Performance and financing agreement

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The service and financing agreement (abbreviation LuFV ) is a contract between the Federal Republic of Germany and Deutsche Bahn on the maintenance and replacement of the infrastructure of Deutsche Bahn's railway infrastructure companies ( DB Netz , DB Station & Service , DB Energie ).

The agreement regulates replacement investments and maintenance expenses. This is to be distinguished from the financing of new construction and expansion measures, which is carried out in particular via the Federal Railways Expansion Act and the Municipal Transport Financing Act .

The third service and financing agreement was signed on January 14, 2020. It provides for replacement investments and maintenance worth 86 billion euros over a period of ten years.

Deutsche Bahn has to submit an Infrastructure Status and Development Report (IZB) by April 30th each year .

prehistory

From 1994 until the introduction of the first LuFV in 2009, replacement investments were financed on the basis of a large number of individual agreements to individual individual and collective agreements. Terms and conditions differed in individual cases, which was accompanied by a complex application and usage check. There was no long-term funding commitment from the federal government, on the basis of which planning and construction capacities could have been built up and maintained. In addition, there was a lack of instruments for measuring the quality of the infrastructure and documentation of the development of the network status. At the beginning of the 2000s, both the federal government and the railway infrastructure companies of Deutsche Bahn realized that the method of financing the existing network had to be fundamentally adapted.

In 2004, before the agreement was concluded, half a billion euros in rail investment funds could not be built after the budget funds were only released after the start of the main construction season. These uncommitted funds have largely been diverted to roads and waterways. The performance and financing agreement is intended to avoid such delays.

The idea of ​​the service and financing agreement arose against the background of the planned partial capital privatization of Deutsche Bahn AG. In 2005, a one-year pilot project of such an agreement was planned for 2006 in order to determine how the maintenance of the rail network of a partially privatized DB AG could be regulated. On June 30, 2006, the then rail boss Hartmut Mehdorn suggested that if the company went public that included the DB network, the rail network should be contractually handed over to the company until around 2045 or 2050. The planned service and financing agreement should provide the possibility for the federal government to bring the network back into state ownership beforehand if certain quality criteria are not met.

In mid-2007, the federal cabinet passed a draft law according to which the DB network should remain fully owned by the state in the event of a partial capital privatization of the company, with its quality and maintenance being regulated in a service and financing agreement named in the law. A performance and financing agreement was also included in the parliamentary motion for partial capital privatization of Deutsche Bahn in May 2008.

First LuFV

The contract signed on November 11, 2008 provides for replacement investments by the federal government amounting to 2.5 billion euros annually. Deutsche Bahn AG pledged to raise at least EUR 500 million of its own funds for the rail network and EUR 1 to 1.25 billion in additional funds annually. New buildings and extensions are not part of the contract. During the five-year term, a total of 973 million euros are available for improvements and expansion measures in local rail transport. The funds are distributed among the federal states according to a quota. A portion is also planned for German routes on Swiss territory.

The federal grants are linked to various requirements. Federal funds are only to be granted if the DB network is not reduced by more than two percent by 2013.

The agreement initially ran from 2009 to 2013. Originally, a term of 10 to 15 years was targeted. According to its own information, Deutsche Bahn spent an average of 1.44 billion euros on maintenance between 2009 and 2012.

In the coalition agreement for the 17th electoral period in 2009, the black-yellow coalition agreed to create instruments to give the federal and state governments a deeper insight into the implementation of the performance and financing agreement. According to the federal government, it was checked in 2011 whether the LuFV should be updated beyond 2013 or replaced by another financing instrument.

As part of the negotiations, the inclusion of an additional quality indicator “capacity” should be considered from mid-2011.

Negotiations for a follow-up contract began in spring 2012. The extent of the need for investment in the infrastructure was disputed. Deutsche Bahn saw an investment requirement of 40 billion euros over a period of ten years. Of this, 14 billion euros went to bridges, 3.9 billion euros to tunnels, 3.7 billion to signal boxes, 2.7 billion to tracks and 1.77 billion euros to platforms. The federal government rejects additional investments (as of December 2012). In the course of the new version, according to a media report, stricter requirements for the quality of the rail network are to be laid down.

In 2014, the federal government wanted to make use of the control rights provided for in the LuFV for the first time and have its own measurement drives carried out over a total length of 5000 km.

criticism

In an audit report from mid-2011, the Federal Audit Office complained that essential information was missing in the network status report. This is so far not suitable for "output control in rail infrastructure financing". While the DB is largely in conformity with the contract, the Federal Ministry of Transport has only set insufficient information requirements in the LuFV. Critics also complain that the quality criteria of the LuFV are too vague. In addition, he suggested an external control.

