Costs and financing of Stuttgart 21

Development of the project costs of Stuttgart 21 over time (as of December 2012)

The costs and financing of Stuttgart 21 have been controversial for years. The projected costs of the Stuttgart 21 project have increased several times since the project was presented in 1994.

The financing of the Bahnhof 21 project agreed in the financing contract of April 2, 2009 amounts to 4.526 billion euros and is provided by Deutsche Bahn , the Federal Republic of Germany, the state of Baden-Württemberg , the Stuttgart region , the state capital Stuttgart and Stuttgart Airport carried.

In December 2012, Deutsche Bahn calculated project costs of 4.696 billion euros. In addition, “additional risks from external influencing factors” amounting to just under one billion euros were named. On March 5, 2013, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn decided to follow a proposal by the Board of Management to increase the financing framework from 4.526 to up to 6.526 billion euros and at the same time to demand that the project partners contribute to the additional costs (possibly in court).

In addition to the developer, the Federal Audit Office and other experts have published cost estimates on behalf of project opponents, each with higher total amounts. Auditors in the arbitration at Stuttgart 21 judged the company's calculation at the time to be fundamentally plausible.

Up to the fourth quarter of 2018, 3.3 billion euros had been spent on planning and construction work and 4.2 billion euros were contractually bound.

Costs (overview)

→ Main article : "History" in the article Costs and Financing of Stuttgart 21

In line with the long development time of the new “Stuttgart 21” project, cost information goes back to the 1990s. In the feasibility study from the beginning of 1995 , the costs (with 1993 prices) were expected to be around 2.45 billion euros. A subsequent update to the price and planning status in 1998 resulted in total costs of 2.6 billion euros. As a result of the further preliminary planning , Deutsche Bahn AG presented a cost estimate of 2.8104 billion euros (real value 2004) as the basis for an economic feasibility study in 2006 .

This information became the basis of the 2009 financing agreement for EUR 4.625 billion between Deutsche Bahn AG, the state of Baden-Württemberg and the city of Stuttgart. The costs have been extrapolated to the development of building prices (“nominalized”) at 3.076 billion euros. The remaining amount of around 1.5 billion euros was used as a “buffer” for the unforeseen.

In the subsequent draft planning, the technical planning and the associated cost determinations were processed in depth by around 60 specialist offices involved. In July 2009, the result of this cost calculation was 5.008 billion euros, which had resulted from 4.066 billion euros for construction costs, 547 million euros for planning costs and 395 million euros from the price adjustment ("nominalization") to the status of 2009.

This cost calculation was revised by the Deutsche Bahn AG by the end of 2009. Substantial savings were expected in the award of contracts, building planning and property acquisition, which totaled around 900 million, which reduced construction costs to 3.218 billion euros. Together with 547 million euros in planning costs and 323 million euros from the building price adjustment (“nominalization”), the cost calculation by Deutsche Bahn AG in December 2009 amounted to 4.088 billion euros.

In the course of the arbitration talks in autumn 2010, these cost details were checked in limited depth by three auditing firms. According to this, the assumptions on optimization potentials are “rather to be assessed as optimistic”, however, exceeding the financing framework is not foreseeable, whereby the assessment of future risks is fraught with high uncertainty. One of the auditing firms involved came to higher total costs of 4.42 billion euros, as lower savings were expected on the land and historical planning expenses were included.

At the end of 2012, Deutsche Bahn AG presented the Supervisory Board with an “inventory of the project” based on external reports. The construction and planning costs were expected to be around 4.7 billion euros, which together with the “buffer” for currently unforeseeable risks and expenses of 930 million euros result in an “increased financing framework” of almost 5.7 billion euros. From “additional services due to external influences” and possible “time delays”, further cost increases have been “roughly estimated” at around one billion euros.

The project planners' cost information was critically assessed and questioned during the project period. In its 2008 report to the budget committee of the German Bundestag, the Federal Audit Office calculated total costs of 5.3 billion euros - based on the standards of the Federal Ministry of Transport. This assessment was confirmed in 2011.

In mid-2008, the Vieregg-Rössler traffic advisory office forecast the total costs for Stuttgart 21 to be 6.9 to 8.7 billion euros in a study commissioned by BUND and Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen . According to a media report, officials in the state of Baden-Württemberg estimated costs in autumn 2009 to be at least 4.9 billion euros. However, an amount of up to 6.5 billion euros is more likely. The then Prime Minister Oettinger had instructed the officials to refrain from a new cost calculation, as these figures were "difficult to communicate to the public".

financing

Financing (according to the financing agreement from April 2009,
with costs from December 2009, nominalized )

Financing share	Payers	Costs (rounded, in € million)
1.1	Deutsche Bahn AG ( own funds )	1,237.0
1.2	Deutsche Bahn AG (share of risk buffer)	232.0
2.1	Federal Government (according to GVFG )	168.6
2.2	Federal local public transport § 8 (1) BSchwAG (financed from LuFV )	197.0
2.3	Federal Long-Distance Transport Section 8 (1) BSchwAG	563.8
2.4	Bund existing wetting agent ( LuFV )	300.0
3.1	Country (according to GVFG and regionalization funds )	285.7
3.2	Country (state budget)	84.6
3.3	Country (share of risk buffer, from state budget)	453.6
4.1	City of Stuttgart	31.6
4.2	City of Stuttgart (share of risk buffer)	206.9
5.1	Airport	107.8
5.2	Airport (share of risk buffer)	119.4
6th	Association Region Stuttgart	100.0
total		4,088.0

Of the project costs (including buffers) estimated in December 2009 of 4.088 billion euros, Deutsche Bahn AG contributed 1.469 billion euros (of which 1,237 million euros in own funds and 232 million euros in risk provisioning), the federal government (including EU funds) 1,229 billion euros , the state of Baden-Württemberg EUR 823.8 million, the state capital Stuttgart EUR 238.58 million, Stuttgart Airport EUR 227.2 million and the Stuttgart Region Association EUR 100 million. The city is providing a construction cost subsidy of 31.56 million euros, which is to be made available from 2010 in eight annual installments of the same amount. (This value results from the sum of the obligations from the framework and implementation agreement) A further 207 million euros, which were defined as part of the risk provision in the calculation valid until December 2009, are to be raised from 2015 at the earliest. According to media reports, Deutsche Bahn will invest 338 million euros annually in the project until 2013.

The risk buffer of 1.45 billion euros added to the then estimated total costs of 3.076 billion euros in the financing contract of April 2009 was used up to finance the total costs of 4.088 billion euros planned at the end of 2009, with the exception of a remaining amount of 438 million euros. The additional costs incurred (difference between EUR 4.088 and EUR 3.076 billion) are borne by the state of Baden-Württemberg (EUR 454 million), Deutsche Bahn (EUR 220 million) and the city of Stuttgart (EUR 207 million). Any additional cost increases would have to be borne by Deutsche Bahn (220 million euros), the state of Baden-Württemberg (106.7 million euros) and the city of Stuttgart (53.3 million euros). Discussions are agreed for any additional cost increases.

The European Union initially contributed 114.47 million euros. The EU investment funds are included in the federal share. The EU will provide a further 594.4 million euros by 2020, which will reduce the federal contribution.

In 2012 and 2013, the EU contributed 20.6 million euros to Stuttgart 21. The sum is to be invested in the Filder Tunnel. Previously, the EU subsidized six studies on the feasibility and environmental compatibility of the Stuttgart hub and the new Stuttgart – Wendlingen – Ulm line with 18.7 million euros. EU co-funding was extended to 2015 in October 2010.

The financial contribution of the state capital Stuttgart through the land is not included in the financing amount of 4.088 billion euros.

On January 25, 2018, a possible increase in the financing framework to around 8.2 billion euros became known. This should include a commissioning postponed to 2025 and a risk buffer of half a billion euros.

history

Board decision of February 24, 1994

At its meeting on February 24, 1994, the board of directors of Deutsche Bahn spoke out against a low-lying through station with a new line from Stuttgart via the airport and Wendlingen to Ulm and in favor of an upgraded line from Stuttgart to Mettingen with a subsequent new line to Ulm. Even under the most favorable assumptions, the internal business interest rate of the solution proposed by the state was 6.56 percent below the solution decided by DB (7.5 percent). The additional costs of the variant proposed by the state were given as at least one billion DM.

Feasibility Study (1995)

The feasibility study from the beginning of 1995 estimated the costs (price status 1993) roughly at 4.807 billion D-Marks (4.180 billion DM building costs plus 15 percent planning allowance), adjusted for inflation ( cost of living index ) this corresponds to 3.6 billion euros today. Financing was to be provided through the sale of land, through additional income from increased passenger numbers, improved operational processes and funds from the Municipal Transport Financing Act. The involvement of private investors was part of the considerations. The so-called “continuation case” was compared. For the maintenance and expansion of the terminus station, costs of 2.901 billion D-Marks were estimated (2.522 billion DM, plus 15 percent planning costs). The calculated operational management costs were 83.9 million DM to 107.2 million DM per year for Stuttgart 21, the calculated maintenance costs were 41.1 to 53.5 million DM per year in the case of continuation. With S21, additional traffic should generate between DM 145.4 million and DM 159.4 million more than the continuation case. The benefit-cost ratio (according to the methodology of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 1992) of the Stuttgart 21 project was given as 2.4; the benefit of Stuttgart 21 would have been between DM 257 and 267 million above the two variants of the continuation case. The project should pay for itself within around 30 years .

Synergy concept and financing agreement (1995)

According to the synergy concept presented at the end of 1995, around half of the project costs of 4.893 billion Deutschmarks (2.502 billion euros) for the S4 / F3 variant (2175 million DM) were to be financed from property revenues. The federal government was to finance the costs of connecting the new line to Ulm (pursuant to Section 8 (1) BSchwAG) of DM 886 million; another DM 350 million as an interest-free loan in accordance with Section 8 (2) BSchwAG. According to the GVFG, the remaining 500 million DM should be financed by the federal, state and local authorities. With a calculated capital value (as of December 31, 1994, interest rate of 7.5%) of 0.8 million D-Marks, the profitability was barely given over a period of 45 years . The traffic science institute at the University of Stuttgart determined an economic benefit of 314 million DM per year (benefit-cost factor of 2.6).

Based on these data, a first financing agreement for the project was signed on November 7, 1995 . The project costs of exactly DM 4.893 billion provided for in this framework agreement were based on the January 1993 price level. The federal government undertook to co-finance the project with 886 million D-Marks. The city of Stuttgart took over 29 million euros, a third of the construction cost increases of 170 million D-Marks (87 million euros).

