Transrapid Shanghai

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Transrapid
Sign at Shanghai Airport
Passenger compartment
Time and speed display
An oncoming Maglev train drives past on the Shanghai Transrapid line at top speed (approx. 430 km / h)
Lóngyáng Street Stop in Shanghai
Side view of the vehicle
Transrapid 08 in Shanghai, exit from Pudong airport station

The Transrapid Shanghai is a magnetic levitation train that was operated on December 31, 2002 on a 30 km long route from the station Lóngyáng Street ( Chinese  龙阳路 , Pinyin Lóngyáng-lù  - "Street of the Dragon and Yáng ") in a suburb of Shanghai ( VR China ), near the Shanghai New International Expo Center (SNIEC) exhibition center at Pudong Airport , the trial operation started. The Shanghai Maglev Train (Magnetic Levitation Train) is operated by Shanghai Maglev Transportation Co., Ltd.

Travel time, travel costs, occupancy

The Transrapid - known in China as the Shanghai Maglev Train (SMT) or Cixuanfulieche ( Chinese  磁悬浮 列车 ) - takes 7 minutes and 18 seconds for the 30 km route. After 3½ minutes (covered distance: 12.5 km) the maximum operating speed of 430 km / h is reached. It is held for 50 seconds before the deceleration phase (again 12.5 km) begins. The average speed on this route is 247 km / h. In the meantime, the majority of journeys (47 out of 59 per day and direction) only run at a reduced top speed of 300 km / h, which increases the travel time to around 8 minutes and 10 seconds. The top speed of 430 km / h (as of August 2013) is only reached in the morning and in the afternoon, each with a time window of around 45 minutes.

Time window 06: 45-08: 45 09: 00-10: 45 11: 00-14: 45 15: 00-15: 45 16: 00-19: 00 19: 00-21: 40
Travel time (minutes) 8:10 7:20 8:10 7:20 8:10
Max. speed 300 km / h 430 km / h 300 km / h 430 km / h 300 km / h
interval 20 minutes 15 minutes 20 minutes

The Transrapid runs 14 hours a day on the route and can transport up to 440 passengers per trip. On average (as of the end of 2007) around 7500 passengers were carried every day. A single 2nd class journey costs 50  CNY (yuan) (approx. 6  euros ), if you present a valid flight ticket 40 CNY (approx. 4.80 euros), also if you pay with the Shanghai Transportation Card. That is 10 times the price of an inner-city subway ride over 5–7 stations or 2.5 times the price of the airport bus, which connects the city center directly with Pudong Airport.

According to media reports, the route is in deficit due to insufficient utilization. On January 20, 2009, Welt Online , citing the China Business Journal, reported a loss of at least 100 million euros for operators by the end of 2007 and an occupancy rate of less than 20 percent.

As early as mid-2004, the fare had been reduced to CNY 50 (yuan) (around 6 euros ) due to low occupancy .

Project

The Transrapid line in Shanghai is the first commercial application of the Transrapid system. However, it was also "only" designed as a test track , since China was not officially the first country to want to carry out the commercial application without knowledge in continuous operation and oncoming traffic (860-1000 km / h differential speed ). The reasons given are the alignment with maximum curve radii and driving with maximum acceleration in order to still be able to reach the maximum speed that is not appropriate for the shortness of the route. The official goal is therefore not to aim for an economical operation, but rather to test the properties in high-load operation.

A particular challenge for the route builders was the soft, water-containing Shanghai sediment soil. In order to give the stilts, which are about 25 meters apart from each other, the necessary stability, they were placed on 8 m² concrete slabs. The forces are absorbed per plate with a maximum of 16 concrete piles reaching up to 80 meters deep. In order to guarantee the very tight tolerances of the driving plane even with tectonic dislocations (e.g. smaller earthquakes), it can be readjusted hydraulically.

