Terminal station 21

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Stuttgart Central Station (2008)

A concept developed in 2006 to redesign the Stuttgart railway junction is referred to as terminus station 21 . It should represent an alternative to Stuttgart 21 , which has been under construction since February 2010 . It provides for the Stuttgart main station to be retained as the terminal station and for the connection to the new Wendlingen-Ulm line to be created via a new section between Esslingen-Mettingen and Wendlingen. The term terminus station 21 was coined by a joint initiative of Verkehrsclub Deutschland , Pro Bahn , Leben in Stuttgart and others.

According to the proponents, end station 21 can be integrated into the new Wendlingen – Ulm line at lower cost with 16 platform tracks in the main station (8 at Stuttgart 21, each without S-Bahn ). As a result, an integral cycle timetable can be implemented with terminus station 21 . The relocation of the freight and storage station would also free up areas for urban development in downtown Stuttgart.

The estimated cost of the project was given in 2007 by proponents of around 1.2 billion euros. The transport scientist Gerhard Heimerl assumes total costs (including the project demolition costs for "Stuttgart 21") of 3.7 billion euros. Critics consider the concept to be immature. At comparable costs to Stuttgart 21, a lower benefit is achieved.

In view of the increasing construction progress of the project, various successor concepts were developed from 2015, for example Umstieg 21 and Stuttgart 21-KombiModell .

Motivation and content of the concept

Sketch of essential measures in the course of terminus station 21

The aim of the terminus station 21 concept is to achieve similar goals as the Stuttgart 21 concept . The concept therefore answers the following questions:

• How should the planned new Wendlingen – Ulm line be integrated into the main station?
• How can Stuttgart Airport be better connected to the main train station, the region and the whole of southern Germany?
• Can areas occupied by the railway in downtown Stuttgart be cleared for urban development?
• How can rail transport in the Stuttgart region be made more attractive and economically efficient in general?

The 5 modules of "Head station 21" (K 21)
	Building block	Advantages according to K21 proponents
1	Modernization of the train station	ground-level, spacious platforms
2	Upgrading the track apron	Increase in performance through a few additional construction measures
3	Expansion of the access routes	Linking the regional and mainline integral timetable
4th	Connection of the new line to Ulm	Halving the travel time to Ulm (also possible without the S 21)
5	Airport connection and new trade fair	several variants possible, can be implemented at short notice by using the existing routes

The terminus station 21 concept essentially provides the following measures as technical answers to the above questions:

• Modernization of the station approach : track plan in the main station, a new flyover structure and two additional tracks coming from Bad Cannstatt. This is intended to increase the capacity of the station and to enable an integral clock schedule .
• Widening and renovation of the existing head platforms and construction of a new platform hall . The necessary space is to be gained from baggage platforms and shunting tracks that are no longer required .
• Approval of unused track areas for urban development (approx. 75 ha, compared to approx. 100 ha for Stuttgart 21)
• Connection of the new line towards Ulm to the airport along the motorway. Connection to the main station through new tracks in the Neckar valley to Mettingen and from there through a tunnel to the motorway. This route can be used both from the airport and from Ulm.
• Use of the S-Bahn station at the airport also for long-distance and regional trains on the new line and the Gäubahn .

Photomontage of a possible platform roof in the context of terminus station 21

Provided that these plans are feasible, according to the advocates of the terminus 21, the following advantages arise:

• 16 tracks (terminus) opposite 8 tracks of the through station. This means that a full node in the integral cycle timetable can be introduced.
• lower construction costs and less construction work in downtown Stuttgart and in the area of ​​the mineral water springs
• higher efficiency, improved transfers and transport flexibility of the above-ground station, lower operating costs
• Higher quality of stay in the above-ground train station, more beautiful views at above-ground train station entrances
• can be implemented in sub-steps that can be started individually and also benefit without further measures

Variant for connecting the new route (without airport connection)

Connection of the new line and ring concept

In the end station 21 concept , it is assumed that the new line to Ulm will be implemented in the H-Minus variant. The connection was made through a tunnel from Obertürkheim to Denkendorf. The section between Bad Cannstatt and Obertürkheim is to be expanded to include six tracks on the existing railway site.

