History of Stuttgart 21

Overview of the planned changes to the railway systems in the Stuttgart area as part of Stuttgart 21 .

The story of Stuttgart 21 is the story of a traffic and urban development project, the construction of which began in 2010 after more than 15 years of planning. Stuttgart 21 is based on discussions about the creation of a fast connection between Stuttgart and Ulm, as a continuation of the high-speed route Mannheim – Stuttgart , in the 1980s. Based on a proposal by Gerhard Heimerl from 1988 and various demands from those involved, the Stuttgart 21 concept was developed in a discussion process lasting several years and presented to the public in 1994. After further studies, spatial planning followed in 1997 and, from 2001, the planning approval procedure . In 2007, the parties involved agreed to finance the project, which was finally implemented at the end of 2009. Construction work officially began on February 2, 2010. After several postponements, the commissioning of the new rail systems is planned for the timetable change in December 2021.

At the protest against Stuttgart 21 several citizens involved.

Emergence

prehistory

As early as 1901, with the Sprickerhof through station, a concept was presented to convert the Stuttgart terminus into a through station. The project was later rejected for structural and operational reasons. After the project failed, the terminus at what is now Bolzstrasse was replaced by a new building designed by Paul Bonatz and Friedrich Eugen Scholer . In 1965 the architects Günter Behnisch , Wilfried Beck-Erlang , Jürgen Joedicke and Roland Ostertag presented the Stuttgart 2000 concept , in the course of which a through station and a two-kilometer lake were to be built in place of the previous railway systems. The city rejected the concept. In the course of the preliminary planning of the high-speed route Mannheim – Stuttgart , the German Federal Railroad considered in 1970 to create a new underground through station for high-speed traffic from Mannheim and Ulm under Stuttgart main station. Trains in the direction of Ulm were to be directed under the Uhlandshöhe into the Neckar valley near Esslingen. These plans were not pursued any further.

origin

In the 1980s, a new and upgraded line was planned between Plochingen and Günzburg , with which the travel times between Stuttgart and Ulm should be shortened. During this time, the Transport Science Institute of the University of Stuttgart carried out various preliminary investigations into the construction of a through station in Stuttgart. In 1988 Heimerl , Hohnecker and Dobeschinsky from the University of Stuttgart brought in a memorandum in which they were all for the first time since 1985 a. a. Summarized comments made in political bodies. It was proposed to build a new line to Ulm with an incline of up to 25 per thousand, with a four-track through station under the existing Stuttgart main station. The state of Baden-Württemberg joined the proposal, which became the starting point for further planning at the end of the 1980s. In the meantime, other large-scale alternatives have been examined.

On October 18, 1990, the Stuttgart engineers Hansjoerg Bohm, Klaus Gurk and Christian Wendt presented an urban planning concept based on Heimerl's plans. In contrast to Heimerl's idea of building a through station as a supplement to the existing terminus, they suggested that all track systems in the inner city area be relocated underground. This should free up 180 hectares between Arnulf-Klett-Platz and Rosensteinpark . Six to eight tracks and operation with diameter lines were planned for the main station. The route leading to the Filder should share a route parallel to the motorway between Möhringen and Plieningen to Ulm and a route to Böblingen (to the Gäubahn). The Gäubahn should be abandoned in the city area. According to Bohm, the Deutsche Bundesbahn rejected the concept.

After weighing up various options up to October 1991, two concepts were pursued. Both variants provided for a four-track through station to be reached from the north in the Stuttgart mainline tunnel beginning in Feuerbach , transversely below the existing main station in the tunnel. From there, the two concepts provided for different lines.

The framework concept H was a further development of Heimerl's concept and provided for a pure high-speed route between Stuttgart and Ulm with gradients of up to 25 per thousand. The existing route should continue to be used by regional and freight trains. For the mainline tunnel, which was to lead from the main station to the A 8 on the Filder plain, gradients of up to 35 per thousand were planned. From there, via Wendlingen, a line with a slope of up to 25 per thousand was to be built to Ulm. It should serve long-distance passenger and light freight traffic. In addition, the existing line between Plochingen and Günzburg was to be expanded to three tracks.

The framework concept K envisaged a four-track expansion of the existing line between Plochingen and Süßen , with mixed operation and a maximum incline of 12.5 per thousand. The long-distance railway tunnel, which was also inclined by up to 35 per thousand, was to lead from the main train station to Plochingen. On the Swabian Alb, a new section was to be built, which was to be linked to the existing line near Beimerstetten . K here stood for combination route . It was developed by Ernst Krittian , the planner of the Deutsche Bundesbahn, and was a combination of the original plans of the DB (variant B of the upgraded and new Plochingen – Günzburg line) with Heimerl's philosophy.

In October 1991, the DB presented two variants designated as H ' and K' , which provided for the continued use of the existing terminal station with 16 tracks instead of the four-track through station. The estimated costs were 3.2 (H ′) and 3.9 (K ′) billion D-Marks. Compared to the original variants, travel time extensions of four (K) or three (H) minutes were calculated. The capacity of both variants was considered sufficient for the traffic development expected in the forecast period; However, there would not have been any reserves for further capacity increases.

In mid-1992, all four variants were presented to the state of Baden-Württemberg. In consultation with the local authorities concerned, the state submitted a statement on September 15, 1992, in which it clearly spoke out in favor of a route close to the motorway. Furthermore, the integration of Stuttgart and Ulm, the underpass of the Stuttgart main train station, a new line from the airport close to the motorway and the integration of the airport into the new line were requested.

After a fundamental decision on the segregation of traffic had been made with Netz 21 in the meantime , a variant K _{25 was} developed from variant K , which allows for a new section of the existing line (25 per thousand, 250 km / h) for long-distance traffic and a continuous four-track expansion in the Filstal intended for 160 or 200 km / h. At the same time, four solutions were developed for both variants in the Stuttgart area:

Variant 1 envisaged a four-track through station transversely below the existing terminal station, with a tunnel between Feuerbach and the new line on the Fildern. The airport and the state trade fair should be connected in a shunt.
Variant 2 corresponded to variant 1, but provided for a closer tour along the airport.
Variant 3 envisaged a new through station as the main station at Rosenstein , in Bad Cannstatt or in Untertürkheim with the simultaneous abandonment of the terminus station. A new route would have been created from Feuerbach, and the existing route from Untertürkheim would have been expanded by two tracks. The new line would have been routed from Esslingen-Mettingen in the tunnel to the A8 near Denkendorf, the airport was to be connected in the bypass, the Gäubahn with adjustments at the north station . Due to the decentralized location of the so-called Rosensteinbahnhof and the necessary local transport connections, this variant was discarded. The approach, however, showed the possibility of using the railway area for urban development.
Variant 4 corresponded to variant 3 in the route from Untertürkheim, but the terminus station was to be retained.

In September 1993 the Deutsche Bundesbahn announced that it would apply for the initiation of the regional planning procedure for the new Stuttgart – Ulm line in coordination with the state government in the same year. The route was to be run along the A 8 and connected to the existing main train station in Stuttgart. The existing facilities from the main train station to Esslingen-Mettingen should be used; from there a tunnel should lead to Neuhausen auf den Fildern. According to the company, this was the most economical solution for the railway. By doing without a tunnel near the airport, around 900 million DM additional costs should be avoided. As options, a long-distance railway tunnel and a high station solution were to be installed above the platforms of Stuttgart Central Station. Considerations for a Rosenstein train station should no longer be pursued. The project was supposed to start in the second half of the 1990s.

In December 1993, however, the board of directors of the Deutsche Bundesbahn decided to continue using the terminus. Trains to Ulm should reach a new line to Ulm at Esslingen-Mettingen . These plans were later referred to as a continuation case or W-case compared to the concept of Stuttgart 21 called an execution case or A-case .

A modified variant H ′ , which was also referred to as the LEAN variant , was developed from the specification of the new route close to the autobahn and the option shown in the Rosenstein variant of combining traffic advantages and urban development . It provided for a modernization of the terminus station and an increase in its efficiency. The existing line between the main train station and Bad Cannstatt was to be upgraded to five or six tracks and six tracks between Stuttgart-Untertürkheim and Esslingen-Mettingen. A new, double-track line was to lead from there underground to the Filder plain near Denkendorf.

Finally, with variant H (also as variant KOMBI ), a final preliminary stage for the Stuttgart 21 project was presented. It provided for the existing, unchanged main station to be combined with a four-track through station serving exclusively high-speed traffic between Mannheim and Ulm.

Building on this, it was examined whether all rail traffic in Stuttgart Central Station could be relocated to an underground through station. For this purpose, an operating concept was developed taking into account the integral clock timetable .

In August 1993, the then railway boss Heinz Dürr commissioned the architect Meinhard von Gerkan to develop variants for a new station at Rosensteinpark. This was supposed to be connected to the main train station by a magnetic train through a 2.5 km long and 80 m wide green area called Avenue 21 . According to von Gerkan's information, later considerations arose from this to lead the tracks to the existing main station underground. A conversion study from the same year suggested an eight-track through station at the main station.

Feasibility study and preliminary project

Presentation of the project

View of the rear of the main train station in March 2008

Track systems at Stuttgart Central Station and the central palace garden in March 2008

On April 18, 1994, railway boss Heinz Dürr , Prime Minister Erwin Teufel , Lord Mayor Manfred Rommel and Transport Ministers Matthias Wissmann (federal government) and Hermann Schaufler (state) officially presented the project at a press conference. With this project the individual interests were united:

the connection to the airport
the retention of the old location of the main train station
the urban development and usability of the freed railway areas at building land prices
the realization of a high-speed line based on the H-route
the removal of the Gäubahntrasse to Vaihingen .

Feasibility study

In June 1994, DB, the federal government, the state and the city commissioned a feasibility study in which around one hundred experts participated. The results, comprising 18 volumes, were presented on January 16, 1995 at the state press conference in the presence of Prime Minister Teufel, Federal Transport Minister Wissmann, State Transport Minister Schaufler, Lord Mayor Rommel and Railway Chief Dürr. The project was considered feasible. A decision on the project was expected at the end of 1995 / beginning of 1996, which should be followed by at least six years of planning and eight years of construction. The study suggested converting the main train station into an eight-track through station, combined with a largely underground ring of access routes. The connection of regional transport lines, the new S-Bahn station Mittnachtstraße, a maintenance station in Untertürkheim and a long-distance station at the airport were already planned. This should be in shunt with a Gleisdreieck be connected to the new line to Wendlingen. According to the price level at that time, total costs of 4.8 billion D-Marks were planned, which were to be raised through the sale of land, additional income from increased passenger numbers, improved operational processes and funds from the Municipal Transport Financing Act. Economic viability was assumed as long as in-depth studies (e.g. on the mineral water problem) ensured the feasibility. The project should avoid four million car journeys (51 million car kilometers) in and around Stuttgart every year.