About 30 percent of the project costs should be covered from additional income from larger numbers of passengers and reduced operating costs. Another 30 percent should be redeemed by marketing the track areas that will become available. The remaining 40 percent of the estimated project costs of 4.893 billion D-Marks were to be covered by loans and grants from the public sector. 443 million DM (226.5 million euros) each were to be financed by the federal government as a construction cost subsidy and an interest-free loan (in accordance with Section 8 (1) of the Federal Railways Expansion Act). The state of Baden-Württemberg was to finance a total of DM 1,050 million (EUR 537 million) (of which EUR 179 million from funds under Section 8 (2) of the Federal Railways Expansion Act, EUR 256 million as a construction subsidy under the Municipal Transport Financing Act and a further EUR 102 million as a construction subsidy from regionalization funds). Flughafen Stuttgart GmbH was to raise EUR 51 million for the airport connection, and the city of Stuttgart, the state of Baden-Württemberg and the federal government jointly raised a total of EUR 10 million.

1998 cost estimate

According to a source from 2005, total costs of 2.6 billion euros were determined on the basis of the price and planning status from 1998. The additional costs compared to previous plans were justified with the further developed planning and the general price increase. Most of the costs (1,543 million euros) were to be covered by Deutsche Bahn AG's own funds.

By the end of 1998 planning costs of 120 million D-Marks were incurred.

Update of the profitability calculation (1999)

In the spring of 1999, the DB chairman Johannes Ludewig stopped further project preparation and initiated a re-evaluation of the profitability. In May 1999, DB commissioned an auditing company from Düsseldorf to evaluate the project. In addition to Stuttgart 21, Frankfurt 21 , the Mottgers-Spange and the new Rhine / Main – Rhine / Neckar line were also part of the test package. The investigation indicated that it would be economical.

The profitability calculation of the project was updated in November 1999. A further update should take place (as of May 2001) when the planning approval procedure is completed and within the framework of the awarding of contracts (expected for the end of 2004). This update finally took place in 2006 (see below).

At the end of 1999, the board of directors of Deutsche Bahn expected total costs of around 5.5 billion Deutschmarks for the project.

According to DB, the uncertain future of the project cost more than 500,000 DM per month in 2000. Up to mid-2000 there were around 190 million planning costs. emerged, around 200 million by mid-2001.

Pre-financing agreement (2001)

At a meeting with the state transport ministers Müller and Wiesheu and the head of the railway company Mehdorn in October 2000 , Federal Transport Minister Klektiven asked the states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria to pre-finance the Stuttgart 21, Neu-Ulm 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. The federal contribution of DM 886 million for the Stuttgart 21 project would not have been available until 2012 without the pre-financing.

In mid-February 2001, the federal government and the state of Baden-Württemberg agreed on pre-financing for Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. The estimated total costs for the pre-financing of both projects were estimated to be around one billion DM, depending on the interest rate trend. This should bring the start of construction seven years forward to 2004; The federal government should repay the pre-financed construction costs in eight years from 2011. By mid-2001, the planning costs spent for Stuttgart 21 totaled more than 240 million DM. The cost of pre-financing the federal portion of Stuttgart 21 (886 million DM) was given as 270 million DM, assuming a six percent interest rate. Previously, from the sum of DM 886 million, "remedial measures to be brought by the railroad necessary" were deducted by DM 120 million. DB's share of DM 120 million was deducted from the DM 270 million, which resulted in costs of DM 150 million for the federal, state and regional partners. Building on this, the city of Stuttgart decided to contribute a maximum of DM 50 million (EUR 26 million) to the costs of the pre-financing of the federal portion, provided that the state and region each also bear a third. The start of construction in 2004, after the expected completion of the planning approval process, was therefore considered certain.

On March 14, 2001, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn AG decided to continue planning insofar as a supplementary agreement to the framework agreement of 1995 was concluded as planned. The plan approval and award phases should be strictly separated from each other. The start of construction was postponed from 2004 to 2005. The previous financing could no longer be maintained. At that time, revenues from additional traffic in the amount of DM 668 million and real estate revenues of DM 799 million were expected.

According to media reports, the federal government and the railways kept the option of leaving the project open. A feasibility study should explain the risks of the project. At the beginning of 2001, the railways and the federal government kept a 34-page interim report from an auditing company on the profitability of the project under lock and key. It quantified risks of DM 930 million for Stuttgart 21, mainly in the areas of tunnel construction, incorrect planning and incomplete planning approval procedures. For example, DM 30,500 per tunnel meter was set, which appeared to be low based on the findings from ongoing projects. The report was commissioned by the federal government in order to obtain a picture of the actual funding requirements. Further risks had not yet been assessed. The paper also took into account general price developments and increased planning costs. The paper stated figures embellished for political reasons and mismanagement of DB. The Deutsche Bahn supervisory board then initially withdrew its willingness to obtain building offers for the project.

A supplementary agreement from July 2001 provided for the resumption of planning that had previously been suspended for more than two years. Deutsche Bahn agreed to provide a further 427 million Deutschmarks in planning funds for Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. Of this, 100 million DM were reserved for land purchase and 60 million DM for geological exploration.

Building on this, it was planned to start negotiations on pre-financing between the federal, state and German railways. The city of Stuttgart undertook to buy space that became available, and the region to share in the additional costs for the S-Bahn. In order to improve the profitability of Stuttgart 21, the state of Baden-Württemberg committed itself, in particular, to the purchase of double-deck cars by DB Regio with 200 million D-Marks. As part of this so-called realization agreement, the city ​​of Stuttgart assumed additional expenses from water management risks amounting to 40 million DM (20.5 million euros) as well as a share of 5 million DM (2.56 million euros) in the additional costs of the airport connection . The project partners agreed to subject the project to a profitability review in 2004, before the planned start of construction, and then to decide on the implementation.

Acquisition of land by the city of Stuttgart (2001)

After the federal government and the city had basically agreed on the sale of all vacant space (with the exception of area A1) around the beginning of 2000, the pre-financing of the Stuttgart 21 project had to be clarified before the sale of the space could be sealed the following year.

On December 21, 2001, the state capital Stuttgart acquired almost all of the areas freed up by Stuttgart 21 with a total area of ​​109 hectares for 897.7 million DM (459 million euros) from Deutsche Bahn. The A1 area will continue to be marketed by Deutsche Bahn.

According to the then mayor of Stuttgart, Manfred Rommel, the proceeds from the property were calculated carefully. Of 100 hectares of railway area, 63 were to be built on and 37 hectares were to be designated as non-building areas. The prices were estimated by city experts and 30 percent were deducted from them. The removal of contaminated sites is to be taken over by Deutsche Bahn AG (as of 1996) and financed from a special program.

The purchase agreement provided for the payment of default interest if the acquired land was not handed over to the state capital by December 31, 2010. The state capital later (as of 2007) agreed to waive default interest until December 31, 2020 due to the delayed implementation of the project (212.5 million euros). This interest was not included in the profitability calculation. This was appropriate after DB had agreed to use the surplus from its profitability calculation to finance the risk of increasing costs.

In 2007, critics of the project pointed out that the areas of the former Stuttgart freight depot, which had been cleared for a number of years, had been lying fallow and, at most, had been built on by public institutions. Furthermore, the company was able to manage the 459 million euros already paid without having to bear any expenses for the project.

In February 2000, the city of Stuttgart agreed to acquire the A2 (approx. 10.52 ha) and A3 (approx. 1.42 ha) sub-areas for DM 415 million (A2) and DM 35 million (A3), respectively. The value date was scheduled for December 31, 2000. The total value of 450 million German marks was based on the marketing of 275,000 m² of floor space at 2,520 DM / m². Discounted at 4.0% per year between December 31, 2000 and December 31, 2011, this resulted in a purchase price of DM 450.2 million as of December 31, 2010. In 2001, the city of Stuttgart bought areas A2 to D. The areas were was previously valued at 25 million euros in the books of the railway.

Further development

At the beginning of 2002, total costs of 2.594 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 were communicated. Deutsche Bahn was to finance 1.543 billion euros of this (from property proceeds and additional income from rail operations). The federal government should contribute 453 million euros, the state of Baden-Württemberg with 537 million euros. For the airport connection (61 million euros) contributions should be made by the airport company, the city, the state and the federal government. After the completion of the plan approval procedure, which is planned for 2004, a new profitability calculation should be submitted. At the end of 2004, based on this, a final decision should be made with secure financing.

In 2002, according to a media report from 2010, the DB already expected costs of 4.203 billion euros for the project. According to DB information, this value should not be in euros, but D-Marks, corresponding to 4.203 billion D-Marks (around 2.15 billion euros) and refer only to the share of DB Netz .

At the end of 2004, it was officially expected to cost 2.6 billion euros. In the course of the ongoing planning approval procedure, the exact costs should be determined.

In October 2004 the state was presented with an updated cost calculation that had been drawn up by Deutsche Bahn over three years. The costs determined in 1998 of 2.6 billion euros were increased to 2.81 billion euros. According to a media report, a buffer of five percent was taken into account in this amount. The country anticipated the possibility that the project would not be a euro more expensive than estimated in 1998. The then Transport Minister Stefan Mappus ruled out a cost explosion “99 percent”.

The financing talks agreed in 2001 continued in 2005.

Individual planning and drilling programs for the Stuttgart 21 project were 50% financed by the European Union between 2001 and 2004 . The total funding is 114.5 million euros. TEN funds from the EU are offset against the federal contribution of 500 million.

Around 2004 EU grants of up to 20 percent of the construction costs were expected. In 2006, the coordinator of TEN Corridor 17 (Paris – Bratislava), Péter Balázs , spoke out before the European Parliament's Transport Committee against co-financing Stuttgart 21 with TEN funds.

Economic feasibility studies (2006/2007)

In 2006, Deutsche Bahn carried out a further profitability study for Stuttgart 21 and the new line to Ulm. It was based on the investment and operating costs expected by DB AG with costs and prices from 2004. Depending on the planning status of the underlying sections, the planning status of the conceptual or draft planning was taken into account.

