Transrapid Munich

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Transrapid Munich
Central Station ↔ Airport
Transrapid Infocenter at the airport (Retired original Transrapid 07)
Project sponsor DB Magnetbahn GmbH
Route length 37.4 km
Travel time 10 min
Highest speed 350 km / h
Average speed approx. 224 km / h
Number of trips per day 230
Daily mileage 8,602 km
Max. Passengers every hour in each direction approx. 2,700
Number of trips annually 83,950
Annual mileage approx. 3.14 million km
Planned number of passengers in 2020 8 million
Planned passenger kilometers in 2020 approx. 299 million km
Energy requirement annually 138 GWh
Estimated construction costs (as of 2008) approx. 3.4 billion euros
construction time approx. 4 a
Number of objections to the project 23,527
Project setting March 27, 2008

Transrapid Munich was a project pursued from the end of 2000 to March 2008 to build a high-speed magnetic levitation train between Munich Airport and Munich Central Station . It was planned to build an approximately 37 km long route, on which Transrapid vehicles would largely run every ten minutes . At a top speed of 350 km / h, the driving time should be ten minutes.

After a cost forecast of more than three billion euros after 1.85 at the beginning, representatives of the federal and state governments agreed on March 27, 2008 not to implement the project. The project was formally terminated with the withdrawal of the application for planning approval by the developer DB Magnetbahn GmbH on April 14, 2008.

The project idea, like the Metrorapid planned between Düsseldorf and Dortmund , came about at the end of February 2000 after the failure of the Berlin-Hamburg high-speed train project . In addition to these two projects, this was the third application attempt in Germany, the implementation of which was canceled after an in-depth planning phase.

Project description

Planned route between the airport and the main train station
Munich main station: start and end point of the planned route
Cross-section of the main train station including the Transrapid station
From the Borstei the route would have run above ground on the former tracks of the Olympia S-Bahn line.

Project plan and route

From 2012, the use of a Transrapid system to connect the airport to Munich was planned. The planned route would have a length of 37.4 km; Of these, three sections with a total of 7.2 km were located in the tunnel, of which the shell of the last section at the airport was partially completed in 1992.

The high-speed maglev connection would have run from the station planned at Munich Central Station in a northerly direction through the urban area, predominantly in a tunnel. After crossing under the Munich-Feldmoching motorway triangle, the planning envisaged a close bundling of routes with the federal motorway 92 , during which the municipal areas of Oberschleißheim , Unterschleißheim , Haimhausen , Eching (Freising district) , Neufahrn bei Freising , Freising and Hallbergmoos would have been crossed. From the Munich Airport motorway junction, the high-speed maglev line was to run between the airport feeder on State Road 2584 and the S-Bahn line to the south to a station in the airport located in the tunnel. The station in the city center was to be built at a depth of 18 meters under tracks 23 to 26 of the main train station. Originally, as an architectural feature, an elevated end of the route one level above the existing platform tracks 11 and 12 was proposed. The area required would have been around 84 hectares. The tunneling would have started south of the Olympic Stadium station on the Borstei, which had been closed since 1988 , but local CSU representatives called for an extension of the tunnel at least to Feldmoching. The possibility of the Transrapid technology of low-noise operation in the speed range around 100 km / h on above-ground routes through existing buildings was not used in the planning.

The Transrapid route had no intermediate stops. It would have strengthened the centralized network structure of the Munich transport system bundled into the city center and would have been unsuitable except for trips to and from the airport. Critics therefore considered tangential connections between individual S-Bahn passengers and improvements in the rail connection, especially in eastern Upper Bavaria, via additional S-Bahn links and network expansion in other regions, to be more important. The planned Transrapid route was rejected by the neighboring communities within the framework of the cross-party Northern Alliance . The then CEO of Deutsche Bahn AG, Hartmut Mehdorn , originally argued that a direct connection (without numerous intermediate stops) could not be arranged in cooperation with the neighboring communities.

Munich Airport is not connected to long-distance rail transport. A fast connection to Munich Central Station was seen as a replacement for the airport's missing long-distance train station. With the Transrapid as the third means of transport, a powerful link between rail and air traffic could have been established ("intermodality"). As a result, travelers could have got to know three different modes of transport on one trip. This should make traveling by train more attractive for passengers not coming from the Munich metropolitan area.

Timetable, operational data and speed

The maglev train was supposed to reach a top speed of 350 km / h with a travel time of ten minutes. The S-Bahn lines 1 and 8 leading to the airport take around 40 minutes from the main station, but also allow access to other stops with a shorter remaining travel time. According to calculations by the Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e. V. the average travel time from 41 major S-Bahn stations to the airport in 2007 was 66 minutes. An express S-Bahn between the main train station and the airport would shorten this average travel time to 51 minutes, the Transrapid to 44 minutes. DB Magnetbahn GmbH named a 15-minute shorter travel time to the airport with the planned Transrapid for over 70 percent of Munich's S-Bahn and U-Bahn stations compared to the traffic situation in 2007.

According to the latest plans, the Transrapid should run every ten minutes from 5 a.m. to 11 p.m. A 20-minute cycle was planned from 4 a.m. to 5 a.m. and from 11 p.m. to midnight. This would have resulted in 230 journeys a day with a total distance of around 8,600 km. If the planned eight million passengers had been reached annually, each trip would have been occupied with an average of 95.3 passengers.

