefly by Dio-Zonaras. The waters off Heraclea with Dio-Zonaras are assumed to be the theater of war (Polybios does not name a location; Cape Ecnomus is a modern assumption). Polybios' description of complex tactical maneuvers seems to be taken more from a military manual of his time than a historical account of the events of 256, according to Bleckmann. Zimmermann, however, thinks that Polybios was able to use eyewitness reports.

According to Polybius, 330 Roman and 350 Carthaginian warships took part in the battle of Ecnomus; Although these numbers are excessive, according to Zimmermann, the assumed fleet size of 200 to 250 units each also shows that both sides are looking for a decision. George K. Tips presents a description of the sea battle of Cape Ecnomus that is as close as possible to the information given by Polybius. Accordingly, the Roman fleet, traveling parallel to the coast, approached the Carthaginian ships in a wide line next to each other in a wedge formation. If the consuls concentrated their forces like this in the middle, it should be possible to break through. However, it is unclear what was hoped for. The Carthaginian ships were superior in agility and speed. “The wedge formation described by Polybius is only improbable if we assume that the Roman consuls had a clear idea of ​​what they were doing. Their tremendous mistakes, of which this was only the beginning, make such an assumption unlikely. ”The Punic warships in the center apparently withdrew to lure the Roman wedge into pursuit: a maneuver that Carthage used in the land war (Battle of Akragas) had already successfully applied. Everything looked like a definite Carthaginian victory. But Hamilkar wrongly assumed that the Roman fleet would maintain its formation and planned accordingly; What he did not know was that the consuls were accelerating the pace so much that the ships behind (the base of the triangle) had to lag behind and the wedge tore apart. As a result, the Carthaginian plan did not work to enclose the attacking Roman formation and then attack from all sides (whereby the Roman ships operating in a confined space would have hindered each other). Now three uncoordinated battles developed simultaneously, and in the chaos Rome was victorious. For tips, Ecnomus is a classic example of how unpredictable actions by an inexperienced opponent can ruin a strategy. John Francis Lazenby, on the other hand, thinks that the development of the battle with the dissolution into three partial battles for the Carthaginian fleet commanders went according to plan. Ultimately, they failed because they couldn't find a remedy for the boarding bridges.

Despite the Roman victory, the two Carthaginian naval commanders Hanno and Hamilkar were still able to conduct operations in the waters around Sicily. The Roman fleet then withdrew to Messana and peace negotiations began. The fact that the two consuls agreed to consult with the Senate and the People's Assembly meant a delay in the conduct of the Roman war and only made sense if there was a real interest on the Roman side in an end to the fighting. This failed, however, according to Bleckmann, because of the “ oligarchical pairs” in Rome, for whom a continuation of the war offered opportunities to gain prestige.

Terracotta vase in the form of a war elephant, found in Pompeii ( Naples National Archaeological Museum )

The two consuls tried to use the rest of their term of office as prestigious as possible. The crossing to Africa was risky, the Roman fleet was encircled by Hanno, who was outnumbered and therefore dared not attack. So the Roman troops landed near Aspis in North Africa and conquered the city. They secured the base, plundered the hinterland from here and freed many Roman prisoners of war. Part of the army had to spend the winter in Aspis if one did not want to give up all the successes in North Africa. Negotiations with the Senate about an extension of command resulted in Manlius returning to Rome with the booty and part of the fleet and celebrating a triumph for the victory at Cape Ecnomus, while Regulus remained in Africa with two legions. That gave him the chance to be the most prestigiously the one who victoriously concluded the campaign against Carthage. That is why he, like the Carthaginians, was interested in peace negotiations. The opposition's position was further weakened by a Numidian revolt against Carthage. The Punic rural population fled to the metropolis, the food supply of this enlarged population caused problems. Cassius Dio provides details of the list of requirements. Zimmermann believes that Roman claims from different treaties have been mixed up, which is why a reconstruction of Regulus' offer to Carthage is no longer possible. In any case, they were so tough that they amounted to a surrender. Carthage had nothing to lose if it refused peace under these conditions and continued to fight.

Bleckmann, on the other hand, distinguishes in the text of Cassius Dio a first catalog, which is plausible to Regulus, and a second, which is anachronistic for Regulus:

• The first provides for the renunciation of Sicily and Sardinia, the release of Roman prisoners of war and the ransom of its own prisoners of war, as well as the assumption of the Roman war costs: hard enough, but within the range of what Rome could ask for.
• The second catalog of demands imposed an alliance on the Carthaginians, according to which every war in Carthage had to be approved by Rome, Carthage was only allowed to own its own warship and had to support Roman expeditions with 30 triremes, which was completely excessive in the situation of 256. Bleckmann therefore considers this second catalog of demands to be a back projection of the Roman peace conditions after the Second Punic War .

Regulus had counted on the Carthaginian leadership agreeing to his tough conditions in their difficult domestic political situation. Against all odds, Carthage refused, and Regulus was now forced to continue the war in North Africa.

The Spartan Xanthippos , a mercenary leader, trained the Carthaginian infantry and the use of war elephants and cavalry units . The Roman army under Regulus suffered in 255 BC. In the battle of Tynes (today's Tunis, approx. 15 km south of Carthage) a devastating defeat: Xanthippus offered the Romans a battle in terrain that was unfavorable for them, Regulus rushed into it. In the plain, the Carthaginians were able to make optimal use of their cavalry and their war elephants. The consul was captured in the course of the battle. Zimmermann says that the Carthaginians owed the success of Tynes to their own resources and not to the newly recruited Greek mercenaries. Polybius stylized the Spartan Xanthippos as the tactical conqueror of Rome “in a surge of Greek national pride”: it is elementary that a strong cavalry and war elephants can best be deployed on the plain; The Carthaginian military leadership knew this even without advice.

Sea battle at Cape Bon, ship disaster off Kamarina

→ Main article : Sea battle at Cape Bon (255 BC)

The remnants of the defeated expeditionary army withdrew to Aspis. The consuls of the year 255, Servius Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior and Marcus Aemilius Paullus , received the order to evacuate these survivors. According to Bleckmann, the fact that a Roman combat fleet with approx. 350 ships sailed back to Africa shows that the two consuls were pursuing more ambitious goals beyond the rescue operation. On the outward journey, pirate raids were undertaken and Kossyra ( Pantelleria ) was devastated . A Punic fleet consisting of around 200 warships opposed the 350 Roman warships at Cape Bon (Cape Hermaion), but was crushed after a short battle. The Romans sank 16 ships and captured 114 ships. In contrast, the Roman losses were insignificant. Both the remnants of Regulus' expeditionary army and the crew of the fleet that had been deployed to rescue them now plundered in North Africa, but they increasingly ran into supply problems. To set up a garrison on North African soil was not possible for logistical reasons, and so only Pantelleria remained as a Roman base when the fleet started its return journey to Rome.