The feasibility study was based on an operating program for 2010. Depending on the working day and direction, 175 trains went to Zuffenhausen, 138 trains on the new line to the airport and 77 each to Bad Cannstatt and Esslingen / Plochingen. In the S-Bahn traffic, 310 trains were planned for Stuttgart Mittnachtstraße and 300 for Schwabstraße. Two hours of rush hour traffic were defined as decisive for the dimensioning of the infrastructure, assuming 13 ICE / ECE, 11 interregional and 35 regional high-speed trains at the main station. 6 S-Bahn lines should be served every 15 minutes. Regional traffic should be tied through, with a stay in the main station of two minutes if possible. The departure and arrival times were taken from the integral cycle timetable planned for 1998, taking into account travel time savings due to the new route to the south and east. The investigations had shown that a timetable concept could be implemented under the given boundary conditions. Furthermore, the concept with eight tracks would already have capacity reserves. The operational simulations, as well as studies from 1990, had shown that individual station sections of the existing terminus station would be overloaded with the forecast traffic volumes in the case of continuation; the greatest bottleneck can only be eliminated through complex structural measures.

Compared to later drafts was u. a. a new long-distance Prague tunnel in the northern connection to the Mittnachtstraße station, the use of the existing Rosenstein tunnel (partly above-ground new line to the main station from its south portal) is planned. The numerous other options considered included, among other things, performance-enhancing measures for the S-Bahn at the main station, a S-Bahn connection between Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt and a single-track freight train connection curve from the line from Waiblingen in a south-westerly direction to the line to Kornwestheim . Numerous other options were also considered.

Pre-project

Those involved in the feasibility study were commissioned to further examine the project technically and economically as part of a preliminary project . For this purpose, a geological and hydrological investigation program was started, which, according to Deutsche Bahn, further substantiated the feasibility of the project. Furthermore, the preliminary project had proven the economic advantages of the project and submitted a financing proposal.

In November 1995 the results of the preliminary project were presented. Four ICE or "ECE" lines should run every hour or two hours via Stuttgart main station, corresponding to an average of one departure in each direction every 20 minutes. Five interregional lines should serve Stuttgart main station every 120 minutes. The train capacity of the station for long-distance traffic should be increased by 50 percent, for local traffic by 80 percent. In terms of urban planning, around 1.3 million square meters of floor space (for 11,000 residents and 24,000 employees) should be created. The Transport Science Institute at the University of Stuttgart determined an economic benefit of 314 million euros per year, corresponding to a benefit-cost ratio of 2.6.

On November 7, 1995 the federal, state, city, regional association and Deutsche Bahn AG concluded a framework agreement to develop and promote the project. It was later modified and specified in the course of the in-depth planning. If the project was approved at the end of 1995, construction work was expected to begin in early 2001 and commissioning in 2008.

Spatial planning, plan approval and implementation discussion

Spatial planning

In June 1996 the project company DBProjekt GmbH Stuttgart 21 was founded. In January 2002 it was converted into DB Projekt Süd GmbH , which was responsible for Neu-Ulm 21 in addition to Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line.

On December 6, 1996, the regional planning procedure for the railway junction and the new line to Wendlingen was applied for. The documents including the environmental impact assessment were displayed in the affected communities from January 7, 1997 to February 6, 1997. In addition to alternative routes and operating concepts, the effects of traffic and noise were the main subject of the 13,700 objections and concerns received by the Stuttgart Regional Council . The regional planning procedure was completed in September 1997 and the project was declared spatially compatible. A through station was planned at the airport opposite the route applied for, and the Kleine Wendlinger curve was moved to the east. The authority positively emphasized the additional capacities of the through station, the connection to the Filder region and the airport as well as the urban development opportunities. A shift of the airport train station to the south and a continuous tunnel under in the area of Wangen as well as Ober- and Untertürkheim should be examined.

In the meantime, on February 28, 1997, a Europe-wide architectural competition for the redesign of the main station was announced. The design by Christoph Ingenhoven was unanimously selected from 126 entries .

Plan approval procedure

After completion of the regional planning procedure, the plan approval procedure was started with the definition of the investigation area for the environmental impact study .

Variant discussion

In the course of spatial planning and planning approval procedures, a number of large and small-scale variants were developed and weighed against each other.

The variants were evaluated in a three-stage process under the criteria of railway operation and traffic, linkage conditions (distances, transfer options, etc.), geology / construction technology, environmental concerns, water (mineral water), property, agriculture and forestry, urban development and investment / profitability .

Large-scale alternatives

Large -scale alternatives in the Stuttgart – Ulm corridor were considered (all price levels: January 1, 1993):

The alternative H ₂₅ envisaged a four-track through station in Stuttgart, with a route close to the autobahn over the Swabian Alb to Ulm. Alternatively, an expansion or a new building was planned between Ulm and Augsburg. (Total investment for the Stuttgart-Feuerbach to Ulm / Neu-Ulm section of approx. DM 3.9 billion).

The alternative H ^'₂₅ provided for the continuance of the train station and an additional track between Central Station and Bad Cannstatt, with retaining the local speed limit of 130 km / h in Bad Cannstatt and Untertürkheim. An additional track for 140 km / h was to run between Stuttgart-Untertürkheim and Esslingen-Mettingen northeast of the existing line, from there a double-track new line at Esslingen-Mettlingen inclined at a rate of up to 25 per thousand should be unevenness. A route close to the autobahn at Neuhausen auf den Fildern should be reached in the tunnel . The loss of travel time in the Mannheim – Ulm route compared to the H ₂₅ solution was given as six minutes and the costs as DM 3.2 billion.

The Stuttgart mainline tunnel, which is more than 20 km long, was part of the K _12.5 variant . The tunnel was to begin at Feuerbach, pass under the Stuttgart main station with a four-track through station and finally join the existing line at Plochingen.

The alternative K _12.5 (Filstaltrasse) was a combination of a new and upgraded line with the Stuttgart mainline tunnel, a four-track through station under the main station to be retained, a new line to Plochingen (where it was a transition to the existing line) and a four-track upgrade of the Filstal line further on to Süßen ( direction operation ). A new section should lead across the Swabian Alb (to Beimerstetten), Ulm should be fully integrated and, alternatively, a new or upgraded section should lead between Ulm and Augsburg. An airport connection was not planned. For the section between Stuttgart-Feuerbach and Ulm / Neu-Ulm, total investments of DM 5.0 billion were planned.

The alternative K '12 _.5 envisaged keeping the terminus station and moving a new track to Plochingen. From there, the route should correspond to the variant such as K _12.5 . An airport connection was not planned. Compared to the framework solution, a loss of travel time of seven minutes was assumed for the Mannheim – Ulm route, with total costs of DM 3.9 billion.

The alternative K ₂₅ (redesign of the Filstal route) provided for the construction of a new route for pure express traffic. This should run parallel to the existing route in the Filstal, above it in its own route. The mainline tunnel was supposed to open up a four-track through station and join the existing Filstal line at Reichenbach. A new section was planned over the Swabian Alb, with a link in Beimerstetten with today's route. Ulm was to be fully integrated; alternatively, a new or expansion solution was planned between Augsburg and Ulm. Freight and regional traffic should remain on the existing routes. The achievable travel time between Stuttgart and Ulm was assumed to be 29 minutes. The total investment (between Feuerbach and Ulm / Neu-Ulm) was 3.9 billion DM.

The alternative K _'25 largely corresponded to the alternative K ₂₅ , but intended to keep the existing terminus station. The calculated total costs were 3.2 billion DM.

In weighing up the project developer comes to the conclusion that the large-scale alternatives H are superior to the alternatives K and H ' , in particular due to shorter travel times, less fragmentation, lower consumption of residential and commercial space, etc. a.

Consideration of variants in the plan approval procedure

In the plan approval procedure, in addition to the aforementioned large-scale alternatives, the following were also assessed as "alternatives in the Stuttgart railway junction":

Maintaining the terminus,

Combination of a new through station for long-distance traffic while retaining the existing station for regional and local traffic,

Relocation of the long-distance or main train station from the city center,

New through station instead of the terminus.

As a starting point for weighing up these variants, the Federal Railway Authority as the planning approval authority sets out in the decision:

“Compared to application planning, the decisive advantages of maintaining the terminus, regardless of the variant, are the low intensity of interventions in individual areas of public and private interests. It should be noted that the decisive differences arise in the urban area, while the routing on the Fildern leads to very similar effects. (…) The retention solutions cannot fully achieve the planning goals, but they also cause less interference. So the question is whether the avoided interventions make it necessary to compromise the planning goals or, to put it another way, whether the interventions in the application solution are so serious that maintaining the terminus station despite less target achievement suggests itself as a preferable alternative. "

- Plan approval decision PFA 1.1 Valley crossing with new main station, 2005, p. 174

	Area requirement (ha)
	total	of it permanently	real
Stuttgart 21	292	99	193
LEAN	148	52	96
	Source: Plan approval decision PFA 1.1, pp. 174, 178

In the weighing up, the planning approval authority determines that if the main train station is retained, the lower dangers for the groundwater, especially for the mineral and medicinal water, are to be seen first. During the Neckar crossings, however, danger areas remained due to the necessary bridge construction. Furthermore, the interference with the environmental protection goods animals and plants, soil as well as air and climate are less, the impact of private property is less, goals of the monument protection are preserved. The obstacle to rail traffic due to the construction period is a disadvantage.

Cost estimates in the planning approval procedure
	applicant		Objectors
	of billion euros	up to billion euros	Billion euros
Stuttgart 21	2.00	2.60
LEAN	1.60	2.60	0.60
REVERSE	2.60
	Source: Plan approval decision PFA 1.1, pp. 177–179

As a result of the weighing up of these variants, the plan approval authority determines in the decision:

“The comparison of the tested alternatives shows that the combination and installation solutions are to be rated worse than the retention solutions. Like application planning, they are sometimes associated with considerable interventions without being able to fully achieve the planning goals. The interventions in their entirety are therefore not matched by any adequate benefit. The project sponsor rightly withdrew these alternatives from further examination at an early stage, i.e. without detailed technical investigations and optimizations. "

- Plan approval decision PFA 1.1 Valley crossing with new main station, 2005, p. 201

The application planning contributes most to the goal of reducing noise emissions, as well as to urban development opportunities. In view of the overall advantages for rail traffic and the possibilities of urban development that can be achieved with the application planning, the burdens during the construction period and the interventions remaining after completion are acceptable. As a result, "none of the alternatives examined suggest themselves as being better suited to implementing the planning".