Chinese universities and companies have long been investigating the extent to which vehicle components can be manufactured locally in China. This localization should bring the know-how into the country and save costs. However, it is sometimes doubted whether this measure actually leads to the desired cost savings. The further development of the system is essentially dependent on the engineering performance and cooperation with the German manufacturers. So China is indeed in track construction already positioned as well, in the control and regulation technology , however, is not as powerful enough. Nevertheless, it is feared that China will save its own expensive development costs and copy the technology.

Project progress

(With partial use of the time tables of the Shanghai Maglev Longyang Station exhibition hall)

  • During a visit by the then Federal Chancellor Schröder , representatives from Thyssen and the Chinese Ministry of Science signed a declaration of intent for the construction of a 50 to 100 km long test route for the Transrapid. Beijing or the Shanghai metropolitan area were considered as locations.
  • June 30, 2000: The German and Chinese governments signed an agreement to conduct a joint feasibility study of the Maglev Shanghai.
  • August 2000: Shanghai Maglev Transportation Development Co. Ltd. was founded with a capital of CNY 2 billion  . Eight partners invested in the project.
  • November 20, 2000: The feasibility study of the Maglev prepared in German-Chinese cooperation was published. At the same time, negotiations between Germany and China began regarding the delivery of components and services. On the German side, the companies Max Bögl , Siemens AG , ThyssenKrupp Transrapid GmbH and Transrapid International GmbH & Co. KG were involved. The contract was worth 1.293 billion DM.
  • January 23, 2001: German and Chinese contractual partners signed the contract for the delivery of components and services. The order volume for the four six-part vehicles (supplied by Thyssen-Krupp) as well as the control, drive and signaling technology (supplied by Siemens) was put at less than two billion DM. The cost of the route in the amount of a further billion DM was financed by the Chinese government. The German federal government subsidized the project with 200 million DM from interest income from the UMTS auctions . The first train was supposed to hover over the line on January 1, 2003, and regular operations should start in early 2004. The signing was initially expected in mid-December 2000 and was postponed after the two sides could not agree on the price.
  • January 26, 2001: Another contract for cooperation in the construction of the route was concluded.
  • February 2001: On the basis of the feasibility study, a first design draft of the project was completed. With the help of the German technology transfer, the final construction of the route, track, maintenance center, etc.
  • March 1, 2001: The construction of the factory hall for the production of the guideway girders began.
  • March 2001: The purchase of the land on the area of ​​the driveway was largely completed. The demolition of buildings in this area was also completed.
  • December 31, 2002: A so-called VIP run took place in the presence of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder .
  • July 2003: The automatically controlled and secured operation with two vehicles and train encounters began. From September 2003, the automatic circulation operation was tested with three vehicles.
  • November 2003: A demonstration run with an 8-section train took place.
  • On November 12, 2003, the unmodified Transrapid set a new record in Shanghai as the fastest commercial maglev train at 501 km / h . For comparison: In 2007 the TGV drove 574.8 km / h as a conventional rail-bound, but as a specially built record vehicle on a specially prepared track in a singular record drive.
  • December 2003: Approval for commercial use as the fastest track-bound vehicle in the world according to the schedule. In the first few weeks of operation, the number of passengers was around 500 to 600 per day, well below expectations. Operation was initially limited to a few hours a day.
  • July 3, 2004: One millionth passenger
  • In mid-2004, the operating company rejected media reports that the route was sinking due to the soft subsoil. This was taken into account when planning the route and the subsidence was under control.
  • July 2005: Four millionth passenger
  • June 2006: Seven millionth passenger
  • End of 2007: total of 13 million passengers carried.
  • July 2008: more than 15 million passengers were carried by the end of July.
  • December 2010: 27 million passengers carried in total.
  • January 2011: Commercial use of a maglev vehicle (4-section train) made entirely in China on the route.

When planning began in 2001, 10 million passengers were expected in 2010; the load factor actually achieved in 2007 is 4 million passengers. According to newspaper reports, high losses are to be earned. An economically more promising route would be opposed to legitimate resident protests because of the high noise at high speeds. The main problem is the broken traffic, as the route only leads to the outer eastern border of the inner-city development and it is necessary to change to buses or the underground. To get to the western part of the city, a further 9 kilometers on difficult terrain and the river crossing would be required.

