Stuttgart 21

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Overview of the planned changes to railway systems in the Stuttgart area
Construction work on the future platform hall of Stuttgart Central Station (January 2018)
Main hall of the Bonatz building after it was cleared in the course of the Stuttgart 21 construction work

Stuttgart 21 (also S 21 for short ) is a transport and urban development project to reorganize the Stuttgart railway junction . As part of the project, eleven new, mostly underground routes (57 km) and four new passenger traffic stations, including a new main train station, are being built. The track areas that are freed up are to be used for urban development . Together with the new Wendlingen – Ulm line , the project is referred to as the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project .

The project was first presented to the public in 1994. Construction work began on February 2, 2010. The completion of the project, initially planned for December 2019, has been postponed several times. The main station is now due to open in December 2025, other parts of the project later.

The official cost estimates have risen several times since the project was presented in 1995: from originally 2.5 billion euros to 4.1 billion euros at the start of construction in 2010 to 8.2 billion euros in January 2018. Outsiders such as the Federal Audit Office hold costs of up to just under 10 billion euros for possible.

Despite the broad consensus of the various interest groups on the need to modernize the Stuttgart railway junction, the Stuttgart 21 project is controversial in many respects. An illegal police operation on September 30, 2010 with several hundred injured, some seriously, led to arbitration at Stuttgart 21 . At the end of 2011, the state of Baden-Württemberg rejected an exit in a referendum . Critics advocate the alternative concept of terminus station 21 , which is now switchover 21 . The protest against Stuttgart 21 is still active, the 500th Monday demonstration took place in February 2020.


Airport and exhibition grounds with existing and planned future tracks

The project is to convert the above-ground, 17-track terminus of the Stuttgart main station into an underground, eight-track through station that has been rotated by around 90 degrees compared to the previous systems ; the underlying double-track S-Bahn station is to be retained and accessed from the north via a new underground route. The previous double-track long-distance railway lines to and from Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt are to be given a new route, with new double-track connections to the Filder plain ( airport / exhibition center ) and to Ober - / Untertürkheim being created. The Gäubahn to Stuttgart-Rohr , the so-called Panoramabahn, should be dismantled. The state, region and city are committed to maintaining the section of the route and building a stop at the north station. In the future, passenger trains in the direction of Singen are to be carried over the new line to the airport and from there over the S-Bahn tracks to Rohr.

In addition to this ring closure in the city area, the following are planned:

A total of 57 kilometers of new railway lines are to be built. The nine planned tunnels have a total length of 30 km or 55 km tube length. The Staatsgalerie tram stop also has to be relocated.

In connection with the new Wendlingen – Ulm line connected in Wendlingen , Stuttgart 21 is officially referred to as the Stuttgart – Ulm railway project . The name Baden-Württemberg 21 , which was also introduced in mid-2000 , has not been used since 2008 because it “does not include the international dimension [of the project]”. The number in the name refers to the 21st century in which the project is to be realized. The new Stuttgart – Wendlingen line is included in the 2003 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan as part of the new and upgraded Stuttgart – Augsburg line . It is part of Priority Axis No. 17 (“ Main Line for Europe ”) of the Trans-European Networks .

Optional extensions

The spatial planning process results in three expansion options that can be implemented without changes to the existing systems:

  • The T-brace describes a direct S-Bahn route between Bad Cannstatt and the North Station . This would create a direct connection and there would be no need to change between the two northern branches of the S-Bahn.
  • The P option provides a third and fourth track between the main train station and Feuerbach . This section is considered to be the most heavily loaded inlet section. The Bad Cannstatt tunnel is to be reached via the Prague tunnel and another underground section.
  • The Nordkreuz option would maintain or reactivate the Gäubahn as an S-Bahn line and connect it with the S-Bahn lines to Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt in the area of ​​the North Station. In this way, additional lines or cycle densities could be introduced.

According to the DB, the three options can be implemented later "without significant interference in rail operations". In addition, according to Deutsche Bahn, the main station can be expanded by a ninth and tenth track if necessary. The cost of adding two more tracks was put by DB at 99 to 152 million euros (as of around 2005).

Urban development

Framework plan for urban development

Around 100 hectares (= 1 square kilometer) of current or former track areas on the edge of downtown Stuttgart are to be made usable through the project. The center area could thus be expanded by 40 percent.

These areas were divided into eight sub-areas:

  • Area A1: former freight yard between Heilbronner Straße and Wolframstraße (development since 1999, including the city ​​library on Mailänder Platz )
  • Area A2: track apron of the main train station (development only possible after completion)
  • Area A3: first construction site immediately north of the new central station (development only possible after completion)
  • Area B: Parking and maintenance station at Rosensteinquartier
  • Post: Property of the former parcel post office, bordering the northeast corner of sub-area B
  • Area C1: inner north station - south part
  • Area C2: inner north station - north part
  • Area D: Gäubahntrasse between sub-area C1 and the Stuttgart-Vaihingen district
  • Area E: Westbahnhof .

20 hectares are to be used for expanding the palace gardens. The remaining area will provide living space for around 11,000 people and jobs for around 24,000 people.

Mass calculations

Around 8 million m³ of excavated material and overburden is expected for the construction of Stuttgart 21; around 1.5 million m³ of concrete are to be transported and installed, around half of which will be in the inner-city area. During construction, groundwater must be extracted, especially for the planning approval sections in the valley area. As of June 2015, water law permits were issued for a total of around 24 million m³.



Schematic overview of the Stuttgart railway junction
Part of the apron of Stuttgart Central Station
The Stuttgart mainline tunnel, which is more than 20 km long, was part of various variants for a new and upgraded line between Stuttgart and the Ulm area. The tunnel was to begin at Feuerbach, pass under the Stuttgart main station with a four-track through station and finally join the existing line at Plochingen.

During the preliminary planning of the high-speed route Mannheim – Stuttgart in 1970, the German Federal Railroad considered building a new underground station for high-speed traffic from Mannheim and Ulm under Stuttgart Central Station. As part of the new and upgraded line between Plochingen and Günzburg planned in the 1980s , possibilities for a through station in Stuttgart were examined. In 1988 Heimerl , Hohnecker and Dobeschinsky from the University of Stuttgart brought in a memorandum in which they proposed a new line to Ulm to be built close to the autobahn. This was to be introduced into a four-track through station under the existing Stuttgart main station. The state of Baden-Württemberg joined the proposal, which became the starting point for further planning at the end of the 1980s. In the meantime, other large-scale alternatives have been examined.

After considering various options up to October 1991, two large-scale concepts were pursued, both of which in the Stuttgart area provided for a tunnel from Feuerbach from the north to a four-track underground through station under Stuttgart's main train station. The framework concept H was a further development of the Heimerl concept and provided for the route from the through station to the Filder plain and to Ulm. The framework concept K , on the other hand, provided for long-distance trains from the main station to Plochingen to be run underground and the subsequent existing line between Plochingen and Süßen to be expanded. In the Swabian Alb, a new section of the line was to be built, which was to be linked to the existing line at Beimerstetten . In October 1991 the Bundesbahn presented variants designated as H ' and K' , which provided for continued use of the terminal station instead of the new through station. On September 15, 1992, the state of Baden-Württemberg spoke out in favor of a route close to the autobahn, which should also connect to the airport.

During the planning process, four variants were developed for the connection to the main train station:

  1. A four-track through station under the existing terminal station with an airport connection in the shunt .
  2. A four-track through station under the existing terminal station with direct airport connection.
  3. A new through station at Rosenstein when the terminal station is abandoned.
  4. The continued use of the terminus.

Variant 3 would have made it possible to use the freed railway area for urban development . With variants 3 and 4, a six-track section of the existing line in the Filstal valley from Esslingen-Mettingen was to be followed by a new line to the Filder plain. In December 1993, the board of the Deutsche Bundesbahn decided on variant 4.

Building on variant H , it was finally checked whether all rail traffic in Stuttgart main station could be relocated to an underground through station. This was the last preliminary stage for the Stuttgart 21 project.

The project was officially presented on April 18, 1994. This project was intended to combine several individual interests: the connection to the airport, the retention of the old location of the main train station, the urban development options, the high-speed route close to the motorway to Ulm and the removal of the Gäubahntrasse to Vaihingen .

As early as October 1990, three engineers from Stuttgart had presented a concept that , based on Heimerl's idea, provided for the clearing of all track areas in the inner city area.

Feasibility study and preliminary project

In June 1994, DB, the federal government, the state and the city commissioned a feasibility study, which was presented on January 16, 1995. The study suggested converting the main train station into an eight-track through station, combined with a largely underground ring of access routes. The connection of regional transport lines, the new S-Bahn station Mittnachtstraße, a maintenance station in Untertürkheim and a long-distance station at the airport were already planned. This should be in shunt with a Gleisdreieck be connected to the new line to Wendlingen. The total costs of 4.8 billion D-Marks were to be raised through the sale of land, additional income from increased passenger numbers, improved operational processes and funds from the Municipal Transport Financing Act. Economic viability was assumed as long as in-depth studies (e.g. on the mineral water problem) ensured the feasibility. The study was based on the operating program for 2010 , which assumed around 30 train journeys in the main train station at peak hours. Numerous infrastructure variants were discarded as part of the feasibility study or only provided as an option.

The preliminary project examined the concept further technically and economically, including a geological and hydrological exploration program. According to the railway, the profitability of the project has been confirmed. The results of the preliminary project were presented in November 1995. The train capacity of the station for long-distance traffic should therefore be increased by 50%, for local traffic by 80%. In terms of urban planning, around 1.3 million square meters of floor space (for 11,000 residents and 24,000 employees) should be created. The benefit-cost factor was 2.6.

On November 7, 1995 the federal, state, city, regional association and Deutsche Bahn AG concluded a framework agreement to develop and promote the project. It was later modified and specified in more detailed planning.

Spatial planning, implementation discussion and plan approval

On December 6, 1996, the regional planning procedure for the railway junction and the new line to Wendlingen was applied for. The documents including the environmental impact study were displayed in the affected communities from January 7, 1997 to February 6, 1997. There were 13,700  objections in Stuttgart Regional Council one. The spatial planning procedure was completed in September 1997 and the project was declared spatially compatible after various changes and new requirements. Then the plan approval procedure was started with the definition of the investigation framework for the environmental impact study . A Europe-wide architectural competition for the redesign of the main train station in the same year unanimously awarded the design by Christoph Ingenhoven . The conception of the operating program also began in 1997 on the basis of a quantity structure developed for this purpose and updated since then .