Responsibility and scope of the examination in the plan approval procedure

Basically, the plan approval authority, the Federal Railway Authority, determines the scope of the tests carried out and the responsibility:

“The costs of the Stuttgart 21 project are of great importance in the public debate. In fact, the investment costs for application planning are the highest of all alternatives. In the application documents, the developer mentioned costs of DM 4.9 to 5.06 billion. (...) The developer has stated that the solution applied for enables economical railway operation and also referred to continuously updated profitability studies. As part of this examination, however, it must be checked whether the requested solution can be built in a lawful manner. The questions of the costs and profitability of a project are examined before the application is submitted by the bodies that have to decide on the financing of the project. Whether a comparative cost-benefit analysis is required for this is therefore not the subject of this procedure, but is part of this decision-making process "

- Planning approval decision PFA 1.1 valley crossing with new main station, 2005

Realization discussion

Railway boss Johannes Ludewig stopped the project in 1998. In support of this, he said in 2011 that Stuttgart 21 was “simply too big and too expensive for the train”.

After all actors with the exception of Erwin Teufel had left their offices in 1994, the project came to a standstill in mid-1999. DB had an auditing company reassess the project (among other projects). After a top-level discussion, DB stated that it did not see any possibility of realizing the project, including the new line, "in one fell swoop". However, the participants agreed to continue to pursue the project in principle. They envisaged a gradual commissioning. A working group from the state, city and DB examined whether a sub-project consisting of the train station, the Filder tunnel and the line to Wendlingen - without a continuation to Ulm - could be economically viable.

In the late summer of 1999, the project, among others, was likely to fall victim to federal austerity constraints. In 1999, the federal states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria exerted increasing pressure on the federal government to implement the project. In November 1999, the state, city, regional association and Stuttgart Airport offered to contribute 1.3 billion D-Marks to the project. On December 1, 1999, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn postponed a decision on the project with reference to funding that seemed too vague. According to media reports, the federal government urged the supervisory body to reject the project because it mistrusted the mixed financing with the state and feared that additional costs would be passed on to the federal government. A profitability calculation by the group expected a gap of at least 344.1 million DM in order to achieve profitability. On December 3, the Lord Mayor of Stuttgart, Wolfgang Schuster , threatened to bring an action for damages against Deutsche Bahn if the Supervisory Board did not approve the project by March 1, 2000. The state of Baden-Württemberg spoke out in favor of renegotiations. In December 1999 a preliminary planning order was placed as part of the Netz 21 strategy . In March 2000, representatives of the federal government on the DB supervisory board made the implementation of the project subject to the condition that it be implemented at the same time as the new line. The state of Baden-Wuerttemberg then decided to advance the start of construction on the new Wendlingen – Ulm line, which was not planned for implementation until 2012, through pre-financing.

On July 5, 2000, the DB supervisory board postponed the topics Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line again after an agreement on the pre-financing offered by Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg had not been reached. On December 5, 2000, Prime Minister Teufel and State Transport Minister Müller finally called on the federal government to give Stuttgart 21 and the new line to Ulm a positive decision by the state elections on March 25, 2001. State politicians repeatedly stressed that the Stuttgart 21 project could only be implemented together with the new line to Ulm.

Planning for the major project was temporarily stopped in 2000. The planning team was cut back from the original 80 employees to a handful. If the schedule, which was valid until at least mid-1999, provided for the start of construction in 2001 and commissioning in 2008, the start of construction was postponed several times in the following period.

After the federal government and the states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria (for Neu-Ulm 21 ) had agreed on pre-financing, the DB's supervisory board approved the project on March 14, 2001. This was tied to the condition that a supplementary agreement to the framework agreement of 1995 had to be concluded as planned. The plan approval and award phases should be strictly separated from each other. The start of construction was thus postponed from 2004 to 2005. This paved the way for the submission of the planning approval documents, which should be completed by the end of 2003. According to other information, the start of construction was only postponed from 2004 to 2005 in May 2001, and commissioning was not expected until 2013 at the earliest.

In July 2001 the DB, the state, the state capital and the regional association concluded an agreement for further cooperation for the realization of the Stuttgart 21 / new Wendlingen - Ulm line project . The paper supplemented and specified the framework agreement from November 1995. Among other things, it provided for a subsidy for vehicle purchases from DB Regio in the amount of 200 million DM. The state also undertook to order around 1.45 million additional train kilometers (at DM 13.95 each), which were originally to be ordered with Stuttgart 21, over ten years from DB Regio. Planning resources and staff should also be reinforced again on the basis of the paper.

relation	Trains every working day
	Summer timetable 2001		Stuttgart 21 (2015) Planning status 2004
	Long-distance transport	Regional traffic	Long-distance transport	Regional traffic
Heidelberg, Mannheim	40	0	64	0
Vaihingen (Enz), Karlsruhe	23	21st	28	24
Boeblingen, Zurich	8th	12	8th	23
Tübingen	0	34	0	54
Ulm (new line)	30th	0	53	0
Goeppingen	10	30th	16	24
Bask	8th	27	9	28
Schwäbisch Hall	1	14th	8th	23
Heilbronn / Würzburg	0	38	19th	35
total	120	176	205	211
Trains (arrivals and departures) in Stuttgart main station every working day.

On October 30, 2001, DBProjekt GmbH Stuttgart 21 submitted the documents, comprising 18 files, for the planning approval procedure for the main train station to the Federal Railway Authority. According to Deutsche Bahn, the planning approval decision should be available about a year later. The documents for the remaining sections should follow every two to three months. A final performance audit and a decision on the project were planned for 2004. The start of construction was expected in 2005 and commissioning in 2013. This first plan approval procedure was opened the following day.

The assumed traffic volumes used as a basis were taken from the 2015 operating scenario in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 1992. The forecast, which was initially aimed at 2010, was later updated to 2015. Compared to the 2001 timetable, it envisaged an increase in the number of trains by around 75 percent in long-distance and around 56 percent in local and regional transport. This forecast was adjusted in 2004 to the operating scenario developed in the course of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003; the reference year was also 2015. While the expected increase in traffic was therefore lower overall, the requirements for the infrastructure remained unchanged according to DB information, as the peak hourly load remained essentially the same. For Stuttgart main station, 434 long-distance and 418 regional trains are expected per day (previously: 448 long-distance and 552 regional). According to the BVWP forecast, two long-distance and 170 long-distance freight trains (previously 16 and 192 trains respectively) should bypass the Stuttgart node via the freight bypass. Between the main train station and Zuffenhausen, 232 long-distance and 118 local trains were forecast for 2015, plus 16 long-distance and 46 regional trains to and from the Gäubahn. A volume of 506 trains (202 in long-distance traffic, 304 in regional traffic) was expected for the route to Bad Cannstatt. While the expected traffic volume towards Feuerbach near Stuttgart 21 remains unchanged at 350 trains per day, today's traffic between Bad Cannstatt and Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof is to be divided between the Filder Tunnel (238 trains per day) and the new connection to Bad Cannstatt via the Hauptbahnhof Nordkopf . The section between Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof and Bad Cannstatt is the most heavily loaded at the Stuttgart node (as of 2004).

Construction work was expected to start in 2005 in mid-2002, with commissioning in 2013 and also in 2003. In 2004, implementation was planned between 2006 and 2013. In 2001 and 2004, the decision to start construction was planned for 2005. After completion of the planning approval procedure, the final decision on the building permit should be made on the basis of a new economic feasibility study, provided that the financing is secured. In June 2006 a decision was expected for autumn 2006.

On April 6, 2006, the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg rejected actions by the BUND and two apartment owners against the planning approval section 1.1 (main station). The Verkehrsclub Deutschland criticizing the project sees the judgment as a legal and not a traffic and financial assessment of the project.

In mid-2006, Deutsche Bahn boss Mehdorn, Federal Transport Minister Tiefensee and Baden-Württemberg's Prime Minister Oettinger agreed to form two working groups that would work towards a decision on the Stuttgart 21 and Wendlingen – Ulm projects in the autumn of the same year. Oettinger took over the management of the working group on Stuttgart 21, which was formed from representatives from DB, the state, city and region, while Tiefensee took over the management of the group on the route to Ulm, in which representatives from the federal, state and DB were sitting. At a meeting of the working groups at the end of September 2006, a decision should be made on the basis of the data compiled up to then.

On March 5, 2013, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn decided to increase the funding framework for the project. 18 of the 20 members vote yes, the lawyer Christoph Dänzer-Vanotti abstained, the representative of the German train drivers' union voted against.

Project decision

In October 2006, the Baden-Württemberg state parliament adopted a motion for a resolution from the CDU , SPD and FDP parliamentary groups to implement Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. The state parliament decided with 115 to 15 votes (from the parliamentary group of the Greens ) that Stuttgart 21 would “best meet the challenges of a long-term efficient rail transport infrastructure also from an economic point of view” and “make sense in terms of transport and environmental policy” for the placement of the state particularly significant in Europe and "useful for structural and national political reasons".

The decision on the project was to be made at a top-level meeting between Federal Transport Minister Tiefensee , Prime Minister Oettinger and Railway Chief Mehdorn on October 23, 2006. Those involved postponed the decision to spring 2007 and agreed to re-examine the profitability of the project. On April 23 and July 28, 2007, there were further top-level talks between the federal, state, city and railways, in which, among other things, the financing, in particular the assumption of the construction cost risk, was discussed.

On July 19, 2007, the federal government, the state of Baden-Württemberg, the railways and the city of Stuttgart agreed on the allocation of costs and the risk of construction costs, thus laying the foundation for the implementation of the project. Accordingly, the state of Baden-Württemberg u. a. on the new Wendlingen – Ulm line, with 950 million euros, a higher share than originally planned and is pre-financing the federal share for this line that will only be available from 2016. In return, the start of construction for the entire project was brought forward to 2010. On September 5, 2007, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn AG approved the implementation of the project.

In 2007 around 25 (according to another source 65) employees were busy with the planning. This number should increase to around 150 when the construction work began (as of 2008). According to DB, the Stuttgart 21 / new Wendlingen – Ulm line project was started in April 2008. The Deutsche Bahn team involved in the project had grown to 60 employees by April 2010. The rail subsidiary DB ProjektBau is planning the project on behalf of DB Netz and DB Station & Service . Overall project managers were Hans Sommer / Reimar Baur (1996 to 2002), Peter Marquart (2002 to 2008), Hany Azer (March 2008 to May 2011) and, since June 2011, Stefan Penn . Manfred Leger has been in this position since September 1, 2013 .

On April 2, 2009, Prime Minister Oettinger, Federal Transport Minister Tiefensee and DB board member Garber finally signed the financing agreements.