The economic feasibility study assumed total costs of 2.8 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 and a construction cost risk of one billion euros, which Deutsche Bahn and the state of Baden-Württemberg should bear. Deutsche Bahn emphasized that the project would be economically viable provided that these risks were hedged. TEN funds amounting to 250 million euros were included in the profitability calculation; however, the amount of the TEN funds actually available was not yet determined (as of May 2007). The appraisal also assumed property proceeds of 740 million euros (price as of 2004). The main station accounted for almost 800 million euros of the estimated total costs of 2.8 billion euros.

Assuming additional financial contributions from those involved, the profitability calculation determined a positive result of 86 million euros. The report names the conditions for implementation and shows risks. The updated profitability calculation was presented to the Federal Ministry of Transport in September 2006. The profitability study is classified by Deutsche Bahn as a trade and business secret. A macroeconomic review was not carried out.

In a two-hour high-level discussion between the federal, state, city and German railways on October 23, 2006, the implementation of Stuttgart 21 remained open. Federal Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee called for a profitability calculation of the project by internal and external auditors, on the basis of which a decision should be made in February or March 2007 at the latest. The present economic feasibility study only mentioned “rough figures” and was only submitted to the federal government a few days before the meeting. According to a press report, the profitability calculation of the railway put a plus of 80 million euros. The federal government committed itself to the realization of the Wendlingen – Ulm NBS, but saw itself unable to start financing before 2017. A decision by May 2007 was deemed necessary because the federal government would have had to register its railway construction projects with the EU for funding by then at the latest. During the discussion, the state and railways agreed how unforeseen additional costs should be distributed. First, the railway should take responsibility for this, then the country and the city.

In September 2006 negotiations were in progress between the project partners as to how additional costs of 200 million euros should be distributed. The airport's share was put at 150 million euros in October 2006 and the region's share at 100 million euros.

The inspection order from the Federal Ministry of Transport was completed in April 2007.

Memorandum of Understanding (2007)

As part of a memorandum of understanding on July 19, 2007, the federal government, the state, the city, the railway and the Stuttgart Region Association agreed to bring the start of construction for Stuttgart 21 and the new line forward to 2010. The paper puts the expected costs at 2.8 billion euros. On the same day, a key issues paper for a financing agreement was concluded. The main part of the costs should therefore be borne by Deutsche Bahn (1.15 billion euros) and the state (685 million, including according to GVFG ). The federal government should participate with funds from the requirement plan amounting to 500 million euros and according to the Federal Railways Expansion Act with around 200 million euros; Any subsidies to be applied for within the framework of the TEN program will be deducted from the federal funds. Under this agreement, increases in construction costs of up to one billion euros will initially be borne by DB AG (220 million euros) and the state (up to 780 million euros).

The state and the state capital again agreed that the city of Stuttgart should take over up to 131 million euros of this 780 million euros if necessary. In return, the city's liabilities from the pre-financing agreement (26 million euros) and the assumption of water management risks (20.5 million euros) were canceled. The latter went over to the general risk of additional costs. The costs to be borne by the city of Stuttgart increased by up to 84.5 million euros. For costs in excess of 3.8 billion euros, Deutsche Bahn should use the excess of up to 160 million euros (93 million euros net present value from 2007) determined in a profitability calculation. Building on this, the state should provide up to 160 million euros (93 million euros at the capital value of 2007). The state capital should take over a third of this additional state share (31 million euros at the capital value of 2007).

The signing was preceded by negotiations that lasted late into the night, in which the state, but also the region and the city, increased their share of the financing. The funding applications for Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm route should be submitted on the same day. Due to the federal contribution of 500 million euros for Stuttgart 21, according to the federal government, a maximum of 100 million euros in EU funding could have been expected.

On July 25, 2007, the state parliament approved the memorandum. In autumn 2007 the signing of the financing agreement for March 2008 was expected.

In August 2008, the Baden-Württemberg state government announced costs of € 5.08 billion for the Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. In addition, a risk fund of 1.45 billion euros is necessary. The budget committee of the German Bundestag approved on 20 November 2008 federal funds totaling 1.55 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen-Ulm. On November 28, the Bundestag approved these funds with the 2009 federal budget. The federal funds are not to be available until 2014. Until then, the state of Baden-Württemberg should make advance payments. In mid-March 2009, the Federal Ministry of Finance announced that it would provide funds of EUR 280.2 million for the project as part of an extraordinary commitment authorization. The federal funds are spread over eleven years.

The funding was divided between the following sources:

• Deutsche Bahn's share is 1.3008 billion euros.
• The state of Baden-Württemberg, together with partners, is taking over 501.8 million euros (including 112.4 million euros from the GVFG federal program). The Stuttgart Region Association , which has pledged 100 million, is refinancing its contribution through contributions from its member municipalities. The state finances its share in Stuttgart 21 and the new line to Ulm from a reserve formed in 2008, including the interest accruing from it.
• Stuttgart Airport will immediately take on a share of 107.8 million euros, a further 112.242 million "to compensate for operating losses" and erect various structures and systems at its own expense. On July 16, 2008, the airport's supervisory board approved the transfer of 112 million euros to Deutsche Bahn. These funds are not tied to specific construction work.
• The federal government is assuming a total of almost 1.5 billion euros. These include EUR 500 million in investment funds (price status: 2004) according to Section 8 (1) BSchwAG ; this share is to be updated by the price development ( construction cost index ) up to 2008 once by 63.8 million euros and represents the "business-as-usual costs" of the originally planned integration of the new Wendlingen – Ulm line in the Stuttgart hub. A further 300 million euros are federal funds for avoided replacement investments in the existing network, which are also made available to Deutsche Bahn in accordance with Section 8 (1) BSchwAG. A further 197 million euros in investment funds for the regional transport network in accordance with Section 8 (2) BSchwAG and 168.6 million euros from the GVFG federal program.

Since the project is not part of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan, the federal government only contributes the so-called as- if costs that would have been incurred without the implementation of Stuttgart 21 for the new Stuttgart – Wendlingen (–Ulm) line.

The Messe Stuttgart participates indirectly through the assumption of costs for construction features.

According to media reports, after the agreement reached on 19 July 2007 on the financing of Stuttgart 21 structural imponderables at the airport (special permit) led to a delay in the financing contract of more than a year.

Financing contract dated April 2, 2009

Deutsche Bahn estimated the total costs in 2008 at 2.8104 billion euros ( real value with price and cost status as of January 1, 2004). When the financing agreement was signed on April 2, 2009, this calculation was updated by an assumed construction price increase of 1.5% per year and raised to a nominal value of 3.076 billion euros. (All prices plus sales tax, insofar as the railway infrastructure company is not entitled to input tax deduction) The estimated costs were nominalized until 2016.

The underlying rate is based on Deutsche Bahn's many years of experience in tunnel and new construction projects. For Deutsche Bahn, the project is "balanced economically" up to a total cost of EUR 4769 million. The loading of the result of participating infrastructure companies of DB networks to be offset by increases in the prices infrastructure to start-up of the project.

The construction costs should be updated as part of the design planning. For this purpose, a “risk provision amount” of 1,450 million euros was provided as part of the financing. Costs in excess of EUR 3,076 million will initially be borne by Deutsche Bahn (up to EUR 220 million). The state and the city will contribute a further 780 million euros, with Stuttgart Airport contributing 119.4 million euros. Deutsche Bahn will provide the next 160 million euros, as well as another 130 million euros, which, however, will be reduced by the cost of financing the new line to Ulm until the federal government has refinanced this line. The state is providing a further 160 million euros, and talks have also been agreed.

Critics complain that an internal cost estimate by Deutsche Bahn from the end of 2008 / beginning of 2009 already estimated construction costs of 3.9271 billion euros for the project. Including planning costs and inflation surcharge, the cost estimate was five billion euros. The planning costs of 186 million euros incurred until then had been financed by DB from its own resources and were not included in this sum.

When the financing agreement was signed in April 2009, the company kept these costs above the agreed budget from the project partners. According to DB information from the end of 2010, when the agreement was signed, it was clear that the planned costs would have to be updated once the design planning was completed.

According to an internal paper issued by the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Transport to media representatives in July 2011, the ministry was already aware of construction costs of 4.066 billion euros in the weeks before the financing agreement was concluded. In addition to 809.134 million euros in planning costs, this resulted in a total of 4,875.134 million euros. This cost level arose on the basis of an almost completely completed draft plan. As early as the end of 2008, Deutsche Bahn knew of cost increases of up to 142 percent in tunnel sections of Stuttgart 21.

According to a media report from the end of 2011, controllers from the Ministry of the Interior calculated costs of between 4.9 and 6.5 billion euros for the project on the basis of railway documents for three construction phases (main station, Filder tunnel, Obertürkheim tunnel) in autumn 2009. As a result, costs of 5.5 billion euros were considered likely, with a price increase rate of 2.5 percent per year for personnel and materials, the officials reckoned 6.5 billion euros. According to a note, “at the request of Mr. MP” (Prime Minister Oettinger ), “a new cost calculation should be refrained from”. Less than a month later, on November 12th, 2009, Oettinger spoke out in favor of not “actively” disclosing calculations that are above the cost limit of 4.5 billion euros.

Cost calculation from December 2009

At the beginning of December 2009, Deutsche Bahn AG submitted a cost calculation based on the draft planning and according to the price status of 2009. The largest cost increases compared to the previous cost estimate of 2004 were attributable to the tunnel construction (370 million euros) and increases in planning and prices (230 million euros).

Further increases in costs resulted from concrete measures, new technical guidelines and more complex groundwater management.

According to the DB, the forecast is based on detailed plans that were submitted to DB between December 2008 and June 2009 by the approximately 60 planning offices involved in the draft planning. This provided data on quantities, prices, trades and geological conditions, on the basis of which a more precise calculation of building costs was possible (see table opposite).

This result of the planning offices of 4066 million euros has been modified by Deutsche Bahn AG in three steps: For the first time as part of the project, construction costs of 44.1 million euros for parking and treatment systems that would become necessary due to the project were added. In a second step, according to an internal “market and procurement analysis”, savings potentials were examined, which resulted in 468 million euros plus 129.9 million euros from property financing, i.e. a total of 597.9 million euros. In the third step, a further EUR 294.0 million was deducted from the aforementioned construction cost calculation due to “opportunities from optimizing the structures” (see table below).