Railway boss Johannes Ludewig stopped the project in 1999. In support of this, he said in 2011 that Stuttgart 21 was “simply too big and too expensive for the train”. After a reassessment, the DB stated that it saw no possibility of realizing the project, including the new line, "in one fell swoop". In principle, however, the project should be pursued further. The project should fall victim to the austerity constraints of the federal government. The federal states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, on the other hand, exerted increasing pressure on the federal government in 1999 to implement the project. In November 1999, the state, city, regional association and Stuttgart Airport offered to contribute 1.3 billion D-Marks to the project. On December 1, 1999, the management board of DB recommended that the supervisory board pursue the project. In December 1999 a preliminary planning order was placed as part of the Netz 21 strategy . Planning for the project was temporarily halted in 2000. If the schedule, which was valid until at least mid-1999, provided for the start of construction in 2001 and commissioning in 2008, the start of construction was postponed several times in the following period.

After the federal government and the states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria (for Neu-Ulm 21 ) had agreed on pre-financing, the DB's supervisory board approved the project on March 14, 2001. This paved the way for the submission of the planning approval documents, which should be completed by the end of 2003. On October 31, 2001, the first planning approval procedure for Stuttgart 21 was opened at the Federal Railway Authority ; the first decisions were made in 2005 and 2006.

On December 21, 2001, the state capital Stuttgart acquired almost all of the areas freed up by Stuttgart 21 (areas A2, A3, B, C and D) with a total area of ​​109 hectares for 897.7 million DM (459 million euros) from Deutsche Bahn .

Plan approval sections

Planning approval sections of Stuttgart 21

In accordance with the regional planning procedure, the developer divided the project into initially seven and then eight plan approval sections. For six of them there are legally binding resolutions ("building law") (status at the end of 2016):

PFA No. description Length
Of which
First application decision Construction costs
(million euros, 2009,
out of date)
1.1 Valley crossing with main station 0.9 0.9 10/30/2001 01/28/2005 893.1

(2019: 1200)

1.2 Filder tunnel 9.6 9.6 12/17/2001 08/19/2005 753.9
1.3a Image area with
station NBS
5.3 5.3 October 2002
(as PFA 1.3)
07/14/2016 488.0
1.3b Airport connection still open still open
1.4 Filder area to Wendlingen 9.9 0.8 06/14/2002 04/30/2008 205.1
1.5 Feed to Feuerbach
and Bad Cannstatt
04/15/2002 10/30/2006 801.0
Feed to Feuerbach 3.6 3.2
Feed to Bad Cannstatt 4.4 4.4
Adaptation of the S-Bahn 4.6 2.7
1.6a Feeding to Ober- / Untertürkheim 08/30/2002 05/16/2007 925.0
Feeding to Obertürkheim 6.1 5.3
Delivery to Untertürkheim 2.8 2.8
Untertürkheim parking station
7.4 0 05/31/2011 still open
total 54.6 35.1 4,066.0
PFA 1.1 Legal force April 6, 2006 by decision of the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg
Sources: Planning approval decisions from PFA 1.1, 1.2, 1.3a, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6a, as well as
outdated status, but the most recent published breakdown of construction costs into construction sections.
Without planning and nominalization costs. For further developments see costs and financing of Stuttgart 21 .
  • Section 1.1 deals with the renovation of the main train station with a valley crossing.
  • Section 1.2 ( Filder Tunnel ) creates the connection between the city center and the Filder plain with an approximately 9.5 kilometer long tunnel. It is part of the 25 km long new line to Wendlingen , which is also the subject of Sections 1.3a and 1.4.
  • Section 1.3 contains a new line section north of Stuttgart Airport and the new long-distance and regional train station (Filderbahnhof) including its connection via the airport tunnel . The existing Flughafen / Messe S-Bahn station is to be connected to the new line towards Stuttgart via the airport curve. The S-Bahn line to the airport is to be connected via the Rohrer curve with the Gäubahn to the south. On March 11, 2015, Deutsche Bahn announced that it would split the previous plan approval section 1.3 into two sections. While section 1.3a was to go into operation together with Stuttgart 21, section 1.3b was scheduled to go into operation one to two years later. The date of the opening of the Gäubahn route through the airport is currently open (as of January 2020).
  • Section 1.4 begins at the eastern edge of the airport and runs to the Neckar valley . There the transition to the new Wendlingen – Ulm line follows.
  • Section 1.5 includes the feeders from the direction of Stuttgart-Feuerbach (Feuerbach tunnel , 3.2 kilometers) and Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt ( Bad Cannstatt tunnel , 3.8 kilometers). The S-Bahn section between the north and the main station is to be re-routed and, together with the new S-Bahn tracks from Bad Cannstatt, via the new Rosenstein tunnel (3.4 kilometers) and the new Mittnachtstraße S-Bahn station to the main station and connected there with the existing S-Bahn tunnel. In addition, a new 355 m long bridge is planned over the Neckar .
  • The PFA 1.6a includes the 6.0 km long Obertürkheim tunnel with the feed to Stuttgart-Obertürkheim and -Untertürkheim.
  • The PFA 1.6b is to create a new parking station in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim. When the planning was revised in 2016, it was reduced in size, but additional sidings are to be added in Stuttgart-Münster and Stuttgart-Obertürkheim. Completion by the time the main station goes into operation is considered uncertain.

Project decision

In October 2006, the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg adopted a motion for a resolution from the parliamentary groups of the CDU , SPD and FDP for the realization of Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. The state parliament decided with 115 to 15 votes (from the parliamentary group of the Greens ) that Stuttgart 21 would “best meet the challenges of a long-term efficient rail transport infrastructure also from an economic point of view” and “make sense in terms of transport and environmental policy” for the placement of the state particularly significant in Europe and "useful for structural and national political reasons".

The federal government, the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, the railway and the city of Stuttgart agreed on July 19, 2007 on the allocation of the costs and the construction cost risk. On April 2, 2009, Prime Minister Günther Oettinger , Federal Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee and DB board member Stefan Garber signed the financing agreements. In order to ensure the profitability of the Stuttgart 21 project, the financing agreement contained a reservation. If, after completion of the draft planning, but no later than December 31, 2009, an increase in the total costs to be incurred for the project over an agreed risk amount had been expected, negotiations between the contractual partners would have to be resumed.

On December 9, 2009, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn approved the inclusion of the project in the company's investment planning. On the following day, the project steering committee also agreed to continue the project. On December 16, 2009, the Bundestag's transport committee recommended rejecting a motion from the Bündnis90 / Die Grünen parliamentary group. In this application, the federal government is requested, without obligation, to impose a moratorium on the rail project and to lift the year-end deadline. On the following day, as recommended, the application was rejected in the plenary session.

On March 5, 2013, the company's supervisory board voted 18 out of 20 votes in favor of increasing the financing framework from the company's own funds by two billion euros. Part of the sum is to be recovered from the project partners through the "speaking clause" of the financing contract.

In the Stuttgart city area, more than 3000 properties are affected by the project.


After the state elections in March 2011, the Greens and the SPD decided in their coalition agreement to hold a referendum on the Stuttgart 21 project. This was held on November 27 of the same year. The subject of the question was whether the state should take advantage of the termination options from the financing agreement and thus exit the project. 58.9 percent spoke out against the state government's obligation to exercise termination rights to terminate the contractual agreements with the state's financing obligations with regard to the Stuttgart 21 rail project, 41.1 percent were in favor.

Complementary projects

During the approval and construction phase, various project changes and extensions were decided, which for the most part are an integral part of the project, but are paid for from sources other than the financing contract for the overall project.

  • In March 2015, the project partners agreed on a change in planning in the Filder area . It includes a third platform track at the airport S-Bahn station , a completely crossing-free Rohrer curve, as well as the expansion of the Stuttgart-Vaihingen station into a regional traffic stop . The cost of the package was estimated at 80 million euros. The Stuttgart Region Association will take on 20 million euros of this, and Deutsche Bahn will take over the rest. The state promised additional transport orders of 30 million euros. The stop in Vaihingen is scheduled to be completed in mid-2021 and put into operation immediately.
  • In February 2017, the Stuttgart Region Association financed four additional points between the Bad Cannstatt and Mittnachtstraße stations in order to increase the flexibility of the S-Bahn in the event of a malfunction. Initially, 2.43 million euros were agreed, which rose to 2.83 million euros in April 2019.
  • While the federal government was opposed to a double-track construction of the Wendlinger curve (to the large Wendlinger curve ), which was initially planned to be single-track, the financing contract was signed on May 3, 2019 at the instigation of the state. Compared to the originally planned implementation, this removes a bottleneck and allows additional traffic. The expected costs of 100 million euros will be financed by the state and the Stuttgart and Neckar-Alb regions . The cost increase to 123 million euros, which became known in June 2020, will also be borne by the state.
  • With the decision of the City of Stuttgart on May 9, 2019, the City of Stuttgart is expected to provide 5.5 million euros to equip the S-Bahn tunnel between the main station and Wolframstrasse with a mass-spring system . The city also pays the ongoing maintenance costs of this system.
  • In the meantime and contrary to the original plan (ETCS with stationary signals ), digital interlockings and ETCS are to be primarily equipped as part of the “Stuttgart digital node” . In addition to the new routes being created as part of Stuttgart 21, some of the surrounding routes are also to be equipped for regular operation with ETCS Level 2 without light signals and automated driving operations (ATO). Instead of the three electronic interlockings previously planned as part of Stuttgart 21 and extensive adaptation to three old interlockings, a digital interlocking is now to be built that will control a total of around 125 kilometers of route. Four old signal boxes (with a total of around 60 kilometers of route) are incorporated into it. By increasing the performance, the quality of operations should first be improved and then scope should be created for expanding the range of services. To do this, all long-distance, regional and S-Bahn vehicles must be equipped with ETCS. For the first two of three building blocks, a financing agreement announced in August 2020 plans to invest 462 million euros in infrastructure, of which 216 million euros are to be borne by the federal government. The award is to take place in autumn 2020, commissioning in sections from the end of 2023, Template: future / in 3 yearsETCS tests from 2024 Template: future / in 4 years. Commercial commissioning in the core area (main line, main station) is planned in several steps in the second half of 2025 Template: future / in 5 years. ATO is scheduled to Template: future / in 5 yearsgo into operation about a year later . The rest of the surrounding area, up to at least the line endpoints of the S-Bahn, is to be Template: future / in 5 yearsequipped by 2030 . The federal government is funding vehicle equipment with up to 200 million euros.
  • The state of Baden-Württemberg is considering an expansion option for S21, the so-called supplementary station, and convened a working group with representatives from the state, Deutsche Bahn, the city of Stuttgart and the Stuttgart Region Association to discuss it. Four additional end tracks are to be built, roughly in the same position as the current end station, but lower on the level of the new S21 through tracks. This should enable more capacity and a more direct connection to the north; In addition, the existing panorama route via the former Stuttgart West station to Stuttgart-Vaihingen is to be maintained as a connection to the Gäubahn and as an alternative route in the event of operational disruptions on the main S-Bahn line . As a premise of the working group, the scope of Stuttgart 21 is considered sufficient for the foreseeable traffic development and priority is given to urban development.
  • In October 2019, the city of Stuttgart and the state of Baden-Württemberg, with the participation of the Stuttgart Region Association, decided to work out a permit plan for the construction of the Löwentorbrücke / Nordbahnhof stop on the panoramic route for the purpose of uninterrupted operation of this route after the commissioning of Stuttgart 21. The platform should be 210 meters long and lie in the curve of the junction towards Stuttgart-Feuerbach. The expected planning costs are 750,000 euros.
An interim solution worked out on behalf of the State Ministry of Transport with the temporary retention of two tracks at the terminal station until the Gäu Railway through the airport is put into operation is technically easy to implement. However, the country gave up the plans after resistance from the city and other actors.
  • As it became known in March 2020, a 10 km long tunnel is to be built as part of the Germany cycle , which will lead out of the Feuerbach tunnel, cross under Zuffenhausen and the A 81 and merge north of Münchingen into the high-speed line to Mannheim . Deutsche Bahn proposed the expansion in 2019 in order to build on Stuttgart 21 and reduce the travel time from Mannheim to Stuttgart to just under 30 minutes.
  • The third expert draft of the Deutschland-Takt, presented at the end of June 2020, provides for a new connection of the Gäubahn between Böblingen and the airport train station, subject to a positive economic assessment. This could z. B. be designed as a "Gäubahntunnel". BMVI State Secretary Steffen Bilger and Regional President Thomas Bopp described this approximately 12 km long tunnel as set and financially secure, but this is controversial. The project would replace the construction project of Pfa 1.3b along with the mixed traffic there with the S-Bahn and the changes to it decided in March 2015. However, Pfa 1.3b should initially be planned further in parallel. So far, there is neither a precise route for the project nor is it stored in the federal transport route plan. State Transport Minister Winfried Hermann estimated the cost of such a tunnel to be more than one billion euros and may not expect completion until after 2030. In this context, Gerhard Heimerl spoke out in favor of the Nordkreuz and a supplementary terminus at the main station. Other critics, including Prime Minister Winfried Kretschmann , see the necessity of the project as an oath of disclosure and their longstanding criticism of the inadequate planning of the overall project as confirmed.