On December 9, 2009, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn approved the inclusion of the project in the company's investment planning. On the following day, the project steering committee also agreed to continue the project. On December 16, 2009, the Bundestag Transport Committee approved . The final discussion in the plenary session followed on December 17th. With the votes of the CDU / CSU , SPD and FDP , against the votes of the left-wing parliamentary group and the Greens , the Bundestag followed the recommendation of the Transport Committee and rejected an application by the Greens calling for a moratorium until the profitability of the entire project was clearly clarified .

After the advertising agency Scholz & Friends won a competition to rename it, the overall project Stuttgart 21 / new line Wendlingen – Ulm has been referred to as the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project since March 2008 , combined with the slogan “The new heart of Europe”. From September 1, 2009 to September 17, 2010, Wolfgang Drexler was the project spokesperson. IT entrepreneur Wolfgang Dietrich has been the spokesperson since September 24, 2010 . Udo Andriof , who was also appointed on this date , resigned at the beginning of May 2011.

arbitration

From October 22 to November 27, 2010, eight " arbitration talks" moderated by Heiner Geißler took place between representatives of project supporters and opponents, which could be followed live on the Internet and on television. Around 60 hours of discussion took place over eight days of the meeting. Until the talks have been concluded, part of the construction work should be suspended and no new contracts should be awarded.

On November 30, 2010, Geißler spoke out in his arbitration verdict in principle for the project and proposed a number of changes under the title Stuttgart 21 Plus , including the maintenance of the Gäubahn , as well as the examination of additional infrastructure measures in the main station. Which of these infrastructure proposals to increase capacity should be implemented should be decided in a so-called "stress test", a series of railway operation simulations with 30 percent increased performance. The results of the simulation runs checked by SMA + Partner were presented in July 2011. According to the 200-page audit by the Swiss inspection office , the through station can process 30 percent more train arrivals than is planned in today's terminal station at peak hour according to the 2010 annual timetable.

During the discussion of the SMA results on July 29, 2011, Heiner Geißler presented a compromise proposal that he and SMA had worked out under the title “Peace in Stuttgart”. According to this, the long-distance traffic should largely be relocated to a new four-track underground station section to be built, while the local traffic would largely remain in an above-ground section reduced to 10 to 12 tracks. The cost of this solution, based on the price of Stuttgart 21, was given as 2.5 to 3.0 billion euros. While the opponents of S21 welcomed the proposal, Deutsche Bahn rejected it.

The state government of Baden-Württemberg issued a joint assessment of the compromise proposal SK 2.2 in October 2011, with partly different assessments by the coalition partners. It is jointly stated that the combination solution would bring the greatest possible efficiency and would lead to fewer interventions. Contractual adjustments and new budgetary decisions are required. Significant differences are expected in terms of costs. According to the Greens, costs of 5.6 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 would be compared to only 4.16 billion for SK 2.2. The SPD, however (like the DB), saw costs of 4.1 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 and 4.95 billion euros for SK 2.2.

After an application by the action alliance against Stuttgart 21, the Stuttgart Administrative Court ruled on February 13, 2012 that the arbitrator's verdict is not legally binding.

Referendum

In the coalition agreement, the Greens and the SPD agreed to hold a referendum on the Stuttgart 21 project and to implement the new Wendlingen-Ulm line in any case. At the end of July 2011, a draft for an S21 termination act was presented. As expected, the law was rejected in the state parliament on September 29, 2011. This cleared the way for the referendum, which was held on November 27, 2011. A majority of 58.9 percent rejected the country's exit from the project. For the law to be adopted, the majority of those who voted would have to have voted yes and the number of yes votes would have to correspond to at least one third of those entitled to vote.

public relation

In the course of the discourse, some initiatives were founded by both supporters and critics, which have lost their relevance over the years, often without finding a formal end.

In December 2011 the city of Stuttgart started the Citizens' Forum Stuttgart 21 . It should help to continue the dialogue between citizens and experts and to critically monitor the construction progress. The last known activity was the “Spirit and Money” campaign , in which nine artists were invited in September 2014 for 200,000 euros to create works of art from the trees felled for Stuttgart . Further planned actions were rejected again.

construction

Dates and costs

The start of construction has been postponed several times. In February and March 2009, the construction supervision of Sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.6a was put out to tender .

During the symbolic raising of the buffer stop at noon on February 2, 2010, two regional trains shielded the ceremony from demonstrators.

In the afternoon the buffer stop was moved back to its previous place.

Construction work officially began on February 2, 2010. Federal Transport Minister Ramsauer , Deutsche Bahn boss Grube , Prime Minister Oettinger, Stuttgart's Lord Mayor Schuster and others symbolically raised the buffer stop on track 049.

Two days after the state elections on March 27, 2011 in Baden-Württemberg , Deutsche Bahn announced that it would “not create any new facts - neither in structural terms nor with regard to the award of contracts” until a new state government was constituted. The work on the groundwater management was postponed, but construction continued in the track apron and on the construction road to the north station. The construction freeze officially ended on June 14, 2011.

On March 23, 2012, Deutsche Bahn announced the postponement of commissioning to December 2020. The calculated project costs increased, according to the railways, by 240 million to a total of 4.33 billion euros.

The official postponement to December 2021 followed on February 15, 2013. In the steering committee meeting on July 23, 2013, Deutsche Bahn estimated the probability of commissioning at the end of 2022 at 80 percent. All planning premises are assumed in the "best case" and additional risks from the planning approval are not taken into account. In external communication, the project spokesman Wolfgang Dietrich insisted on the end of 2021. The later dates are "only due to commercial caution", said rail board member Volker Kefer .

On December 12, 2012, Deutsche Bahn announced expected cost increases of around 1.1 billion euros. Media reports named expected costs of 6.8 billion euros. On March 5, 2013, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn decided to raise the project's funding framework to 6.526 billion euros. The amount is made up of 5.987 billion euros “total value” and 539 million euros “free buffer”. The company announced that it would like to involve the other project partners in financing the additional costs.

At the beginning of 2015 the schedule of the project came under pressure due to various delays:

The building permit for the airport section was not yet available. At the beginning of February 2015, Deutsche Bahn assumed that this would be the case by September 2015. In the past, the approval procedures for similarly complex sub-projects took significantly longer, up to two years. In addition, the design of the route and the train station at the airport was controversial between the project partners; a report by the Technical University of Dresden questioned the efficiency of the route.
In order to still be able to meet the opening date at the end of 2021, the railway asked the construction companies to complete the technical work in just under four years. Eighteen months earlier, Deutsche Bahn had budgeted more than five years for this work.
The approval for a sufficiently deep excavation at the planned underground station was not yet available, so that the work started there in August 2014 came to a standstill.
The tunnel work also proceeded more slowly than planned: the advance at the Filder Tunnel had come to a standstill from mid-December 2014 to the end of January 2015. At the tunnel Obertürkheim until the beginning of February 2015 only 50 meters propulsion were made from December, 2013.

Those involved in the project at the beginning of February 2015 therefore considered the planned completion date at the end of 2021 to be unrealistic - despite statements to the contrary by the communications office. In December 2017, a new planning status with costs of at least 7.6 billion euros and completion in 2024 at the earliest became known. The Federal Audit Office estimates the costs at around 10 billion euros.

In April 2016, the railway equipment for the project was put out to tender.

Track apron

To create space for the excavation, the platforms and the transverse platform of the station were relocated 120 meters in the direction of the track apron. To make this possible, 10 kilometers of track were expanded in 61 construction phases, 5.3 kilometers of track were newly laid, 92 points were removed and 50 new points were installed.

At the beginning of September 2009, the moving of the platforms and the necessary reconstruction of the end station track field were awarded as part of the preparatory work. Construction work began in February 2010. Even during the temporary construction stops during the arbitration and after the state elections in March 2011, work on the track apron continued.

Due to a planning error during the renovation of the ramp of the S-Bahn tunnel at the main station, there were restrictions in S-Bahn traffic from June 2010 to January 2011.

On July 25, September 29 and October 9, 2012, trains derailed when exiting platform 10 in the direction of Feuerbach. Overbuffering is suspected to be the probable cause : As a result of the unfavorable curve routing at switch 227, the buffers of two cars would have wedged into one another. Tighter curves in the track apron had resulted because this was shortened from February 2010 as part of the renovation work for Stuttgart 21. Long-distance tracks 8, 9 and 10 were temporarily closed, and some train connections had to switch from the main train station to nearby train stations.

The platforms were moved forward on May 26, 2013. The platforms were successively shortened in 13 phases and a new, temporary transverse platform was built. The work was completed with the opening of the transverse platform on October 21, 2013.

Display board in Stuttgart main station during the ramp closure (May 2010)
Track apron on October 9, 2012; in the background wagons of the derailed train
Double occupancy of a track due to the bottlenecks after the derailment
Dismantling of platform 1 at the end of May 2013
Platform 12 was moved forward at the end of September 2013
Railway operations during the renovation, end of September 2013

Station building

Dismantling

While the station building is to be largely preserved in the course of the project, the side wings will be demolished. According to the project sponsors, it is not possible to preserve the wings because their foundations would protrude into the planned station concourse. The planning approval decision states that the "transport, operational and, above all, the urban planning advantages of the project compared to the current situation" are so important that "the public interest in the unrestricted preservation of the Bonatz building takes a back seat to the public interest in the realization of the planned project “Must. The Chamber of Architects of Baden-Württemberg and the Association of German Architects support the project and consider it as "the withdrawal of destructive interference from the 19th and early 20th century, which led to a gigantic iron and gravel area in the heart of the city". The Stuttgart Regional Court decided that the side wings were not decisive for the architectural recognition of the station.

Architects, who attach great importance to the station as a unique testimony to the architecture of the 1920s, criticize the demolition of the side wings, as it would significantly change the overall impression of the building. An international call for the preservation of the main station (including the side wings) initiated by Matthias Roser was joined by the Pritzker Prize winner Richard Meier and the architect David Chipperfield . In November 2009, members of the International Council for the Preservation of Monuments appealed to the responsible politicians to preserve the main station in full and suggested that the station be included in the list of proposals for UNESCO World Heritage . In October 2008 the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Hauptbahnhof Stuttgart" in Berlin presented a call for the maintenance of the station building. This was supported by more than 270 architects and monument conservationists from several countries. A petition submitted by 3,100 people to the German Bundestag in 2008 was examined by the Petitions Committee on January 3, 2009 without a decision . The chairmen of the Federal Building Culture Foundation , Michael Braum, and the German Foundation for Monument Protection , Gottfried Kiesow , also criticize the planned demolition in a joint press release.