Construction cost estimate (2004) and construction cost calculation (2009)
Planning approval of positioning sections	Spatial scope	2004 (rounded in million euros)	2009 (rounded in million euros)
1.1	Valley crossing with Stuttgart main station	775	893.1
1.2	Filder tunnel	311	753.9
1.3	Image area with airport connection	322	488.0
1.4	Filder area to Wendlingen	216	205.1
1.5	Feed to Feuerbach / Bad Cannstatt	453	801.0
1.6	Feeding to Ober- / Untertürkheim	479	925.0
total		2,508	4,066.0
Left column: Cost status of the financing agreement (planning and price status from 2004) Right column: Planned construction costs after draft planning , before cost optimization ( real value with planning status 2009 and price status 2008).

In total, construction costs of 3218.2 million euros would have resulted, to which 17 percent (547.1 million euros) were added for planning costs (price as of 2008). To the total (real construction and planning costs of 3765.9 million euros), 322.5 million euros (8.6 percent) were added to compensate for inflation. In total, this would result in nominal project costs of EUR 4,087.8 million. According to this planning status, the difference to the EUR 4,526 million stipulated in the financing agreement of April 2009 was around EUR 440 million as risk provision.

Construction cost calculation DB AG after cost optimization (nominalized, status 2009).	Costs (rounded in million euros)
Construction costs according to the draft plan	4,066
Regional parking u. Treatment systems	44.1
Savings potential from market and Award analysis	- 597.9
Opportunities from optimizing the structures	- 294.0
Total construction costs	3,218.2
Planning costs (+ 17% of the construction costs)	547.1
Total construction and Planning costs	3,765.3
Nominalization	322.5
Total construction and Planning costs nominal value as of 2009	4,087.8

The project costs in December 2009 were 3.765 billion euros. Around 3.2 billion euros of this was accounted for by construction costs and 547 million euros by planning costs. A further 322 million euros were added for building price increases. This value was determined by adding a flat rate of 1.5 percent per year (from 2004) to the annual financing share. The total estimated cost of the project was 4.088 billion euros.

According to media reports, the company has meanwhile expected total costs of 4.9 billion euros internally. The savings of EUR 597.8 million determined in the course of the aforementioned “market and procurement analysis” were determined in a multi-stage process: First of all, the calculation was based on a market price survey carried out by the purchasing department of Deutsche Bahn. The project costs were also corrected on the basis of experience. In a final step, the revised costs were compared with the company's other tunneling measures. The almost 598 million euros include, among other things, 129.9 million euros saved in real estate acquisition costs; 146.5 million euros are to be saved in the excavation of the tunnel, 87.7 million euros in reinforcing steel and 28.8 million euros in shotcrete.

Development of the cost calculations for "Stuttgart 21", as of the end of 2012

According to the DB, the potential savings through “optimization of buildings” are broken down into 218 million euros without changes to the underlying planning approval decisions and another 76 million euros with such changes. In addition to changes in tunneling technology ( shotcrete construction instead of tunnel boring machines ) and lower assumed swelling pressures, changes in plan approval section 1.5 and at train stations are also planned. The changes require the approval of the Federal Railway Authority, architects, builders, project partners and experts. According to the company, the cost savings in the tunnels are based on new, lower load assumptions based on measurements. The Federal Railway Authority has not yet received an application from Deutsche Bahn to adjust the planning (as of December 2009). It is doubted whether the planned cost savings will last before the supervisory authority.

According to information from mid-2010, 132 million euros will be spent on the changes to the light rail systems required in the course of the project.

Arbitration (2010)

In the course of the arbitration talks in autumn 2010, the project costs of 4.088 billion euros were assessed by three auditing companies (Märkische Revision, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Susat & Partner). Basically, they come to the assessment that Deutsche Bahn AG, on the one hand, is “very optimistic” about the opportunities for cost savings and, on the other hand, due to the risks, especially from the construction, it is questionable whether they can be fully realized.

Savings potential from market and Award analysis of DB AG	Costs (in million euros)
Savings sum	597.9
Rock eruption	146.5
Construction site equipment	130.6
Rebar	87.7
conventional superstructure	40.1
Slab track, mass-spring system	34.2
Shotcrete	28.8
Real estate transactions	129.9

After examining the documents of Deutsche Bahn AG, the involved company “Märkische Revision” comes to higher project costs of 4.42 billion euros, since savings on land are not formally secured and historical planning costs have to be included. With a view to the savings expected by Deutsche Bahn AG totaling 579.9 million euros, the company “Märkische Revision” declares that this potential for savings is very optimistic and that Deutsche Bahn AG has not submitted any reliable evidence for significant quantities. According to the auditors, there is a significant risk that the savings cannot be realized in full, i.e. that the project costs could be higher.

The expected savings in technical areas of 468 million euros (= 11.5% of the total costs) would, according to the auditing company, relate to the excavation in the tunnel works, construction site equipment, reinforcing steel, shotcrete and the costs of the superstructure (see table). The following reductions in the cost estimates made by the specialist planners were subsequently made by Deutsche Bahn AG:

• Excavation costs for the tunnels (rock excavation) in plan approval section 1.2 by 49% and for plan approval section 1.6a by 43% below the planners' prices (without verifiable evidence)
• Construction site setup costs, especially in plan approval sections 1.3 (Filderbahnhof / airport) and 1.5 (two tunnels in the direction of Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt) significantly reduced (without prior detailed examination of the background)
• Reinforcing steel costs (including installation) for all planning approval sections with the market price level of the 2nd quarter of 2009 (at that time significant reduction due to the financial crisis, the reduction that occurred was already balanced out at the end of 2010)
• Shotcrete costs reduced without concrete, verifiable price evidence
• Superstructure costs (slab track, switches, ballast bed, mass-spring system) reduced by approx. 32%

In addition, there would be potential savings in property costs of EUR 129.9 million. In order to present this information, the auditing company noted that Deutsche Bahn AG had initially submitted a version for EUR 298 million. In a "current" version that was subsequently handed over, this area was reduced to EUR 129.9 million and the above-described potential for savings in construction costs was shown for the first time.

The auditing company PricewaterhouseCoopers notes fundamentally with regard to the cost information provided by Deutsche Bahn AG and the update due to cost increases (nominalization) that the information was converted from 2004 to 2009, but not until the end of the project. With this method chosen by Deutsche Bahn AG, an annual increase of 1.5 percent is assumed. Upon conclusion of the contract, further increases would be passed on to the supplier through fixed price fixing. If this does not succeed (e.g. due to fluctuations in the price of building materials or execution times lasting several years) there is a risk of further increases in costs.

Further development (2011/2012)

An internal risk analysis from the end of March 2011, which was partly made public through a media report, lists 121 risks of the project. The 48 positions, which are backed by specific amounts, have a total volume of 1.264 billion euros. Around 750 million euros of this were earmarked as "savings potential". Around half of these had already been implemented at the time of the report. According to its own information, Deutsche Bahn assumed that it would also be able to skim off the remaining potential. Possible additional costs resulting from the arbitration procedure are not included in the project risks. The risks specifically quantified in the document included additional costs for the tunnel construction (174 million euros) as well as planning and coordination deficiencies (76 million euros).

The planned project costs were exceeded by March 2011 by 50 million euros. At the same time, savings of around 60 million euros had been achieved by then. The Deutsche Bahn rejected the representations. Most of the savings presented in the arbitration process have meanwhile been realized. At the end of September 2011, rail technology director Volker Kefer indicated further cost increases of 370 million euros.

At the steering committee meeting on July 30, 2011, Deutsche Bahn corrected the total costs to 4.166 billion euros. Four additional measures therefore cost 78 million euros: 17.5 million euros for additional conventional security technology, 23.4 million euros for GSM-R extensions, 35.1 million euros for the continuous double-track connection of the airport and an additional switch connection north of Feuerbach (2.3 million euros).

On September 23, 2011, Deutsche Bahn announced at a steering committee meeting that it would expect additional costs of 370 million euros by 2016. Of this, 130 million euros are attributable to additional project costs and 240 million euros to procurement risks. There are also other, unknown risks. Of the agreed financial contribution of 4.526 billion euros, 390 million euros remained in reserve.

McKinsey report (2012)

Cost information for "Stuttgart 21" Deutsche Bahn AG as of Dec. 2012.	updated cost calculation (in million euros)	listed spiked Finanz.- frame (million euros)	Rough estimate of additional external costs (in million euros)
Construction and planning costs after cost optimization in December 2009	3,766
minus remaining opportunities	−170
plus necessary services (2)	610
plus unrealized savings potential (2)	490
Construction and planning costs as of December 2012 (1)	4,696	4,696
Buffer (1)		930
total		5,626
Estimation of additional costs by country and State capital Stuttgart (3)			590
Estimation of additional costs by authorities (time delays) (4)			400
total			990
(1) P. 4 (2) Page 5, the sum of € 1,100 million is referred to as the "calculation difference" (3)In detail (p. 9) as a “rough estimate”: additional services (airport bus station) € 300 million, changes to specifications € 300 million, specific risks € 140 million, land € 50 million less “opportunities” - € 200 million (4) P. 11

At the end of 2012, Deutsche Bahn identified so-called calculation deviations in the amount of 1.1 billion euros in an “inventory of the project” based on an external expert opinion . This additional requirement was presented to the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn on December 12, 2012 along with other topics. It is made up of 610 million euros for “necessary but not budgeted services” (for example fees) and 490 million euros for “unrealisable plan approaches (savings potential)” (for example previously underestimated property and raw material prices). Property costs were forgotten, among other things, and the density of the existing lines was underestimated. Additional demands, bad planning and a lack of buffers were named as further reasons. While earlier cost calculations were based on the draft planning , today it is often an implementation plan .

Further risks are identified through "external influences", which are estimated from the additional services "Filderdialog / Arbitration" at around 300 million euros and from the acquisition of land, changes to specifications and specific risks at around 290 million euros. Together with additional costs of around 400 million euros from foreseeable time delays and “administrative difficulties”, Deutsche Bahn adds up these “additional risks from external factors” to around one billion euros. To finance these additional risks, Deutsche Bahn expects an agreement within the framework of the so-called speaking clause . According to other sources, “internal extrapolations” are a worst-case scenario. According to press reports, Deutsche Bahn is assuming total costs of 10.7 to 11.3 billion euros.

Deutsche Bahn proposes to increase the financing framework previously agreed with 4.5 billion euros from its own resources to 5.6 billion euros. According to Deutsche Bahn, the expected return on capital employed will decrease from 7.5 percent (based on the previously planned equity contribution of 1.7 billion euros) to 1.9 percent. According to a media report, significantly higher rents and massive increases in train path and station prices have been set in order to achieve economic efficiency. The return on investment for Deutsche Bahn becomes negative from additional costs of 1.78 billion euros.