→ Main article : Ship disaster off Kamarina

The majority of this fleet sank in a storm off the southern coast of Sicily; this shipwreck with up to 100,000 deaths is considered the greatest catastrophe in maritime history. Nevertheless, both consuls celebrated a triumph for their victory at Cape Bon; in addition, Aemilius Paullus, like Duilius before him, was honored in Rome with a Columna rostrata . The Carthaginians used the situation for an offensive. Their most important achievement was the retaking and destruction of Agrigento.

From the withdrawal from Africa to the battle of the Aegatic Islands (255–241 BC)

Remnants of the Punic city fortifications of Palermo with later revisions. Outer wall of the Santa Caterina Monastery, Via Schiopperetti.

Theater of War Sicily 254–251

The Romans were able to almost compensate for the ship losses off Kamarina with an ambitious fleet building program. The consuls of the year 254 BC BC, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina and Aulus Atilius Caiatinus , had served once, and their high social prestige, combined with a large clientele , apparently resulted in many volunteers signing up for military service. Together with the rest of the expedition fleet of their predecessors, they had over 300 warships. The attack on the Carthaginian bases in Sicily began on the north coast. The Carthaginian general Karthalo successfully repelled a siege of the Drepana fortress. After this failure, the Romans attacked Palermo (Panormos). The lower town was stormed, but the citadel (according to Dio-Zonaras) offered resistance for a long time and was starved to death. After that, there was only enough time for minor military operations. The conquest of Palermo was particularly profitable for the Romans because the defeated inhabitants were allowed to buy themselves free from the threat of enslavement. Rome received over 400 talents of silver from them , which corresponds to 8-14.4 tons. A fragment of the history of Cassius Dio states that the Carthaginians brought up some Roman ships laden with booty on the return voyage.

The relatively successful strategy of the attacks on the Sicilian north coast was implemented in the following year 253 BC. Continued; The focus was on an attempted attack on the fortress Lilybaion . From the western tip of Sicily the fleet drove on to Africa under the consuls Gaius Sempronius Blaesus and Gnaeus Servilius Caepio . Carthaginian resistance prevented them from setting up a base on land, and so they sailed along the coast, getting into dangerous situations off the island of Djerba (Meninx) and near the Gulf of Gabès . Unsuccessful, the navy turned back, ran at Palermo and headed for the Italian coast. Over 150 ships were lost on the high seas off Palinuro ; Consul Servilius was obviously among the drowned men. According to Polybios, this recent shipping disaster led to a change in Roman strategy: from naval warfare there was a return to land warfare. The only tangible result was the booty gained from looting the African coast, which was enough for a triumphal procession by Sempronius. Bleckmann concludes from this that the Senate was thoroughly satisfied with the successes in the Naval War 253 and that the People's Assembly pushed through its suspension.

The consuls of 252 commanded their legions, the remaining Roman fleet and the fleet of the allied Syracuse. With these combined forces, they took Thermai Himeraiai after the Carthaginians evacuated the place. It seemed that Rome could be successful without a large fleet, and so shipbuilding was postponed for another year. Carthage observed this development and responded with an offensive: a large Carthaginian army led by Hasdrubal with 140 war elephants landed in Sicily. Hasdrubal besieged Palermo, which was defended by the proconsul Lucius Caecilius Metellus . Metellus had a ditch dug in front of the walls and set up lightly armed units in front of it, with the task of inciting the elephants to attack and luring them into the ditch. Here the animals were so badly injured with projectiles that they panicked against the Carthaginian troops. Metellus now led the failure and achieved a significant victory. Hasdrubal returned to Carthage and was sentenced to death as responsible for the heavy defeat. Metellus, on the other hand, was honored with a triumph in Rome, in which the captured war elephants were displayed. As a result of this event, the elephant became a kind of “family coat of arms” of the Caecilii Metelli , which appears several times on their coins.

Consul Publius Claudius Pulcher (249 BC)

Theater of war, Sicily 250–249

Theater of War Sicily 248–241

From 250 BC The Carthaginian fortress Lilybaion on the western tip of Sicily became the main battlefield of war; it was considered impregnable. Roman attempts to achieve quick success by storming or betraying Carthaginian mercenaries came to nothing. There was also no way of preventing Carthaginian reinforcements from reaching Lilybaion through the narrow harbor entrance. Now a siege wall has been raised to starve the city. But the besiegers also suffered from supply and health problems. When the consuls then halved the size of the siege army, this remaining army itself found itself in a threatening situation. The consuls of 249 therefore had the task of finding a solution to this messy situation. Publius Claudius Pulcher continued the siege of Lilybaion, but the defenders had ample supplies and the possibility of reinforcements by sea at any time. Driven by his personal ambition, Claudius prepared a naval action. He had his siege troops build ships based on the model of a captured high-quality Carthaginian Pentere. With these newly built, some captured and the already existing Roman warships, he brought together a new fleet. The aim was a surprise attack on Drepana, from where the Carthaginians supported the defenders of Lilybaion. He assumed a pirate-style surprise operation and did not expect a regular sea battle. The Carthaginian fleet, led by the Adherbal, left in good time and stopped the attackers so that they had to fight with their backs to the coast - an unfavorable situation. The fact that the inexperienced Roman ship's crews were unable to coordinate maneuvers had a disastrous effect in the Battle of Drepana . Claudius lost 93 ships and saved himself with a remnant of about 30 ships. After this severe defeat he returned to Rome.

Shortly after this defeat, the fleet of the consul Lucius Junius Pullus sank in a storm off the south coast of Sicily. In view of these losses, the Senate discussed how to proceed. Claudius apparently claimed as consul to lead another fleet to Sicily, which his opponents in the Senate did not want to allow because of his failures at Drepana. The majority of the Senate instead ordered Claudius to appoint a dictator. This in turn then raised his own client, Marcus Claudius Glicia, to this position. That was entirely in accordance with the Roman constitution. However, the opposition managed to abdicate Claudius Glica, possibly with the help of the augurs. The dictator Aulus Atilius Caiatinus , who was then appointed by Claudius and a former consul, could not achieve any major successes; thus the experiment of a dictatorship for foreign policy purposes ended without consequences.