A lawsuit by Peter Dübbers, a grandson of Paul Bonatz, against the demolition due to possible copyright infringement was dismissed on May 20, 2010. Dübbers appealed in June 2010 . The Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart had a six days previously submitted by Dübbers 11 August 2010 urgent application back against the demolition. On October 6, 2010, the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court dismissed Dübber's appeal. After the court had not admitted an appeal , Dübbers, however, filed a non-admission complaint with the Federal Court of Justice in December 2010 . This was rejected on November 9, 2011. On January 30, 2012 , the administrative court of Baden-Württemberg rejected an urgent application by Dübber against the demolition of the south wing .

On May 18, 2010, Wolff & Müller was awarded the contract to demolish the north wing . The construction of the construction site began on July 30, 2010 under police protection. The start of the demolition work was scheduled for August 1, 2010. The north wing was gutted by mid-August 2010, and the demolition of the facade of the north wing began on August 25th.

Work on dismantling the south wing began on January 13, 2012 with the gutting of the building. The external demolition of the building began on January 30th and should be completed in March 2012. On March 19, a pillar of the platform roof was damaged, after which construction work was suspended for about three weeks. The dismantling of the south wing was completed on July 31, 2012.

From May 2, 2012 to October 21, 2013, the north exit was closed to allow the construction of the technical building. With the temporary closure of the north access, a temporary access on the area of the former north wing was put into operation.

In January 2014, the demolition of the track roofing between the old main building and the temporary cross platform began.

At the end of July, the exhibition on Stuttgart 21 in the station tower was closed. The viewing platform on the tower has also not been accessible since then. From mid-August 2019, the shops in the previous main hall of the main station were closed to make room for a renovation that should take at least five years. The previous services of the railway and some shops will be distributed to temporary new buildings in the area of the old north entrance, the former banking hall of the BW Bank and to stalls on the temporary new track head.

Demolition work on the north wing, August 26, 2010
Completed demolition, September 27, 2010
Demolition work on the south wing, March 2012
Removed track roof over the dismantled tracks 15 and 16, March 2014
Former head area of the platforms, September 2014
Demolition work under the dismantled tracks 15 and 16, September 2014
Cleared hall of the Bonatz building, October 2019

Technology building

Construction pit for the technical building

The control and safety technology for the new underground station, the S-Bahn station and parts of the old station building are to be installed in the technology building. After the north wing was dismantled in June 2010 and the trees were transplanted on Kurt-Georg-Kiesinger-Platz in February 2011, civil engineering work began in April 2012. To secure the construction pit, drill supports were installed. Since the technology building will protrude under the Bonatz building, it had to be underpinned using a high-pressure injection process. The shell work was completed in October 2013.

The Stuttgart-based company Wolff & Müller had originally been awarded the contract for the technical building in May 2010, but they returned the order without giving any reason. It was put out to tender again in December 2011 and awarded to a working group consisting of the two companies Kellerbau in Süßen and Fischer in Weilheim an der Teck . The company Kellerbau filed for bankruptcy at the beginning of August 2012 and the construction was continued by the company Fischer alone.

New building

In mid-July 2010, the construction of the main station (including the adjoining tunnel sections of the north and south head, the culverts Nesenbach, West and Cannstatter Strasse) was put out to tender. In March 2012, the contract was awarded to a consortium led by the Stuttgart construction company Züblin .

The necessary for the construction of the station trough reconstruction of Nesenbach - culvert at the main station should begin in the second half of 2012 and be completed in 2014 after the state of planning from March 2012 found. At the beginning of August 2014 this conversion had still not started. Deutsche Bahn had applied for a change to the originally planned conversion method, which had not been approved by the Federal Railway Authority at the time.

At the beginning of August 2014, the excavation work for the station trough began. Its sections are numbered from 1 to 25. Work initially began in section 16, in the area of the former central bus station. A schedule presented in mid-2013 for the excavation work in the Mittlerer Schlossgarten was considered outdated in mid-2014. Of the 14 construction steps planned up to then, 7 had been completed and the work was about five months behind schedule.

Although it was originally planned to keep the building, the former building of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was also demolished for the construction work in the section on Jägerstraße from mid-February .

In mid-August 2015, work on the station trough was several months behind schedule. At this point in time, the construction workers reached the bottom in section 16, the deepest point. According to the schedule that Deutsche Bahn and the construction company Züblin had submitted a year earlier, this should have been achieved by the beginning of April at the latest. Of the 18 planned partial steps on construction phase 16, 7 were completed.

On January 26, 2016, one year after the date set in the August 2014 schedule, the casting of the floor slab in the first construction pit of the main train station began, initially with the base plate on the so-called media channel. The foundation stone for the new station was laid on September 16, 2016, more than 6 years after construction began.

In June 2017, around 18 months later than planned according to the previous plan, construction began on the first of 28 chalice pillars that will in future support the roof of the main station. The seventh cup column was concreted in February 2020.

Sections of the station trough
Excavation work on Section 16, August 2014
Excavation in the former platform area of the old central station, February 2015
Field 1 above Jägerstrasse: demolition of the IHK building, February 2015
Sections 16 to 21, view from the station tower. Left behind the construction site is the planetarium
Foundation construction in the former platform area of the old main station, October 2017
Concrete plant at the main train station, October 2017
The construction site in January 2020

Middle palace garden

Clearance work in the castle park after tree felling at night, October 1, 2010
Derelict in the middle palace garden and main station in March 2012
Construction site in the middle palace garden in November 2013
Construction progress at the beginning of October 2017
View from the station tower, December 2017
Stump of a calyx support, January 2018

On April 1, 2010, the previous central bus station at the main train station was closed and relocated to other locations, as the site is needed as a construction logistics area for Stuttgart 21.

In order to set up the groundwater management, the first trees in the middle palace garden were felled on October 1, 2010 at around 1:00 am - amid protests by several thousand citizens - under police protection. While the BUND had applied for a temporary injunction against the felling at short notice, the Federal Railway Authority had forbidden the felling; Outstanding documents of the landscape conservation planning should be submitted beforehand, in particular a species protection report on possible occurrences of the Russian beetle . According to a media report, representatives of DB and EBA had agreed in a meeting seven hours before the start of the felling. Occurrences of the Russian beetle found in one of the 25 felled trees were recovered that same night and taken to a rearing station. Critics complain that the responsible authorities knew of the violation of species protection law before the trees were felled . In response to an urgent application by the BUND against DB Netz at the Stuttgart Administrative Court , the aim of which was to ban the felling in the short term, the EBA, the regional council and DB did not inform the court of their considerable concerns regarding species protection; In a subsequent ruling, the court emphasized that if it had known these facts, it would have prohibited the felling. Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior and the police kept the planned felling date secret from the regional council and the Federal Railway Office. The EBA only found out about the tree felling after a phone call from the court.

On the night of February 14th to 15th, 2012, the central palace garden was cleared by the police in accordance with the general decree of the city of Stuttgart. Around 2,500 police officers, also from other federal states, were on duty. The following day, the waste management department in Stuttgart began to clear the tent village. By February 25, 2012, 68 trees had been moved and 116 felled with a spade machine . Of the trees to be relocated, 14 were relocated within the palace gardens and 54 within the urban area.

In August 2012, several sculptures were moved within the palace garden: the Eberhards group , the “Monument to the Württemberg Grenadier Regiment Queen Olga” and the Franz Liszt Monument . At the same time, the state pavilion built for the National Garden Show in 1977 was demolished and the street “Am Schloßgarten” was permanently closed to traffic.

Groundwater management

Groundwater control system (May 2011)

In the planning approval decision of 2005, it was planned to build a total of four decentralized water treatment systems as part of the groundwater management. In 2009, the railway applied for a central system to be built in the Mittlerer Schlossgarten instead, in order to reduce interference with traffic and the cityscape and to improve the control and monitoring of the system. This was approved by the Federal Railway Authority in April 2010.

In mid-December 2008, the establishment of 90 groundwater measuring points in the palace garden began to monitor the 5 to 8 m deep subsidence of the groundwater necessary for the main station excavation.

From autumn 2010 to December 2011 - with an interruption for the construction stop after the state elections in Baden-Württemberg in 2011 - the building for the central groundwater management and a “substantial part” of the 12 kilometer long and up to 20 centimeter thick pipe connections were constructed.

On December 16, 2011, the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg declared that the approval by the Federal Railway Authority was illegal. The court upheld a lawsuit by the Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation (BUND). According to the court, the Federal Railway Authority should have examined the consequences of nature conservation law and involved the BUND. After a total of 30 associations were given the opportunity to submit a statement on the amendment in April 2012, the Federal Railway Authority approved the central groundwater management again on October 23, 2012.

While the approval process was still in progress, the railway applied for a change to the plan: The water withdrawal would have to be increased to 6.8 billion liters, more than double the originally planned amount. This change of plan is controversial. The plan amendment application to increase the permissible extraction and extraction volumes to up to 6.8 million m³ or 0.76 million m³ is dated May 13, 2011. On April 20 and September 12, 2012, the documents were presented again in a modified form and initiated the hearing on August 30, 2012. By the end of the objection period on October 23, 2012, around 10,000 objections had been raised by around 4,000 objectors. The discussion took place from July 15 to 17, 2013, after numerous requests for bias against the head of the negotiation at the time, another discussion date took place from September 9 to 13, 2013. Another discussion day followed on December 12, 2013. The plan change notification was issued on September 22, 2014 The permit is limited to a period of seven years from the start of commissioning of the groundwater management.

In the spring of 2014, members of the engineers group against Stuttgart 21 , according to their own statements, took water samples from the end pieces of the pipes. They found increased levels of rust in the samples. A traffic accident in Jägerstrasse at the end of June 2014 seemed to confirm this finding. A truck had knocked over some of the blue pipes. On press photos it could be seen that rust water had run out of the pipes and that they were rusted inside. Towards the end of August 2014, the Federal Railway Authority ordered a more precise, regular inspection of the groundwater to be discharged for the period up to the end of October 2014.

Tunnel work

On May 5, 2010, the construction of the Filder and Ober- and Untertürkheim tunnels with an expected contract volume of 1.7 billion euros were tendered across Europe. On July 30, 2011, the construction of both tunnels was awarded. The contract is worth more than 700 million euros. According to the DB, around a quarter of the total construction costs of Stuttgart 21 have been awarded.

In March 2012, Deutsche Bahn awarded the construction work for the Feuerbach tunnel to a bidding consortium led by Baresel and the work on the Bad Cannstatt tunnel to a community led by Hochtief . At the same time, the station access tunnel belonging to section 1.1 was given a bidding consortium under the leadership of the Stuttgart construction company Züblin together with the construction of the new main station.