Two regional trains shielded the ceremony from demonstrators during the symbolic raising of the buffer stop.
Construction activity around the main train station

The symbolic start of construction was celebrated on February 2, 2010. Federal Transport Minister Peter Ramsauer , the CEO of Deutsche Bahn Rüdiger Grube , the Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg Günther Oettinger , the Lord Mayor of Stuttgart Wolfgang Schuster and others symbolically raised the buffer stop on track 049. This marked the beginning of the reconstruction of the terminus station track field as a preparatory measure. Due to a planning error when converting the ramp of the S-Bahn tunnel at the main station, there were restrictions in S-Bahn traffic between the end of June 2010 and January 10, 2011 . On May 27, 2013, the platforms began to be moved forward by 120 m in the direction of the apron. With the commissioning of the relocated cross platform on October 21, 2013 - twenty months later than announced when the order was placed - the reconstruction of the track apron was completed.

The north wing of the main station was completely demolished in August and September 2010, the south wing in January to July 2012. In the early morning of October 1, 2010, the first trees were felled in the middle of the palace gardens amid protests by several thousand citizens who were present under police protection.

On July 30, 2011, the construction work for the Filder Tunnel and the Obertürkheim Tunnel were awarded with an order value of more than 700 million. On March 12, 2012, construction contracts for the main train station, the Bad Cannstatt tunnel and the Feuerbach tunnel were awarded with a total value of around 800 million euros. According to DB, 50 percent of the total construction volume and 90 percent of the tunnel structures for Stuttgart 21 had been awarded.

The shell of the technical building at the north exit was erected from April 2012 to October 2013.

Since the beginning of 2012, the Sulzbachtal railway overpass, the longest bridge structure in Stuttgart 21 at 365.40 m, has been under construction. During the year 2013, the main action started in all tunnels on the Stuttgart district with false attacks ( Tunnel Obertürkheim , tunnel Bad Cannstatt and tunnel Feuerbach ) and the construction of the starting excavation (Filderstadt tunnel) . On December 4, 2013, the first tunnel of the Stuttgart 21 project was pierced with the Obertürkheim tunnel .

In the vicinity of the main train station, the SSB built a new light rail tunnel parallel to Heilbronner Straße from 2013 to 2017. The first tunnel tube went into operation in November 2016, the second in April 2017. Since December 2017 there has been a direct connection from the main train station to the new station Budapester Platz due to the changed route of the U12 . The stop at Pragfriedhof was given up.

The civil engineering work for the trough of the main station began on August 5, 2014 in the middle palace garden. The shell of the underground station and the four adjoining tunnels are to be completed by 2019. At the beginning of July 2015, the construction of the Nesenbach culvert began and was completed in 2018. The light rail route between the Staatsgalerie and Charlottenplatz was closed from May 2016 to December 2017. The routes between the Staatsgalerie and the Hauptbahnhof have been closed from December 2017 until at least 2022 Template: future / in 2 years.

At the beginning of September 2018, the driving work for the two tunnel tubes to Obertürkheim was interrupted due to large amounts of groundwater penetrating (approx. 30 liters per second). A modified tunneling procedure is to be used, which also requires new permits from the Federal Railway Authority.

48.8 km (83%) of 58.8 km of tunnels have been driven (as of October 2019).

Damage caused

The tunnel bores under the Kernerviertel ( Stuttgart-Mitte ) caused cracks in numerous buildings, although attempts were made to counteract the expected subsidence with uplift injections. The intermediate building between the buildings at Kernerstrasse 30 and Schützenstrasse 14 had to be demolished. There were also numerous faults in traffic areas. The distance between the upper edge of the tunnel and the building foundations is sometimes less than 10 meters in this area.


Construction phases of the main station (status: planning approval, approx. 2005)

The plan approval procedure in section 1.3 applied for by Deutsche Bahn in October 2002 was in the preparatory examination by the Federal Railway Authority at the end of 2011., The planned use of the existing S-Bahn station at the airport for long-distance and regional traffic led to this section beforehand Delays. After the Federal Ministry of Transport issued the necessary exception permit on June 18, 2010 and the public participation procedure Filder-Dialog S21 was completed, Deutsche Bahn submitted a new application for planning approval on May 2, 2013. The planning approval decision was issued in July 2016, and the contract was awarded in October 2019 after a three-year legal dispute. For the second part of the airport section (Section 1.3b), the planning approval procedure is in progress (as of October 2019).

For section 1.6b (Untertürkheim parking station), which has not yet been planned, the hearing procedure was applied for on July 1, 2010 and the plans were publicly displayed between July 19 and August 18, 2010. The hearing is still pending. The building rights are available in the remaining five sections.

After the new rail junction is fully operational, the track areas that are no longer required are to be cleared, for which either a plan approval procedure or exemption from railway operations is necessary.

Completion dates

In the run-up to the referendum in November 2011, Deutsche Bahn announced December 2019 as the completion date. On March 23, 2012, Deutsche Bahn announced the postponement of commissioning to December 2020. The official postponement to December 2021 followed on February 15, 2013. In the steering committee meeting on July 23, 2013, Deutsche Bahn estimated the probability of commissioning at the end of 2022 Template: future / in 2 yearsat 80 percent. All planning premises are assumed in the "best case" and additional risks from the planning approval are not taken into account.

In the years up to the end of 2017, the completion date at the end of 2021 was set, but at the same time a deadline for "countermeasures" of up to two years was stated. However, the accelerated construction time necessary to meet this deadline could not be achieved. At the beginning of 2018, Deutsche Bahn announced that it is now expected to be completed in 2025.

The commissioning of the railway junction is to take place in several stages. The main station is to go Template: future / in 5 yearsinto operation when the timetable changes on December 14, 2025 . Half a year earlier, the Mittnachtstraße S-Bahn station is due to go into operation, but the long-distance and regional transport links via Bad Cannstatt will require several months of renovation of the Bad Cannstatt station after the main station has gone into operation. The route of the Gäubahn over the airport is to be put into operation several years later, the timely commissioning of the connection of the airport to the new line towards Ulm as well as the parking station are considered uncertain. As part of the multi-stage commissioning concept, several schedule changes are required.

Project management

From 1996 to 2001 the DB subsidiary DBProjekt GmbH Stuttgart 21 was entrusted with the planning, then for a short time DB Projekt Süd GmbH , which finally merged into DB ProjektBau GmbH in 2003. On September 1, 2013, the newly founded DB Projekt Stuttgart-Ulm GmbH took over project control. Previous overall project managers were Hans Sommer / Reimar Baur, Peter Marquart , Hany Azer and Stefan Penn . Manfred Leger has held this position since September 1, 2013 .


Alternative concept for terminus station 21 compared to Stuttgart 21

Proponents of the project emphasize extensive opportunities for urban development , economic and social opportunities through the new traffic concept, the continuous high-speed connection with a stop in the center of Stuttgart, the preservation of the linking function of the main train station as well as the expected reduction in travel times and an increase in travelers.

Opponents of the project consider the project to be detrimental to operations, not friendly to rail customers, polluting the environment and overpriced. They complain about interventions in the environment, groundwater, monuments and private property and fear an impairment of mineral water resources . Furthermore, numerous other rail projects in Baden-Württemberg (including the expansion of the Gäubahn and the Rheintalbahn as well as the electrification of the Südbahn ) would be blocked by the project, since the state government is concentrating on Stuttgart 21. Funds from the cancellation of regional traffic (2007) would also be channeled into the project. The travel time advantage of the through station, also due to the push- pull train concept, is  zero for the majority of travelers compared to the alternative terminus station 21; no significant reduction in travel time can be achieved through the through station.