According to information from rail boss Rüdiger Grube, Deutsche Bahn wants to ensure credibility, honesty and transparency by providing information about the expected costs at the end of the project. According to unofficial information, this one-time increase should achieve a realistic value. According to the company, to finance the additional costs, the debt of the Deutsche Bahn is to be reduced annually by around 100 million euros less than planned. According to Deutsche Bahn, the company's debt will be reduced "somewhat more slowly" than planned in the years 2017 to 2019 due to the additional costs. The additional costs were not at the expense of other projects. Baden-Württemberg's transport minister, Winfried Hermann, expects that Deutsche Bahn will not want to refinance additional train-path and station prices through rising fares.

The supervisory board of Deutsche Bahn asked the board of directors to examine all alternatives - including an exit. The three state secretaries on the supervisory board requested the management board to present a status report on Stuttgart 21 at every meeting in the future. A written report with quarterly updated figures should be submitted in good time. He submitted 135 questions to the board.

Employee and capital representatives were originally supposed to receive answers to their questions posed at the December 12, 2012 meeting in separate meetings on January 14th and 18th. These meetings were canceled on January 11th because the necessary data from the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers was not available. The supervisory board should decide on February 21, 2013.

In a four-hour meeting of the capital representatives represented on the DB Supervisory Board, it was decided to prepare a new profitability calculation. In a table template prepared for the meeting for the political representatives on the supervisory board, the Federal Ministry of Transport considered the arguments put forward by Deutsche Bahn to be too weak to agree to finance the additional costs from company funds. The ministry wanted to have the information submitted by Deutsche Bahn checked again. At the time, federal funds should not be released. According to a statement by Deutsche Bahn for the Supervisory Board, “under the current framework conditions (...) such a project would not start, but would continue”.

The company put the total of the already incurred or concretely foreseeable additional costs at 1.165 billion euros. Of this, 613 million euros accounted for forgotten services / costs for construction and planning, 490 million euros for calculated but not achieved savings, 200 million euros for general price increases, 156 million euros for poor project execution and 83 million euros for general additional costs.

Supervisory board resolution of March 5, 2013

On March 5, 2013, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn decided to follow a proposal by the Board of Management to increase the financing framework from 4.526 to up to 6.526 billion euros and at the same time to demand that the project partners contribute to the additional costs (possibly in court). This amount includes already determined and other possible additional costs. According to the chairman of the supervisory board, the calculation was checked by two auditing companies. 18 out of 20 members of the supervisory board had approved the proposal, the lawyer Christoph Dänzer-Vanotti abstained, the representative of the union of German locomotive drivers voted against. In the opinion of the railway boss Rüdiger Grube , the project partners should assume around 60 percent of the additional costs. According to an internal report, Deutsche Bahn reckons that it will only be able to involve the project partners in the financing beyond self-inflicted additional costs of 1.1 billion euros.

The profitability of the project was no longer achieved.

Tax revenues may only be used to finance projects whose economic benefit is greater than the expected costs. In the run-up to the decision, the then Chancellery Minister Ronald Pofalla exerted influence to prevent the federal government from issuing an opinion on the exit costs. Eisenhart von Loeper obtained five corresponding advice notes from the Chancellery by means of the Freedom of Information Act , including two actions before the Berlin Administrative Court.

Development from 2013

On November 22, 2013, the project partners in the steering committee took note of the cost forecast, which had been raised to almost six billion euros, and released funds of up to 4.5 billion euros; the city of Stuttgart and the state of Baden-Württemberg continue to decline participation beyond the agreed contribution. According to information provided by Deutsche Bahn to its supervisory board, 468 million euros of the approximately two billion euros in security buffer had been used in April 2014.

By April 2014, Deutsche Bahn had spent 787 million euros on Stuttgart 21. This does not include planning costs incurred before April 1, 2009.

According to Deutsche Bahn information from April 2015, orders amounting to 48 percent of the total value, around 2.8 billion euros, have been awarded.

Expert opinion by Vieregg-Rössler (2015)

In December 2015, Vieregg-Rössler issued a further report at the cost of 9.8 billion euros for Stuttgart 21. The updated figures take into account previous experience with construction progress. These allow a more precise forecast of the total costs. Based on the updated findings, Vieregg-Rössler does not expect the project to be completed until 2024 at the earliest. The Bahn's supervisory board then decided in its next meeting to have Stuttgart 21 examine its own liability risks and the costs. The decisive factor for the decision was possibly also that the Federal Audit Office announced an audit report on the role of state secretaries on the supervisory board. The Federal Audit Office had previously publicly complained that the railway was not acting cooperatively.

Increase in budget (January 2018)

In January 2018, the Supervisory Board increased the “total value” to 7.705 billion euros, and the financing framework was increased to 8.2 billion euros. In between there is a buffer of 495 million euros. The increase in costs was justified u. a. through construction price increases, more complex tunnel construction procedures in anhydrite and more extensive approval procedures. In addition, commissioning is expected in 2025. Critics had previously feared cost increases due to the more complex building in anhydrite.

Analysis of DB's plan loss (April 2018)

In an internal paper by Deutsche Bahn from April 18, 2018, it is assumed that a total of 4.034 billion euros of DB's own resources will have to be used for the renovation of the rail hub, around four times as much as planned. On the other hand, positive “project effects” would be EUR 0.656 billion, “property effects” EUR 1.15 billion. Thus, a plan loss of 2.228 billion euros is assumed for the rail company. According to information from the Stuttgarter Zeitung , the DB top openly admitted the inefficiency of Stuttgart 21 to the Bundestag's transport committee for the first time.

Meanwhile, the regular financing according to the financing agreement will expire at the end of 2018. Contributions from the public project partners will end there, and Deutsche Bahn AG will have to take over the further financing itself. According to MdB Matthias Gastel , the money from the public purse will probably have already been spent.

criticism

Federal Audit Office (2008, 2011, 2013 and 2019)

In a report at the end of 2008, the Federal Audit Office calculated project costs of EUR 5.3 billion, i.e. additional costs of EUR 1.2 billion, based on the standards of the Federal Ministry of Transport. An internal appraisal of this ministry came after evaluating current building price developments for major projects, showing price increases of up to 60% for projects with high risk areas such as a large proportion of tunnels and a high proportion of copper and steel. Accordingly, the DB AG's construction cost estimate of 3.08 billion euros at the time was added to with 60% (= 4.93 billion euros). He also criticized the fact that the costs for the Kleine Wendlinger curve and the parking facilities (297 million euros) were not included in the total project costs. The Federal Ministry of Transport rejected the report as unfounded. Cost increases by 60 percent are not to be expected due to the depth of planning, but the economic efficiency was proven in the report submitted in 2007.

The Federal Audit Office reiterated its criticism in July 2011. The cost information from Deutsche Bahn for Stuttgart and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line, which has now been corrected, also did not stand up to the investigations by the Federal Audit Office. The auditors firmly assumed that the actual costs of the project would still reach the level of the estimate.

In mid-2013, the Federal Audit Office announced a so-called confirmation audit of Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. It is about the role of the Federal Ministry of Transport and the representatives sent by it to the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn. For this purpose, cost and benefit assessments are to be checked to see whether federal grants have been used properly and economically. The Federal Audit Office has been auditing since the beginning of 2013. According to the authority, reliable results should not be available until the end of 2013 at the earliest (as of August 2013).

In September 2019, the Federal Audit Office warned that the funding framework of € 8.2 billion was exhausted. Several remaining risks in different construction phases could no longer be covered. In its report of September 13, the Federal Audit Office called for stricter controls by the federal government. In addition, the project scope of Stuttgart 21 may have to be reduced in order to keep the budget. A further increase in costs is "economically unsustainable" for Deutsche Bahn AG.

BUND and the Greens (2008)

A study carried out on behalf of BUND and Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen forecast total costs of 6.9–8.7 billion euros in mid-2008, depending on the approach to building cost increases. To determine the figures, empirical data from other railway projects were used in a flat-rate form and supplemented with “flat-rate surcharges” of 33.4%. The official cost forecasts therefore contained errors similar to those in the case of the Munich Transrapid , in particular the failure to take account of changed tunnel lengths and increased material and energy costs.

Deutsche Bahn AG, as the developer, contradicted the representations. Foreseeable increases in construction costs are already taken into account in the cost estimate. The project is also one of the company's best and most comprehensive projects planned. The forecast traffic could only be managed with the planned project, which, in contrast to alternative variants, was largely planned. The construction costs were "roughly estimated" by Vieregg-Rössler and were "bare assumptions".

Opponents criticize the increasing cost of the project. It is also criticized that the project is at the expense of regional projects such as the Züttlingen – Möckmühl line, the Stuttgart – Singen Gäubahn , the Heilbronn urban railway or the new Rhine / Main – Rhine / Neckar line or the expansion of the Rhine Valley line.

The project also lacked funds for regional transport. The Verkehrsclub Deutschland criticized the fact that the Stuttgart 21 project was increasing the pressure to make savings in regional traffic, especially in rural areas, as lines running towards Stuttgart could not be shortened due to their importance for the profitability of the major project.

Legal opinion of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (2010)

A legal opinion presented in November 2010 by the lawyer Hans Meyer on behalf of the Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen parliamentary group in the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg considers the financing of the Stuttgart 21 project to be unconstitutional . Both the financing of the new Wendlingen – Ulm line and the Stuttgart 21 project violated the principle of the financial constitution , Art. 104a .

At the end of August 2011, the state government of Baden-Württemberg announced that it would not transfer the annual installment of the state share of 50 million euros due on August 31, 2011. It should be checked whether there is any payment obligation. By August 2011, the country said it had spent 80 million euros on the project. The installment was ultimately paid “with reservations”. By March 2015, the state had transferred 272 million euros to Deutsche Bahn.

Exit costs

By December 31, 2009, negotiations were to be commenced if the risk amount stipulated in the financing agreement was foreseeably exceeded. If this had not been successful, the project was to be canceled and the costs incurred up to then to be shared between the railway infrastructure companies involved and the state of Baden-Württemberg in a ratio of 60:40. According to DB , project costs of 73 million euros arose between the Memorandum of Understanding (June 2007) and December 2009; if the project had been canceled at the end of 2009, the state would have had to pay 29 million euros.