In its comments on the budget management of the federal government in 2012, the Federal Audit Office criticized "considerable system deficiencies" in some of the LuFV key figures. The requirements of the Federal Budget Code are only inadequately met. In 2013 he criticized the fact that the orderly course of the award procedure could hardly be traced. The Federal Railway Authority only checks randomly. In 2011, for example, the authority checked only 10 of 1,836 contracts awarded, whereby some non-serious shortcomings were found. Deutsche Bahn refused to carry out independent audits by the Court of Auditors.

From its point of view, the federal government criticizes the inadequate possibilities of controlling the investments made by Deutsche Bahn in the course of the LuFV. Since the investment requirement was clearly undercut, especially in maintenance, it is imperative to specify budgets.

Renewal of the agreement

The original service and financing agreement between the railways and the federal government ended on December 31, 2013. It was to be renegotiated by the 18th German Bundestag or the government elected by the MPs. For a transitional period, the current agreement was initially extended by two years with slight adjustments in September 2013.

According to a press report from December 2012, the original demand by Deutsche Bahn for an annual investment framework of 4.5 billion euros has decreased to 3.4 billion euros. The federal government has considered allowing the existing agreement to continue until better quality control has been negotiated.

According to plans from spring 2013, Deutsche Bahn was to receive 250 million euros in additional funds for 2013 and 2014. The focus was on the barrier-free expansion of traffic stations and railway bridges. According to an agreement concluded in September 2013, 500 million euros were to be reallocated from the budget for new construction projects in 2013 and 2014 to funds for asset maintenance.

The LuFV should be renegotiated after the 2013 federal election . New test criteria should be introduced, for example the condition of bridges. The annual federal grant should be increased to three billion euros from 2016. In addition, the Deutsche Bahn should contribute 500 million euros. In the draft for the 2015 federal budget, three billion euros were set aside, which represents an interim status of the negotiations between the federal government and DB. By 2019, the amount should increase to 3.9 billion euros. In return for the additional funds, DB should follow stricter guidelines for the use of funds.

The introduction of a performance and financing agreement between the federal government and the federal states is also being considered for German trunk road construction (as of 2012). The federal government would make a fixed amount available to the federal states over a period of five years for the maintenance and rehabilitation of its roads; in return, the federal states would guarantee a defined quality of the traffic routes. Saved funds could be freely used by the federal states.

Second performance and financing agreement

As part of the LuFV II, the profits of the railway infrastructure companies of Deutsche Bahn are to be transferred in full to the federal government, which invests them in the infrastructure without compromising. Starting in 2015, the federal government is to provide an average of four billion euros in replacement investments per year, and DB is to provide an average of 1.5 billion euros in own funds for maintenance every year.

The budget committee of the German Bundestag approved the LuFV II on December 17, 2014.

LuFV II provides for the federal government to participate in replacement investments between 2015 and 2019 with amounts between 3.1 and 3.5 billion euros. Dividend payments by Deutsche Bahn to the federal government, in an expected amount of up to 650 million euros per year, will also be made available for replacement investments. In the period between 2015 and 2019 [obsolete] , 12 billion euros in the superstructure, 4 billion euros in control and safety technology, 3 billion euros in (at least 875) bridges, one billion in tunnels and 8 billion euros in other trades (e.g. B. telecommunications, energy systems). Compared to the first LuFV, an additional eight billion euros are to be invested. At peak times, 850 construction sites should be running per day, around 1700 additional employees should be hired.

The LuFV II is partly public. A version of the infrastructure status and development report with sections declared as operating and trade secrets, the infrastructure cadastre, information on route features and speeds as well as measuring train and IIS infrastructure data are kept under lock and key.

Third performance and financing agreement

The conclusion of LuFV III was planned for 2020 in 2015. Work on the agreement began in mid-2017.

It should initially run from 2020 to 2024. In spring 2019, investments of 83 billion euros were planned, of which 52 billion euros were federal funds and 31 billion euros were DB's own funds. The Ministry of Transport obtained an expert opinion on the need for funds, for which a presentation of the results dated April 30, 2019 was published.

The Committee on Transport and Digital Infrastructure of the German Bundestag approved the draft LuFV III on November 13, 2019. It provides for a total of 86.2 billion euros in maintenance funds for the years 2020 to 2029, 59 percent more than stored in LuFV II. DB is to contribute 24.2 billion euros in own funds, 41 percent more than before.

On January 14, 2020, Federal Transport Minister Andreas Scheuer , DB AG CEO Richard Lutz , and DB Infrastructure Director Ronald Pofalla signed the now final version of the third service and financing agreement (LuFV III) in the presence of Federal Finance Minister Olaf Scholz . It provides a total of 86 billion euros for replacement investments and maintenance by 2030. Of this, 62 billion euros are to be financed by the federal government and 24 billion euros by DB (with its own funds). This means an increase in DB's own funds compared to LuFV II by 44%. Every year 2000 kilometers of track and 2000 points are to be renewed. 2000 more railway bridges are to be renewed. Around seven billion euros are earmarked for interlocking technology. The agreement came into effect retrospectively on January 1, 2020.