According to the published speed band, the train coming from Munich should already be operated in the city area in the Olympic Park area above ground at a speed of 250 km / h. In the direction of the airport to Feldmoching, a distance of around 12 km at a speed of 350 km / h should be covered in around two minutes from around km 15 to km 27, before the speed is reduced again over the remaining 10 kilometers to km 37 (airport) should. Coming from Munich, the Isar and the Isar floodplains would be crossed at kilometers 30 to 33; Depending on the route, the speed should have been reduced to 200 km / h to 250 km / h. The Isar floodplains are a protected area under the Fauna-Flora-Habitat Directive . Also in the rest of the planned route outside of Munich there are restrictions on the driving speed in some places, as the route z. B. for reasons of landscape protection in curve radii unsuitable for high speed follows the motorway. The average speed achieved in this operation would have been around 223 km / h. If the average waiting time of five minutes for a train to depart would have resulted in an average travel time from station to airport of 15 minutes and a travel speed of around 150 km / h.

Passengers who have booked a flight should be able to check in at the main train station .

vehicles

The interior of the Transrapid exhibited at Munich Airport

The traffic should be managed with four vehicles and one replacement vehicle. At the end points, the vehicles should be swiveled over to the other lane using a kind of rotating platform. Getting off, turning and boarding should take 10 minutes; one vehicle round trip would have taken 40 minutes. Vehicles of the Transrapid 09 type were intended for use on the route . The first vehicle, around 80 meters long and weighing 170 tons, was handed over by the manufacturer to the Transrapid test facility in Emsland in April 2007 . In contrast to earlier trains, this prototype was specially developed for the requirements of regional transport. The load capacity was increased, the doors enlarged, multi-purpose compartments (e.g. for luggage, strollers or bicycles) integrated and the height of the vehicles raised by around 15 centimeters. Vehicles with around 420 passenger seats (including 148 seats) were planned for use in Munich.

Planned fares

The tickets for the Transrapid should be included in the MVV tariff structure, although a Transrapid surcharge was provided. The following fares should be charged:

  • 13.80 euros for single journeys (8.80 euros for a single ticket 4 zones + 5.00 euros Transrapid surcharge),
  • 17.50 euros for a day ticket (10.00 euros for a single day ticket for the entire network + 7.50 euros Transrapid surcharge),
  • with a monthly ticket 163 euros (138 euros with Isarcard 13 rings + 25.00 euros Transrapid surcharge).

(MVV tariff, as of April 1, 2007; other MVV tickets are also possible in some cases.)

The amount of the Transrapid surcharge is stated in the feasibility study from 2002. According to the Bavarian SPD, however, a price for a single journey of 17 to 20 euros instead of 13.80 euros was the subject of planning in 2007.

Project planning

planning

At the beginning of 2000, Deutsche Bahn initially pursued plans to build an additional S-Bahn line from the east to Munich Airport. To find the route, the company presented three variants and initiated a spatial planning procedure to find the route .

At the end of February 2000, the federal government, the federal states and the DB AG agreed to examine five alternative projects for the failed Berlin – Hamburg high-speed maglev train and to decide on them within two years. In addition to a downtown connecting the airport Berlin-Schönefeld , a compound of the Hahn airport with the Airport Frankfurt as well as two other projects while also downtown Munich airport link was considered. On August 23, 2000, the Federal Government, Deutsche Bahn and the companies in the Transrapid consortium agreed to implement a Transrapid reference route in Germany.

In October 2000, the results of the investigations initiated in February 2000 were available. Two of the five projects were to be continued and evaluated as part of a feasibility study with an integrated environmental impact study : In addition to the Metrorapid, the Transrapid Munich was also planned. The decision to plan the maglev train was made in 2001 by the Bavarian State Ministry for Economic Affairs, Infrastructure, Transport and Technology and Deutsche Bahn AG.

On January 21, 2002, the results of the feasibility and environmental impact study for the Munich Transrapid and the Metrorapid were presented in Berlin. The study rated the project as feasible. The federal government then promised investment funds. The planners opted for the so-called "West Route", which runs over a disused S-Bahn line past the Olympic site to the airport. The alternative east route across the exhibition grounds was rejected as part of the regional planning procedure due to significantly poorer values.

The feasibility study assumed a 10-minute cycle with a driving time of ten minutes and a top speed of 350 km / h as key data of the operating concept. Commissioning was planned for the 2006 World Cup. The traffic forecast of the feasibility study assumed 7.9 million passenger journeys (290.8 million passenger kilometers) per year. Of this, 110.5 million pkm should be shifted from motorized individual traffic. The expected income should be above the operating costs; the economic benefit-cost factor was given as 1.5. 1.6 billion euros should be invested in infrastructure and vehicles. The federal government had earmarked a total of 2.3 billion euros for both maglev projects; According to media reports, 0.7 billion euros of this should go to the Transrapid Munich.

The main reason for the plan was the assumption of a sharp increase in the number of passengers at Munich Airport. In 2006 Munich Airport had 30.7 million passengers. The forecast of over 50 million passengers in 2020, from which the need for the Transrapid is derived, was the subject of criticism.

Counts and extrapolations resulted in around 6.2 million S-Bahn passengers on the airport line in 2003. Based on the assumption of increases in air traffic, the application for planning approval predicts six million S-Bahn passengers and eight million passengers for 2020 Transrapid. In objections to the plan approval, a sufficient reason for the plan was doubted. The forecast of the number of passengers was questioned by the objectors and it was pointed out that the existing capacity of the S-Bahn with max. 9,600 passengers an hour in each direction is sufficient and the capacity of the planned Transrapid is exceeded with around 2,700 passengers an hour in each direction. According to recognized guidelines, new planning is only necessary when the existing traffic capacity is over 60% full; the utilization of the two S-Bahn lines to the airport is below 30%. The airport is adequately connected to the city center with six trains every hour in each direction via two S-Bahn lines.

The planning was entrusted to the Bayerische Magnetbahnvorbereitungsgesellschaft mbH (BMG), half owned by the Free State of Bavaria and the DB AG. After completion of the regional planning procedure in mid-2002, the planning approval was prepared from October 2003. Commissioning was planned for 2009 at the beginning of 2003. In mid-2003, Deutsche Bahn AG and the state of Bavaria agreed that DB AG should act as the builder, owner and operator of the project.