The work for the north-western head of the station will be carried out using an open construction method. The buildings at Jägerstrasse 22-24 and the rear part of the former Federal Railway Directorate were demolished between April and October 2012. The house at Sängerstrasse 4, at the southern end of the planned underground station, stood in the way and was demolished in October 2013.

During the year 2013 began with false attacks ( Tunnel Obertürkheim , tunnel Bad Cannstatt and tunnel Feuerbach the starting excavation () and construction Filder Tunnel ) main measures in all tunnels on the Stuttgart district. In November 2013, driving work began on the Wagenburg tunnel in Stuttgart , which will serve as a rescue access for the underground station and the Filder tunnel. These had to be interrupted after 15 days because the state water supply did not agree with the amount of the compensation that the railway had offered for the tunneling of its administration building. After a preliminary agreement, construction work continued on November 28, 2013.

On December 4, 2013, the first tunnel of the Stuttgart 21 project was pierced with the Obertürkheim tunnel . This was followed by the start of the Bad Cannstatt tunnel on March 21, 2014, the start of construction of the Filder tunnel on July 10, 2014 and the start of December 2014 the start of the Feuerbach tunnel.

At the end of 2017, 35.1 of 58.8 km of tunnels (60%) had been driven, in June 2018 it was 40.8 of 58.8 km of tunnels (70%). At the beginning of September 2019, the advance for the Filder Tunnel was completed, in February 2020 that for the Bad Cannstatt Tunnel. This completed the driving and excavation of a total of 49.4 km or 84% of the tunnels.

Demolition of the house at Sängerstr. 4th
Construction site in front of the Wagenburg tunnel
State water supply building
Station-side portal of the Feuerbacher Tunnel, January 2016
Construction work on the B10, in the area of the future Bad Cannstatt tunnel (December 2016)

Fire protection

In 2012, an expert office commissioned by the DB diagnosed considerable deficiencies in the fire protection of the planned building and the tunnels. The fire protection concept could not be approved and would endanger human life in an emergency. The railway then had the fire protection concept revised. In September 2013, the Stuttgart fire brigade also confirmed that the new concept had serious deficiencies.

The expert Christoph Engelhardt has criticized since 2014 that the fire protection in the underground station is not working. Concrete warnings also come from the renowned fire protection expert Hans-Joachim Keim, who, among other things, examined the Kaprun tunnel fire disaster. Due to the incline of the platform and the distance between the rescue tunnels, evacuation could not be successful. He called the Filder Tunnel a “nine kilometer long chimney” . According to Keims, the new underground station “has the potential to become Europe's largest crematorium.” While four trains per platform are planned in the DB operating programs, the official evacuation simulations are based on only two trains per platform.

Bridge structures

At the beginning of 2012, the Sulzbachtal railway overpass, the longest bridge structure in Stuttgart 21 at 365 m, was under construction. This construction was completed in 2015.

In the case of the new Neckar Bridge , the cycle advance of the bridge parts was completed in mid-2018. The road slabs were installed in 2019.

Sulzbachtal railway overpass, 2018
Neckar Bridge
Pedestrian walkway

Construction logistics

Construction logistics area at the Nordbahnhof (2016)

At the end of February 2011, the contract for construction roads and logistics areas between the main train station and the north train station was awarded. The construction work on the four-kilometer-long and eight-meter-wide construction road between the main train station and the central logistics areas at the north station began in May 2013; from July to October 2014, a conveyor belt was set up on the federal highway 14 to remove the excavation from the tunnel construction sites.

Light rail

State Gallery construction site, January 2020

The project makes it necessary to relocate the Staatsgalerie tram stop and the tram tunnel between the Hauptbahnhof and Türlenstraße stops . Around the beginning of July 2010, Deutsche Bahn and the Stuttgarter Straßenbahnen (SSB) agreed on the distribution of the costs amounting to 132 million euros.

The Heilbronner Strasse urban railway tunnel has been under construction since March 2013. The two tunnel tubes were hit on July 20, 2013. The SSB estimate that it will take nine months for the tunnel tubes to break through. The new route is scheduled to go into operation at the beginning of 2016 and enable the new tram route between the main train station and the new city library.

The prerequisite for the construction of the new Staatsgalerie tram stop is the construction of station segment 22, on which the new tram stop will then be based. Construction work for the new stop began in 2018 and should be completed by the end of 2020.

Former railway management

The former railway management set on pillars

In mid-2017, the building of the former railway headquarters was undermined and placed on a 1.3 m thick concrete slab. This in turn rests on some supports between which the construction machinery and vehicles can maneuver. The railway had aimed to demolish and rebuild the building built between 1911 and 1912. However, the city of Stuttgart insisted on preservation.

Stuttgart-Feuerbach train station

Demolition work at Feuerbach train station, March 2013

Construction work in the Stuttgart-Feuerbach train station began on October 30, 2012. By December 2012, new overhead line masts were erected and the filling of the platform underpass began. In 2013, platform 3 was demolished to make room for the new track system. The shell is to be completed in mid-2021.

Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 59–67.

^ Hugo Kübler: The expansion of the Stuttgart main station . Reprint from Neue Tagblatt No. 253, 254, 255, 256., ZDB -ID 125445-5 , Stuttgart, October 1905.

^ Hany Azer , B. Engel: Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. In: tunnel. Issue 7/2009, ISSN 0722-6241 , pp. 12-24 ( PDF file , 290 kB).

↑ ^a ^b Achim Wörner: The main station in the mirror of the times (3) . Stuttgart newspaper . January 22, 2008. Archived from the original on August 14, 2009. Retrieved on December 3, 2010.

^ Hans-Martin Heuschele: A train station under the main train station . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 202 , August 27, 1970, pp. 17 .

^ Gerhard Heimerl : Winding paths to the goal. Detours and obstacles on the way to Stuttgart 21 . In: Turm-Forum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. A milestone in the European high-speed network . Stuttgart 2006, "Sonderedition 678-1006", pp. 47–49.

↑ Gerhard Heimerl: Routing of the DB high-speed line Stuttgart – Augsburg (–Munich): Notes and Considerations for the documentation of the preliminary examinations of the ABS / NBS Plochingen-Günzburg. Stuttgart 1988.

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 50–58.

↑ Dieter Schubert: Planner suggestion: New city via the station tunnel . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 242, October 19, 1990, p. 19.

^ Controversial billion dollar project: The man who invented Stuttgart 21 ( Memento from December 27, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: Financial Times Deutschland , December 24, 2010.

↑ ^a ^b Planned tunnels in the course of the new Stuttgart – Ulm line . In: tunnel. Issue 5/1993, ISSN 0722-6241 , pp. 288-292.

↑ Deutsche Bundesbahn / Deutsche Reichsbahn (Ed.): New line Stuttgart - Ulm: The railway applies for the regional planning procedure . Press release from September 6, 1993.

^ ^A ^b ^c Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, projects (publisher): "Stuttgart 21" project. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, approx. 1995, pp. 5, 8, 16 f., 20-25, 32 f., 36 f (similar version as PDF file online, 14 MB).

↑ Meinhard von Gerkan : Renaissance of the railway stations as the nucleus of urban development . In: Renaissance of the railway stations. The city in the 21st century . Vieweg Verlag , 1996, ISBN 3-528-08139-2 , pp. 16-63, in particular pp. 56 f.

^ Association of German Architects u. a. (Ed.): Renaissance of the railway stations. The city in the 21st century . Vieweg Verlag , 1996, ISBN 3-528-08139-2 , pp. 156-163.

↑ Stuttgart is to be tunneled under for long-distance trains . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 89, 1994, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 10.

↑ ^a ^b underground station for long-distance travelers . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 13, 1995, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 8.

^ Armin Käfer: Experts: The underground train station in Stuttgart can be built . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . January 17, 1995.

^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, project (ed. :): "Stuttgart 21" project: The feasibility study (overview) . Four-page information brochure, no year (approx. 1995).

↑ ^a ^b Stuttgart is gearing up for the future of transport policy . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 88, 1996 (supplement), ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 900.

^ Gerhard Heimerl : Efficient transport as a location factor . In: The Railway Engineer . 1996, No. 5, ISSN 0013-2810 , pp. 8-12.

↑ State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Financing agreement for the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project ( Memento of the original from August 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 2.3 MB). Printed matter 14/4382 of April 22, 2009. @1@ 2

^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, regional area Stuttgart, projects (ed.): The synergy concept Stuttgart 21. The results of the preliminary project . Brochure (44 A4 pages), Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 10-21, 38-40 ( PDF file , 14 MB).

↑ ^a ^b ^c Peter Marquart : The development of the project planning . In: Regional Council Stuttgart (ed.): Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm: The consideration of water management in planning - an interim balance . Proceedings, September 26, 2006, ( PDF file, 8 MB ( Memento from December 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive )), pp. 6–13.

↑ From Stuttgart 21 to DBProjekte Süd . In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 3.

↑ Christoph Ingenhoven: An answer developed from the location: Realization competition for the redesign of Stuttgart Central Station . In: TurmForum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart Project 21. Book accompanying the exhibition in the TurmForum Stuttgart 21, pp. 56–59.

↑ DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, p. 3.

↑ DB ProjektBau GmbH Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction: Extension and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg. Stuttgart - Wendlingen area with airport connection. Section 1.1 Crossing the valley with the main train station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0.
1. Explanatory report Part II: Presentation of the choice of variants . Document dated October 4, 2004, approved by the decision of the Federal Railway Office, Karlsruhe / Stuttgart branch office of January 28, 2005. File number 59160 PAP-PS21-PFA 1.1, pp. 2-4, 7-10.

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h DB ProjektBau GmbH Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction: Extension and new construction of the Stuttgart - Augsburg line. Stuttgart - Wendlingen area with airport connection. Section 1.1 Crossing the valley with the main train station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0.
1. Explanatory report Part II: Presentation of the choice of variants . Document dated October 4, 2004, approved by the resolution of the Federal Railway Authority, Karlsruhe / Stuttgart branch office of January 28, 2005. File number 59160 PAP-PS21-PFA 1.1, pp. 11-17, 19.

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g Federal Railway Office: Plan approval decision according to § 18 Paragraph 1 General Railway Act (AEG) for the conversion of the Stuttgart railway junction "Project Stuttgart 21" plan approval section 1.1 (valley crossing with new main station) from rail km - 0, 4- 42.0 to train km + 0.4 + 32.0 in Stuttgart ( Memento of the original from March 4, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF file). Stuttgart January 28, 2005, pages 174, 200-203, 254. @1@ 2

^ Konstantin Schwarz, Michael Gerster: Stuttgart-21 opponents sense their chance . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , March 31, 2009, p. 5.