Funding elements

The financing elements are made up as follows:

  1. Funds for replacement investments (i.e. demolition and new construction of existing infrastructure) from the federal budget, the so-called infrastructure contribution (Section 2.1).
  2. Repatriation of the dividend paid by the DB to the federal government to the DB's railway infrastructure companies for replacement investments. The expected amount is specified in the agreement, the so-called planned dividend (Section 2a.1).
  3. Own funds of the EIU for replacement investments, the so-called minimum own contribution (§ 8.2).
  4. Own funds of the EIU for the maintenance and upkeep of the existing infrastructure, the so-called maintenance contribution (§ 4.2).
Financing according to LuFV III in millions of euros
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 total
Replacement investment
Infrastructure contribution 4,642.5 4,642.5 4,642.5 4,642.5 4,642.5 5,342.5 5,542.5 5,642.5 5,742.5 5,942.5 51,425
Planned dividend 650 650 650 650 650 700 700 700 700 700 6,750
Minimum personal contribution 125 125 125 125 125 150 150 150 150 150 1,375
maintenance
Maintenance contribution 1,920 1,920 1,920 2,020 2,060 2.110 2.140 2,170 2,200 2,250 22,780
total 7337.5 7337.5 7337.5 7437.5 7477.5 8302.5 8532.5 8662.5 8792.5 9042.5 82,330
  1. ↑ However, at least 22,780 million euros (§ 4.1), i.e. more than the sum of the individual items of 20,170 million euros.
  2. ↑ The difference to the 86 billion euros mentioned in the press results from the investments relevant for the existing network in expansion projects of the requirement plan amounting to 3,850 million euros, which are also mentioned in the contract text.
  3. ↑ Taking into account A 1.

If the EIU do not meet their planned own contributions, the federal government will reduce its contribution by one million euros for each million euros missed, in the form of a penalty. Penalties are also levied for failing to meet the planned investment measures. However, these penalties are capped at a total of 500 million euros (for more than 7 misconduct) over the entire term of the agreement.

criticism

The Federal Audit Office criticizes the long-term provision of the funds and advocates provision in two-year slices. Furthermore, the entry into force of the agreement should be made dependent on the fulfillment of parliamentary demands, the success should be checked before further tranches are released and parliamentary reservations should be included in the contract.