As part of the cooperation agreements with the German system manufacturers, a technology transfer was agreed which should enable the Chinese side to build maglev trains largely independently. The first vehicle completely manufactured in China was presented to the public in spring 2010 and has been in everyday use on the track since January 2011. Visually, it largely corresponds to the "German" Transrapid.

Expansion plans

Attempts by the Transrapid consortium to convince the Chinese government to use the Transrapid technology on the planned route to Beijing failed.

At the beginning of 2004, the consortium hoped to use the Transrapid for routes from Shanghai to Hangzhou or Nanjing instead . The planned expansion to the neighboring city of Hangzhou, 170 kilometers away, was abandoned in January 2011.

Another expansion plan includes the connection of the approximately 53 kilometers distant airports in Shanghai ( Pudong International Airport with Hongqiao Domestic Airport to the west of the city center ). Thyssen-Krupp and the Shanghai Maglev operating company should have agreed on an expansion before the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai , according to earlier reports ; however, the project was abandoned with this termination. In order to keep the nuisance of the local residents low, the original route planning was shortened and an underground route was planned in large parts. The connection to the second airport is intended in particular to improve the profitability of the entire route, which then runs more centrally, due to the currently unsatisfactory capacity utilization. In January 2008 there were demonstrations against the expansion of the Transrapid in Shanghai. Residents particularly fear health problems. The costs of further route construction in China are now said to be 46 million euros per km and have more than doubled compared to the original plans. It is unknown whether the Chinese operators will continue to implement the project plan. In any case, the euphoria is gone, the plants are being neglected. Thyssen-Krupp closed the Transrapid plant in Kassel in 2012.

Incidents

On August 11, 2006, there was a technical defect that caused a Transrapid to catch fire. According to eyewitness reports, the second car suddenly caught fire. The train was able to stop after 500 meters and the fire was quickly extinguished. Despite the heavy smoke development, nobody was injured. There was only material damage. However, the route was blocked for several days by the wrecked train and was therefore out of service. The cause so far is a defective battery .

See also

Web links

Commons : Transrapid Shanghai  - Collection of Images, Videos and Audio Files
 Wikinews: Portal: Transrapid  - in the news

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Petra Kolonko: The train ends here . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . September 26, 2013, ISSN  0174-4909 , p. 7 ( online ).
  2. ↑ a b Harald Maas Shanghai truncates the Transrapid in the Tagesspiegel , published on January 2, 2008
  3. ^ Johnny Erling: In China, the Transrapid could become an underground train . In Welt-Online , published on January 20, 2009
  4. ↑ a b Report Transrapid problems . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 6/2004, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 274.
  5. ↑ Andreas Lorenz China's almost real Transrapid on Spiegel-Online , published on June 2, 2007
  6. ↑ News update shortly . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 2/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 81
  7. ↑ Without a source
  8. ↑ Railway budget . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2001, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 146 f.
  9. ↑ Message "Green light" for the Transrapid . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 3/2001, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 130.
  10. ↑ Transrapid: First "flight to zero" . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 2/2003, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 67.
  11. ↑ Report Transrapid with few passengers . In: Railway technical review . 53, No. 3, 2004, p. 96.
  12. ↑ a b Report Beijing - Shanghai: Hardly any chances for the Transrapid . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 3/2004, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 126.
  13. ↑ Resident protests drive up Transrapid costs ( memento from August 1, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ). In: Financial Times Deutschland online edition, January 4, 2008.
  14. ↑ Maglev link plan is suspended in ShanghaiDaily , published on January 18, 2011.
  15. ↑ Chinese protest against the Transrapid in Süddeutsche Zeitung , published on January 13, 2008
  16. ↑ Andreas Lorenz citizens demonstrate in front of Shanghai's city hall on Spiegel-Online , published on January 14, 2008
  17. ↑ Disappointed: Shanghai regrets the Transrapid railway in Augsburger Allgemeine on February 4, 2013

Coordinates: 31 ° 12 ′ 14.4 "  N , 121 ° 33 ′ 14.4"  E