From the beginning it was doubted that this would be able to cope with the traffic growth required for the project. This criticism was an essential subject of the proceedings before the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg (VGH) for the expropriation of a resident. The last judgment here was in July 2014 that the capacity of Stuttgart 21 was 32 trains per hour, but this was not a "new fact" and therefore did not justify a revision of the 2006 VGH decision. In fact, 38 trains ran in peak hour in 1996 and 39 trains in 2011 in the terminus and the train service is to be increased by 30% through Stuttgart 21 according to the planning approval. Critics therefore see the Stuttgart 21 project as a reduction in station capacity below current requirements, far from the planned growth. The common good would be harmed by the creation of a bottleneck on the European main line Paris-Bratislava. This criticism was also the subject of the 4th referendum against Stuttgart 21 and an exchange of arguments on performance within the scope of the discussion procedure in plan approval section 1.3. A joint application by the Left and Alliance 90 / The Greens in the Bundestag for a moratorium at Stuttgart 21 was justified with this criticism of the performance.

The cost of the project was also criticized. In some cases the opinion is expressed that only construction companies and banks benefit from the project, which is being promoted by a “ mafia ” of politics, the construction industry and banks. The initiative Leben in Stuttgart - Kein Stuttgart 21 criticizes, for example, that Daimler supports the project to promote sales of construction vehicles . Most recently, the alleged reluctance of the internal knowledge of the railways about higher construction costs at the time of the financing contract and the faulty basis of the decision of the railway supervisory board to continue building Stuttgart 21 were criticized. This justified a 3rd referendum against Stuttgart 21, cancellation 21, which aimed to terminate the financing contract by the city of Stuttgart and whose application for approval of a referendum was rejected by the municipal council on July 2, 2015 because the city appraiser was pursuing a unlawful aim. Furthermore, a criminal complaint against the board of directors and the supervisory board of Deutsche Bahn AG, or a complaint against the failure to commence relevant investigations, is pending with the General Public Prosecutor's Office in Berlin confirmed an obligation to provide information.

Ernst Krittian , the planner responsible for the Stuttgart – Augsburg project in the early 1990s, criticized the fact that criticism of the Stuttgart 21 concept was not tolerated. After criticizing the Stuttgart 21 project, his responsibility was withdrawn. A "Stuttgart Connection" pushed the project through, the political decision was made "in the manner of a lord of the manor". Project opponents complained in 1996 that the planned proceeds of 2.2 billion D-Marks for 56 hectares of net building land (corresponding to around 4,000 D-Marks per square meter) had been set too high.

Project proponents and project opponents agree that the Stuttgart railway junction needs to be modernized - i.e. also improved in terms of its performance. Already in the 1990s it was criticized that no alternatives to Stuttgart 21 had been examined. In 1996, Umkehr Stuttgart , an alliance of environmental and transport associations, put forward a proposal with the concept The Better Stuttgart 21 to rebuild Stuttgart Central Station without the need for tunnels and with better options for an integral timetable . The Traffic Club Germany developed with "reverse Stuttgart" and the citizens' initiative "Living in Stuttgart - No Stuttgart 21" the alternative concept railhead 21 ( "K21"), which provides for the conversion of existing facilities while maintaining the 17-track head station. In 2016 the alternative concept Umstieg 21 was presented, which included the use of already built parts.

The award of a ten-year contract for regional transport to Deutsche Bahn in 2001 without a tender was also criticized. According to DB information, Stuttgart 21 is not profitable without long-term local transport contracts. The competition lawyer Clemens Antweiler considers this direct award as well as the additional payments granted to be a hidden subsidy from Deutsche Bahn. The local transport company Baden-Württemberg admitted that the contract amount included a “certain amount” for Stuttgart. Following the transport contract running until 2016, sections of the route will continue to be awarded to Deutsche Bahn without a tender until Stuttgart 21 goes into operation. The Greens assume that by 2025 more than 100 million euros more will be spent than under competition.

According to Deutsche Bahn, the project should create 10,000 new permanent jobs in Baden-Württemberg, including around 4,200 in Stuttgart. Up to 7,000 jobs are to be created during the construction work. The IMU Institute , on the other hand, only has 2,500 additional jobs.

Traffic concept

According to the project partners, one goal of the project is to improve the passenger transport offer by increasing capacity, a denser network in regional transport and shorter travel times. Stuttgart 21 is supposed to lead to an increase in offers and reduced travel times in long-distance and regional traffic and to better connect Stuttgart Airport . One of the main aims of the project is to quickly link the existing Mannheim – Stuttgart line with the planned new Wendlingen – Ulm line . Travel times are to be reduced on all regional transport routes. Stuttgart Airport and the New State Trade Fair will be connected directly to the planned new route. The journey time from the main train station to the airport train station is to be eight minutes in the future. The planned Rosenstein district is also to be developed via the new Mittnachtstraße S-Bahn station and the travel time in the tangential traffic between Bad Cannstatt and Feuerbach is to be improved.

Compared to the 2001 timetable, the traffic forecasts on which the plan approval procedure is based assume an increase in the number of trains at the main train station by 75% in long-distance and 56% in regional traffic. Accordingly, 434 long-distance and 418 regional trains are expected per day.

In July 2007, the planning of the Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Baden-Württemberg (NVBW) began for the years from 2020. The 2020 offer is based on the assumptions of the operating scenario of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003 and the planning approval of the Stuttgart 21 project and assumes the realization of numerous other projects (expansion of the Rhine Valley Railway , Electrification of the southern runway, etc.). As part of the concept, it was planned to expand the train kilometers driven in Baden-Württemberg to up to 86 million train kilometers (2012: around 65.5 million train kilometers). In addition to this 31 percent increase, an option with a 40 percent increase in performance was planned. This expansion, expected purely through competitive gains, has proven to be unaffordable (as of 2012). Instead, the traffic offer is to be expanded by 15 to 20 percent.

Proportion of travelers in 2007 who would travel at least two minutes faster or slower with the Stuttgart 21 and terminus 21 concepts (as of November 2010)

A comparative travel time analysis between the planning statuses ( network graphic ) for Stuttgart 21 and a network graphic presented by K21 supporters for terminus 21 was made on behalf of the then state government in November 2010. 38,220  relations between 196 train stations in Baden-Württemberg were evaluated, different further infrastructure expansions were assumed for both concepts and the travel times were weighted with the number of travelers from 2007. At Stuttgart 21, 19% of the travelers would be traveling at least two minutes faster, 13% at least two minutes longer and almost 70% about the same length. At terminus station 21, around 13% of passengers would be traveling for a shorter time, 6% longer and 80% for about the same length of time.

Stuttgarter Netz AG , founded in 2011 and dissolved in 2018, designed a concept to maintain the terminal station even after Stuttgart 21 went into operation and to take it over from DB Netz AG in part by means of a decommissioning procedure in accordance with Section 11 of the General Railway Act . Well-known railway companies have an interest in continuing to use the terminus. The underground station cannot be expanded and is therefore not sufficient for additional traffic. Since a decommissioning procedure was not planned before the dismantling of the terminus station, the implementation of such a procedure was sued by the Stuttgarter Netz AG. The lawsuit against the Federal Railway Authority was rejected by the Federal Administrative Court in the last instance in July 2018 . The terminus station does not have to remain usable for third parties, since its traffic function will remain fully intact even after its renovation. Thus the basis for a decommissioning procedure is no longer applicable.

According to research by Südwestrundfunk in June 2019, the future Stuttgart rail hub does not allow integrated regular service based on the Swiss model. In order to be able to offer half-hourly intervals to surrounding cities such as Heidelberg, Nuremberg or Zurich as part of the Germany cycle , the number of tracks in the main train station and the number of access routes are insufficient. Likewise, the doubling of the number of passengers that the Federal Ministry of Transport is now striving for is not feasible. The DB rejected this representation. Among other things, a train could run on each of the eight platform tracks of the main station every five minutes and on each of the connecting tracks every two minutes on average. A few weeks later, the federal government confirmed the long transfer times, but did not consider it necessary to expand the project. Transport Minister Hermann and other transport experts such as Matthias Gastel or the VCD see a need for additional infrastructure. Therefore, Hermann suggested the construction of an additional underground stop and set up a working group to develop useful modules for capacity expansion, in which the city and Deutsche Bahn also participate.

Rail operations

View of the rear of the main train station in March 2008
Schematic track plan of the planned underground station (with eight tracks)

The plan justification for the project was based on the 2010 + x operating program , which was later developed. According to an expert report prepared in 1997, the through station can cope with the operating program on which it is based with an average of 25.5 track occupations per hour. In addition, coordinated operating programs with 32 to 35 track occupations per hour are possible. An occupancy of the through station with 39 track occupations per hour is possible, whereby the nominal output of the section between Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen and the main station would be exceeded by four trains.

As part of a railway operation simulation called a "stress test" and carried out as a result of the arbitration ruling, it was demonstrated in 2011 that the planned main train station could process 49 trains arriving at peak hours (7 am to 8 am) in "economically optimal operating quality". On behalf of Deutsche Bahn and the state of Baden-Württemberg, SMA and partners tested the result. The methodology and results of the operational simulation are controversial.

An expert opinion by the University of Stuttgart determined an optimal performance range of the through station of 42 to 51 trains per hour on the basis of an operating program developed for S21. For a variant of an expanded terminus (terminus 21, K21), however, 28 to 38 trains per hour were determined. The maximum capacity is 72 trains in the through station or 43 trains per hour in the K21 variant under consideration. An operating program optimized for K21 or the operating program actually run at the terminus were not examined. With an integral cycle schedule, lower performance is to be expected, since the train journeys are less evenly distributed due to the timing. Entrances to the converted main station are possible with 60 km / h to 100 km / h instead of the previous 30 km / h.

There are route exclusions in the rail apron of the terminus station , which prevent the existing capacities from being exhausted. These can only be eliminated with considerable construction work and costs. Project opponents doubt these statements and costs and presented a counter-concept with the alternative project Head Station 21 , which provides for an optimization of the track apron and the addition of the flyover structures for the crossing-free introduction of the lines into the station and which should be below the estimated costs for Stuttgart 21 . Due to the ring structure of Stuttgart 21 , changes in the direction of travel should be unnecessary and the number of points reduced from 225 to 48, the slab track and other measures should lower operating costs.