In 2005, the preparatory work was transferred to DB Magnetbahn GmbH (DB MB) without any further involvement from the State of Bavaria. This company acted as a maglev train company within the meaning of the Maglev Building and Operating Regulations (MbBO). The plan approval procedure for this began with the application for plan approval for the first two of five sections at the Federal Railway Authority by Deutsche Bahn on February 28, 2005. On May 24, 2006, the Supervisory Board of DB Magnetbahn GmbH met for its constituent meeting.

In April 2007, the Federal Railway Authority approved the line's safety concept submitted for approval on June 23, 2005.

At the end of March 2006, all municipalities affected by planned construction measures received documents for participation and hearing in the planning approval procedure. These were displayed from April 27, 2006 to May 26, 2006 in the affected communities and in the Munich City Museum . 23,527 objections from municipalities, associations and citizens were registered, 93 percent of which were collective and mass objections . The hearing process at Ballhaus Unterschleißheim began on February 26, 2007 and ended after 73 days of negotiations on July 19, 2007. The hearings were recorded on a total of more than three thousand pages. The public interest in the hearing process turned out to be low. Around 70 citizens presented their complaints personally in the course of the procedure.

The government of Upper Bavaria, which was responsible for the hearing process and the assessment of objections to the Transrapid planning, announced in January 2008 that the examination of 23,527 objections had been completed and the documents had been forwarded to the responsible Federal Railway Authority . It was also the task of the government of Upper Bavaria to identify possible solutions to objections that were judged to be legally relevant. These can be measures such as additional noise barriers or extended tunnels, which would have made the project considerably more expensive if it had been included in the planning approval decision. Numerous objections address the feared noise pollution from residents along the route.

In response to the objections, the developer made a number of changes to the plan. The laying of rescue shafts to defuse conflicts with property owners was cited as an example. The government of Upper Bavaria did not consider a new public hearing to be necessary. By mid-2008, on the basis of a completed technical planning and the resulting total investment costs, a basis for the award of contracts to the industrial companies involved should be available. The plan approval decisions should, according to the operator, be issued by mid-2008. According to the DB AG, construction should begin at the end of 2008.

Expropriations or resettlements were not planned. The pure construction time was calculated at four years.

The time planning was burdened with great uncertainty due to unresolved financing issues, open legal issues at the time in connection with the referendum against the project and possible conditions in the planning approval decision. Furthermore, the lawsuits announced by the City of Munich and the affected communities against a possible positive planning approval decision could have delayed the project for years.

On March 27, 2008 the project was abandoned due to the costs.

Costs and financing

The feasibility study assumed total costs of around 1.6 billion euros.

According to the planning documents as of September 2007, the planned costs for the project were 1.85 billion euros. This sum was derived in 2004 from the 2002 feasibility study. The federal government planned to contribute 550 million euros to the project. A precise cost estimate, on the basis of which a decision about the implementation of the project should be made, should be presented at the end of 2005 after the design planning has been completed (status: beginning of 2005).

The total investment of 1.85 billion euros was questioned by critics; Amounts between 2.2 and 2.5 billion euros were often mentioned. According to Christian Ude, Lord Mayor of Munich, the responsible ministries in Berlin and Bonn assumed 2.2 billion euros at the beginning of 2008. According to Günther Beckstein in January 2007, however, the 1.85 billion euros should already contain a risk surcharge in the three-digit million euro range. According to information from the federal government from the beginning of March 2008, the federal funds for the Munich Transrapid could be raised without any negative consequences for other investment projects. Should the Transrapid project not be implemented, the federal funds would be allocated to traditional modes of transport. The decision on the use of the funds in this case would be made on the basis of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan. A reallocation of federal funds for an express S-Bahn is not possible due to the responsibility of the states for local transport.

At the end of 2003, the EU declared the project part of the Trans-European Networks . At the same time, a grant of 7.5 million euros was approved for the preparation and implementation of the plan approval procedure.

From the 2004 cost estimate of 1.85 billion euros, around 1.7 billion euros had been promised by September 24, 2007 as part of a realization agreement. The operator Deutsche Bahn was supposed to invest 235 million euros in the project, the federal government had earmarked 925 million euros in its budget (from a special funding pool), the Free State's share (financed through privatization proceeds) was 490 million euros. The industrial companies involved, Siemens AG and ThyssenKrupp, were each to contribute 25 million euros. The airport company was supposed to contribute around 100 million euros to the financing, which the state capital Munich, as a co-partner (23% share) of the airport, wanted to prevent. With the financing from special funds and privatization proceeds, the construction of the Munich Transrapid would not have been at the expense of local public transport, according to the operating company. The necessary unanimity for expansion projects should be agreed in the airport's partnership agreement. The city of Munich saw the Transrapid station on the airport site as an expansion project requiring unanimity with the participation of the airport.

On September 25, 2007 it was announced that the last funding gap (based on 2004 costs) had been closed. Federal Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee declared in September 2007 that the agreement was “a further step towards the realization of the Transrapid” and that the “final expenditure and risk structure” had to be clarified before construction began. Prime Minister Beckstein emphasized that under no circumstances would he agree to a further increase in state funds.

The low financial commitment of the Transrapid manufacturers ThyssenKrupp and Siemens was criticized against the background of the particular importance of a line in Germany for further orders from abroad.

DB AG and the manufacturer consortium GSV under the leadership of Hochtief , with Siemens , ThyssenKrupp , Bilfinger Berger and Max Bögl wanted to implement the project as a target cost project and therefore entered into an in-depth design-to-cost process, with the project being available on the the existing financial framework should be optimized. An updated cost estimate was to be submitted on April 28, 2008, and in mid-2008 the industrial consortium wanted to announce a fixed price at which they would have been willing to set up the project in the version they had defined. In order to prepare the offer, the consortium was given documents in the amount of 162 moving boxes.