According to the DB, the total costs of a project termination would have been around two billion euros in mid-December 2009. 702 million euros would have been spent on the repurchase of land, 117 million euros in subsidies to be paid back to the airport and the EU and around 50 million euros for the reversal of engineering contracts. Planning costs would have had to be written off around EUR 210 million. In addition, an investment backlog of 1.35 billion euros, which resulted from the renovation project on the existing systems, should have been reduced. This investment backlog would have resulted from a long-term view until 2054. By 2020, costs of EUR 340 million would have been incurred.

In the course of the arbitration talks in autumn 2010, these exit costs were assessed by three auditing firms. The arbitrator summarized the results as follows: One of the (auditing) companies came to the conclusion that an exit would cost around 1 billion euros, the other two even assume 1.5 billion euros.

The unwinding of the property sales was assessed differently by the auditing firms involved. PricewaterhouseCoopers took a purely business management view. The company "Susat & Partner" assumes that the costs set by Deutsche Bahn AG for the reversal of the property sales are to be equated with the depreciation from the lack of relocation of the rail traffic.

The “Märkische Revision” was based on a structural classification, according to which a distinction must be made between the macroeconomic view and the business view. She would see the reversal of the property costs in the amount of 750 million euros not as exit costs, but only as costs from an economic point of view. The pure project exit costs would amount to approx. 450 million euros, additional project exit costs "of around 200 million euros would be incurred if the new Wendlingen - Ulm line was not built either.

According to information from Deutsche Bahn from October 2010, a month of construction interruption would cost around ten million euros. According to a media report, the seven-week construction and awarding freeze between the state elections and the constitution of the new state government resulted in costs of around 30 million euros. According to information from Rüdiger Grube in May 2011, every month of construction delay costs 10 to 15 million euros. With every additional month these costs would skyrocket. A six-month postponement would therefore cost around 150 to 200 million euros, a year 300 to 400 million. Anyone who delayed the project until a referendum in October would have to expect demands from DB of more than 100 million euros. The financing of the delay-related additional costs from the project budget of 4.5 billion euros is not to be accepted from the perspective of Deutsche Bahn. After the constitution of the new state government, talks about the financing of the additional costs are to be started immediately.

In the event of a project being terminated, according to DB, an increasing level of delays in the Stuttgart node can be expected in the traffic volumes expected in the 2015 traffic forecast. Furthermore, it would not be possible to save travel time. The railway companies would lose additional revenues from additional traffic.

At the beginning of June 2011, DB board member Kefer put the cost of an extended construction stop until mid-July at 50 to 60 million euros, as this would postpone the project by one year. A six-month construction freeze until the referendum was concluded would have cost 410 million euros, according to Kefer, as a lot of the work would have to be re-tendered and the planning of the construction work on the network would have become obsolete.

At the beginning of 2013, Deutsche Bahn put the exit costs at 2.001 billion euros. Of this, 795 million euros went to the reversal of real estate transactions, 545 million euros in damages for construction companies and planners, 411 million euros to repay investment grants already received for planning and construction, 130 million euros for the restoration of the old main station (excluding Bonatz building) , 112 million repayment for the airport grant (with interest). Another source puts the amount of compensation payments from contracts calculated at 486 million euros, corresponding to 30 percent of the order volume. The State Secretaries on the DB Supervisory Board considered the sum of the exit costs mentioned to be excessive. According to information provided by the city of Stuttgart in 2011, the repayment expense is limited to 682 million euros, since the costs of the already built-up areas at the Nordbahnhof are to be deducted.

According to the supervisory board documents from the beginning of 2013, the further construction is 77 million euros cheaper than the continuation. The return on equity of Stuttgart 21 is accordingly −0.3 percent. The exit costs were checked by PricewaterhouseCoopers and secured by the supervisory board through an expert opinion by KPMG.

According to a calculation submitted by the Vieregg-Rössler office in February 2016, withdrawing from the project is six billion euros cheaper than continuing to build it. In addition to immediate exit costs of 1.5 billion euros, including planning costs of 309 million euros already spent and work already paid for of 730 million euros, 369 million euros were incurred for the reversal of the real estate business and 400 million euros for upgrading the existing systems. Another two billion euros are necessary for a new construction and expansion between the terminus and Ostfildern. It is proposed that the excavation pit of the new main train station, which had already been created at the time of the report, be used to build a street, a bus station and a parking deck.