After the consuls of 248 had continued the land war in Sicily and the attacks on Lilybaion and Drepana without any progress, it was decided in 247 to end the naval war. Apparently public opinion was agitated at the heavy losses of 249, and this prompted the tribunes to take action. Claudius had to answer in a perduellion process. The domestic political backgrounds are identified differently in research:

• Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp believes that the two tribunes Pullius and Fundanius Fundulus, together with representatives of the nobility, brought Claudius to justice for the provocative appointment of one of their own clients as dictator. The formal reason for the process, however, was an alleged disregard for auspices, an expression of delusional overestimation of oneself. The Roman defeat was a divine punishment for the auspice crime of Claudius, and with this construction Claudius could be made liable for his unauthorized conduct of the war.
• Bruno Bleckmann , on the other hand, sees Pullius and, above all, Fundanius acting as independent, important popular people who understood how to exploit the indignation of the population over the costly warfare and who worked towards the decision of the people's assembly to end the naval war. Claudius escaped a capital lawsuit and was sentenced to a fine.

From 247 B.C. In Sicily, Hamilcar Barkas took over the Carthaginian supreme command. In the course of the next few years he managed to regain lost ground through rapid attacks.

A new Roman fleet

Roman warship, relief, 1st century BC. BC ( Vatican Museums )

Victoria depiction of the ram of a Roman warship sunk near the Egadi Islands, inscribed dated to 241 BC. BC (Battle of the Egadi Islands Project)

Polybius depicts the final phase of the First Punic War in a moralizing way as a painful struggle between two exhausted opponents of the war, in which the Romans were able to achieve one last great energy output due to their greater discipline and therefore won. Carthage apparently had massive financial problems and therefore difficulties in paying its mercenaries and maintaining its fleet. From the Roman point of view, the situation was not so dramatic, but a protracted, thoroughly successful land war in Sicily.

While the naval war was interrupted by the state for a few years, there were private naval associations that carried out an attack on the North African port city of Hippo , for example . This large-scale piracy revived a traditional form of private war that had become uncommon in Rome because an aristocrat there could only gain prestige in a state context and not on his own with a private troop of soldiers. When the state then resumed fleet building, it had taken on features of the previous private privateer war:

“Reserves were no longer available in the state treasury ... According to their personal financial circumstances, they [= members of the nobility and the knightly class] undertook to provide an equipped Pentere , alone, in twos or threes , on the condition that they Reimbursed costs if things went according to plan. "

- Polybios : Historien 1.59.6.

The crews of these ships had not been recruited by the Roman militia system, but were volunteers. They brought practical experience from the previous private pirate war with them. As a result, the new Roman fleet acted much more professionally than previous Roman fleets. One of the consuls of the year 242, Gaius Lutatius Catulus , managed to get the command of the navy alone because his colleague Aulus Postumius Albinus was a Flamen Martialis and the Pontifex Maximus forbade him to participate in a war outside Italy - probably a political maneuver. Lutatius Catulus supported the Roman besiegers of Drepana with the fleet. He took the port of Drepana as well as anchorages and other positions at Lilybaion. But then he was wounded himself because he fought at high personal risk, always with the motive to excel. The wound restricted his radius of action in Sicily. In March 241, at the end of his year in office, he achieved a spectacular victory: at dawn in heavy seas he attacked a large Carthaginian supply convoy. These were warships that had been converted as transport ships, with additional warships as escort. The heavily laden transport ships were difficult to maneuver; that was the decisive factor in the battle of the Egadi Islands . Some of the Carthaginian ships managed to escape, so that the Carthaginian fleet was weakened but not destroyed. Yann Le Bohec sums up: The First Punic War started at sea (with Roman troops translating to Sicily), fought largely as a naval war, and it ended at sea. However, a pseudo-battle, namely a Roman ambush, can be established near the Egadi Islands.

peace contract

→ Main article : Lutatius Treaty

After this defeat, the Carthaginians asked for a peace treaty. According to Polybios, they had no other choice, as a continuation of the war in Sicily had to appear hopeless due to a lack of supplies. Klaus Zimmermann doubts this, however, since the high Roman demands for money, part of the peace treaty, were met by Carthage. Then Carthage would have had the opportunity to use this money to finance the construction of a new fleet. But the Carthaginian leadership did not see its own state threatened in its existence and preferred to forego Sicily than continue to undertake high armament efforts with an uncertain outcome.

Hamilkar Barkas entered into negotiations with Catulus. They initially agreed on the following conditions: Carthage should evacuate Sicily and Lilybaion, reconcile with Hieron, release all Roman prisoners and pay reparations to Rome for 2200 Euboean talents over 20 years.

However, the Roman People's Assembly increased this amount to 3,200 talents, 1,000 of which were to be paid immediately, and reduced the deadline to 10 years. In addition, Carthage had to evacuate the Aeolian Islands . Both sides were forbidden to negotiate with allies of the other side. But these are subordinate points, for Rome there was a main interest that clearly emerges: Carthage should pay more money in less time. Hamilkar and Catulus signed a valid contract, according to Zimmermann, which the Roman Senate canceled due to an alleged formal error in order to increase the reparation amount. Since Carthage had already vacated its positions, it had to accept this dictate from Rome.

Dexter Hoyos notes that after some regulatory measures, presumably the settlement of local conflicts, Rome largely left the population of Sicily to fend for themselves over the next few years. Even if the conquest of Sicily had become a war goal, there was still no plan how to use the island.

→ Main article : Mercenary War

Carthage demobilized its huge mercenary army after the peace agreement with Rome. The troops were transferred to North Africa, where there was a dispute with the Carthaginian authorities over the payment of wages. The non-Punic population of North Africa joined the uprising; Their goal was to destroy the Carthaginian state and replace it with a Libyan state of its own , said Zimmermann. This mercenary war brought Carthage to the brink of doom; the fact that Carthage was able to hold out was because the insurgents were waging an all-land war. The metropolis was strongly fortified and was supplied with supplies by sea, which is why the siege failed. After the Carthaginians seized some Italian merchant ships carrying food for the rebels, Rome sent an embassy to Carthage. She achieved that Carthage released the imprisoned crew of the merchant ships. Apparently in return, Rome pursued a neutral policy in the mercenary war from then on and even enabled Carthage to recruit new mercenaries in Italy, which was actually excluded by the Lutatius Treaty. As a gesture of goodwill, Rome released the Punic prisoners who had not yet been released (probably because of Carthage's lack of money).

While Carthage put down the mercenary uprising in North Africa, the mercenaries stationed in Sardinia also revolted . This jeopardized the supply of grain to the capital, and Carthage sent troops to Sardinia to put down the uprising. However, they joined the mercenary uprising, murdered all of the Carthaginians on the island and occupied the coastal cities. The organization of its own political union failed because the rural population did not recognize the mercenaries as a government. Rome remained neutral under the Lutatius Treaty when the mercenaries in Sardinia sought their help. After Carthage put down the mercenary uprising in North Africa, the Senate decided to send troops to Sardinia. This never happened because the Sardinians had meanwhile driven out the mercenaries. Carthage was now arming in order to reintegrate Sardinia into its dominion. Rome viewed this as an aggressive act and forced Carthage to pay an additional 1200 talents and cede Sardinia to restore peace. In 237, Roman troops occupied Sardinia. In 227 Sardinia and Corsica were placed under a Roman governor.