As a result of the new cost estimates of 3.4 billion euros that became known on March 26, 2008, the previous financing concept and another design-to-cost process became irrelevant.

Project evaluation

Economy of the Munich Transrapid

Standardized evaluation

As part of the standardized evaluation (Standi) , an NKV value (benefit-cost ratio) of 1.5 was given for the Transrapid Munich . Transrapid-specific effects outside of the project (reference effect, increased export) that do not correspond to the normal standardized assessment were also assumed . Otherwise the result would have remained below 1 and therefore not worthy of funding, according to the Federal Audit Office.

Compared to wheel / rail technology

A regular tender for the Munich Transrapid project in competition with other (wheel-rail or maglev) technologies was not carried out, which resulted in correspondence between the EU Commission and the Federal Government in 2006.

According to Transrapid critic Rudolf Breimeier, the infrastructure investment requirement to shift one passenger kilometer per year (1 pkm / a) from road to rail should be around 6 times higher for this regional Transrapid than for new railway lines ( NBS Cologne-Rhine / Main 2.00 euros, Metrorapid and Transrapid Munich for 12.60 euros).

On March 22, 2006, Munich's Lord Mayor Ude presented an alternative concept for the Transrapid planning, which was rejected by the city, which had been developed by the Berlin traffic planner Jürgen Siegmann. As the Munich Airport Express (MAEX), the main station was to be connected to the airport via express S-Bahn trains every 15 minutes. With three to four intermediate stops, the trains should reach the airport in around 25 minutes via the second trunk line tunnel , the Leuchtenbergring and Ismaning (along the S8 line). The planned investment costs were given as 625 million euros. The MAEX also includes planned expansion measures for 235 million euros for freight traffic and the so-called Erdinger Ringschluss . According to the Bavarian Transport Minister Müller , the Free State of Bavaria would have had to invest 400 million euros more in an express S-Bahn than for the Transrapid, which is co-financed by the federal government. Bavaria would have to pay additional annual customer fees of around 20 million euros only for an express S-Bahn, but not for the Transrapid. The Bavarian state government has therefore not carried out any further in-depth planning regarding an express S-Bahn. The argumentation of the Bavarian State Government was based on cost forecasts for the Transrapid, which turned out to be incorrect in March 2008.

Profitability of the company

A profitability calculation by Deutsche Bahn from 2005 assumed a gross profit of 22 million euros. Annual costs of 41 million euros and revenues of 63 million euros were announced. Only the refinancing of the railway-specific investment costs (around 10% of the total) were included in the costs, without interest and repayment on the contributions from the federal government and the Free State. Their contributions were booked out as “non-repayable benefits” (comparable to the procedure for long-distance routes). The railway also wanted to return the route to the Federal Republic of Germany after 20 years with a "neutral result" .

The company is expecting around eight million passengers in 2020, 80 percent of whom will be passengers.

Railway boss Mehdorn had as an argument for the Transrapid project u. a. stated that fewer train sets are required for a ten-minute cycle and thus a higher level of economy in operation than with an S-Bahn.

If at least some of the costs of financing and wear and tear of the route had been included, there would have been no economic operation. Even if the S-Bahn operator's shortfall in revenue due to migrating passengers is included, according to one critic, the operation should no longer be profitable.

Environmental balance

Transrapid 07 as an information center in the Munich Airport Center at Munich Airport
Transrapid Infocenter at the airport (Retired original Transrapid 07)

Because of its high acceleration capacity, the Transrapid is suitable for the concept of a high-speed train in local traffic.

Regardless of the mode of transport, however, this traffic concept requires a high level of energy input for physical reasons, as energy consumption increases with the square of the speed and the considerable amount of energy required to accelerate the vehicle mass and payload to 350 km / h for a short distance and only a small gain in time .

The deputy energy policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group, Axel Berg, called the Transrapid four times more energy consumption on the short distance in Munich compared to the S-Bahn. The Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e. V. published, according to its own calculations, a total energy consumption of an S-Bahn from Munich main station to the airport of 380 kWh compared to the alleged 1400 kWh of the Transrapid. The Transrapid consortium has not released any detailed data.

Assuming this value for the planned annual mileage and the planned annual passenger volume would correspond to approx. 0.389 kWh per passenger kilometer or a gasoline equivalent of approx. 4.37 l per 100 passenger kilometers. For the Hamburg-Berlin route planned at the end of the 1990s and more suitable for the conception of the Transrapid, a petrol equivalent of 3.2 l per 100 passenger kilometers was calculated, compared to 2.5 l for the ICE at the time, assuming a load as on the ICE routes. Even then, the lighter and better utilized TGV managed with 1.5 liters per 100 passenger kilometers.

In the feasibility study of the project, the total annual energy requirement of the transport system was estimated at 138 GWh. If you put this value in relation to the intended transport performance of eight million passengers over 37.4 km each, the result is an energy consumption of 0.461 kWh per passenger-kilometer or a petrol equivalent of approx. 5.2 l per 100 passenger-kilometers.