In the Competitor Report 2019/20, the non-federally owned railways criticize the high proportion of DB's own funds and, above all, their designation as own funds. These funds would ultimately be financed by the train path prices, the costs of which, however , have to be borne by the railway companies . In addition, the Deutsche Bahn AG group generates its profit mainly from the surpluses of the infrastructure companies.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the Federal Government to the small question of the MPs Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Winfried Hermann, Bettina Herlitzius, other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN ( dipbt.bundestag.de PDF; 79 kB). Printed matter 17/5689 of April 29, 2011.
  2. ^ A b c Anne Brandstädter, Jürgen Marx: Financing of the existing infrastructure secured for ten years . In: The Railway Engineer . tape 71 , no. 6 , June 2020, p. 6-11 .
  3. ↑ Bavaria is fighting for federal funds for expansion of the rail network. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 5/2005, p. 242 f.
  4. ↑ Klaus Ott : Railway boss Mehdorn is rebuilding the board and the group. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . March 12, 2005, p. 23.
  5. ↑ Klaus Ott , Martin Hesse: Bahn wants to keep the network until 2050. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . July 1, 2006, p. 17.
  6. ↑ Wolfgang Tiefensee : The fear of the countries is unfounded. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , August 16, 2007, p. 22.
  7. ↑ request of the CDU / CSU and SPD: Future train, railway of the future - The railway reform to develop (PDF, 64 kB) German Bundestag Printed Matter 16/9070 of 7 May, 2008.
  8. ↑ a b c d 4 billion euros for the rail network. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , November 12, 2008, p. 13.
  9. ↑ German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Ute Kumpf, Michael Groß, Christian Lange (Backnang), other MPs and the parliamentary group of the SPD - printed matter 17/13198 - status of important transport projects for Baden-Württemberg ( PDF; 177 kB). Printed paper 17/13846 of June 6, 2013, p. 6.
  10. ↑ Basics of infrastructure financing . In: Netznachrichten . No. 4 , 2013, ZDB -ID 2548162-9 , p. 6 ( online ( memento from January 16, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF]).
  11. ↑ Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question of the MPs Uwe Beckmeyer, Sören Bartol, Martin Burkert, other MPs and the parliamentary group of the SPD - Printed matter 17/7080 - Implementation of the coalition agreement - Mid-term review of the Federal Government in the field of transport, construction and urban development. ( dipbt.bundestag.de PDF; 258 kB) German Bundestag, printed matter 17/7296 of October 12, 2011, p. 12 f.
  12. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: The railway's supervisory board criticizes ailing bridges. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . December 7, 2012, p. 11 ( stuttgarter-zeitung.de ).
  13. ^ A b Daniela Kuhr: Transport Minister Dobrindt wants to control the railways more strictly . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . January 29, 2014, p. 1 (Munich) (similar version sueddeutsche.de ).
  14. ^ Court of Auditors: Federal government controls rail too little . In: Handelsblatt (online edition), June 25, 2011.
  15. ^ A b Daniel Delhaes, Dieter Fockenbrock: Record profit according to plan. In: Handelsblatt . P. 4 f.
  16. ↑ Michael Baumüller, Daniela Kuhr: Attack on the train . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . May 25, 2013, p. 23 (similar version sueddeutsche.de ).
  17. ^ Daniel Delhaes: Federal government plans fines for the railway. In: Handelsblatt . November 21, 2012, p. 8.
  18. ↑ BMVBS: An additional 500 million euros for the existing rail infrastructure . LokReport Archive - News from Monday, September 9, 2013.
  19. ↑ More for the network . In: Handelsblatt . No. 77 , April 22, 2013, p. 6 .
  20. ↑ Deutsche Bahn wants to fully invest network profits in rail again. Süddeutsche.de , September 6, 2013.
  21. ^ Deutsche Bahn: More money, more control . In: Wirtschaftswoche . April 8, 2013, p. 9 (similar version wiwo.de ).
  22. ↑ Bahn has to pay for late trains . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . 7 July 2014, p. 21 .
  23. ↑ Max Härder: The limits of the asphalt mania. In: Wirtschaftswoche . No. 15, April 7, 2012, pp. 18-22.
  24. ↑ Billion program for the modernization of the railways . In: StationsAnzeiger . No. December 12 , 2014, p. 1 ( deutschebahn.com ( memento from April 3, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF]).
  25. ↑ Performance and Financing Agreement II ("LuFV II") (...) . 1st edition. 2014, p. 6, 7 ( eba.bund.de ( Memento from April 2, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF; 13.0 MB ]).
  26. ↑ DB Netz is tackling the investment backlog . In: Netznachrichten . No. 1 , 2015, ZDB -ID 2548162-9 , p. 1 ( online ( memento from September 22, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF]).
  27. ↑ Performance and Financing Agreement II ("LuFV II") (...) . 1st edition. 2014, p. Annex 14.3, pages 1 and 2 ( eba.bund.de ( memento of April 2, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF; 13.0 MB ] PDF pages 315/316).
  28. ↑ DB AG (Ed.): Future Rail - Together for more quality, more customers, more success . Autumn. Berlin 2015, p. 19 ( deutschebahn.com ( memento from January 1, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF]).
  29. ↑ Ferlemann: Not until 2040 is the network “optimal” state of preservation . In: Rail Business . No. 4 , 2019, ZDB -ID 2806214-0 , p. 2 .
  30. ↑ Daniel Delhaes: 52 billion - Nevertheless, the financial blessing does not cause any cheers for the railway. In: handelsblatt.com. May 17, 2019, accessed May 24, 2019 .
  31. ^ Next LuFV with more federal money and a longer term . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 7 , July 2019, p. 338 .
  32. ↑ Joachim Dannenbaum, Ralf Allrich: Requirements plan determination LuFV III 2020 - 2024. (PDF) Expert opinion on behalf of the Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure. In: eba.bund.de. Dornier Consulting, Mazars , April 30, 2019, accessed May 15, 2020 .
  33. ↑ Transport Committee approves LuFV III. In: bundestag.de. German Bundestag, November 13, 2019, accessed on December 28, 2019 .
  34. ↑ We are maintaining and modernizing the #StarkeSchiene with 86 billion euros. In: bmvi.de. Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, January 14, 2020, accessed on January 14, 2020 .
  35. ^ Statement by DB: Federal Audit Office wants to go back to the 1980s. In: deutschebahn.com. Deutsche Bahn, September 18, 2019, accessed on September 20, 2019 .
  36. ↑ Gerald Traufetter: Parliament should control railways more closely. In: spiegel.de. November 11, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  37. ↑ Clear the way - for healthy competition. Competitor Report Railways 2019/20, pp. 6-7. (PDF) In: mofair.de. mofair / NEE, October 9, 2019, accessed June 18, 2020 .
  38. ↑ Clear the way - for healthy competition. Competitor Report Railways 2019/20, pp. 2-4. (PDF) In: mofair.de. mofair / NEE, October 9, 2019, accessed June 18, 2020 .