Impact history

Ancient historiography

During the current war, the consuls reported regularly to Rome. If they received a triumph, plaques of their military successes were displayed. At her funeral years later, the laudation funebris was given, at which the deeds of the deceased were recalled again, possibly using the family's own notes. As Pontifex Maximus , Tiberius Coruncanius began in 249 BC. BC, i.e. during the ongoing war, with list-like records of events that were significant for the entire republic. The emerging Roman annals could draw on two traditions: the family archives and the records of the pontifices. According to Bruno Bleckmann , the history of Cassius Dio made direct use of this annalistic tradition of the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC; Most of his work has only survived as an excerpt from the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras (hence Dio-Zonaras). The positive thing about the work of the Zonaras is that he consistently refrained from making his own comments, negative that he tightened up the material. A characteristic of the annalistic tradition is that the individual phases of the war are represented equally.

In contrast, in his histories , Polybios shaped the material more strongly by setting priorities. Polybios used two older historical works that are now lost. His main source was Quintus Fabius Pictors pro- Roman representation, which he compared with the anti- Rome work of Philinos of Akragas . Polybius claimed to be able to explain the outcome of the war. The war opponents Rome and Carthage were of equal value in his portrayal in all areas. What made the difference was the Roman “collective psyche ” with the willingness to fight consistently and with maximum commitment for a goal ( ancient Greek ψυχομαχεῖν psychomacheĩn ). Accordingly, the "Romans" appear at Polybios as an acting collective. Another quality feature that had a positive influence on the triumph of the Romans was, from the perspective of Polybius, the mixed Roman constitution, which combined elements of monarchy, democracy and aristocracy. (Polybius here is committed to an Aristotelian ideal and therefore does not value the power of the Senate enough.) The course of the war in Polybius is characterized by dramatic vicissitudes, first because the uncontrollable nature of the sea is an additional actor in the naval war, and second, so that the protagonists have the opportunity to prove their strengths of character.

Gnaeus Naevius , who witnessed the First Punic War as a contemporary, wrote an epic about this historical material that is only preserved in fragments ( Bellum Punicum ).

As a kind of natural law, Cicero formulated that the location of a city by the sea had an adverse effect on the morale of the inhabitants. The location of Rome on the Tiber, i.e. some distance from the coast, is therefore perfect for the capital of a stable empire. He chose Carthage as a negative example alongside Corinth:

"But nothing more shook Corinth and Carthage for a long time and ultimately ruined them than this homelessness and dispersion of the citizens, because in their greed for trade and seafaring they had neglected the cultivation of the corridors and the practice of weapons."

- Cicero : De re publica 2, 4, 7

For Cicero, the military decline resulted from the fact that the pressed or paid rowers only used their muscular strength, while the fight on the mainland developed inner values (virtus) among the soldiers . The Romans at the time of the First Punic War, as a pure land power, were not deficient in this regard, they embodied the old moral values. Then, with Rome reaching out to sea, the decline inevitably set in, which led to the crisis of the republic in which Cicero found himself. The historian Appian similarly linked ocean orientation with moral decay. According to him, during the Third Punic War , the consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus called on the Carthaginians to give up their port city and to re-establish Carthage far inland.

If, from today's point of view, an essential result of the First Punic War is Rome's rise to sea power, Ernst Baltrusch asks whether this was already the case for the Roman politicians or historians, and is (despite the well-known designation of the Mediterranean as "our sea", mare nostrum ) skeptical: imperium in the sense of authority could only exist where people lived. That was impossible on the water, and that is why the Mediterranean appeared to contemporaries as a lawless area for which there could be no stable order.

art

Sea battle at the Egadi Islands ( Sala di Annibale, Conservator's Palace)

Messala's capture of the city of Messana at the beginning of the First Punic War was promptly celebrated with a "triumphal painting" on the outer wall of the Curia Hostilia , the former meeting place of the Senate. It was at the latest when the Curia burned in 52 BC. Destroyed BC, but is known from its mention by Pliny the Elder .

In 1507/08 Jacopo Ripanda and his workshop painted a hall of the Conservators' Palace in Rome with scenes of the Punic Wars. With the exception of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, all motifs are taken from the First Punic War, namely:

• Triumph of Rome over Sicily;
• Battle of the Egadi Islands;
• Peace negotiations between Hamilkar Barkas and Gaius Lutatius Catulus .

Ripanda had studied the reliefs on Trajan's Column . This can be seen in the ship depictions of the naval battle as well as in the quadriga during the triumph over Sicily. In the otherwise purely historical fresco cycle, two large mythological figures stand out: Neptune embraces the nereid Amphitrite. This pair represents the harmony that was achieved through Roman dominance on the sea with the end of the First Punic War. The striking imitation of ancient models gives the historical scenes something didactic. The Roman magistrate met in the hall, which was apparently supposed to be based on ancient forerunners.

Everyday culture

Carthage theme park near Hammamet

The war between Rome and Carthage gained new significance in the context of Orientalism from the 19th and into the 20th century. The fact that superior Romans defeated the Punians provided a paradigm for the establishment of a French colonial empire in Algeria and Tunisia. Italy was able to stylize itself as the legacy of Rome and thus justify its claim to Libya (cf. the film Cabiria , which combined the plot - Roman heroes save a girl from being sacrificed by cruel Carthaginians - with texts by Gabriele d'Annunzio ).

The modern state of Tunisia relates to ancient Carthage in a complex way. Habib Bourguiba decided in 1957 to have the presidential palace built in the area of ​​the Carthage archaeological site. The appeal to one's own Punic past was intended to provide a domestic audience with an alternative to the colonial propaganda of France, which based its North African expansion on the Roman paradigm. During the reign of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali , the Punier symbolism was increased (banknotes, public buildings, etc.), and the opposition also satirically referred to Carthage.

Tunisia is interested in cultural heritage tourism, whereby there was interference between the Puniertum propagated under the Ben Alis government and the tourist interest, which was primarily directed towards Greco-Roman antiquities. One result was Carthage theme parks (2003 in Hammamet, 2013 near Tunis). They are set in the era of the Punic Wars, but the Carthage culture is reduced to stereotypical elements, such as the omnipresent elephants.

Research history

"[In retrospect] the Roman world domination by no means appears as a gigantic plan designed and carried out by insatiable greed for the country, but as a result that the Roman government has imposed on the Roman government without, even against its will."

- Theodor Mommsen : Roman History, Volume I, 13th edition, Berlin 1923, p. 781.