For the environmental assessment, however, the use of primary energy is relevant. Here z. B. Losses in the conversion of hard coal and lignite, which accounted for 47% of the electricity mix of the railways in 2006, and losses in electricity transport are taken into account. The average efficiency of German coal-fired power plants, some of which are the focus of international criticism, is said to be 38%. With internal combustion engines, such losses occur mainly in the vehicle and, unlike with electric traction, are already part of the consumption measured on the vehicle. The exact factors for converting the energy consumption of the vehicle into primary energy consumption are not mentioned in the published environmental indicators of the railways 2006; the primary energy factor for electricity is 2.7 according to EnEV (Energy Saving Ordinance). The primary energy consumption of the Transrapid can be assumed to be approximately 2.7 times the consumption measured on the vehicle, even with the special electricity mix of the railways. For all local passenger transport, the railway cites an average primary energy consumption of 1.48 MJ (0.41 kWh) per passenger-kilometer for 2006, which corresponds to 4.7 l petrol equivalent per 100 passenger-kilometers. A significantly higher consumption is likely for the energy-intensive Transrapid operation in Munich. The share of 32% nuclear energy and 13% renewable energy sources in the electricity mix of the railways is an essential factor for lower CO 2 emissions per passenger-kilometer than for means of transport that exclusively use fossil energy sources.

Uneconomical energy consumption may have been one of the reasons for the planned maximum speed in regular traffic, which is 350 km / h in Munich compared to 430 km / h in Shanghai. A reduction of the planned travel time in Munich from 10 minutes by 10% to 9 minutes should result in more energy consumption of around 30%.

Environmental factors such as noise emissions and land consumption could hardly be assessed, as an alternative expansion of the airport's transport links to be compared was not planned. The SPD parliamentary group in the Bavarian state parliament considered the planned use of the Transrapid on the short-haul route in Munich to be economically and ecologically unacceptable and demanded that a study be carried out on the environmental impact and resource consumption of the construction and operation of the route.

The Federal Railway Authority refused to view the environmental and technical data of the Transrapid, which led to a complaint from critics to the EU Commission.

A demand forecast from 2004 assumed that 30 percent of Transrapid travelers would change from their car. The planning was based on three million car journeys per year, which should be shifted to the Transrapid. The assumption that the Transrapid, unlike the S-Bahn, would be attractive to car users was a key environmental argument of the proponents of the Munich Transrapid project.

security concept

For the maglev project in Munich, a safety concept for a rail-bound traffic system was drawn up and approved for the first time in Germany. Transrapid International , Deutsche Bahn AG and the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior (as representatives of the fire brigades ) were involved in developing the concept . The concept was submitted to the Federal Railway Authority for approval on June 23, 2005 and approved on April 20, 2007 after review.

The risk analysis comes to the conclusion that the high-speed maglev is at least as safe as conventional wheel-rail systems. The reasons for this include automatic operation, safety against derailment, non-existent level crossings and protective measures in bundling areas or crossings with other modes of transport.

At the end of June 2007, the Münster Higher Administrative Court dismissed a complaint by the Transrapid objection community ATEG for inspection of the route's safety concept.

Political environment, social acceptance

The federal governments Schröder and Merkel and the Bavarian state government supported the project. The mayor of Munich and the coalition of the SPD and the Greens in the Munich city council were among the sharpest critics of the project.

The CSU sat among other things to the effect as "technological Lighthouse" and also stressed (u. A. Against internal party critics like Peter Gauweiler ), the Transrapid neither more expensive by an extension of the planned in downtown Munich tunnels still prevail at the expense of regional transport projects to try. The Federal SPD also endorsed it , while the Bavarian SPD switched to the critics. The Bavarian Greens were against the Transrapid project in Munich, the federal party supported it during its government participation in the red-green coalition. The FDP supported the project at the state and federal level.

The Munich city government advocated an express S-Bahn to the airport as an alternative, which the Free State rejected as the responsible body for local rail passenger transport . The city of Munich intended to file two lawsuits against the planned route and, as a partner at the airport, to speak out against its participation in the project. The Munich mayor Ude also called for the Transrapid to be dispensed with in favor of the major project for the second S-Bahn main line in Munich , which was delayed until 2022 according to the current rail plan .

Since the beginning of the planning, the Transrapid project had social acceptance problems beyond the residents concerned; a survey by the opinion research institute Forsa determined a rejection of the project by 58% of the representative interviewees in Bavaria in September 2007. The association “Bayern pro Rapid”, supported by the business community, was supposed to publicize the Transrapid. The association was supported, among others, by the President of the Technical University of Munich Wolfgang Herrmann and the association “Mobil in München”.

The Transrapid controversy was a central theme of the local election campaign in Munich (election date March 2, 2008). Munich's Lord Mayor Christian Ude (SPD) was confirmed in his office with 66.7 percent of the votes cast, while his challenger Josef Schmid (CSU) received 24.5 percent. Both Josef Schmid and the Munich chairman of the Junge Union, Tobias Weiß, linked the poor election result of the CSU in Munich with their advocacy of the Transrapid project. It was not possible to convey the advantages of the unpopular project. Bavaria's Prime Minister Günther Beckstein did not want to see a vote against the project in the Munich election result. The surprising end of the unpopular project a few days after the local elections was often interpreted in the political debate as the CSU's opportunism with regard to the state elections in autumn 2008.

Referendum

On November 29, 2007, the collection of signatures began for a referendum against the maglev train. On December 20, 2007 the referendum "For Bavaria - No to the Transrapid" was applied for at the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior . At the beginning of January 2008, the ministry came to the conclusion that the petition for a referendum violated the Bavarian constitution . On January 21, the Ministry of the Interior submitted its assessment to the Bavarian Constitutional Court , which declared the referendum on April 4, 2008 to be inadmissible. The request violates Article 73 of the Bavarian Constitution, according to which no referendum may take place on the state budget. Only the subsidy of the project with 490 million euros was a decision of the Bavarian state government connected with the planned maglev train. The referendum wanted to prohibit this subsidy. Formally, it was also a federal government project. A referendum against the project itself was not possible, since referendums according to the Bavarian constitution cannot deal with federal matters.

The decision is of no current importance because of the completion of the project. However, even in the future, financial participation by the State of Bavaria in federal government projects cannot be prevented with a referendum.