The existing S-Bahn station at Stuttgart Airport is to be linked to the existing rail network by a short connection to the new line at Denkendorf and the Neckar Valley Railway to Obertürkheim. These additions create a ring system between the main train station and the airport. The Rohrer curve would enable a tangential connection from Böblingen to Esslingen via the airport. The Bad Cannstatt - Obertürkheim section is to be expanded by two tracks.

history

In the feasibility study presented at the beginning of 1995 for the Stuttgart 21 project, the costs of the repair and modernization of the Stuttgart railway junction were expected to cost 2.901 billion DM (1993 price, equivalent to around 2.2 billion euros today , each including 15 percent planning costs ). This was omitted

• DM 937 million for the renewal of engineering structures, some of which had already expired;
• a further DM 325 million of reinvestments were made in the earth and the superstructure
• and DM 263 million in security, communication and high-voltage technology.

The total amount of the investments deferred with regard to Stuttgart 21 was 1.67 billion DM. 1,002 million DM were earmarked for supplying the new line (expansion Obertürkheim – Untertürkheim, new construction Obertürkheim – Denkendorf – Wendlingen). 184 million DM were set aside for the modernization of the parking area.

In spring 1995 the working group Stuttgart 21 / Development Concept Filder der Grünen presented three alternative concepts:

• The Stuttgart 21 Plus variant corresponded to the Stuttgart 21 concept, but provided for twelve instead of eight platform tracks in the main station.
• The Stuttgart 21 Kombi variant provided for long-distance traffic to be routed to a four-track underground through station and the above-ground terminal station to be retained for regional traffic.
• The Stuttgart 21 Lean variant intended to retain the existing terminus (without an underground through station). According to the original DB plans, the new line to Ulm was to lead via Esslingen-Mettingen to Denkendorf.

The working group favored the LEAN and KOMBI variants . The alternative LEAN largely corresponds to “terminus station 21”. The results are summarized in the plan approval decision and can be taken from this source, which is still accessible. In the assessment, the planning approval authority determined that if the main train station were to be retained, the lower dangers for the groundwater, especially for the mineral and medicinal water, would be seen first. During the Neckar crossings, however, danger areas remained due to the necessary bridge construction. Furthermore, the interference with the environmental protection goods animals and plants, soil as well as air and climate are less, the impact of private property is less, goals of the monument protection are preserved. The obstacle to rail traffic due to the construction period is a disadvantage. (Decision PFA 1.1, p. 203) The application planning contributes most to the goal of reducing noise emissions, as well as to urban development opportunities. Since ultimately no serious disadvantages can be identified and the aforementioned hazards and loads, particularly in the case of groundwater, are manageable through “complex construction processes, a sophisticated groundwater management and a differentiated 'action plan for problem scenarios', none of the alternatives examined suggest itself as being better suited to the implementation of the planning . "(Decision PFA 1.1, p. 203)

The costs are listed in the assessment, but have not become relevant for the decision:

“The costs of the Stuttgart 21 project are of great importance in the public debate. In fact, the investment costs for application planning are the highest of all alternatives. In the application documents, the developer stated costs of 4.9 to 5.06 billion DM. ... The developer has stated that the proposed solution enables economical railway operation and also referred to constantly updated economic studies. As part of this examination, however, it must be checked whether the requested solution can be built in a lawful manner. The questions of the costs and profitability of a project are examined before the application is submitted by the bodies that have to decide on the financing of the project. Whether a comparative cost-benefit analysis is required for this is therefore not the subject of this procedure, but is part of this decision-making process "

- Planning approval decision PFA 1.1 Valley crossing with new main station, 2005, p. 200/201

The " arbitration talks" moderated by Heiner Geißler between representatives of project supporters and opponents of Stuttgart 21 themed on November 12, 2010 the concept of terminus station 21 .

The proponents of “terminus station 21” put the five expansion stages in the foreground, which attaches a quick traffic benefit to this concept with reduced risks. In the course of the "arbitration talks", auditors were called in to assess the cost information for "Stuttgart 21". In connection with possible exit costs, they also commented on the costs for "terminus 21" and stated that the costs of 1.345 billion euros for the continuation of the terminus station of Deutsche Bahn AG refer to the period up to 2054 in other words, later maintenance expenses as they are also to be applied for "Stuttgart 21" after a service life of 20 years. The actual repair investment would be 488 million euros by 2020 according to information from Deutsche Bahn AG.

The green-red state government is assuming costs of 800 million euros for the renewal of the terminal station and the track apron as well as for the improvement of the access routes. Added to this are the costs for the approximately 8 km above-ground sections to be built and for the 7.5 km long tunnel between Esslingen-Mettingen and Wendlingen. Deutsche Bahn AG has cited costs of 1.05 billion euros for this.

discourse

Comparison of the concepts Stuttgart 21 and terminus 21 (sketch)

According to proponents, the project distinguishes itself from Stuttgart 21 in particular through the possibility of setting up an integral cycle timetable, connecting the main train station to the airport and fulfilling the operational services required in an operational scenario for 2015. The Netz 21 concept is also met. Furthermore, the concept manages without new train stations.