Theodor Mommsen saw in Roman politics a "defensive imperialism", which was motivated by an excessive need for security. In Mommsen's view, the war over Sicily was the one major exception: it had not been imposed on Rome (ibid.), But it also followed Rome's security interests. The decision to intervene in Sicily was a historic turning point, said Mommsen. The Senate gave up the wise limitation to the Italian peninsula and chose a new policy, the dimensions of which could not yet be assessed: “It was one of the moments when the calculation stops and when the belief in one's own star ... the courage to join hands grasp, which beckons from the darkness of the future, and to follow her no one knows where. "

The contrast between the sea power Carthage and the land power Rome was set absolutely by modern historians and further elaborated as the contrast between a luxurious lifestyle made possible by trade on the one hand and a frugal life from agriculture on the other. This view of history was enhanced by the Nazi ideology, which saw the struggle between Romans and “ Semitic ” Puners as a necessary consequence of “racial antagonism”. An anthology, Rome and Carthage, edited by Joseph Vogt in 1943, represents this Nazi historiography . A joint effort . The initiative for this anthology, in which leading German-speaking ancient historians contributed, came from Helmut Berve ( Aktion Ritterbusch ). The authors dealt differently with the requirement to grasp the “struggle” of two peoples with the “modern concept of race” (as Vogt said in the foreword). Fritz Schachermeyr was particularly strongly identified with it. In his contribution to Carthage from a Race-Historical Contemplation , he characterized the Carthaginians as a “ changeling between races and worlds”, their Levantine “marginal Semitism” had been worsened by the move to North Africa. The Roman opponent of the war, on the other hand, had the "advantages of the Nordic race." The anthology was hardly received scientifically after 1945 and those involved, with the exception of Matthias Gelzer , did not deal with the topic they worked on in 1943.

Alfred Heuss followed Mommsen in 1949 and argued that Rome could not have been interested in expanding into Sicily so soon after the fighting in southern Italy: “If anything is probable, it is the fact that during this time, shortly after the whole of southern Italy was affiliated to Rome, the Romans could see themselves as saturated and apparently have also done so ... “Rome got into this war unprepared; Since a lot was at stake with a defeat, all energies were mobilized and in the end you were successful.

The interest of modern historians in the First Punic War is also justified by the fact that a constellation comparable to that of the First World War is recognized here, in several respects:

• The motives on both sides must have been different at the beginning of the war than in the further course of the war.
• The ancient authors asked about the legitimacy of this war (war guilt discussion).
• Efforts were made to win public opinion in Rome for the war.

The fact that the First World War is present in the historical specialist discussion can be seen in the choice of words, for example when Eberhard Ruschenbusch judges: "So the parties involved slid into the war in good faith in their rights ..."

Bruno Bleckmann believes that the Roman expansionist drive was driven by the ambition of the respective consuls to gain prestige during their term of office with major military feats. Klaus Zimmermann rejects the thesis that a war had to break out between Carthage and Rome almost by fate. Historical processes can be explained by the decisions of people and institutions, not by the underlying laws. "What made the Punic Wars ... inevitable was not the competition between two great powers, but the notorious inability of the Romans ... to tolerate independent, prosperous states alongside them."

swell

• Polybios: history . 1st volume, translated by Hans Drexler ( Library of the Old World , Greek series). Artemis, 2nd edition Zurich / Stuttgart 1978. ISBN 3-7608-3614-3 .
• Cassius Dio: Roman History . Fragments of books 1–35, translated by Otto Veh (Library of the Old World. The Classics of Antiquity). Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf 2009. ISBN 978-3-538-03124-1 .

literature

• Nigel Bagnall : Rome and Carthage. The struggle for the Mediterranean. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-489-5 .
• Bruno Bleckmann : The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Investigations into aristocratic competition in the republic. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2002; ISBN 3-05-003738-5 .
• Dieter Flach , Christine Schraven: The question of war guilt in the change of international relations between Rome and Carthage. In: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie NF 150/2 (2007), pp. 134–178 ( online ).
• Markus Gerhold: Rome and Carthage between war and peace: legal historical study of the Roman-Carthaginian relations between 241 BC BC and 149 BC Chr. Peter Lang, Frankfurt / Main 2002, ISBN 3-631-39598-1 .
• Franz Hampl : On the prehistory of the first and second Punic War. In: Rise and Fall of the Roman World. Volume 1/1. 1972, pp. 412-441.
• Herbert Heftner : The Rise of Rome. From the Pyrrhic War to the fall of Carthage (280–146 BC). 2nd improved edition. Pustet, Regensburg 2005, ISBN 3-7917-1563-1 .
• Alfred Heuss : The First Punic War and the Problem of Roman Imperialism (On the political judgment of the war). In: Historical magazine . Volume 169/3, 1949, pp. 457-513.
• Wilhelm Hoffmann : Carthage's struggle for supremacy in the Mediterranean. In: Rise and Fall of the Roman World . Volume 1/1. 1972, pp. 341-363.
• Wilhelm Hoffmann: The Mamertiner's request for help on the eve of the First Punic War. In: Historia. Ancient History Journal . Volume 18/2, 1969, pp. 153-180.
• Dexter Hoyos (Ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars (= Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World ). Wiley, Chichester 2011.
• Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars (= studies of ancient literature and history . Volume 50). De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1998. ISBN 3-11-015564-8
• John Francis Lazenby: The First Punic War. A Military History. UCL Press, London 1996, ISBN 1-85728-136-5 .
• Yann Le Bohec : La marine romaine et la première guerre punique . In: Klio 85 (2003), pp. 57-69.
• Gunnar Manz: Rome's Rise to World Power: The Age of the Punic Wars. Springer, Wiesbaden 2017, ISBN 978-3-658-12144-0 .
• Johannes Hendrik Thiel : A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War. North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1954.
• George K. Tips: The Battle of Ecnomus. In: Historia. Ancient History Journal. Volume 34/4, 1985, pp. 432-465.
• Karl-Wilhelm Welwei : Hieron II of Syracuse and the outbreak of the First Punic War . In: Historia. Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 27/4 (1978), pp. 573-587.
• Klaus Zimmermann : Rome and Carthage. 3rd revised and updated edition. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2013, ISBN 978-3-534-26025-6 .
• Klaus Zimmermann: Carthage. The rise and fall of a great power. Theiss, Stuttgart 2010, ISBN 978-3-8062-2281-4 .