Referendum

The citizens of the city of Munich should decide in a petition initiated by the city council whether the city of Munich should exhaust the legal means against the plan approval. That would have been possible without a referendum, but the city of Munich wanted to demonstrate through the vote that the construction of the Transrapid line would have been against the will of the citizens of the city of Munich. The citizens' petition scheduled for April 13, 2008 was canceled by the City Council of Munich on April 9, 2008 while the vote was already in progress by postal voters. DB Magnetbahn GmbH announced that it would discontinue the planning approval on April 8th and complete it on April 9th. The planned vote was thus irrelevant.

Trivia

The then Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber - one of the biggest proponents of the project - gave a speech at the New Year's reception of the CSU city council group in Munich on January 21, 2002, which also included a passage promoting the Munich Transrapid. In the course of this passage Stoiber stalled several times and mixed up the words “Hauptbahnhof” and “Flughafen”. As a result - beginning four years later from January 2006 - the passage was received and satirized in all types of media, including leading media such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . Phrases such as “if you are from the main train station” or “in ten minutes” became popular words and were also quoted in other political areas, sometimes in a modified form, but with a similar tone when a speaker recognizes a parallel between the respective facts and the Munich discussion about the Transrapid believed.

The speech was set to music for a drum test by Jonny König, a student at the Popakademie Baden-Württemberg at the time . The video Stoiber on Drums , published in early 2013, brought him attention on the Internet and was also shown totally live on the TV show .

Suspension of the project

On March 27, 2008, Federal Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee (SPD) and Bavaria's Prime Minister Günther Beckstein (CSU) declared in Berlin that the Transrapid Munich project had failed. The main reasons given for this were the considerably increased cost forecasts and the financing concept that has become untenable.

Those responsible for all companies in the industrial consortium qualified the planned costs of 1.85 billion euros as achievable in September 2007, which is in contradiction to the 3.4 billion euros mentioned in March 2008.

The CEO of Siemens , Peter Löscher , blamed the construction industry involved. The system operators would have kept their calculation.

The increased cost forecasts particularly affected tunnels, earthworks and buildings. The tunneling under the Munich main station, increased noise protection, longer tunnels and thicker pillars of the elevated carriageway were named as examples of additional costs. In September 2007, 820 million euros were budgeted for the construction of the route and tunnel, while in March 2008 construction costs of at least 2.2 billion euros were stated. The Hochtief company announced that it was not involved in the cost estimates of 1.85 billion euros at the time and was therefore not responsible for earlier miscalculations. An expert report on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Transport from 2001 was the basis of all planning figures. Deutsche Bahn experts revised this in 2004. According to the construction companies, the material costs for concrete and steel alone are more expensive than the originally estimated total construction costs. According to the construction industry, the estimated 3.4 billion euros did not yet contain any risk surcharges that would have been necessary if an order had been accepted at a fixed price.

Gerhard Hess , General Manager of the Bavarian Construction Industry Association , saw the responsibility with Deutsche Bahn, which was responsible for the planning and which had only passed on the information necessary for the calculation in October last year. Bahn boss Hartmut Mehdorn already knew in 2007 that the budget figures were untenable and nevertheless confirmed them to politicians.

A media report reported on unacceptable contract conditions from the construction industry's point of view and unusually restrictive requirements with which Deutsche Bahn wanted to deliberately fail a project that did not fit into its concept.

At the end of April 2008, the federal and state governments agreed on the distribution of the planning and procedural costs. Accordingly, the federal government takes over 52 million euros, the state over 70 million euros.

The termination of the project sparked political controversy about the abrupt end and also sparked a debate about the meaning and future of Transrapid technology. In an analysis, Andreas Bernard came to the conclusion that the oscillating definition of the development of the Transrapid was indicative of the stagnation and failure of an invention: The Transrapid was sometimes positioned as a better ICE, sometimes as a better S-Bahn, and had the claims at sober cost. But benefit analysis can never meet. In their opinion, Transrapid supporters brought up economically more suitable routes in Germany.

In May 2008, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp announced the dissolution of their joint venture Transrapid International after the failure of the Transrapid project in Munich .

The former serves as an information center Transrapid vehicle at Munich Airport was sold to the company Max Bögl for the symbolic price of one euro and at its headquarters in Sengenthal in Neumarkt in the Upper Palatinate erected . The company had developed the concrete components for the track for the Transrapid. Around 1.4 million people had informed themselves about the project. The exhibition, housed in an original part of the Transrapid train, was open to the public for six years. World icon

aftermath

In the discussion about alternative, improved connections between the airport and Munich Central Station, the British Arriva group, operator of the Regentalbahn in Germany, and the French group Veolia, operator of the Bayerische Oberlandbahn , have expressed interest in operating an airport express train. The operator of the Munich S-Bahn, part of the Deutsche Bahn, is also very interested in an Airport Express. The investigation of the new construction of a route for bicycle-rail traffic or the expansion and change of use of existing routes between the airport and the main train station is to be the subject of an expert report tendered by the Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs.

The funds of 490 million euros provided by the Free State of Bavaria for the Transrapid will be invested in research projects. The focus is on non-university research, the Fraunhofer institutes and facilities of the Max Planck Society. The establishment of a new Max Planck Institute for the Physics of Light in Erlangen and the establishment of a Europe-wide network for dementia research in Munich were named as concrete projects by the Bavarian government.

The Federal Administrative Court saved from the demolition of the project around one million euros, which to process the expected for new employees Transrapid complaints would have to be spent.

Transrapid Shanghai

One of the driving forces behind the construction of a Transrapid line was always the idea that the existence of a “reference line” could promote the export of Transrapid trains. The Transrapid Shanghai was inaugurated in China on December 31, 2002 ; it runs over a distance of about 30 km.