From the point of view of the Stuttgart 21 project planners (as of 2007), the optimization of the terminus station is only the second best solution for the Stuttgart rail junction compared to Stuttgart 21. This left route exclusions that would prove to be an obstacle to performance due to the only five access tracks. Furthermore, a modernized terminus station remains a bottleneck in the high-speed network and can only cope with increasing traffic volumes to a limited extent. The planning approval decision for Stuttgart 21 states that the "claim that all regional trains can be connected in a terminus station" is wrong.

Proponents of terminal station 21 put the capacity of Stuttgart 21 at 52 trains per hour, while that of the “reformed terminal station” was 84 trains per hour. A performance study commissioned by Deutsche Bahn identified an interval between 28 and 38 trains per hour as the optimal performance range of the modernized terminal station; 42 to 51 trains per hour were determined for the through station. The maximum capacity is 72 trains in the through station and 43 trains per hour in the head station. Empirical studies would also have shown significantly greater operational disadvantages of the modernized terminus station when this limit was exceeded. According to Gerhard Heimerl , the terminal station can in principle achieve the performance required by Stuttgart 21, but with less benefit. Proponents of K21 described the calculation bases for the performance study presented by Deutsche Bahn as "unrealistic" because trains stopping at the through station was only one to two minutes and the connection to the surrounding rail network was not taken into account.

In contrast, Egon Hopfenzitz, the former head of Stuttgart Central Station, calculates that the current terminus station already has a capacity of 74 trains per hour if the stopping time is reduced to 6 minutes. Ernst Krittian , the planner formerly responsible for the Stuttgart – Augsburg project, considers a modernized terminal station to be at least as efficient as the planned through station.

In addition to the track diagram of a train station, its entry and exit routes also determine performance to a significant extent. A comparison of the operating concepts of S21 and K21 shows, according to Boris Palmer, a proponent of K21, that S21 is a relatively inefficient "savings solution" that cannot handle more trains at peak hours than the current terminus.

The Stuttgart Airport / Messe station would have to handle 28 trains per hour if terminating station 21 were to be implemented on two platforms. Today 4 trains per hour are processed there, at Stuttgart 21 there are 14 trains in the Terminal station.

According to K21 supporters, in contrast to Stuttgart 21 , the concept can be implemented gradually. Critics, on the other hand, fear several years of delays due to new planning approval procedures. The subsequent work would have to be laboriously carried out during ongoing operation, which would restrict operation and lead to additional costs. In addition, the use of acoustic gang warning systems is necessary. A construction period of around 12 to 15 years is required for the expansion of the terminus station while operations continue, since construction can only be carried out in sections while maintaining operations. Operational restrictions and disabilities are to be expected.

Proponents of K21 point to lower costs compared to the Stuttgart 21 concept. Heimerl, on the other hand, assumes (as of September 2010) - including the price increase - of 3.739 billion euros - 349 million euros less than for Stuttgart 21; the risk of cost increases is greater with K21. However, due to the lack of a contribution to cost recovery from property sales, this amount is not covered.

According to information from the S21 project planners from 2007, an increase in the performance of the main station, including the 5th and 6th track to Bad Cannstatt, would cost 1.15 billion euros. In addition, costs of 1.05 billion euros were incurred for an ascent tunnel to the Filder plain (similar to the Filder tunnel ), and a further 370 million euros for connecting the airport via a branch track; this would have to end in a new terminus, as the existing airport station could not accommodate the additional traffic. For further increases in performance, a 5th and 6th track from Untertürkheim to Esslingen-Mettingen would be required, whereby existing buildings and roads would have to be demolished and rebuilt on a larger scale. The project has no prospect of funding. According to the planning approval decision for Stuttgart 21, the desired networking of the modes of transport is not possible with K21.