Remarks

1. ↑ Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic (= Oldenbourg ground plan of history . Volume 2) Walter de Gruyter, 6th edition 2004, p. 41 f. (Accessed by Verlag Walter de Gruyter ).
2. ^ Walter Ameling: Carthage: Studies on the military, state and society (= Vestigia. Contributions to ancient history . Volume 45). Beck, Munich 1993, p. 169 ff., Summary p. 238.
3. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, pp. 4–9.
4. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, pp. 9–12.
5. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 12. Cf. Titus Livius: Ab urbe condita 9,43,26: Et cum Carthaginiensibus eodem anno foedus tertio renouatum legatisque eorum, qui ad id uenerant, comiter munera missa .
6. ↑ Polybios: Historien 3.26.1–5; The Fragments of the Greek Historians 174 F 1; Hatto H. Schmitt : The State Treaties of Antiquity , Volume 3: The Treaties of the Greco-Roman World from 338–200 BC Chr.Beck , Munich 1969, p. 438.
7. ↑ Dieter Flach, Christine Schraven: The question of war guilt in the change of international relations between Rome and Carthage , 2007, p. 140. Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 12-14 and 22.
8. ^ Dexter Hoyos: Treaties True and False. The Error of Philinus of Agrigentum. In: The Classical Quarterly , Jg. 35 (1985), pp. 92-109, here p. 107: From the Punic… standpoint… the 'Philinus' is just about too good to be true: a solemn and sworn public pact that put the Romans squarely in the wrong .
9. ↑ Polybios: Historien 3.25.3–5; Hatto H. Schmitt : The State Treaties of Antiquity , Volume 3: The Treaties of the Greco-Roman World from 338–200 BC Chr.Beck , Munich 1969, p. 466.
10. ↑ Polybios: Historien 3.25.2.
11. ^ John Serrati: Neptune's Altars: The Treaties between Rome and Carthage (509-226 BC) . In: The Classical Quarterly 56/1 (2006), pp. 113-134, especially pp. 120-129.
12. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 16. Somewhat different Eberhard Ruschenbusch: The outbreak of the 1st Punic War . In: Talanta 12/13 (1980/81), pp. 55–76, here pp. 75 f .: There was a treaty of the year 306 that contained delimitation provisions, but the Strait of Messina was not defined as the boundary between both spheres of interest , but only analogously: the Romans should not approach the coasts of the Carthaginians, and vice versa.
13. ↑ ^{a b} Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic (= Oldenbourg outline of history . Volume 2) Walter de Gruyter, 6th edition 2004, p. 42. (accessed by Verlag Walter de Gruyter )
14. ↑ Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 153.
15. ^ Franz Hampl: On the prehistory of the first and second Punic War , 1972, p. 416.
16. ↑ Quoted here from: Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 18.
17. ↑ Eberhard Ruschenbusch dates the Battle of Longanus to the year 264, so the request for help is a direct consequence of the Mamertinian defeat. According to Ruschenbusch, the dating of the battle to the year 269, which is held by many authors, is erroneous, a consequence of the fact that diverging chronologies were merged with one another for the rise of Hieron. Cf. Eberhard Ruschenbusch: The outbreak of the 1st Punic War . In: Talanta 12/13 (1980/81), pp. 55-76, here pp. 72-74.
18. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 20. Dexter Hoyos also considers two simultaneous embassies to be unlikely and therefore believes that it is a stylistic device with which two separate embassies have been combined. See the same, The Outbreak of War . In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 129–148, here pp. 138 f.
19. ↑ Franz Hampl: On the prehistory of the first and second Punic War , 1972, p. 419 f.Hampl mentions here among other things: Adolf Lippold : Consules. Studies on the history of the Roman consulates from 264 to 201 BC Chr . Habelt, Bonn 1963; Franz Kiechle : Roman history . Part 1: Rome's rise to world power . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1967; Karl-Ernst Petzold : Studies on the method of Polybios and their historical evaluation (= Vestigia . Volume 9). Beck, Munich 1969.
20. ↑ Carl Neumann: The Age of the Punic Wars . Koebner, Breslau 1883, pp. 76–80, citations p. 77 and p. 80.
21. ^ Franz Hampl: On the prehistory of the first and second Punic War , 1972, p. 420.
22. ↑ Franz Hampl: On the prehistory of the first and second Punic War , 1972, p. 421.
23. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 21.
24. ↑ Quoted here from: Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 19.
25. ↑ Here, questions of the constitution of the Middle Republic are combined (the consuls' address to the crowd seems to be a contio ) with translation decisions (e.g. the "many" ruined by the war). Michele Bellomo provides an overview of the possible interpretations: Polybius and the Outbreak of the First Punic War . In: Studi Classici e Orientali 59 (2013), pp. 71–90.
26. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 21 f. Cf. Dieter Flach, Christine Schraven: The question of war guilt in the change of international relations between Rome and Carthage , 2007, p. 144: It is unlikely that the Senate had no quorum and left the decision to the people's assembly.
27. ↑ Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic (= Oldenbourg ground plan of history . Volume 2) Walter de Gruyter, 6th edition 2004, p. 42. (accessed by Verlag Walter de Gruyter ) Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 69–71 and 77.
28. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 76.
29. ↑ Dieter Flach, Christine Schraven: The question of war guilt in the change of international relations between Rome and Carthage , 2007, p. 145.
30. ^ Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp: Consensus and Competition. The political culture of the Roman Republic in a new perspective . In: Klio 88/2 (2006), pp. 360-396, especially p. 385 f.
31. ↑ Hans-Joachim Gehrke: The Romans in the First Punic War . In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate. Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 153-171, here pp. 167-170.
32. ↑ Eberhard Ruschenbusch: The outbreak of the 1st Punic War . In: Talanta 12/13 (1980/81), pp. 55-76, here pp. 56-58.
33. ↑ Eberhard Ruschenbusch: The outbreak of the 1st Punic War . In: Talanta 12/13 (1980/81), pp. 55-76, here pp. 59 and 71.
34. ↑ Polybios: Historien 1.10.5–8.
35. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, pp. 22–24.
36. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 57–66.
37. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 27 f.
38. ^ Coinage of the Roman Republic Online : RRC 23/1 . See Michael Hewson Crawford : Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean Economy . University of California Press, Berkeley / Los Angeles 1985, p. 109.
39. ↑ Quoted here from: Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 19.
40. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8,9 ( online at LacusCurtius )
41. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 24.
42. ↑ Dieter Flach, Christine Schraven: The question of war guilt in the change of international relations between Rome and Carthage , 2007, p. 146 f.
43. ↑ See Diodor : Historische Bibliothek 23.1.4.
44. ↑ Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 159. Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 25.
45. ↑ Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264-241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (Ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 151.
46. ↑ Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 160. Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 101 f.
47. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8.9 ( online at LacusCurtius )
48. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 78–82.
49. ↑ Polybios: Historien 1.16.9; Diodor: Historical Library 23.1.4.
50. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 26. Dexter Hoyos emphasizes that there was no Roman alliance with Hieron, who had just been fought, but only a relatively non-binding "friendship" (amicitia) . See Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars , Berlin / New York 1998, p. 107.