outlook

Insofar as the "stress test" agreed in the course of the discussions should result in additional measures, according to Deutsche Bahn, an agreement between the project partners on the cost allocation is necessary. Financing from the existing risk buffer is not planned.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Without a source
2. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): DB S21 project: Information on the press conference on December 12, 2012 . 14-page presentation, Berlin, December 12, 2012, (PDF; 0.2 MB).
3. ↑ ^{a b} Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): DB Supervisory Board approves additional funds for increasing the financial framework of the Stuttgart 21 station project . Press release from March 5, 2013.
4. ↑ German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the Federal Government to the small question of the MPs Matthias Gastel, Stefan Gelbhaar, Stephan Kühn (Dresden), other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - printed matter 19/9108 - . Stuttgart 21 - Cost development and implementation of planning approval section 1.3 (connection to the airport). tape 19 , no. 10035 , May 9, 2019, ISSN  0722-8333 , p. 2 ( BT-Drs. 19/10035 ).
5. ↑ ^{a b c d} What will the rebuilding of the Stuttgart rail hub cost? ( Memento of the original from October 25, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Website on the pages of bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de , accessed on January 7, 2013. 
6. ↑ Financing Stuttgart 21: What will the renovation of the Stuttgart railway junction cost? ( Memento of the original from October 25, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Document on the website bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de , accessed on January 14, 2013. 
7. ↑ City of Stuttgart: Question about a referendum on Stuttgart 21: Mayor Schuster clarifies facts again ( memento of the original from February 12, 2013 in the web archive archive.today ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release from November 19, 2007. 
8. ↑ ^{a b} Stuttgart 21: A project of the century is rolling . In: DB Welt , issue 1/2010, p. 4 f.
9. ↑ ^{a b} Hope that there will be money left over ( Memento from December 20, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , December 17, 2009.
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h} City of Stuttgart: Stuttgart 21. Current report on the status quo . Annex to municipal council printed matter 609/2007.
11. ^ Christian Esser, Astrid Randerath : Schwarzbuch Deutsche Bahn , 1st edition, Bertelsmann-Verlag, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-570-10036-3 , p. 272.
12. ↑ ^{a b c} Project partners agree: Stuttgart 21 is coming  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release from December 10, 2009.  
13. ↑ ^{a b} Bahn fires board after "Stuttgart 21" debacle . In: Die Welt (online edition), December 10, 2009.
14. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i} State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Financing agreement for the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project ( Memento of the original from August 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked . Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 2.4 MB). Printed matter 14/4382 of April 22, 2009. 
15. ↑ Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (ed.): Works for the construction of the high speed line between Stuttgart and Wendlingen  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 0.3 MB). Data sheet as of October 2012.  
16. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: EU pays billion for the railway line to Ulm . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 161 , July 16, 2015, p. 17 .
17. ^ Konstantin Schwarz: EU gives money for Stuttgart 21 and route to Ulm . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 16 , January 21, 2014, p. 15 ( online ).
18. ^ The project from a European perspective ( Memento of December 24, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 17, 2010.
19. ↑ European coordinator PP17 (Ed.): Annual activity report 2009-2010 for PP17 . Brussels, August 2010, p. 14.
20. ↑ Transport: Commission examines the financing of 92 major infrastructure projects in the area of ​​the trans-European networks . Press release IP / 10/1391 of October 27, 2010.
21. ↑ Gerald Traufetter: Stuttgart 21 threatens to be even more expensive and to be finished later. In: Spiegel Online. January 25, 2018, accessed January 25, 2018 . 
22. ^ Rudolf Breimeier: Stuttgart 21: A sloping train station - economical and operational? In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 2 , 2013, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 96-99 .
23. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, projects (ed.): Project »Stuttgart 21«. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, approx. 1995, pp. 5, 8, 16 f., 20-25, 32 f., 36 f (similar version as PDF file online, 14 MB).
24. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, regional area Stuttgart, projects (ed.): The synergy concept Stuttgart 21. The results of the preliminary project . Brochure (44 A4 pages), Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 10-21, 38-40 ( PDF file , 14 MB).
25. ↑ Stuttgart main station is to be tunneled under . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 257, 1995, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 1.
26. ↑ ^{a b c d} Costs of the Stuttgart 21 rail project (PDF; 116 kB). Bundestag printed matter 16/10233, September 16, 2008.
27. ↑ Teufel demands a clear yes to “Stuttgart 21” from Berlin . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 283, 2000, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 5.
28. ^ H. Dieterle: Stuttgart 21 - A project of the century on the way to realization . In: Tiefbau , 9/1998, pp. 614–620 PDF file ( Memento from February 23, 2014 in the Internet Archive ).
29. ↑ ^{a b c} A calculation that works. The financing of the Stuttgart 21 . In: TurmForum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart project 21. Book accompanying the exhibition in the TurmForum Stuttgart 21 , p. 38 f.
30. ↑ Jutta Garber: Stuttgart 21: The big sister of Eurogate . In: Hochparterre , issue 9, year 12, 1999, p. 50 f.
31. ↑ ^{a b} City Council of the City of Stuttgart: Contract for the realization of Stuttgart 21 and acquisition of the A2 and A3 sub-areas of the Stuttgart 21 planning area from Deutsche Bahn AG . Printed paper 89/2000 of February 11, 2000.
32. ↑ Consulting firm examines the "Frankfurt 21" project . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . No. 122 , May 29, 1999, pp. 73 .
33. ↑ Michael Ohnewald : "The railway is working flat out on Stuttgart 21" . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . April 9, 2001, p. 21 .
34. ↑ ^{a b} Deutsche Bahn AG (publisher): Signals for Stuttgart 21, the new Wendlingen - Ulm and Neu Ulm 21 line still on green  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release 056/2001 from May 16, 2001.  
35. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Response of the Federal Government to the Minor Question from MPs Winfried Hermann, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Dr. Valerie Wilms, another member of parliament and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - printed matter 17/3766 - profitability calculation for Stuttgart 21 (PDF; 94 kB). Printed matter 17/4008 dated November 30, 2010.
36. ^ Wulf Reimer: Bahn board member for the construction of "Stuttgart 21" . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , November 29, 1999, p. 2.
37. ↑ Bahn Supervisory Board stops “Stuttgart 21” . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 279, 1999, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 25.
38. ^ Thomas Wüpper: Railway: Stuttgart21 not endangered . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , May 11, 2000, p. 1.
39. ↑ Michael Ohnewald : The Chancellor wants to get Stuttgart 21 on the right track . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . August 1, 2000, p. 17 .
40. ↑ ^{a b} Michael Ohnewald : New train station is to go into operation in 2013 . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . July 11, 2001, p. 21 .
41. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Municipal Council of the City of Stuttgart: Printed matter 177/2001. March 2001.
42. ↑ Confident in the last stand . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 209, 2000, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 12.
43. ↑ ^{a b} “Green light” message for Stuttgart 21 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2001, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 148.
44. ↑ Billionaire project “Stuttgart 21” is realized . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 38, 2001, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 5.
45. ↑ ^{a b c} Michael Ohnewald : Contractual partners get Stuttgart 21 off the siding . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . July 25, 2001, p. 19 .
46. ↑ Michael Ohnewald : Bahn says yes - but Stuttgart 21 threatens new delays . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . March 15, 2001, p. 21 .
47. ↑ Billion dollar project Stuttgart 21 still very uncertain . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 54, 2001, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 5.
48. ↑ Michael Ohnewald : Secret paper on Stuttgart 21 is fueling speculation . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . March 16, 2001, p. 23 .
49. ↑ Cost explosion in major rail projects . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 61, 2001, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 2.
50. ↑ Well-calculated rail track . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 70, 2001, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 5.
51. ^ Michael Ohnewald : Timetable for Stuttgart 21 out of time . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . May 17, 2001, p. 23 .
52. ↑ ^{a b} Landtag of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Small inquiry from Abg. Heiderose Berroth FDP / DVP and response from the Ministry of Environment and Transport: Status of preparations for the timely implementation of the Stuttgart 21 project ( memento of the original from October 4, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 10 kB). Printed matter 13/111 of July 20, 2001, point 5. 
53. ↑ Mathias Bury: The vision of the tunnel station in 18 files . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . November 2, 2001, p. 23 .
54. ^ Mathias Bury: "Historical Dimension" . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . December 22, 2001, p. 24 ([online]).
55. ↑ Manfred Rommel : The discussion has only just begun . In: Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart (Ed.): Stuttgart 21: Drafts for the new city . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1996, ISBN 3-421-03219-X , pp. 3–7.
56. ↑ Gangolf Stocker : Stuttgart 21: 2007 year of decision . In: Schiene , Issue 2/2007, ISSN  0932-2574 , pp. 20-23.
57. ↑ Bahn benefits from the Stuttgart 21 project . In: Frankfurter Rundschau , December 19, 2009.
58. ↑ The first address . In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 5.
59. ^ ^{A b c} Sven Böll, Frank Hornig, Simone Kaiser, Andreas Wassermann: Save yourself who can . In: Der Spiegel . No. 7 , 2013, ISSN  0038-7452 , p. 16-18 .
60. ↑ DB Projects South at a glance . In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 2.
61. ↑ "Important future projects that belong together ..." . In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 8.
62. ↑ Bahn withheld costs for S21 . stern.de , November 24, 2010.
63. ↑ Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Deutsche Bahn: Costs for Stuttgart 21 presented transparently - report by "stern.de" on allegedly kept secret cost increases incorrect . Press release from November 24, 2010.
64. ^ Arbitration procedure for Stuttgart 21: Shorthand protocol of November 26, 2010 (PDF; 604 kB), page 13.
65. ↑ The Superbahnhof . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 264, 2004, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. V1 / 13.
66. ^ ^{A b} Michael Ohnewald : Balance of the engineers: Stuttgart 21 not more expensive . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 252, October 29, 2004, p. 21.
67. ↑ Financing for Stuttgart 21 will not be clarified until June. (No longer available online.) Swr.de, April 23, 2007, archived from the original on September 29, 2007 ; Retrieved November 25, 2011 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
68. ↑ Thousands demonstrate peacefully . Stuttgarter Zeitung (online edition), August 3, 2010.
69. ^ A gap in the European network ( Memento from August 1, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , July 28, 2010.
70. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Republic of Germany, the State of Baden-Württemberg, Deutsche Bahn AG, DB Netz AG, DB Station & Service AG and DB Energie GmbH, the state capital of Stuttgart, the Stuttgart Region Association for implementation the new Stuttgart - Ulm line and the Stuttgart 21 project dated July 19, 2007 (PDF file, 3 pages).
71. ↑ Report EU against Stuttgart 21 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 6/2006, p. 270.
72. ↑ ^{a b} Answer of the Federal Government to the Minor Question from MPs Winfried Hermann, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Bettina Herlitzius, other MPs and the Alliance 90 / THE GREENS parliamentary group (PDF; 145 kB). In: Drucksache 17/955.
73. ↑ ^{a b c} German Bundestag: Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from MPs Winfried Hermann, Fritz Kuhn, Alexander Bonde, other MPs and the BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN parliamentary group (PDF; 90 kB). Printed paper 16/5331 dated May 30, 2007.
74. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development: Report request from the budget committee of the German Bundestag for the clean-up meeting for the 2009 budget on November 20, 2008 . Opinion (three pages) of November 13, 2008.
75. ↑ Michael Ohnewald : Old love does not rust . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 232, October 7, 2006, p. 36.
76. ↑ Markus Grabitz: Stuttgart 21: Federal government delays decision . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . October 24, 2006, p. 1 .
77. ^ ^{A b} Michael Isenberg: Resubmission spring 2007: Tiefensee lets Stuttgart 21 calculate again . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . October 24, 2006, p. 3 .
78. ↑ ^{a b} Roland Pichler: Federal government doubts Stuttgart 21 . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . October 24, 2006, p. 1 .
79. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Oettinger: City should take risk . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . October 25, 2006, p. 19 .
80. ↑ Mathias Bury: "Money for ICE route only if yes to new station" . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . October 24, 2006, p. 21 .
81. ^ Mathis Bury: Gäubahn connection slows down procedures . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . September 1, 2006, p. 19 .
82. ↑ Michael Isenberg: "We will not accept every request" . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . October 11, 2006, p. 18 .
83. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Bahn boss: From 2010 on, the excavators will roll . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 165 , July 20, 2007, p. 21 .
84. ^ Hany Azer , B. Engel: Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. In: tunnel. Issue 7/2009, ISSN  0722-6241 , pp. 12-24 ( PDF file , 290 kB).
85. ↑ Michael Isenberg: Correction to Stuttgart 21: Bahn should bear costs . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . October 18, 2007, p. 22 .
86. ↑ Financial requirements for Stuttgart 21 increase. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , August 20, 2008, p. 5.
87. ↑ “The project is running” ( Memento from September 11, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ). In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , November 21, 2008.
88. ↑ Without a source.