Critics complain that the project destroys any prospect of expanding Stuttgart Central Station into a full node in an integral clock schedule (ITF). According to Deutsche Bahn, however - even with economically justifiable expansions - no sensible ITF full node could be built due to limited inflow capacities. A rigid application of the ITF principle leads to stays on the platforms of up to more than half an hour. On the other hand, the implementation of an ITF intermediate stage could be implemented sensibly in terms of traffic, in which regional traffic could be set up every half hour during rush hour. It should u. a. regional traffic will be tied through mainly as a cross-city link . In the future, local transport lines should ideally run at minutes 15 and 45 at the Stuttgart hub, long-distance lines at minutes 00 and 30 to enable short and stable connections. The transfer cycles at the existing ITF clock nodes in Baden-Württemberg can be fully retained.

In July 2010, a presentation by SMA and partners from 2008 was made public. In 2008 the company was commissioned by the NVBW to revise the integral cycle timetable for Baden-Württemberg for 2020. The office developed a schedule concept based on the Stuttgart 21 infrastructure in a multi-stage process. The authors criticized the high load on the single-track sections at the airport and on the Kleine Wendlinger curve and other operational bottlenecks. The bottom line is that only two train paths per hour and direction are available for long-distance traffic to Ulm, while in the approach to the Gäubahn, long-distance and regional train routes require an average of around seven minutes to extend the journey time due to S-Bahn trains . Several route conflicts in the main train station could not be resolved. The design of the timetable is "only possible to a very limited extent" due to the "tightly dimensioned infrastructure [...]", the "overall system is very difficult to control" and future expansion of services can only be implemented to a very limited extent. "Due to the explosive nature of the available results", "absolute silence" was agreed. The Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Transport rejected the criticism. In 2008, SMA was explicitly commissioned by the state's own local transport company to identify weak points. Solutions for the problems were subsequently developed on the basis of the working paper. SMA confirmed this representation and described the slides as “outdated planning status”, and “individual aspects are shown in isolation”. With regard to the planned operating concept, the planned infrastructure is “tight and not overdimensioned”, and the development of the timetable concept is therefore of particular importance. The Stuttgart underground station is not a limiting factor and the infrastructure does not have to lead to bottlenecks. For the S-Bahn and the Gäubahn there are no disadvantages in terms of timetables, an ITF clock node can be implemented. The operating concept has since been further developed (status: July 2010), the desired traffic volumes led in various places to "schedule-technically demanding constructions".

The Verkehrsclub Deutschland (VCD) criticizes that "in the event of a major disruption to the S-Bahn during rush hour in the inner city tunnel", all rail traffic around Stuttgart will be impaired in future because the underground main station does not have the same number of S-Bahn trains Could take head station. In addition, regional trains could no longer wait for long-distance trains to arrive. The project planners counter this by saying that a total of eight connecting tracks will be available in the future, while today all trains enter and leave on five tracks heading north. The possible ring traffic makes it easier to compensate for deviations in the operational sequence and to minimize delays.

A study by the Vieregg und Rössler office on behalf of the Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen parliamentary group in the Stuttgart municipal council and the BUND criticized in 2008 that route conflicts cannot be ruled out in the through station. According to SMA, there are “very few” route exclusions. According to Vieregg and Rössler, the shutdown of the Gäubahn means that S-Bahn trains will no longer be able to divert S-Bahn trains over this route in the event of disruptions in the S-Bahn tunnel. Another disadvantage is the elimination of the possibility of using S-Bahn tracks to Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt for regional trains. On the other hand, according to the railway, there are new connections, instead of using the Gäubahn, S-Bahn trains can be diverted via the airport, for example.

Originally, ETCS Baseline 3 with stationary signals was to be used in the project. Further equipment with ETCS and with reduced conventional signaling was considered around 2018. In the meantime (as of 2019) the node is to be equipped with digital interlockings and ETCS Level 2 without light signals as well as automated driving operations (ATO) as part of the Digital Rail Germany .

Civil engineering and geology

Pipes for groundwater management on the southeast corner of the main station

Around 60% of the new railway lines from Stuttgart 21 will run underground in tunnels (33 km of the 57 km long railway line) and in the valley they will cross urban development and the Neckar with the Obertürkheim tunnel. Three train stations, 18 bridges and a parking area are to be built. The special structural engineering expenses resulting from the geological conditions, with the associated technical and financial imponderables, represent a focus in the discussion about Stuttgart 21.

A geological report from 2003 commissioned by Deutsche Bahn and attached to the planning approval documents classifies the Stuttgart underground as "dangerous". It is full of sinkholes and cavities. The temporary project manager Hany Azer described the building site as “difficult”.

The architect Frei Otto , who was involved in the conception and planning of the new main train station until 2003 , left the project completely in January 2009 because he could no longer be responsible for the project. The station could be flooded or, due to its location in the groundwater, “rise like a submarine from the sea”. The planned measures against the dangers found in the report from 2003 are not sufficient, there is "danger to life and limb".

According to the architect and engineer Werner Sobek , “Stuttgart 21 […] is by far not the most difficult building and does not have the most difficult building site”. The new main station is also completely above the anhydrite layer. The unaffected anhydrite of the plaster of paris transforms into plaster of paris when water gets in and develops considerable pressure forces through swelling. The longer tunnels for Stuttgart 21 will cross anhydrite zones, the tunnels to Feuerbach and Ober- / Untertürkheim will run through anhydrite zones several times. About 7.8 kilometers of the planned tunnels are located in underdeveloped gypsum keuper . Proponents also refer to numerous projects implemented in the Stuttgart underground, including the S-Bahn turning loop and the Hasenberg tunnel . Critics, on the other hand, mention the Engelberg tunnel and the Wagenburg tunnel , where problems with anhydrite occurred. The Obertürkheim tunnel crosses under the Neckar with an overburden of around 8 m in places. The construction and manufacture of tunnel sections in fault zones and transition zones to other geological layers requires special measures.

Due to in-depth knowledge of the groundwater inflow and the use of a modified model, Deutsche Bahn applied in March 2011 to increase the total delivery volume of groundwater management in three PFAs from a total of 9.1 to 12.4 million m³ (of which 6.8 instead of 3.0 million . m³ in PFA 1.1). The associated plan change notification was issued in September 2014.


Trees and trees that have to be felled or moved for the construction of the underground station
Part of the middle palace garden on the morning of October 1st, 2010 after tree felling at night
Fallow land in the middle palace garden, March 2012

Stuttgart 21 aims to save 310 million car kilometers in long-distance traffic and 67 million car kilometers in local and regional traffic every year. Together with the additional savings of 630 million car kilometers a year achieved with the new Wendlingen – Ulm line and taking into account the additional emissions caused by rail traffic, the net result is an expected reduction in CO 2 emissions of 176,800 tons per year.

Around eight million cubic meters of overburden are moved; The inner-city area with the main train station alone accounts for around four million cubic meters. Most of the overburden is to be removed via the company's own construction roads and by freight trains. Part of the mass is to be used to backfill a former open- cast lignite mine in Lochau and to recultivate a gypsum quarry in Lauffen ob Rottweil .

A 100 m wide strip is to be intervened in the central palace garden (between today's main train station and the state pavilion). According to Deutsche Bahn, 8 of the 19 hectares will be intervened during the construction work. After completion of the construction work, the palace garden is to be expanded by 21 hectares.

The planning approval decision provided for the removal of 282 larger trees in section 1.1. The trees to be felled in the palace garden have a trunk circumference of 80 to 500 cm and some are around 200 years old. As an ecological compensation, the planting of 293 trees up to 12 m high is planned. 30 hectares of newly created green space are also to be planted with 5000 trees and shrubs. According to the arbitration ruling of November 30, 2010, only trees should be felled in the palace garden that would soon die due to illness or old age, while healthy trees should be replanted. 16 trees at the north exit were then moved in February 2011. By February 25, 2012, 68 trees had been moved and 116 felled in the Mittlerer Schlossgarten using a spade machine . Of the trees to be relocated, 14 were relocated within the palace gardens and 54 within the urban area. The trees to be felled were selected by an expert forum led by the Stuttgart professor Ortwin Renn , who also developed a concept for using the trunks as dead wood , for art projects and children's playgrounds.

The surface of the main station is to be greened in the area of ​​the central palace garden. An “easily accessible, relatively flat hill” is to be created above the station concourse, which, according to the planning approval decision, does not change the landscape. The vaulting is between 6 meters at the station tower and 3 meters at the State Gallery entrance. After completion of the station, ten glass light eyes of the underground station hall, each 15 meters in diameter, will arch 4.3 m high in the central palace garden. Since the palace garden is no longer trimmed by Cannstatter Straße (later temporarily "Am Schloßgarten"), the planning approval decision comes to the conclusion that the redesign is an improvement for the cityscape.

In contrast to the Rosenstein Park, the castle garden is not designated as an FFH area , but it is an important habitat of the Russian beetle . The planning approval decision did not include any of the trees known as inhabited at the time for felling. All felled trees are examined for Russian beetles, which may be relocated. When trees were felled on October 1, 2010, larvae of the Russian beetle were found in an old plane tree and brought to a breeding station. Around 20 trees near Ferdinand-Leitner-Steg, which may have populations of Russian beetles, are to be preserved permanently and protected during the construction phase.

Groundwater management building in August 2011

Around 5.8 million cubic meters of water are to be treated in the project. Project opponents fear pollution of the mineral springs under Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt and an impairment of the urban climate . Sobek points out that the horizon of the mineral water in the area of ​​the new station begins 50 m below the floor slab and that there is still a 35 m thick, impermeable layer between the deepest foundation and the mineral water, which separates the groundwater and mineral water. In addition, numerous underground car parks as well as S-Bahn and light rail tunnels are located lower.

After measurements by the Dekra at Stuttgart light rail stations showed increased fine dust concentrations, increased fine dust pollution in the future main train station is feared.

Security concept and fire protection

In 2012, the Stuttgart fire department criticized deficiencies in the project's fire protection concept. 14 points of a 16-point catalog of demands from the Stuttgart fire brigade are still open. The planned dry extinguishing water pipes meant that up to 45 minutes would pass before extinguishing water was available at the scene of the incident in the tunnel.

Opportunities to ventilate the tunnels and escape galleries in the event of fire are also necessary. In particular, there are no smoke outlets on the tunnel ceiling, say critics.

A comprehensible evacuation concept for the planned underground station is missing. The planning approval from 2003 was based on 10,000 people to be evacuated, the current provisions of the Federal Railway Authority assume up to 16,000 people in an accident. (P. 357) In contrast, more recent statements from project representatives assume a significantly reduced number of people to be rescued: The fire protection officer of DB AG, Klaus-Jürgen Bieger, gives only 6,500 people for the entire platform hall instead of the last 16,164 and the project spokesman Wolfgang Dietrich gives as the "worst case" for one of the four platforms 2,530 people to be evacuated to critics note that according to the operating program planned for the stress test and the methodology of the Federal Railway Authority previously used for Stuttgart 21, more than 6,000 people would have to be rescued and a good 16,000 people would have to be taken into account in total for the platform hall. (P. 52 f)

Because of the longitudinal incline of the platforms in the main train station, which have a height difference of six meters at 400 meters (this corresponds to a gradient of around 1.5%), people in prams and wheelchairs could be harmed.