According to K21 advocates, no interventions in private property and only minor interventions in the environment are necessary. According to Stuttgart 21 supporters, the connection of the new line to Ulm, on the other hand, leads through densely populated, ecologically sensitive area. In addition, additional and probably higher overpass structures are required, which also require civil engineering work in the track field to at least the same extent as Stuttgart 21. In the castle gardens and in the Neckar valley, the project would cause "considerable discomfort". The planning approval decision for Stuttgart 21 indicates that in the course of the widening of the Neckar Bridge Bad Cannstatt necessary for K21, dangers for the high-quality mineral water below the Neckar may arise. In the case of relocation of the operating facilities in Rosensteinpark, interventions would have to be made in the lower palace garden for the necessary shunting tracks , the plane tree avenue would have to be felled and an open-cut tunnel would be created in Rosensteinpark . For a fifth and sixth track in the Neckar Valley, retaining walls between 6 and 8 meters high and a length of 4,200 meters are required. The action alliance against Stuttgart 21, on the other hand, emphasizes that no interventions in the palace garden are required for terminus 21. The plans for the two additional tracks are identical to those of S21. The routing and thus the interventions in this area are therefore identical to the plans for Stuttgart 21.

Critics of terminus station 21 complain that the concept lacks a final route, after five route variants were gradually proposed. It is structurally not planned to the end and without a coherent operational concept. A solution that corresponds to the current concept, as one of four basically conceivable variants, was examined until 1995 and rejected.

Another disadvantage is that urban development in the inner city, unlike Stuttgart 21, is not possible. For a long time, all the areas that are freed up have common edges with the railway systems in operation, which reduces the quality of living and amenity and, in some cases, health-related noise emissions .

Legal process

In the judgment on a procedure initiated by the Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation Germany (BUND) and two apartment owners against the planning approval decision for the planning approval section 1.1 of the Stuttgart 21 project, the Baden-Württemberg Administrative Court came to the conclusion that it was “doubtful” “whether that Project 'K 21' could be an alternative to 'S 21' ”.

literature

• Roland Ostertag : The disenchanted city. Plea against self-destruction. Grohmann, Stuttgart 2008, ISBN 978-3-927340-83-1 .
• Lutz Aichele : Living above: Why Stuttgart 21 doesn't need an alternative. Schröderscher Buchverlag, Diepholz 2011, ISBN 978-3-89728-071-7 .
• Ullrich Martin , Peter Breuer, Jan Diestel (Eds.): Terminus station K 21. Presentation and assessment of the state of play as of March 26, 2011 (= New Transport Science Journal , Issue 5). Books on Demand, Norderstedt 2011, ISBN 978-3-8448-8177-6 .

Web links

Commons : Head station 21  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Kopfbahnhof-21.de Official website of the K21 alliance (information, background, news)
• “Head station 21” concept , Verkehrsclub Deutschland VCD, Baden-Württemberg regional association
• Criticism of Stuttgart 21 (living in Stuttgart e.V.)
• "Stuttgart 21 - Synopsis of the current situation, the current DB planning and the BUND / VCD alternative" Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Karl-Dieter Bodack, February 2007 (PDF file, 16 pages, 315 kB)
• S. Behnsen, H. Kleemann: The future was yesterday - New approaches and considerations in the decades-long debate about the Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen - Ulm route Contribution to the Stuttgart Mobil - City and Mobility conference , Stuttgart, 2007 (PDF, 18 Pages, 3976 kB).