↑ Shunting on the siding . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 144, 1995, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 5.

↑ Notification of withdrawal from major projects? . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7/8, year 1999, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 282.

↑ ^a ^b ^c “Stuttgart 21” project called into question . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 153, 1999, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 5.

↑ Dankwart Guratzsch: Railway station projects are threatened . In: The world . No. 171 , July 26, 1999, ISSN 0173-8437 , p. 14 .

↑ Notification of major projects on the siding . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 9, year 1999, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 338.

↑ Announcement Billion Holes . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10, year 1999, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 401.

↑ countries set the course to train and waistband . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 267, 1999, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. L14.

↑ Bahn Supervisory Board stops “Stuttgart 21” . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 279, 1999, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 25.

↑ ^a ^b ^c Stuttgart business . In: Der Spiegel , issue 33/2010, p. 38.

↑ Lord Mayor threatens Bahn with lawsuit . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 281, 1999, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 6.

↑ Municipal Council of the City of Stuttgart: Printed matter 177/21. March 2001.

↑ Report Stuttgart 21 postponed again . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 8–9 / 2000, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 338.

↑ Teufel demands a clear yes to “Stuttgart 21” from Berlin . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 283, 2000, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 5.

^ "ICE route must not fail at Stuttgart 21" . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 284, 2000, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 44.

↑ Helmut Kobus : The development of water management problems in the planning process . In: Regional Council Stuttgart (ed.): Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm: The consideration of water management in planning - an interim balance . Proceedings, September 26, 2006, ( PDF file, 8 MB ( Memento from December 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive )), pp. 14-27.

↑ A diary like a politician during an election campaign . In: DB Welt , February 2008 edition, p. 8.

↑ Understand the station . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 257, 1997, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 14.

↑ ^a ^b ^c Announcement "Green light" for Stuttgart 21 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2001, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 148.

↑ Michael Ohnewald : Bahn says yes - but Stuttgart 21 threatens new delays . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . March 15, 2001, p. 21 .

^ Michael Ohnewald : Timetable for Stuttgart 21 out of time . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . May 17, 2001, p. 23 .

↑ ^a ^b Deutsche Bahn AG (publisher): Signals for Stuttgart 21, the new Wendlingen - Ulm and Neu Ulm 21 line still on green ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release 056/2001 from May 16, 2001.@1@ 2

↑ DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory Report Part I: General Part - Supplement (adaptation to the BVWP 2003) . As of October 4, 2004, p. 35.

↑ Mathias Bury: The vision of the tunnel station in 18 files . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . November 2, 2001, p. 23 .

↑ Under the microscope: How the plan approval procedure works . In: TurmForum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart Project 21. Book accompanying the exhibition in the TurmForum Stuttgart 21, p. 50 f.

↑ DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 27, 30 f.

↑ DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory Report Part I: General Part - Supplement (adaptation to the BVWP 2003) . As of October 4, 2004, pp. 1 f, 32 f., 36.

^ Reimar Baur: Tunnel construction in the Stuttgart 21 project . In: Geotechnik , Volume 25 (2002), Issue 3, pp. 153–156.

^ DB ProjektBau, Project Center Stuttgart 1 (Ed.): Stuttgart 21: Feuerbach and Bad Cannstatt feeder with S-Bahn connection . 14-page brochure dated August 2003.

↑ Back from the siding . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 283, 2001, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 55n.

↑ Man as a mole . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 196, 2004, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 38.

↑ "Important future projects that belong together ..." . In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 8.

^ In autumn, decision on the Stuttgart train station . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 137, 2006, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 6.

^ Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Lawsuits against "Stuttgart 21" unsuccessful . Press release April 6, 2006.

^ Verkehrsclub Deutschland, Landesverband Baden-Württemberg: VCD regrets VGH judgment on Stuttgart 21 . Press release No. 7/2006, dated April 6, 2006.

↑ message Speedy decision in Baden-Wuerttemberg . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 8–9 / 2006, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 380.

↑ Martin Buchenau, Daniel Delhaes, Dieter Fockenbrock: Full speed in the tunnel . In: Handelsblatt . No. 46 , March 6, 2013, ISSN 0017-7296 , p. 20 .

↑ ^a ^b Request of the parliamentary group of the CDU, the parliamentary group of the SPD and the parliamentary group of the FDP: Resolution zu Stuttgart 21, printed matter 14/381 (PDF; 94 kB) Landtag of Baden-Württemberg. September 28, 2006. Archived from the original on January 12, 2012. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved October 17, 2010. @1@ 2

↑ State Parliament, 14th electoral period, 10th session on Thursday, October 12, 2006 (PDF; 565 kB), ( Memento of the original from January 17, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Agenda item 3. @1@ 2

↑ Plenary minutes 14/10 (PDF; 579 kB) State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg. October 12, 2006. Archived from the original on January 17, 2012. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved October 17, 2010. @1@ 2

↑ Highest Railway . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 226, 2006, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. V2 / 1.

^ Bahnhof Stuttgart 21 is further delayed . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 246, 2006, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 5.

↑ Financing for Stuttgart 21 will not be clarified until June . Article on swr.de from April 23, 2007 (no longer available online).

↑ Decision on construction cost risks postponed . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten of June 29, 2007.

↑ New top meeting in Stuttgart 21 . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten of April 18, 2007.

↑ Financing for Stuttgart 21 is available . In: Spiegel online from July 19, 2007.

↑ Deutsche Bahn AG: DB Supervisory Board expects partial privatization in the first half of the coming year . Press release from September 5, 2007.

↑ In profile: Peter Marquart. Patient planner of the major project "Stuttgart 21". In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , July 18, 2007, p. 4.

↑ Bahn is competing with citizens for approval . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten of January 2, 2008.

↑ A thank you to pea soup . In: DB Welt , April 2010 edition, p. 17.

↑ ^a ^b ^c overall project manager . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , August 19, 2011, p. 19.

↑ Stefan Penn replaces Hany Azer . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung, around May 31, 2011.

↑ Ministers seal billions in the Deutsche Bahn project . Spiegel online, April 2, 2009.

↑ Billion billion project Stuttgart 21 sealed . ( Memento of April 13, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten, April 2, 2009 (online edition).

↑ Deutsche Bahn AG (ed.): DB Supervisory Board: Green light for the Stuttgart 21 project / Richard Lutz appointed as the new CFO .

↑ Stuttgart 21 is coming: project partners agree . Press release from December 10th, 2009 on das-neue-herz-europas.de .

↑ Major project Stuttgart 21 overcomes parliamentary hurdle in committee . ( Memento of the original from October 18, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Current announcement (hib) of the German Bundestag from December 16, 2009. @1@ 2

↑ plenary 12.17. German Bundestag, stenographic report, 12th session (PDF; 2.9 MB) German Bundestag . December 17, 2009. Retrieved October 21, 2010.

↑ Printed matter 17/125. Application by MPs Winfried Hermann, Kerstin Andreae, Birgitt Bender, Alexander Bonde, Ingrid Hönlinger, Memet Kilic, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, Fritz Kuhn, Agnes Malczak, Beate Müller-Gemmeke, Dr. Gerhard Schick, Bettina Herlitzius, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Ingrid Nestle, Daniela Wagner, Dr. Valerie Wilms, Cornelia Behm, Hans-Josef Fell, Ulrike Höfken, Bärbel Höhn, Oliver Krischer, Undine Kurth (Quedlinburg), Nicole Maisch, Friedrich Ostendorff, Dr. Hermann Ott, Dorothea Steiner, Markus Tressel and the BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN parliamentary group: Moratorium for Stuttgart 21 - Ensure profitability of the major project before construction begins (PDF; 70 kB) German Bundestag . December 2, 2009. Retrieved October 21, 2010.

↑ Printed matter 17/268. Decision recommendation and report of the Committee for Transport, Building and Urban Development (15th Committee) on the motion of MPs Winfried Hermann, Kerstin Andreae, Birgitt Bender, other MPs and the BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN parliamentary group - printed matter 17/125 - (PDF; 80 kB) German Bundestag . December 17, 2009. Retrieved October 21, 2010.

↑ "The New Heart of Europe" . ( Memento from May 28, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten, March 25, 2008.

↑ Railway project Stuttgart – Ulm e. V. (Ed.): "The spokesman function is no longer compatible with the attitude of the SPD in the state and in the federal government". Resignation of Wolfgang Drexler MdL as spokesman for the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project . Press release from September 17, 2010.

↑ Railway project Stuttgart – Ulm e. V. (Ed.): The new spokesman for the Stuttgart-Ulm rail project will be former district president Dr. Udo Andriof and entrepreneur Wolfgang Dietrich . Press release from September 24, 2010.

↑ Communications office for the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project (ed.): Dr. Udo Andriof finishes speaking at the Stuttgart-Ulm rail project . Press release from May 2, 2011.

↑ Without a source

^ Vote for "Stuttgart 21 plus" . In: Handelsblatt . No. 233, 2010, ISSN 0017-7296 , p. 10 f.

↑ After two hours at the dead point . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 240, 2010, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 2.

^ Arbitration Stuttgart 21 PLUS (PDF file; 80 kB). November 30, 2010.

↑ "Geissler missed a great opportunity" . FAZ.NET . December 1, 2010. Retrieved December 6, 2010.

↑ Report on the station renovation: Stuttgart 21 passes the stress test. In: Spiegel Online . July 21, 2011, accessed June 9, 2018 .

↑ SMA AG Zurich: Audit for the operational quality review Stuttgart 21 - final report ( memento from April 1, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), Zurich, July 21, 2011 (PDF; 3.3 MiB).

↑ Heiner Geißler, SMA + Partner AG: Peace in Stuttgart - A compromise solution to pacify the disputes over Stuttgart 21 schlichtung-s21.de , pdf, document of July 29, 2011.

^ State government of Baden-Württemberg: "Evaluation of the combination solution by Dr. Heiner Geißler / SMA and partners through the state government “ mvi.baden-wuerttemberg.de ( Memento of the original from January 31, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , pdf, Stuttgart Oct. 2011, accessed on October 23, 2011. @1@ 2

↑ Press release: Urgent motion by two members of the action alliance against Stuttgart 21 against tree felling remains unsuccessful. Administrative Court Stuttgart, February 13, 2012, accessed on August 31, 2013 .

↑ Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen, SPD (ed.): The change begins. Coalition agreement between BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN and the SPD Baden-Württemberg Baden-Württemberg 2011 - 2016 , p. 30 f. ( PDF file , 0.9 MB).