Monument preservation

Demolition work on the north wing, August 26, 2010

The facades of the listed reception building will be preserved, as will the station hall and tower. When the side wings were torn down, the integrity of the U-shaped complex with its three-dimensional U structure was lost.

The planning approval decision states that the “traffic, operational and, above all, the urban development advantages of the project compared to the current situation” are so important that “the public interest in the unrestricted preservation of the Bonatz building takes a back seat to the public interest in the realization of the planned project got to".

The rear parts of the listed building of the old Federal Railway Directorate in Stuttgart were demolished. The historic parks along the existing operating area of ​​the railway were also intervened.

Costs and financing

The client of the project is Deutsche Bahn . The Federal Republic of Germany , the state of Baden-Württemberg , the Verband Region Stuttgart , the state capital Stuttgart, Flughafen Stuttgart GmbH and the European Union are all participating in the financing .

Overview of financing agreements and cost estimates


By April 2014, Deutsche Bahn had spent 787 million euros on Stuttgart 21. This does not include planning costs incurred before April 1, 2009. Up to the fourth quarter of 2018, 3.3 billion euros had been spent on planning and construction work and 4.2 billion euros were contractually bound.

The forecast costs had been raised several times in the course of planning. The feasibility study from the beginning of 1995 estimated the costs (as of 1993) at a rough estimate of 4.807 billion Deutschmarks (4.180 billion DM building costs plus 15 percent planning allowance). This corresponds to around 2.45 billion euros. Based on the price and planning status of 1998, total costs of 2.6 billion euros were later determined.

As the basis of the financing agreement of March 30, 2009, Deutsche Bahn estimated the total costs for 2008 at 2.8104 billion euros (real value 2004) or updated and nominally at 3.076 billion euros.

An updated cost estimate presented in December 2009 on the basis of the draft planning and with prices from 2009 puts the total costs at 4.088 billion euros. Around 3.2 billion euros of this are construction costs, 547 million euros in planning costs and around 322 million euros are intended as a surcharge for building price increases. During the arbitration talks in autumn 2010, the cost calculations were examined to a limited extent by three auditing firms. According to this, the assumptions about the optimization potential are "rather to be assessed as optimistic", but it is not foreseeable that the financial framework will be exceeded. The assessment of future risks is fraught with great uncertainty. The official “total value range” was set by the project partners in March 2012 at 4.330 billion euros.

An appraisal by the management consultancy McKinsey , the results of which were presented to the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn on December 12, 2012, forecast planning and construction costs totaling 4.696 billion euros. Adding 930 million euros in the so-called "buffer" resulted in a project total of 5.626 billion euros. In the opinion of Deutsche Bahn, a further 990 million euros of impending additional costs lie within the sphere of influence of the project partners, state and city. Other interpretations assume a total of 2.3 billion euros in additional costs.

The Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn decided on March 5, 2013 how to proceed. The railway estimated the project costs at 4.730 billion euros. In addition to 1.796 billion euros in risks and “buffers”, this results in a financing framework of 6.5 billion euros.

Critics had previously doubted the total cost. In mid-2008, a study carried out by the Vieregg-Rössler transport consultancy on behalf of BUND and Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen forecast total probable costs for Stuttgart 21 of 6.9 to 8.7 billion euros. The Federal Audit Office calculated in a report at the end of 2008, based on the standards of the Federal Ministry of Transport, with additional costs of 1.2 billion euros and total costs of 5.3 billion euros. According to a media report, officials from the state of Baden-Württemberg had estimated the costs in autumn 2009 to be at least 4.9 billion euros. However, an amount of up to 6.5 billion euros is more likely. The then Prime Minister Oettinger had instructed to refrain from a new cost calculation, as these figures were "difficult to communicate to the public".

At the end of November 2017, an increase in the budget to 7.6 billion euros became known. At the end of January 2018, an increase in the financing framework to 8.2 billion euros, including a risk buffer of 495 million euros, was announced. The increase in costs was justified u. a. through construction price increases, more complex tunnel construction procedures in anhydrite and more extensive approval procedures. In November 2019, the risk buffer was dissolved and the total value was increased to 8.2 billion euros. However, DB would like to continue to adhere to the cost forecast of a maximum of 8.2 billion euros.

An investigation carried out by Vieregg-Rössler at the beginning of 2016 was 9.8 billion euros. The Federal Court of Auditors considers total costs of up to ten billion euros to be realistic since 2016 at the latest.

The Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung and the left-wing member of the Bundestag Sabine Leidig reported that DB CEO Richard Lutz said in the Bundestag's transport committee in April 2018 that the project would no longer be built with today's knowledge. He said it was clearly too uneconomical. The only reason why you don't get out is that the exit costs are too high.

In September 2019, the Federal Audit Office warned that, in its view, the financing framework of € 8.2 billion was not sufficient to cover several remaining risks in various construction phases. The Federal Court of Auditors called for stricter control by the federal government and, if necessary, a reduction in the scope of the project. A further increase in costs is "economically unsustainable" for Deutsche Bahn.

The information given here does not include the costs of the supplementary projects.


According to the 1995 feasibility study, the project should be financed through the sale of land, additional income from increased passenger numbers, improved operational processes and funds from the Municipal Transport Financing Act. The participation of private investors was considered. According to the synergy concept presented at the end of 1995, around half of the project costs of 4893 million D-Marks (2175 million DM) were to be financed from property proceeds. The federal government was to finance the costs of connecting the new line to Ulm (pursuant to Section 8 (1) BSchwAG) of DM 886 million; another DM 350 million as an interest-free loan in accordance with 8 (2) BSchwAG. The remaining DM 500 million were to be financed by the federal, state and local authorities in accordance with the Municipal Transport Financing Act. Based on these data, a first financing agreement for the project was signed on November 7, 1995 .

In mid-February 2001, the federal government and the state of Baden-Württemberg agreed on pre-financing of the federal portion by the state. The start of construction was to be brought forward by seven years to 2004.

As part of a memorandum of understanding on July 19, 2007, the federal government, the state, the city, the railway and the Stuttgart Region Association agreed to bring the start of construction for Stuttgart 21 and the new line forward to 2010. On the same day, a key issues paper for a financing agreement was concluded. Of the total costs of 2.8 billion euros, Deutsche Bahn was to bear 1.15 billion euros and the state 685 million. The federal government should contribute with funds from the requirement plan amounting to 500 million euros and according to the Federal Railways Expansion Act (BSchwAG) with around 200 million euros.

With the 2009 federal budget, the German Bundestag approved federal funds totaling 1.55 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 and the new line between Wendlingen and Ulm. In the end, however, these federal funds were hardly paid out for Stuttgart 21 by offsetting them with EU funds.

According to the financing agreement of March 30, 2009, the then assumed total costs of 3.076 billion euros should be borne by the following institutions :

  • Deutsche Bahn 1,300.8 million euros, including planning grants from the European Union.
  • The federal government donated 500 million euros from BSchwAG funds to the project and 497 million euros of the same funds to Deutsche Bahn, as well as a proportion of 168.6 million euros and GVFG funds, together 1,165.6 million euros.
  • The state of Baden-Württemberg with partners 389.4 million euros as a grant and a share of 112.4 million euros in the GVFG funds used, a total of 501.8 million euros.
  • The Stuttgart Airport 107.8 million euros.

In addition, the airport undertook to provide a further 112.2 million euros "to compensate for operating losses", a total of 220 million euros. In addition, he should erect various structures and facilities at his own expense.

The European Union initially contributed 114.47 million euros to the financing. A further EU funding of 594.4 million euros is planned until 2020. The EU funds are expected to completely replace the federal funds from the BSchwAG for the project by the end of the project.

For the updating of the construction costs as part of the draft planning, a "risk provision amount" of 1,450 million euros was provided, which is divided between Deutsche Bahn, the state, the city and Stuttgart Airport.

On the basis of the updated cost estimate presented in December 2009, the total costs are distributed at 4.088 billion euros as follows.

  • Deutsche Bahn AG contributes 1.469 billion euros (thereof 1,237 million euros in equity and 232 million euros in risk provisioning),
  • the federal government (including EU funds) 1.229 billion euros,
  • the state of Baden-Württemberg 823.8 million euros,
  • the state capital Stuttgart 238.58 million euros,
  • Stuttgart Airport EUR 227.2 million and
  • the Stuttgart Region Association 100 million euros.

In the opinion of the lawyer Hans Meyer , this mixed financing is unconstitutional. The financing contract is therefore void. With a ruling of June 14, 2016, the Federal Administrative Court ruled the opposite. Rail projects are therefore not a federal task, as the rail companies act as private companies. Co-financing by the state and municipalities is therefore permissible.

On March 5, 2013, the Supervisory Board of Bahn AG approved an increase in the financing framework from 4.526 billion euros to 6.526 billion euros. According to media reports, pressure from the Chancellery had been exerted shortly beforehand on the state secretaries on the supervisory board of DB AG in order to achieve a positive result on the question of further construction.

The assumption of the additional costs is controversial between the project partners; the city of Stuttgart and the state of Baden-Württemberg refuse to participate. For a long time, Bahn AG refrained from taking legal action against the other partners for additional costs. In November 2016, she tried to reach an agreement to suspend the statute of limitations so that she could continue to dispense with a lawsuit. However, this inhibition agreement was rejected by all partners except the Verband Region Stuttgart.

As a result, Bahn AG filed a lawsuit with the Stuttgart Administrative Court on December 23, 2016. In the letter of claim previously sent to the partners, the project managers emphasize that the project was initially rejected by the Bahn AG and that it does not primarily serve to optimize the railway infrastructure, but rather pursues urban planning, transport and economic policy goals of the partners. What is required is a breakdown of the additional costs amounting to 1,461 million euros to 514 million euros for the EIU (Bahn AG), 120.3 million euros for the airport and 827 million euros for the country and city; as well as an update of this breakdown for any additional cost increases of the project.

The financial framework was increased to 8.2 billion euros in January 2018. No information has yet been given about the financing of this increase.