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} 10. The alternative: Terminal station 21 . BUND eV. Retrieved December 8, 2010.
2. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Gangolf Stocker : Stuttgart 21: 2007 year of decision. In: Schiene issue 2/2007, ISSN  0932-2574 , pp. 20-23
3. ^ ^{A b} Mathias Bury: "K 21 is also a billion-dollar project" . Stuttgart newspaper . September 11, 2010. Retrieved January 7, 2015.
4. ↑ Stuttgart 21 combi model . BUND eV. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
5. ^ Arnoldi: "Head station 21" [1] (PDF file; 7.36 MB) Stuttgart 2011
6. ↑ Roland Ostertag : New plans for the expansion of the palace gardens and Rosenstein Park at terminus 21
7. ↑ The ring concept for Stuttgart (PDF file; 1.13 MB) in The station with a head: Head station 21 , p. 6, box at the bottom left
8. ^ ^{A b} Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, regional area Stuttgart, projects (publisher): Project »Stuttgart 21«. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, approx. 1995, p. 32 f (similar version as PDF file online, 14 MB).
9. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Alliance / The Greens, Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Alternatives are feasible! Green suggestions for Stuttgart 21 and the Filder development concept ( Memento of the original from January 31, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF file, 44 pages; 6.73 MB). Stuttgart, April 1995, p. 22 f. 
10. ↑ ^{a b c d Federal} Railway Authority Stuttgart: Plan approval decision PFA 1.1 Valley crossing with new main station. ( Memento of the original from January 31, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 2.3 MB) Stuttgart January 28, 2005, accessed October 14, 2011 
11. ^ Wrestling about the terminus station concept , online article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung from November 12, 2010
12. ^ Märkische Revision, PricewaterhouseCoopers AG WPG, Susat & Partner OHG WPG (ed.): Report of the arbitration group on the Stuttgart 21 project under the direction of Dr. Heiner Geissler. Stuttgart Expert opinion on the reference date November 15, 2010 (PDF file; 1.15 MB) Document on the arbitration meeting of November 26, 2010, p. 85/86
13. ^ State government of Baden-Württemberg: "Evaluation of the combination solution by Dr. Heiner Geißler / SMA and partners through the state government “ Archived copy ( memento of the original from January 31, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 120 kB) Stuttgart Oct. 2011, p. 4, accessed on October 24, 2011 
14. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Peter Marquart : Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. Planning status and outlook. In: Tiefbau , 119, No. 4/2007, ISSN  0944-8780 , pp. 190–196 ( PDF file ( memento of the original from October 20, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked . Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. , 657 kB) 
15. ^ ^{A b c d e} Ullrich Martin : Stuttgart 21: Large-scale project with a European dimension. In: Deine Bahn , Issue 7/2009, pp. 6–13
16. ↑ ^{a b c} Plan approval decision according to § 18 Paragraph 1 General Railway Act (AEG) for the reconstruction of the Stuttgart railway junction "Project Stuttgart 21" Plan approval section 1.1 (valley crossing with new main station) from rail km - 0.4- 42.0 to rail km + 0.4 + 32.0 in Stuttgart (PDF) Federal Railway Authority Karlsruhe / Stuttgart. January 18, 2005. Archived from the original on September 21, 2010. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved October 18, 2010. 
17. ↑ Volkhard Jung: Much more performance for less money - the reformed terminal station is much more efficient! (PDF file; 102 kB). In: Der Fahrgast, Issue 1/2005, pp. 28–29
18. ↑ U. Martin, H. Dobeschinsky, P. Breuer, M. Haderer, N. Sonnenberg: Comparison of the capabilities and performance of the new through station (S21) and a variant of the redesigned terminus (K21) as part of the redesign of the Stuttgart main station (final report ) , Stuttgart 2005. In: Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart (Hrsg.): Stuttgart 21 - Discourse ( PDF file  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and remove then this reference. , 21 MB), Stuttgart 2009, pp. 2287-2369, in particular pp. 2330, 2332, 2337 f., 2341  
19. ↑ 4th Arbitration Discussion, Part 2.S. from minute 24 , accessed on November 18, 2010 . 
20. ↑ "Project decision in manorial manner" ( Memento of the original from January 28, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 21, 2010. 
21. ↑ 1st arbitration discussion, part 6, p. From minute 10 , accessed on November 18, 2010 . 
22. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Wolfgang Arnold: K21 - Alternative or Phantom? . Stuttgart trams . July 13, 2010. Archived from the original on December 12, 2010. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved December 28, 2010. 
23. ↑ ^{a b c} Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm eV (Ed.): Project sponsors of Stuttgart 21 criticize verbal armament of the GREENS ( Memento of the original from September 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release from August 18, 2010. 
24. ↑ Heimerl sharply criticizes K 21  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Südwestpresse , August 28, 2010, accessed on August 28, 2010  
25. ↑ The Phantom K 21 in sight . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , September 14, 2010
26. ^ Peter Marquart : The development of the project planning. In: Regional Council Stuttgart (Hrsg.): Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen - Ulm: The consideration of water management in the planning - an interim balance - . Proceedings, September 26, 2006, ( PDF file ( Memento from December 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive ), 8 MB), pp. 6–13
27. ↑ ^{a b} "K 21 is not an alternative" . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , August 31, 2010.
28. ^ Action alliance against Stuttgart 21 (ed.): For K21 no trees have to be felled in the palace garden . November 8, 2010.
29. ↑ State Capital Stuttgart, Communications Department (ed.): The Stuttgart – Ulm Railway Project: Reorganization of the Stuttgart 21 railway junction and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line ( memento of the original from September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . 136-page presentation as of August 2010 (PDF file, 14.8 MB), pp. 55, 59 ff. 
30. ^ Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Lawsuits against "Stuttgart 21" unsuccessful . Press release April 6, 2006.
31. ^ Decision of the 5th Senate of the Baden-Württemberg Administrative Court of April 6, 2006, file number 5S848 / 05, paragraph 55