51. ↑ Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: Hieron II of Syracuse and the outbreak of the First Punic War , 1978, p. 584 f.
52. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 85–95. Klaus Zimmermann: Rome and Carthage , Darmstadt 2013, p. 102 f.
53. ↑ Hans-Joachim Gehrke: The Romans in the First Punic War . In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate . Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 153–171, here p. 160.
54. ↑ Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars , Berlin / New York 1998, p. 111 f.
55. ↑ Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 161 f.Cf. Polybios: Historien 1.17. and Cassius Dio : Roman history , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with excerpts from the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8.10 ( online at LacusCurtius )
56. ↑ ^{a b c} Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264–241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (Ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 152.
57. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 96-100. Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 162. Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 103.
58. ↑ Polybios: Historien 1.20.
59. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 106-109.
60. ↑ Christopher de Lisle: The Punic Wars (264-146 bce) . In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 169–182, here p. 172. Cf. Polybius: Historien 1.20.15.
61. ^ Yann Le Bohec: La marine romaine et la première guerre punique , 2003, pp. 60 and 63.
62. ↑ Hans-Joachim Gehrke: The Romans in the First Punic War . In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate . Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 153–171, here p. 162.
63. ↑ Ernst Baltrusch: Vulnerable to “corruption and moral decay”? The reception of Greek naval power in Rome . In: Hans Kopp, Christian Wendt (Ed.): Thalassokratographie. Reception and transformation of ancient maritime domination (= transformation of antiquity . Volume 52). De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2018, p. 93–114, here p. 103 f., With reference to: Bernhard Linke: The Republic and the Sea. Naval armament and Roman domestic politics at the time of the Punic Wars . In: Ernst Baltrusch et al. (Hrsg.): Seemacht, Seeherrschaft und die Antike . Steiner, Stuttgart 2016, pp. 163-185.
64. ↑ Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 163.
65. ↑ Polybius: Histories 1.21.4-8.
66. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8.10–11 ( online at LacusCurtius )
67. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 114–116. See Eric Kondratieff: The Column and Coinage of C. Duilius: Innovations in Iconography in Large and Small Media in the Middle Republic . In: Scripta Classica Israelica . Volume 23, 2004, pp. 1-39. ( online )
68. ↑ basis of a Colonna Rostrata of C. Duilius in archaeological database Arachne
69. ↑ Gunnar Manz: Rome's Rise to World Power: The Age of Punic Wars , Wiesbaden 2017, p. 196.
70. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 105.
71. ↑ ^{a b} Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic (= Oldenbourg outline of history . Volume 2) Walter de Gruyter, 6th edition 2004, p. 43.
72. ^ Yann Le Bohec: La marine romaine et la première guerre punique , 2003, p. 64.
73. ↑ Michael Pitassi: Navies of Rome . Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge 2009, p. 54.
74. ↑ Gunnar Manz: Rome's Rise to World Power: The Age of Punic Wars , Wiesbaden 2017, p. 204.
75. ↑ ^{a b} Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 106.
76. ↑ Polybios: Histories 1.24-25.
77. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 145–147.
78. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 147.
79. ↑ CIL I² 9 . Cf. Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 147–150.
80. ↑ Polybios: Historien 1.24.
81. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8.11-12 ( online at LacusCurtius )
82. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 151–155.
83. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8.12 ( online at LacusCurtius )
84. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 154.
85. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, p. 157 f. Cf. Orosius: Historiae adversum Paganos 4.8.5.
86. ↑ Polybios: Historien 1.26.10-16; Cassius Dio : Roman history , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8.12 ( online at LacusCurtius )
87. ↑ Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264-241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 156. Polybius mentions Ecnomus in the context of his portrayal of the battle as a place where the Roman land army had gathered and where she was taken on board by the fleet: Histories 1.25.8.
88. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 161 and note 3.
89. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 107.
90. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 107. Cf. Polybios: Historien 1.25.7–9.
91. ↑ George K. Tips: The Battle of Ecnomus , 1985, p. 452: The wedge which Polybios describes seems unlikely only if we assume that the Roman consuls had a clear idea of ​​what they were doing, and their egregious blunders, of which these were only the first, make that difficult to believe .
92. ↑ George K. Tips: The Battle of Ecnomus , 1985, p. 454.
93. ↑ George K. Tips: The Battle of Ecnomus , 1985, p. 464.
94. ↑ John Francis Lazenby: Ecnomus, Battle of . In: The Oxford Companion to Military History . Oxford University Press, 2004 online version.
95. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 160–163. Klaus Zimmermann: Rome and Carthage , Darmstadt 2013, p. 107 f.
96. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , Fragments of the 11th Book, 43.23 f. ( Online at LacusCurtius )
97. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, pp. 30 and 109.
98. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 163–167. For the two catalogs of claims see also Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars , Berlin / New York 1998, p. 116: Here if anywhere are two sources being used in succession, the second much more inventive than the first .
99. ↑ Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264-241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 157. Werner Huss: Die Karthager . Beck, 3rd revised edition, Munich 2004, p. 169.
100. ↑ Polybios: Historien 1.32–34.
101. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 167 and note 4.
102. ↑ Gunnar Manz: Rome's Rise to World Power: The Age of Punic Wars , Wiesbaden 2017, p. 217.
103. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 110.
104. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 169–171.
105. ↑ Hans-Joachim Gehrke: The Romans in the First Punic War . In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate . Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 153–171, here p. 163.
106. ↑ Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264-241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 158. Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, p. 172. Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 111.
107. ^ Salvatore de Vincenzo: Sicily . In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 537–552, here p. 547. Cf. Francesca Spatafora, Adele Mormino: Aree archeologiche della città di Palermo (Le Guide Brevi a cura della Soprintendenza Beni culturali ed ambientali di Palermo - Servizio per i beni archeologici) , Palermo o. JS 20. ( PDF )
108. ↑ Cassius Dio : Roman History , fragments of the 11th book supplemented with the excerpts of the Byzantine historian Johannes Zonaras : Epitome 8,14 ( online at LacusCurtius )
109. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 173.
110. ↑ Cassius Dio: fragment 43,29a. Cf. Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 174.
111. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 175–180. See Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264–241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (Ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 159. Gunnar Manz: Rome's rise to world power: The Age of Punic Wars , Wiesbaden 2017, p. 222 .
112. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 181. Boris Rankov: A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264–241 . In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 149–166, here p. 159 f. Gunnar Manz: Rome's rise to world power: The Age of Punic Wars , Wiesbaden 2017, p. 223 f.
113. ↑ Tanja Itgenshorst: Tota illa pompa: the triumph in the Roman republic . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2005, p. 133.
114. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 186–189. Werner Huss: The Carthaginians . Beck, 3rd revised edition Munich 2004, p. 175. Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 112.
115. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 189–191.
116. ^ Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp: Senate and people's tribunate in the early 3rd century BC. Chr . In: Walter Eder (Ed.): State and statehood in the early Roman republic . Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1990, pp. 437-457, here p. 447.
117. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 192–201.
118. ↑ Jeffrey P. Emanuel: Seafaring and Shipwreck Archeology . In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 423-432, here p. 430 f. See RPM Nautical Foundation: Egadi 4 Ram
119. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 205–208.
120. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 209–212.
121. ↑ Quoted here from: Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 211 f.
122. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, p. 214: “In view of the fact that at the end of the third century [...] religious concerns were already demonstrably in the service of political machinations, this can also be assumed for the events of 242. "
123. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, p. 216 and note 2. Cf. the annalistic tradition in Orosius: Historiae adversum Paganos 4.10.5. "Orosius' report in particular shows how the typical aristocratic ambition of the consul ... exposes him to an extremely high personal risk."
124. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the Republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 214-218. See Christopher de Lisle: The Punic Wars (264–146 bce) . In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 169-182, here p. 172: When a new Roman fleet arrived in Sicily in 242 bce and blockaded the remaining Carthaginian strongholds, the fleet that the Carthaginians sent was hurriedly assembled, overladen, and mostly composed of previously captured Roman ships .
125. ^ Yann Le Bohec: La marine romaine et la première guerre punique , 2003, p. 67.
126. ↑ Polybios: Histories 1.61.1–2.
127. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 34 f.
128. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 36 f. Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic (= Oldenbourg outline of history . Volume 2) Walter de Gruyter, 6th edition 2004, p. 43.
129. ↑ Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars, Berlin / New York 1998, p. 122.
130. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 38: "Without ... the resources of the hinterland you were faced with an enemy whose declared aim was the annihilation of the Carthaginian state and the establishment of your own 'Libyan' community".
131. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 38 f.
132. ↑ Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars, Berlin / New York 1998, p. 124.
133. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 39. Jochen Bleicken: History of the Roman Republic (= Oldenbourg outline of history . Volume 2) Walter de Gruyter, 6th edition 2004, p. 44.
134. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 51 f.
135. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, p. 35.
136. ↑ Christian Mann: Antiquity. Introduction to Classical Studies . Academy, Berlin 2008, p. 114 f.
137. ↑ Bruno Bleckmann: The Roman Nobility in the First Punic War. Studies on aristocratic competition in the republic , Berlin 2002, pp. 27–29.
138. ^ Cicero: De re publica 2.5-10.
139. ↑ Quoted here from: Marcus Tullius Cicero: Der Staat (De re publica) , Latin and German. Ed. And transl. by Karl Büchner. Artemis & Winkler, 5th edition Munich / Zurich 1993, p. 103.
140. ↑ Ernst Baltrusch: Vulnerable to “corruption and moral decay”? The reception of Greek naval power in Rome . In: Hans Kopp , Christian Wendt (Ed.): Thalassokratographie. Reception and transformation of ancient maritime domination (= transformation of antiquity . Volume 52). De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2018, pp. 93–114, here pp. 103 f. And 106.
141. ↑ Appian: Libyca 86-89.
142. ↑ Ernst Baltrusch: Vulnerable to “corruption and moral decay”? The reception of Greek naval power in Rome . In: Hans Kopp, Christian Wendt (Ed.): Thalassokratographie. Reception and transformation of ancient maritime domination (= transformation of antiquity . Volume 52). De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2018, pp. 93–114, here pp. 97–99.
143. ↑ Tanja Itgenshorst: Tota illa pompa: the triumph in the Roman republic . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2005, p. 89. Cf. Pliny the Elder : Natural history 35.22.
144. ^ John T. Paoletti, Gary M. Radke: Art in Renaissance Italy . Laurence King, 3rd edition London 2005, p. 412. Duncan Bull: Jan Gossaert and Jacopo Ripanda on the Capitoline . In: Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Ar t 34/2 (2009/10), pp. 89-94.
145. ↑ Brien K. Garnand: Phoenicians and Carthaginians in the Western imagination . In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 697-712, here p. 705.
146. ↑ Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels, Peter van Dommelen: Punic Heritage in Tunisia . In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 729-742, here pp. 730 f.
147. ↑ Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels, Peter van Dommelen: Punic Heritage in Tunisia . In: In: Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean . Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 729-742, here p. 737.
148. ↑ Mommsen himself did not use this term. On the criticism, see William V. Harris: Ware and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 1979. Referred to by: Christian Mann: Antike. Introduction to Classical Studies . Academy, Berlin 2008, p. 111 f.
149. ↑ Ernst Baltrusch: Mommsen and Imperialism . In: Alexander Demandt, Andreas Goltz, Heinrich Schlange-Schöningen (Ed.): Theodor Mommsen - Science and Politics in the 19th Century. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2005, pp. 201–225, especially pp. 208 f.
150. ^ Theodor Mommsen: Roman History , Volume I, 13th edition, Berlin 1923, p. 512.
151. ↑ Hans Beck : The Reasons for the War . In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars , Chichester 2011, pp. 225–241, here p. 226.
152. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, pp. 1–3.
153. ^ Peter Kuhlmann, Helmuth Schneider: The ancient sciences from Petrarch to the 20th century . In: History of the ancient sciences. Biographical Lexicon (= Der Neue Pauly . Supplements Volume 6) Metzler, Stuttgart / Weimar 2012, p. Xv-xlvi, here p. Xli.
154. ^ Matthias Sommer: Rome and Carthage - a balance sheet after 75 years . In: Michael Sommer, Tassilo Schmidt (Ed.): From Hannibal to Hitler. "Rome and Carthage" 1943 and German Classical Studies under National Socialism . wbg academic, Darmstadt 2019, pp. 8–21, here p. 10.
155. ^ Alfred Heuss: The First Punic War and the Problem of Roman Imperialism (On the Political Assessment of the War) , 1949, p. 458.
156. ^ Alfred Heuss: The First Punic War and the Problem of Roman Imperialism (On the Political Assessment of the War) , 1949, especially p. 507 f.
157. ↑ Explicitly in Dexter Hoyos: Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars , Berlin / New York 1998, p. 11 4 f.
158. ↑ Hans-Joachim Gehrke : The Romans in the First Punic War . In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate . Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 153–171, here p. 155 f .; Eberhard Ruschenbusch: The outbreak of the 1st Punic War . In: Talanta 12/13 (1980/81), pp. 55-76, here p. 71.
159. ↑ Klaus Zimmermann: Rom und Karthago , Darmstadt 2013, p. 145.

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