In an internal paper by Deutsche Bahn from April 18, 2018, it is assumed that a total of 4.034 billion euros of DB's own resources will have to be used for the renovation of the rail hub, around four times as much as planned. On the other hand, positive “project effects” would be EUR 0.656 billion, “property effects” EUR 1.15 billion. Thus, a planned loss of 2.228 billion euros is assumed for the rail company. According to information from the Stuttgarter Zeitung , the DB top openly admitted the inefficiency of Stuttgart 21 to the Bundestag's transport committee for the first time.

At the end of 2018, the regular financing according to the financing agreement expired. This ends the contribution payments from the public project partners; Deutsche Bahn AG has to take over the further financing itself. According to MdB Matthias Gastel , the money from the public purse will probably have already been spent. In March 2019, DB's internal financial planning was announced. With more than four billion euros to spend on the project by 2023, the project will become a heavy financial burden for the group.

Communication and reception

public relation

Large format advertisement for Stuttgart 21 in the area of ​​the former main station north wing. In the foreground parts of the site fence hung with criticism can be seen.

From 1998 to 2019 the tower forum provided information about the project.

The communication office for the project has twelve employees (as of 2011). Together with the Turmforum, it is under the umbrella of the Bahnprojekt Stuttgart Ulm e.V. association created in 2009 by the project partners for public communication. V.

In the summer of 2009, member of the state parliament, Wolfgang Drexler (SPD), was appointed project spokesman. Drexler resigned from this post on September 17, 2010. From September 24, 2010, Wolfgang Dietrich acted as project spokesman. Udo Andriof , who was appointed with him , resigned in May 2011.

Dietrich was replaced by Georg Brunnhuber on February 4, 2015 , but he no longer carried the official title of "speaker". The post of project spokesman was only filled again by Jörg Hamann in October 2015. Hamann was previously head of u. a. The local editorial office of the Stuttgarter Nachrichten responsible for Stuttgart 21 and was known for his articles in favor of the project. In August 2019, the management of the S-21 club was again taken over by Bernhard Bauer , a former ministerial director who was controversial because of his role in the police action on September 30, 2010.

Protests and Arbitration

Vigil near Stuttgart Central Station (June 2013)
Rally of Stuttgart 21 supporters on October 23, 2010
Demonstration on August 13, 2010 in front of the town hall
Water cannon in the middle palace garden, September 30, 2010
Rally in the middle palace garden, October 1st, 2010

Opinion surveys on Stuttgart 21 have repeatedly shown and still (as of 2014) changing majorities in the population for or against the construction project. The project found the highest rejection with 67% in August 2010, the highest approval with 66% in November 2012. In some cases, various institutes asked for both a majority rejection and majority approval at the same time.

On November 14, 2007, 61,193 valid signatures were handed over in the town hall for a referendum aimed at the city's withdrawal from the project; 20,000 were necessary. The corresponding referendum was rejected on December 20, 2007 by the Stuttgart City Council with 45 to 15 votes because it was legally inadmissible.

Since the official decision to implement the project, there have been numerous protests. Since November 2009, so-called Monday demonstrations with several thousand participants have been taking place every week. The organizers of the protest include the citizens' initiative Leben in Stuttgart , the Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland and the district association of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen . The alternative concept for terminus station 21 was jointly developed and signatures were collected for a referendum. The Park Guard Initiative primarily campaigned against the felling of trees in the palace gardens. Even after the construction site there was cleared in February 2012, it continues to serve as the largest communication platform for critics on the Internet.

On September 30, 2010, several thousand people demonstrated against the preparatory measures in the middle palace garden, during which 25 trees were to be felled. Up to 400 people were injured during the evacuation of the palace gardens through the use of batons , water cannons and pepper spray by the police. Two demonstrators were seriously injured in the eyes, one of them, the engineer Dietrich Wagner , is almost blind. The police operation led to 380 criminal charges against police officers and 121 against demonstrators, which have so far resulted in 104 preliminary investigations , including 19 against police officers. At the beginning of August 2013, two members of the riot police received seven months' probation, and another 120 daily rates.

On November 18, 2015, the police eviction of 30 September 2010 from the Stuttgart Administrative Court for unlawful explained because the police had failed to comply with the eviction of the castle garden "the high hurdles of the Basic Law".

On the following day (October 1), according to police reports, at least 50,000 people (according to the organizer: around 100,000) demonstrated in the middle palace garden. The largest demonstration to date against the project took place on October 9, 2010 (as of October 10, 2010). The police spoke of at least 63,000 participants, the organizers of around 150,000.

Since mid-September 2010 there have also been noteworthy demonstrations by those in favor of the project. According to the police, 7,000 participants took part in the rally with the largest number of participants to date on October 23, 2010.

From October 22 to November 27, 2010, eight "arbitration talks " moderated by Heiner Geißler ( CDU ) took place between representatives of project supporters and opponents, which could be followed live on the Internet and on television. Around 60 hours of discussion took place over eight days of the meeting. Until the talks have been concluded, part of the construction work should be suspended and no new contracts should be awarded.

On November 30, 2010, Geißler spoke out in his arbitration verdict in principle for the project and proposed a number of changes under the title Stuttgart 21 Plus , including the maintenance of the Gäubahn , as well as additional capacity reserves on the access routes and in the station. Which proposals to increase capacity should be implemented should be decided after a so-called "stress test" , an operational simulation with increased occupancy. The results of these simulation runs were audited by SMA + Partner and presented in July 2011. According to this, the through station can process 30 percent more train arrivals at peak hours than the terminal station in 2011.

During the discussion of the stress test results on July 29, 2011, Geißler presented a compromise proposal that he and SMA had worked out under the title “Peace in Stuttgart” . According to this, the long-distance traffic should largely be relocated to a new four-track underground section of the station, while the local traffic would largely remain in an above-ground section reduced to ten to twelve tracks. The cost of this solution, based on the price of Stuttgart 21, was given as 2.5 to 3.0 billion euros. While the opponents of S21 welcomed the proposal, Deutsche Bahn rejected it.

Since the arbitration, three further citizens' petitions have been submitted to the city of Stuttgart, each of which aims to get the city out of the Stuttgart 21 project . The second referendum was based on the view that the mixed funding of the project was unconstitutional; the action against the rejection of this referendum by the municipal council was unsuccessful in the second instance, the appeal to the Federal Administrative Court is permitted (status: May 2015). The 3rd referendum focuses on the additional costs of the project, the 4th referendum sees a planned reduction in capacity in Stuttgart 21 . The signatures were handed over in December 2014 and March 2015, respectively. In July 2015, the municipal council rejected the 3rd and 4th petitions.

The 500th Monday demonstration with around 4,000 participants took place in February 2020.


From December 16, 2011 to April 1, 2012, an 80-meter-long piece of a site fence in Stuttgart 21 hung with numerous protest notes was displayed in the special exhibition Live Against? The building fence and Stuttgart 21 exhibited in the House of History Baden-Württemberg .

The term Stuttgart 21 was chosen in the vote for Word of the Year 2010, after “ Wutbürger ”, in second place.

The incidents around the Stuttgart 21 project play the main thematic role in the episode The Indian of the television series Tatort . It was first broadcast on June 21, 2015.

In 2011, the writer Heinrich Steinfest published the detective novel Wo die Löwen weeping , which is about Stuttgart 21 and in whose afterword the author positions himself critically.

In June 2018, Baden-Württemberg's transport minister Winfried Hermann called the Stuttgart 21 project "the biggest wrong decision in railway history." He also said: "We are spending a lot of money and sinking a train station and this has no advantage." In view of the construction progress at that time, there was no going back.

The project was the subject of the second half of the satirical program Die Anstalt on January 29, 2019 .

Years after the preparation of his reports, which had a significant influence on the project planning, Gerhard Heimerl, in a handwritten letter to State Transport Minister Winfried Hermann, attached importance to the statement that he had never advertised a completely underground station, but rather wanted a through station combined with the existing terminus .