89. ↑ 280.2 million euros for the “Stuttgart 21” rail project ( Memento of the original from May 4, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Message on the website of the "Magistrale für Europa" initiative , March 19, 2009 (accessed January 7, 2013). 
90. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG: Stuttgart 21: maximum security in terms of costs and tunnel construction . Press release from December 16, 2009.
91. ↑ Municipalities have to pay for Stuttgart 21  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . In: Ludwigsburger Kreiszeitung (online edition), April 24, 2010.  
92. ↑ Is Stuttgart taking money away from 21 other projects? ( Memento of the original from February 6, 2013 in the web archive archive.today ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . In: Mannheimer Morgen , August 24, 2010. 
93. ↑ Michael Isenberg: Airport helps railways on their feet ( Memento from July 14, 2011 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , August 20, 2008.
94. ↑ German Bundestag: Information from the Federal Government: Transport Investment Report 2009 (PDF; 19.9 MB), printed matter 17/444 of January 14, 2010, p. 28 f.
95. ↑ German Bundestag: Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the MPs Winfried Hermann, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Peter Hettlich, other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - Printed matter 16/7104 - (PDF; 69 kB). In: Drucksache 16/7371 , November 29, 2007.
96. ↑ Jörg Hamann, Konstantin Schwarz: “Now it's about optimization” . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , No. 134, June 13, 2012, p. 18 (similar version online ).
97. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Profitability at risk again . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . June 4, 2008, p. 17 .
98. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k} Deutsche Bahn AG: Current state of affairs Stuttgart 21 (PDF; 95 kB). Information (10 A4 pages) dated December 10, 2009.
99. ↑ Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development: DB AG information workshop on Stuttgart 21 for the AR representatives on February 5, 2013 . S. 1, 7–9, 11 ( PDF file ).
100. ↑ ^{a b c d} Thomas Wüpper: Bahn can also cancel meetings of the supervisory board . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . January 12, 2013, p. 21 ( online ).
101. ↑ Jörg Nauke, Thomas Braun: Railway kept knowledge to itself . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung (online edition), December 2010.
102. ↑ Jörg Nauke: A rough calculation . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , March 22, 2011.
103. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Bahn kept true costs under lock and key for a year . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten (online edition), December 2010.
104. ↑ ^{a b} DB Mobility Logistics AG (ed.): Deutsche Bahn rejects claims about the lack of transparency in the costs of Stuttgart 21 . Press release from December 8, 2010.
105. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: S21: “Significantly higher costs are to be expected” ( Memento of September 3, 2011 in the Internet Archive ). In: Frankfurter Rundschau , July 16, 2011.
106. ↑ Swabian bill . In: Der Spiegel , No. 45, 2011, p. 42 f.
107. ↑ ^{a b} Grube: We build tunnels and not bunkers ( Memento from December 15, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , December 12, 2009.
108. ↑ (Fax of November 22, 2011) on the website of the Second German Television.
109. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Märkische Revision, PricewaterhouseCoopers AG WPG, Susat & Partner OHG WPG (ed.): Report of the arbitration group on the Stuttgart 21 project under the direction of Dr. Heiner Geissler. Stuttgart Expert opinion on November 15, 2010 (PDF; 1.2 MB). Document on the conciliation meeting of November 26, 2010, pp. 19–44.
110. ↑ ^{a b} "Stuttgart 21" is to be built despite additional costs . In: Die Welt , December 11, 2009.
111. ↑ Did the specialist planners calculate moon prices? . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , May 11, 2010.
112. ↑ Deutsche Bahn AG: The application is missing for new tunnel plans ( memo of December 26, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). Stuttgarter Zeitung , December 23, 2009.
113. ↑ ^{a b} “Stuttgart 21”: cost savings of up to 294 million “without in-depth planning”. Archived from the original on August 13, 2010 ; Retrieved January 6, 2013 . 
114. ↑ Light rail has to make way . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , July 4, 2010.
115. ↑ DB ProjektBau GmbH: Large-scale project Stuttgart 21 - Wendlingen-Ulm - opportunities and risks , (PDF; 2.7 MB), March 25, 2011.
116. ^ Arno Luik : 121 Risks . In: Stern , March 25, 2011, pp. 130–135.
117. ↑ ^{a b} Michael Isenberg, Konstantin Schwarz: So far, 50 million euros additional costs . In: Schwarzwälder Bote (online edition), April 2010.
118. ↑ Thomas Durchdenwald, Jörg Nauke: Critics accuse the railway of covering up . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 229 , October 2, 2013, p. 21 ( online ).
119. ^ DB Mobility Logistics AG (Ed.): DB rejects speculations about cost increases at Stuttgart 21 as unfounded . Press release from April 1, 2011.
120. ↑ Handelsblatt: S 21, Bahn indicates higher costs. September 23, 2011, accessed October 4, 2011.
121. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: Proponents keep silent about cost increases . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , September 1, 2011. ( online ).
122. ↑ Michael Isenberg, Josef Schunder: Railway: Additional costs and increased buffer . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , September 24, 2011 ( online ).
123. ↑ ^{a b} Markus Grabitz, Konstantin Schwarz: Stuttgart 21 becomes an oath of revelation for Kefer . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , December 13, 2012, p. 3 (similar version online ).
124. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: On the dump . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , December 13, 2012, p. 1 ( online ).
125. ↑ Nikolaus Doll: Bahn board member threatens to be expelled because of S21 . In: Die Welt , December 3, 2012, p. 10 ( online ).
126. ↑ Two billion more for S21 - Bahn presents new cost accounting for Stuttgart underground station . In: Badische Zeitung , December 13, 2012, p. 1.
127. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: Greens: Bahn reckons with eleven billion . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . January 19, 2013, p. 20 ( online ).
128. ↑ ^{a b c} D. Delhaes, D. Fockenbrock: Germany's most expensive hole . In: Handelsblatt . No. 26 , February 6, 2013, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 1 .
129. ↑ Dieter Fockenbrock: What will happen to the Group's return target? In: Handelsblatt . No. 26 , February 6, 2013, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 7 .
130. ↑ Bahn board wants to submit a new application . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 45 , February 22, 2013.
131. ↑ Daniela Kuhr: The fast Mr. Grube . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . January 11, 2013, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 16 .
132. ^ ^{A b} Daniel Delhaes: Federal government distrusts the train at S21 . In: Handelsblatt . No. 241, December 12, 2012, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 18.
133. ^ ^{A b} D. Delhaes, D. Fockenbrock: Railway supervisors demand facts . In: Handelsblatt . No. 244, 2012, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 16.
134. ↑ Bahn does not want "Stuttgart 21-light" . In: Rheinische Post (online edition), December 22, 2012.
135. ↑ Will Stuttgart 21 make train tickets more expensive? . In: Zeit online , December 13, 2012.
136. ↑ Dieter Fockenbrock: The train has to check the exit from “Stuttgart 21” . In: Handelsblatt . No. 242, December 13, 2012, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 16 f.
137. ↑ ^{a b} Dietmar Seher: Stuttgart 21, too few trains - these are the construction sites of the railway boss , derwesten.de , 23 January 2013.
138. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: The federal government is distancing itself from Stuttgart 21 . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . February 5, 2013 ( online ).
139. ↑ ^{a b} Michael Isenberg: Costs and risks in the billions burden the S-21 bill . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 54 , March 5, 2013, p. 15 .
140. ↑ Martin Buchenau, Daniel Delhaes, Dieter Fockenbrock: Full speed in the tunnel . In: Handelsblatt . No. 46 , March 6, 2013, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 20 .
141. ↑ Max Haerder, Christian Schlesiger: Annoying report . In: Wirtschaftswoche . No. 11 , 2013, p. 13 .
142. ↑ Bahn: S 21 is no longer economical. In: stuttgarter-zeitung.de. February 26, 2013, accessed June 4, 2016 . 
143. ^ Franz Schmider: Federal Chancellery and Stuttgart 21 - how great was the influence? In: Badische Zeitung. May 23, 2016. Retrieved May 23, 2016 . 
144. ↑ The Chancellery releases blackened S-21 notices? In: stuttgarter-zeitung.de. May 29, 2016. Retrieved May 29, 2016 . 
145. ↑ Hermann has great doubts about the schedule . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung, November 22, 2013, accessed on November 25, 2013.
146. ↑ Dieter Fockenbrock: Stuttgart 21 is running out of money . In: Handelsblatt . No. 109 , June 10, 2014, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 26 .
147. ↑ German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Matthias Gastel, Harald Ebner, Christian Kühn (Tübingen), other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - printed matter 18/1420 - station project Stuttgart 21 - cost development and project progress . tape 18 , no. 1606 , June 3, 2014, ISSN  0722-8333 , p. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 ( PDF file ).
148. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Bahn has to catch up with construction delay by a year . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . April 22, 2015, p. 16 ( online ).
149. ↑ New report by Vieregg-Rössler: The real costs of Stuttgart 21 are currently 9.8 billion euros. Document collection on the site of the action alliance against Stuttgart 21. Action alliance against Stuttgart 21, December 16, 2015, accessed on April 16, 2016 . 
150. ↑ The railway supervisory board has costs and liability checked. Stuttgarter Zeitung, March 16, 2016, accessed on April 16, 2016 . 
151. ↑ The Court of Auditors wants to inform the Bundestag about S21. Stuttgarter Nachrichten, February 15, 2016, accessed on April 16, 2016 . 
152. ↑ A permanent construction site for the audit office. Stuttgarter Nachrichten, May 13, 2014, accessed on April 16, 2016 . 
153. ↑ The Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn AG advised on schedule and cost developments for Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen-Ulm route. (No longer available online.) In: deutschebahn.com. Deutsche Bahn, January 26, 2018, archived from the original on January 27, 2018 ; accessed on January 26, 2018 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
154. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: S 21: Bahn is building a billion dollar grave . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. April 19, 2018. Retrieved April 19, 2018 . 
155. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Why Deutsche Bahn will soon pay for the project alone. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten. April 4, 2018, Retrieved April 4, 2018 . 
156. ↑ Bundesrechnungshof : Report of the Federal Audit Office according to § 88 Abs. 2 BHO on the projects Stuttgart 21 and the new line Wendlingen - Ulm ( memento of the original from October 9th 2010 in the internet archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 574 kB), October 2008. 
157. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: Court of Auditors sees its criticism confirmed . Stuttgarter Zeitung, July 15, 2011, accessed on July 24, 2011.
158. ↑ Court of Auditors is also examining the ICE route . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . July 31, 2013, p. 16 .
159. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: test results only after the federal election . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . August 5, 2013, p. 17 ( online ).
160. ↑ David Nau: Report: No more financial buffer - criticism of Minister Scheuer. In: Südwest Presse . September 17, 2019, accessed September 20, 2019 . 
161. ↑ Manfred Schäfers: Scheuer comes under pressure because of Stuttgart 21 risks . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . September 16, 2019 ( faz.net [accessed September 20, 2019]).
162. ↑ ^{a b} Vieregg-Rössler GmbH (Ed.): Determination of the probable costs of the Stuttgart 21 project ( memento of the original from November 26, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 1.2 MB). Munich, July 2008, p. 10. 
163. ↑ Stuttgart 21 is getting more expensive . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , 19./20. July 2008, p. 6.
164. ↑ Deutsche Bahn AG: Statements about cost increases at Stuttgart 21 are unfounded ( memento of the original from August 9, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release from July 18, 2008. 
165. ↑ Rüdiger Soldt: "Stuttgart 21 not more expensive than 4.5 billion euros" . FAZ.NET . November 26, 2010. Retrieved November 28, 2010.
166. ↑ The Stuttgart billion thing . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 248, 2006, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 4.
167. ^ Verkehrsclub Deutschland, Landesverband Baden-Württemberg: Is 15 percent of the rail network threatened? . Press release No. 16/2006 of July 17, 2006.
168. ^ Hans Meyer : Financial constitutional questions of the Stuttgart rail conflict . Berlin, November 3, 2010, pp. 48–51 ( PDF file ( Memento of the original from February 5, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to instructions and then remove this note. , 250 kB). 
169. ^ Konstantin Schwarz: Land suspends payments to rail . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , August 30, 2011 ( online ).
170. ↑ Thomas Braun: Government checks payment stop . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , August 27, 2011.
171. ↑ Country has paid the installment due . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . September 1, 2011, p. 21 .
172. ↑ 596 million paid to railways . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 62 , March 16, 2015, p. 15 .
173. ↑ Exit would cost the railway dearly . In: Handelsblatt , December 11, 2009.
174. ^ Arbitration Stuttgart 21 PLUS , point 9, October 30, 2010.
175. ↑ ^{a b c} Märkische Revision, PricewaterhouseCoopers AG WPG, Susat & Partner OHG WPG (ed.): Report of the arbitration group on the Stuttgart 21 project under the direction of Dr. Heiner Geissler. Stuttgart Expert opinion on November 15, 2010 (PDF; 1.2 MB). Document on the arbitration meeting of November 26, 2010, pp. 75–81.
176. ↑ "No construction or contracting stop" . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 11, 2010.
177. ↑ Michael Isenberg: Keeping still costs hundreds of millions of euros . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , No. 94, April 23, 2011, p. 5.
178. ↑ "We are now continuing to build" . In: Focus , issue 20/2011, May 16, 2011, p. 110 f.
179. ↑ : Deutsche Bahn AG (ed.) Wanting to keep DB announcing the future government of Baden-Wuerttemberg, to October a referendum on Stuttgart 21: . Press release from April 26, 2011.
180. ↑ "We continue to build" . In: Die Zeit , No. 24, June 9, 2011, p. 26 ( online ).
181. ↑ Jörg Nauke, Thomas Braun: The railway cannot afford additional costs . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . February 26, 2013, p. 20 ( online ).
182. ↑ Daniel Delhaes: Always on with "Stuttgart 21" . In: Handelsblatt . No. 42 , February 28, 2013, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 9 .
183. ↑ Christian Milankovic: S-21 opponents predict low exit costs . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 36 , February 13, 2016, p. 21 ( online ).
184. ↑ Jörg Hamann, Michael Isenberg: "Risk buffer is not for rework" . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , December 13, 2010, p. 3. ( online ).