Web links

Commons : Transrapid Munich  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ The too expensive prestige project . In: HNA , March 26, 2008.
  2. ↑ Bavarian State Ministry for Economic Affairs: Transrapid Munich project not feasible due to significant price increases. March 27, 2008
  3. ↑ a b Spiegel Online: Transrapid in Munich is not being built , accessed on March 27, 2008.
  4. ↑ Planning for the Transrapid officially ended . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , April 15, 2008, p. 41.
  5. ↑ a b Report on Transrapid alternatives . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 147
  6. ↑ Dominik Hutter: The main train station is becoming a monster construction site . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , January 9, 2006, p. 53.
  7. ↑ a b c d Both the second S-Bahn main line and the Transrapid in Munich? . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 2/2005, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 74 f.
  8. ↑ Michael Kerkloh, CEO of Munich Airport in a TV Munich discussion program on the Transrapid; First broadcast January 25, 2008, 8:45 p.m.
  9. ↑ a b c d e The best for Munich . In: DB Magnetbahn GmbH (Ed.): Ten minutes , issue 1/2008, p. 1.
  10. ↑ In 10 minutes - every 10 minutes , PDF document from Deutsche Bahn AG, p. 39, accessed January 24, 2008
  11. ↑ Josef Ruppel Special aspects for the driving dynamics of the magnetic high-speed train in the Munich project ( Memento from June 12, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF file; 1.4 MB). In: 4th Dresden Symposium Transrapid, October 2004
  12. ↑ a b c d From all over Bavaria to the airport quickly and easily . In: Ten minutes , issue 1/2008, p. 2 f.
  13. ↑ a b c Klaus-Dieter Josel: Deutsche Bahn plans in the greater Munich area ( Memento from June 6, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), presentation from September 25, 2007, p. 16 (PDF file, 1.9 MB)
  14. ↑ a b Transrapid End the fairy tale hours . Munich's Lord Mayor Christian Ude, June 29, 2007
  15. ^ Announcement Further rail connection for Munich Airport . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 150.
  16. ↑ a b German Bundestag: Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Horst Friedrich (Bayreuth), Jan Mücke, Patrick Döring, other MPs and the parliamentary group of the FDP - printed matter 16/8125 - (PDF file; 70 kB). Printed paper 16/8357 of March 4, 2008
  17. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j Feasibility study for high- speed maglev lines . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 3/2002, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 153.
  18. ↑ a b c d e Thomas Graf: The safety concept for the Munich maglev train . In: EI railway engineer . No. 10, 2007, ISSN  0013-2780 , pp. 12-15.
  19. ^ Resident Interest Group Olympisches Dorf e. V .: The Transrapid on our doorstep , March 27, 2006.
  20. ^ Opinion and objection by the Federal Nature Conservation Association. V. against the plan approval ( Memento of October 12, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF file; 373 kB). Nature Conservation in Bavaria Association V. , June 8, 2006.
  21. ↑ Transrapid: First "flight to zero" . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 2/2003, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 67.
  22. ^ Notification of planning approval for the Transrapid to Munich Airport . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2005, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 154.
  23. ↑ a b Deutsche Bahn AG: Federal Railway Authority (EBA) approves safety concept for the Munich maglev train . Press release from April 24, 2007.
  24. ^ Message DB Magnetbahn elects board . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 6/2006, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 270.
  25. ↑ Discussion appointments: Check the Transrapid Munich for 70 days . In: DB Welt , April 2007 edition, p. 4.
  26. ↑ a b Discussion of the Transrapid ended ( memento of September 30, 2007 in the Internet Archive ). In: Merkur online from July 19, 2007
  27. ↑ Munich's interest in maglev is low. In: DB Welt , regional section south, June 2007 edition, p. 23
  28. Jump up to battle with arguments . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , February 26, 2007
  29. ^ Government of Upper Bavaria: Government of Upper Bavaria takes a position on the Federal Railway Authority . Press release no.18 from January 15, 2008.
  30. ↑ The mammoth task of the Transrapid . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 16, 2008, p. 37.
  31. ↑ Transrapid tunnel is not getting any longer . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 26, 2008, p. 53.
  32. ↑ a b DB Magnetbahn: The aim is to start construction at the end of 2008 . In: DB Welt , November 2007 edition, p. 5
  33. ^ Michael Hilbig Transrapid terminus at the State Chancellery . On Focus-Online , November 19, 2007
  34. ↑ a b Report EU money for Transrapid . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 12/2003, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 526.
  35. ↑ Beckstein wants to start the Transrapid campaign . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , January 15, 2008.
  36. ↑ Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (ed.): Press release No. 275/2007 of September 25, 2007.
  37. ↑ Worn to hunt, trouble in the CSU . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 6, 2007.
  38. ↑ Wolfgang Kaden The companies themselves stop the Transrapid . On: Spiegel Online, July 20, 2007
  39. ^ Dominik Hutter, Joachim Käppner State government remains on the Transrapid course . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 5, 2008, p. 54.
  40. ↑ Costs for the Munich Transrapid remain unclear until mid-2008 ( memento of December 30, 2007 in the Internet Archive ). In: logistik-inside.de , December 11, 2007
  41. ↑ Herbert Baum The industrial policy benefits of the Transrapid - methods of quantification ( Memento from June 11, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF file; 37 kB). In: Dresden symposium Transrapid 2005, p. 13
  42. ↑ Arithmetic artist Mehdorn . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung of September 5, 2007
  43. ^ A b Rudolf Breimeier: Transrapid discussion with embellished dates? . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , edition 3/2002
  44. ^ Message City of Munich wants express S-Bahn instead of Transrapid . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 5/2006, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 212.