Web links

Commons : Stuttgart 21  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e f g h Plan approval decision according to § 18 Para. 1 General Railway Act (AEG) for the conversion of the Stuttgart railway junction "Project Stuttgart 21" Plan approval section 1.1 (valley crossing with new main station) from rail km - 0.4-42 .0 to rail km + 0.4 + 32.0 in Stuttgart (PDF) Federal Railway Office Karlsruhe / Stuttgart. January 18, 2005. Retrieved October 20, 2013.
  2. a b Verband Region Stuttgart (Ed.): Session No. 002/2019 . October 2, 2019 ( ).
  3. a b Klaus Arnoldi: Plea for a needs-based expansion , PDF file from April 2, 2004 (8 pages, 880 kB).
  4. a b c d Deutsche Bahn AG: Another milestone in the new Stuttgart – Ulm building project . Press release from June 13, 2007.
  5. a b c DB ProjektBau GmbH: New building project Stuttgart – Ulm. New routes, new traffic concept for the region, Germany and Europe ( Memento from October 22, 2013 in the Internet Archive ). (PDF file; 5.2 MB).
  6. Wolfgang Feldwisch: Major rail projects as a challenge for tunnel construction . In: Geotechnik , 30 (2007), No. 4, ISSN  0172-6145 , pp. 217-225.
  7. a b Stuttgart 21 campaign presented - "The new heart of Europe". In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . March 25, 2008, archived from the original on May 28, 2008 ; Retrieved March 25, 2008 .
  8. A new name is being sought for the grave of millions . Stuttgarter Zeitung (online), March 28, 2008.
  9. Report Stuttgart 21 postponed again. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 8–9 / 2000, p. 338, ISSN  1421-2811 .
  10. What is behind Stuttgart 21. (No longer available online.) In: . August 3, 2010, formerly in the original ; Retrieved October 4, 2010 (No archive version available).  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / Note in Phoenix on message in Today daily archive. In: Phoenix . August 3, 2010, archived from the original on December 30, 2015 ; accessed on December 30, 2015 .
  11. ^ Information from the Federal Government Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003 BT-Drs. 15/2050 of November 17, 2003, p. 37 f. (PDF; 3.5 MB).
  12. a b Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (Hrsg.): Works for the construction of the high speed line between Stuttgart and Wendlingen Data sheet as of October 2012, updated version online .
  13. a b c d e DB ProjektBau, Project Center Stuttgart 1 (ed.): Stuttgart 21: Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt feeder with S-Bahn connection . 14-page brochure dated August 2003.
  14. ^ DBProjektBau GmbH, Northwest Branch (Ed.): Plan approval documents. Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new construction line Stuttgart - Augsburg. Stuttgart - Wendlingen area with airport connection. Section 1.5: Access to Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt. Construction km −4.0 −90.3 to −0.4 −42.0 and −4.8 −64.4 to −0.4 −42.0.
    Appendix 1: Explanatory report. Part III: Description of the plan approval area
    Document dated June 9, 2006. Plan approved on October 13, 2009 by the Federal Railway Office , Karlsruhe / Stuttgart branch (file number 59160 PAP-PS21-PFA1.5 ), p. 15 f.
  15. Guesswork on doing without . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , August 31, 2010.
  16. Deutsche Bahn AG (ed.): For the report in the Stuttgarter Zeitung of August 31, 2010 "Guessing guesswork about doing without two tracks", the railway states: Plan approval decision remains unchanged - extension by two tracks is technically possible . Press release from August 31, 2010.
  17. Rainer Engel : Unrestrained into the black hole? In: Der Fahrgast , Issue 2/2005, pp. 29–32, ISSN  1619-1072 ; ( PDF file , 177 kB).
  18. a b Highest railroad for alternatives. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 192, 1996, p. 11, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  19. a b c d e f g Hany Azer , B. Engel: Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. In: Tunnel , issue 7/2009, pp. 12-24, ISSN  0722-6241 ( PDF file , 290 kB).
  20. ^ Hans-Martin Heuschele: A train station under the main train station . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 202 , August 27, 1970, pp. 17 .
  21. ^ Gerhard Heimerl : Winding paths to the goal. Detours and obstacles on the way to Stuttgart 21. In: Turm-Forum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. A milestone in the European high-speed network . Stuttgart 2006, "Sonderedition 678-1006", pp. 47–49.
  22. Gerhard Heimerl: Routing of the DB high-speed line Stuttgart - Augsburg (- Munich): Notes and considerations on the documentation of the preliminary investigations of the ABS / NBS Plochingen - Günzburg . Stuttgart 1988.
  23. a b c d e f g h DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km −0.4 −42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 50–58.
  24. a b Planned tunnels in the course of the new Stuttgart – Ulm line. In: Tunnel , Heft 5/1993, pp. 288-292, ISSN  0722-6241 .
  25. ^ A b Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, regional area Stuttgart, projects (publisher): Project »Stuttgart 21«. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, approx. 1995, pp. 5, 8, 16 f., 20-25, 32 f., 36 f (similar version as PDF file online, 14 MB).
  26. Stuttgart is to be tunneled under for long-distance trains. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 89, 1994, p. 10, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  27. Dieter Schubert: Planner suggestion: New city via the station tunnel . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 242, October 19, 1990, p. 19.
  28. Underground station for long-distance travelers. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 13, 1995, p. 8, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  29. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, project (ed. :): "Stuttgart 21" project: The feasibility study (overview) . Four-page information brochure, no year (approx. 1995).
  30. a b c DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km −0.4 −42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 59–67.
  31. a b Stuttgart is gearing up for the future of transport policy . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 88, 1996 (supplement), p. 900, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  32. a b c d State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Financing agreement for the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project . Printed matter 14/4382 of April 22, 2009.
  33. ^ A b Gerhard Heimerl : Efficient transport as a location factor. In: The Railway Engineer . 1996, No. 5, ISSN  0013-2810 , pp. 8-12.
  34. DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km −0.4 −42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, p. 3.
  35. Christoph Ingenhoven : An answer developed from the location: Realization competition for the redesign of Stuttgart Central Station. In: TurmForum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): Das Projekt Stuttgart 21. Book accompanying the exhibition in TurmForum Stuttgart 21 , pp. 56–59.
  36. ^ A b Ullrich Martin : Stuttgart 21: Large-scale project with a European dimension. In: Deine Bahn , Issue 7/2009, pp. 6–13.
  37. ^ Konstantin Schwarz, Michael Gerster: Stuttgart-21 opponents sense their chance . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , March 31, 2009, p. 5.
  38. Shunting on the siding. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 144, 1995, p. 5, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  39. Notification of withdrawal from major projects ?. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7/8, year 1999, p. 282, ISSN  1421-2811 .
  40. a b “Stuttgart 21” project called into question . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 153, 1999, p. 5, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  41. Announcement Billion Holes. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10/1999, p. 401, ISSN  1421-2811 .
  42. ↑ The federal states set the course against the railway and the federal government In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 267, 1999, p. L14, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  43. ^ Wulf Reimer: Bahn board member for the construction of "Stuttgart 21" . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , November 29, 1999, p. 2.
  44. a b c d e Peter Marquart: The development of the project planning . In: Regional Council Stuttgart (ed.): Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm: The consideration of water management in planning - an interim balance . Conference proceedings, September 26, 2006, ( PDF file ( Memento from December 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive ), 8 MB), pp. 6–13.
  45. Helmut Kobus : The development of water management problems in the planning process . In: Regional Council Stuttgart (ed.): Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm: The consideration of water management in the planning - an interim balance - . Proceedings, September 26, 2006 ( PDF file ( Memento from December 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive ); 8 MB), pp. 14–27.
  46. Understand the station. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 257, 1997, p. 14, ISSN  0174-4917 .
  47. a b c Announcement "Green light" for Stuttgart 21 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2001, p. 148, ISSN  1421-2811 .
  48. Under the microscope: How the plan approval procedure works. In: TurmForum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart project 21. Book accompanying the exhibition in the TurmForum Stuttgart 21 , p. 50 f.
  49. ^ Mathias Bury: "Historical Dimension" . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . December 22, 2001, p. 24 .
  50. Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg 5th Senate: Unsuccessful action by a co-owner of a property affected by expropriation law against the planning approval decision for the reconstruction of the Stuttgart railway junction. Ref. 5 S 848/05. In: Landesrecht BW Bürgerservice. April 6, 2006, accessed February 1, 2020 .
  51. a b Plan approval decision according to § 18 Para. 1 General Railway Act (AEG) for the reconstruction of the Stuttgart rail junction "Project Stuttgart 21" plan approval section 1.2 (Fildertunnel) from rail km +0.4 +32.0 to rail km +10, 0 +30.0 in Stuttgart (PDF) Federal Railway Office Karlsruhe / Stuttgart. August 19, 2005. Archived from the original on August 10, 2014. Retrieved October 20, 2013.
  52. PFA 1.3a planning approval decision
  53. a b Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (Ed.): Plan approval decision according to § 18 Abs. 1 Allgemeine Eisenbahngesetz (AEG) for the renovation of the Stuttgart railway junction "Project Stuttgart 21" plan approval section 1.4 Filder area to Wendlingen (...) . PDF file , Stuttgart, April 30, 2008.
  54. a b c d Plan approval decision according to § 18 Para. 1 General Railway Act (AEG) for the conversion of the Stuttgart railway junction "Project Stuttgart 21" Plan approval section 1.5 to Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt from rail km - 4.0 - 90.3 to - 0 , 4 - 42.0 and - 4.8 - 64.4 to - 0.4 - 42.0 in Stuttgart (PDF; 1.3 MB) Federal Railway Office Karlsruhe / Stuttgart. October 13, 2006. Archived from the original on December 30, 2015. Retrieved on April 30, 2012.
  55. a b Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (Ed.): Plan approval decision according to § 18 Paragraph 1 General Railway Act (AEG) for the reconstruction of the Stuttgart railway junction “Project Stuttgart 21” Plan approval section 1.6a transfer to Ober- and Untertürkheim (...) . PDF file (1.1 MB), Stuttgart, May 16, 2007.
  56. DB Mobility Networks Logistics: Current status Stuttgart 21 . December 10, 2009.
  57. ^ Claudia Henzler: Ten years of construction work, ten years of dispute. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 1, 2020, accessed February 1, 2020 .
  58. ↑ So far without a source
  59. Christian Milankovic: S 21: Fildertrasse changes the schedule . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 58 , March 11, 2015, p. 1 ( ).
  60. a b Konstantin Schwarz: City and country argue about the Gäubahn stop. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten. January 24, 2020, accessed January 30, 2020 .
  61. ^ Public announcement for “Project Stuttgart 21; Plan approval section 1.6a (transfer to Ober- / Untertürkheim) in Stuttgart ”. In: Verkehrsblatt , Volume 61, Issue 11, June 15, 2007, pp. 408 f, ISSN  0042-4013 .
  62. a b Konstantin Schwarz: Stuttgart 21 is gradually going into operation. In: January 29, 2020, accessed January 29, 2020 .
  63. a b Request of the parliamentary group of the CDU, the parliamentary group of the SPD and the parliamentary group of the FDP / DVP: Resolution zu Stuttgart 21, Drucksache 14/381 (PDF) Landtag of Baden-Württemberg. September 28, 2006. Retrieved October 17, 2010.
  64. State Parliament, 14th electoral period, 10th session on Thursday, October 12, 2006 (PDF) , agenda item 3.
  65. ^ State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg - 10th session, 14th electoral term. (PDF) Plenary minutes 14/10. In: State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg , October 12, 2006, p. 417 , archived from the original on March 24, 2016 ; accessed on March 9, 2019 .
  66. Financing for Stuttgart 21 is available. In: Spiegel Online , July 19, 2007.
  67. Ministers seal billions in the Deutsche Bahn project. Spiegel Online , April 2, 2009.
  68. ↑ The Stuttgart 21 billion project sealed ( memento of April 13, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , April 2, 2009 (online edition).
  69. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): DB Supervisory Board: Green light for the Stuttgart 21 project / Richard Lutz appointed as the new CFO . Press release from December 9, 2009.
  70. a b Project partners agree: Stuttgart 21 is coming . Press release of the communications office Bahnprojekt Stuttgart - Ulm from December 10, 2009.
  71. a b Printed matter 17/268. Decision recommendation and report of the Committee for Transport, Building and Urban Development (15th Committee) on the motion of MPs Winfried Hermann, Kerstin Andreae, Birgitt Bender, other MPs and the BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN parliamentary group - printed matter 17/125 - (PDF; 80 kB) German Bundestag . December 2, 2009. Retrieved October 21, 2010.
  72. Printed matter 17/125: (…) Moratorium for Stuttgart 21 - Ensure profitability of the major project before construction begins ( PDF ; 70 kB) December 2, 2009. Accessed October 21, 2010.
  73. Martin Buckenau, Daniel Delhaes, Dieter Fockenbrock: Full speed in the tunnel . In: Handelsblatt . No. 46 , March 6, 2013, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 20 .
  74. Christian Milankovic: Homeowners criticize rail offers on S 21 . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 161 , July 16, 2015, p. 21 ( online ).
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