  45. ↑ "Ude speaks wrongly and unfairly" . In: Merkur Online from December 5, 2007
  46. ↑ Hartmut Mehdorn: "I never wanted to be a diplomat" . Hoffmann and Campe, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-455-50047-9 . P. 125.
  47. ↑ Objections to plan approval procedures ; Axel Berg, Member of the Bundestag, accessed on January 5, 2008
  48. ^ Transrapid in Munich ( Memento from October 26, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e. V. , 2nd edition 2006, PDF document; Retrieved January 4, 2008
  49. ^ Transrapid magnetic high- speed train: The facts and their evaluation, conference of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 1995
  50. ↑ German power plants among the most harmful in the EU . ARD Tagesschau , May 9, 2007
  51. ^ Rail environmental key figures 2006, then online PDF document of Deutsche Bahn AG, May 2007, accessed January 24, 2008
  52. ↑ ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: Rainer Köhler Transrapid Ecology and Economy. In: Dresdner Fachtagung Transrapid 2007, p. 56 )@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.transrapidtagung.de
  53. ↑ Environmental balance sheet of the Transrapid: CSU sticks head in the sand. Statement of the SPD Munich on the environmental balance sheet, December 13, 2007 ( Memento from August 19, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )
  54. ↑ a b Opponents of the Transrapid file a complaint with the EU Commission . On: ad-hoc-new.de , July 18, 2007 ( Memento from September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  55. ↑ German Bundestag: Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the MPs Winfried Hermann, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Peter Hettlich, other MPs and the BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN parliamentary group - printed matter 16/7104 - (PDF file; 67 kB). In: Drucksache 16/7371 , November 29, 2007
  56. ↑ Government goals by Beckstein - care allowance, Transrapid and balanced budget . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , November 5, 2007
  57. ↑ Transrapid In the Tunnel of Fear . In Süddeutsche Zeitung , October 8, 2007
  58. ↑ Bavarian State Parliament Plenary Protocol 14/110 (PDF file; 875 kB) of February 13, 2003, p. 8023.
  59. ↑ Two lawsuits against the Transrapid . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , September 12, 2007
  60. ↑ OB Ude insists on the second main line “S-Bahn more important than Transrapid” . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 3, 2007.
  61. ^ Message controversial Transrapid: majority of Bavarians against . On: n-tv.de , September 27, 2007
  62. ↑ Sebastian Fischer Munich mutinies against the Transrapid . On: Spiegel-Online , May 6, 2006
  63. ↑ The Transrapid drummers "Better late than never" . In Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 20, 2007.
  64. ↑ Interview with Josef Schmid in the election coverage of the local broadcaster münchen.tv on March 2, 2008
  65. ↑ Beckstein: Realization uncertain . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 3, 2008
  66. ↑ shake-up at the right time . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 3, 2008
  67. ^ Bavarian State Ministry for the Environment: referendum "For Bavaria - No to the Transrapid" applied for at the Ministry of the Interior . Press release from December 20, 2007
  68. ^ Transrapid referendum: Court examines dispute . In: Mittelbayerische Zeitung of January 21, 2008
  69. ↑ Referendum is inadmissible . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung of April 4, 2008
  70. ↑ Council desire Transrapid: Decision on the organization of a citizens' decision (PDF file, 75 kB) Decision document of the Munich City Council, 12 December 2007.
  71. ↑ Transrapid referendum does not take place . Press release from the City of Munich, April 9, 2008
  72. ^ Munich cancels referendum. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , April 9, 2008.
  73. ^ City waives referendum . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , April 8, 2008.
  74. ↑ Blog entry with Mario Sixtus (January 4th or 18th, 2006, Archive.org version) ( Memento from January 27th, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  75. ↑ An analysis of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
  76. ↑ Jonny König: The drumming puppeteer at Sticks .de
  77. ↑ ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: Communication 062/2008 from the Federal Ministry of Transport about the discontinuation of the project. March 27, 2008 )@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.bmvbs.de
  78. ↑ Severin Weiland, Sebastian Fischer: Stop for Stoiber's suspension railway . In: Spiegel-Online , March 27, 2008
  79. ↑ Nobody wants the buck. (tagesschau.de archive) In: tagesschau.de , March 28, 2008
  80. ↑ Buildings are too expensive in Germany . In: Die Welt , April 6, 2008.
  81. ↑ Thomas Fromm: Tussle in the target corridor . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 27, 2008.
  82. ↑ Michael Kröger: Beautifully calculation and loss of reality - Transrapid disgraced government and industry. In: Spiegel-Online , March 28, 2008.
  83. ↑ Eberhard Krummheuer: The Transrapid is dead . In: Handelsblatt , March 27, 2008.
  84. ↑ Construction industry blames Mehdorn for the Transrapid debacle. In: Spiegel-Online , March 28, 2008.
  85. ↑ Nikolaus Doll, Jan Hildebrand: How the train slowed the Transrapid In: Die Welt , April 3, 2008, p. 16.
  86. ↑ ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: Federal Government and Bavaria share planning costs for Transrapid . AP report from April 28, 2008. )@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.pr-inside.com
  87. ^ Andreas Bernard: Floated out . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 29, 2008, p. 15.
  88. ↑ Transrapid consortium is closed . In: Spiegel-Online , May 8, 2008.
  89. ^ Sabine Dobel: One euro for the Transrapid. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , 21./22. May 2008, p. 49.
  90. ↑ Munich Transrapid sold for one euro . In: Die Welt , May 21, 2008
  91. ↑ Dominik Hutter: Does the private express come to the airport? , In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , p. 53, July 10, 2008
  92. ↑ Transrapid - millions for research: Bavaria wants to become FIT . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , July 8, 2008
  93. ↑ ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: End of the Transrapid saves the administrative court millions . In Pr-inside . Accessed on February 13, 2009 )@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.pr-inside.com