↑ Law on the exercise of termination rights in the contractual agreements for the Stuttgart 21 rail project (S 21-Kündigungsgesetz). (PDF) Printed matter 15/0496. In: landtag-bw.de. September 13, 2011, accessed June 24, 2020 .

↑ Final result of the referendum on November 27, 2011 on the bill "Law on the exercise of rights of termination in the contractual agreements for the Stuttgart 21 rail project (S 21 termination law)" . State Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg . 2011. Archived from the original on December 6, 2011. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved June 9, 2012. @1@ 2

↑ Citizens' Forum Stuttgart 21 . Website of the project ..

↑ Source is missing

^ D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision . Announcement 2009 / S 36-052979 of February 21, 2009 in the electronic gazette of the European Union.

^ D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision . Document 76895-2009-EN of March 18, 2009 in the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union.

^ D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision . Call for tenders 2009 / S 60-086615 March 27, 2009 in the electronic gazette of the European Union.

↑ Communication Office Railway Project Stuttgart - Ulm (Ed.): Construction work for Stuttgart 21 begins ( Memento of the original from September 28, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release 1/2010 from January 13, 2010. @1@ 2

^ DB Mobility Logistics AG (ed.): After the state election: Deutsche Bahn zu Stuttgart 21 . Press release from March 29, 2011.

^ Michael Isenberg: Ghostly calm in groundwater management . Stuttgart news . March 30, 2011. Retrieved March 30, 2011.

^ Opponents block construction site again , Stuttgarter Zeitung Online, June 14, 2011.

↑ Thomas Wüpper: Bahn is expecting further delays internally . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . April 21, 2012 ( online ).

↑ Markus Heffner: The railway admits a year delay . Stuttgarter Zeitung, March 24, 2012, p. 21 ( similar version online ).

↑ Markus Heffner: Bahn changes the schedule again . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . February 16, 2013, p. 22 ( online ).

↑ Thomas Durchdenwald, Markus Heffner: Project partners make heavy accusations . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . July 24, 2013, p. 19 ( online ).

↑ Kefer stays at the end of 2021 . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 219 , September 20, 2013, p. 19 ( online ).

^ Jörg Nauke: Bahn confirms internally deadline delay ( memento of October 5, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), Stuttgarter Zeitung, September 16, 2013

^ Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): DB S21 Project: Information on the press conference on December 12, 2012 . 14-page presentation, Berlin, December 12, 2012, (PDF file; 0.2 MB) , pp. 4, 5.

↑ Sven Böll: McKinsey report: Costs for Stuttgart 21 rise to 6.8 billion euros , Der Spiegel, December 12, 2012, accessed on October 3, 2013

↑ ^a ^b Thomas Wüpper: The cost explosion and its consequences , Stuttgarter Zeitung, December 12, 2012, accessed on October 3, 2013

↑ Thomas Wüpper: Those responsible breathe easy - for the time being , Stuttgarter Zeitung, March 5, 2013, accessed on October 3, 2013

↑ Volker Kefer: Steering Committee Stuttgart 21 on July 23, 2013 (PDF; 1.1 MB), presentation, p. 22, accessed on October 3, 2013

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d Konstantin Schwarz: Construction companies should do magic. Stuttgarter Nachrichten, February 6, 2015, accessed on March 4, 2015

↑ Sascha Schmierer: Filder-Trasse not recommended. Stuttgarter Zeitung, March 1, 2015, accessed on March 4, 2015

↑ Christian Milankovic: Tunnel drill is working again. , Stuttgarter Zeitung, January 28, 2015, accessed on March 4, 2015

^ Christian Milankovic: Bahn is lowering the S-21 tunnel. Stuttgarter Zeitung, February 18, 2015, accessed on March 5, 2015

↑ Claus Hecking, Gerald Trauvetter: Week of Truth for Stuttgart 21. In: Der Spiegel. December 12, 2017. Retrieved December 29, 2017 .

↑ Costs for Stuttgart 21 now at ten billion euros. In: The time. July 5, 2016. Retrieved December 29, 2017 .

^ Germany-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision. Document 2016 / S 075-132648. In: Supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union . April 16, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016 .

^ Germany-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines. Document 2016 / S 071-124769. In: Supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union . April 12, 2016. Retrieved April 16, 2016 .

↑ ^a ^b ^c track apron . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. Archived from the original on August 23, 2012. Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved November 1, 2012. @1@ 2

↑ Volker Kefer : Continuing construction despite construction freeze? . Direktzu.de. April 15, 2011. Retrieved April 4, 2012.

↑ S-Bahn is now delayed . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , June 29, 2010.

↑ S-Bahn traffic back to normal . Stuttgart news . January 4, 2011. Retrieved February 15, 2012.

↑ Ralf Recklies: Railway chaos will probably continue for days , Stuttgarter Zeitung , September 30, 2012, accessed on October 9, 2012.

↑ Rebecca Müller: Test train derailed at the main train station , Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 9, 2012, accessed on October 9, 2012.

↑ Markus Heffner: Another train derailed at the main station. Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 10, 2012, p. 17.

↑ ^a ^b Christine Bilger, Michael Petersen: Three tracks remain closed until further notice . Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 10, 2012, accessed on October 10, 2012.

^ Thomas Durchdenwald: Longer ways for rail travelers . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . May 27, 2013 ( Longer ways for rail travelers [accessed June 5, 2013]).

^ Relocation of the cross platform in Stuttgart main station . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. May 23, 2013. Archived from the original on October 5, 2013. Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved June 12, 2013. @1@ 2

↑ ^a ^b ^c Cross platform for Stuttgart 21: New ways in the main station , online article by Markus Heffner, Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 21, 2013.

^ Ullrich Martin : Stuttgart 21: Large-scale project with a European dimension . In: Deine Bahn , Issue 7/2009, pp. 6–13.

↑ Bonatz building remains a reception building for the train station . In: Dialog 21 , Edition 2, September 2010 ( ZDB -ID 2569219-7 ), p. 3.

^ For Stuttgart 21: argumentation paper of the state boards (PDF; 25 kB) Chamber of Architects, Association of German Architects. October 26, 2007. Retrieved March 13, 2011.

^ Reasons for the judgment in the Dübbers case ./. Deutsche Bahn . Stuttgart Regional Court . May 20, 2010. Retrieved December 10, 2010.

↑ ^a ^b Worldwide protest: Train station must not become a torso ( memento from November 24, 2010 in the Internet Archive ), Stuttgarter Zeitung from October 2, 2008.

↑ Bonatz building is to become a world cultural heritage . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , November 25, 2009.

↑ Architects want to save the main train station . ( Memento of the original from October 10, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 9, 2008. @1@ 2

↑ MPs take their time . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , May 2, 2010.

^ Petition: Railway real estate management - Stuttgart Central Station from November 6, 2008 . German Bundestag . Retrieved February 20, 2011.

↑ Still no answer . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , March 2, 2011.

↑ Bundesstiftung Baukultur (Ed.): Central Station Stuttgart - Bahnchef Grube conducts a crisis discussion with foundations ( memento of the original from December 18, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Press release from July 26, 2010. @1@ 2

^ Lawsuit by Bonatz-Enkel: The process started on April 22, 2010 Stuttgarter Nachrichten online, February 5, 2010.

↑ The court allows the station to be converted . Stuttgart news . May 20, 2010. Retrieved May 20, 2010.

^ Dispute over copyright . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , June 25, 2010.

↑ Court rejects urgent application against demolition . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , August 11, 2010.

↑ Dübbers is defeated, albeit just under . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 6, 2010.

↑ Bonatz grandson does not give up . ( Memento of the original from February 20, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , December 15, 2010. @1@ 2

↑ Federal Court of Justice (ed.): Federal Court of Justice decides in the copyright dispute over “Stuttgart 21” . Press release 186/2011 from November 24, 2011.

↑ Stuttgart 21: Administrative Court rejects an urgent application against the demolition of the south wing of Stuttgart Central Station . Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg . January 30, 2012. Retrieved February 1, 2012.

↑ ^a ^b Communication Office Railway Project Stuttgart – Ulm (Ed.): Demolition of the north wing of the Stuttgart train station continued . Press release from August 13, 2010.

↑ Demolition at the main train station begins under great police protection , Stuttgarter Zeitung , July 30, 2010.

↑ ^a ^b Bahn wants to tear down the north wing in August . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , July 26, 2010.

↑ Railway project Stuttgart-Ulm e. V. (Ed.): Bahn prepares the demolition of the north wing . Press release from July 13, 2010.

↑ [1]

↑ ^a ^b Bahn continues construction work on Stuttgart 21 . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. January 13, 2012. Archived from the original on January 16, 2012. Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved January 14, 2012. @1@ 2

↑ Demolition of the south wing has begun . Handelsblatt . January 30, 2012. Retrieved February 1, 2012.

↑ Jürgen Bock: The demolition of the south wing is dormant for months . Stuttgart news. April 4, 2012. Retrieved April 4, 2012.

↑ Jürgen Bock: The demolition of the south wing continues . Stuttgart news. April 12, 2012. Retrieved April 16, 2012.

↑ Demolition of the south wing. (No longer available online.) Stuttgart-Ulm rail project, archived from the original on October 23, 2013 ; Retrieved November 13, 2013 .

↑ ^a ^b Beginning of the measures to relocate the north access at the main station . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. April 17th, 2012. Archived from the original on August 22nd, 2012. Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved May 6, 2012. @1@ 2

^ SIR: Diggers nibble on the station roof . Stuttgart newspaper. January 21, 2012. Retrieved March 14, 2014.

↑ Editor Stuttgarter Zeitung: Stuttgart Central Station: S-21 exhibition closes on Sunday. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. July 26, 2019, accessed September 8, 2019 .

↑ dud: Closing shops in the counter hall: That will change in Stuttgart Central Station. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. August 13, 2019, accessed September 8, 2019 .

↑ ^a ^b On the construction site: technical building . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. Archived from the original on October 26, 2012. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved November 1, 2012. @1@ 2

↑ Markus Heffner: Technology building grows underground. Stuttgarter Zeitung, August 16, 2012, page 19

^ D-Stuttgart: Construction of train stations . Document 2010 / S 137-211193 of July 17, 2010 in the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union.

↑ ^a ^b ^c DB places orders for tunnels and new Stuttgart underground station worth around 800 million euros . Deutsche Bahn . March 13, 2012. Accessed on May 7, 2012. ( Page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2
↑ Markus Heffner: Work on the underground station will begin in 2013 . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 55, March 6, 2012, p. 19 (similar version online ).
↑ Thomas Durchdenwald: Dates have been postponed again and again. Stuttgarter Zeitung, August 5, 2014, accessed on August 10, 2014
↑ Christian Milankovic: Trogbau for the station starts at four points. Stuttgarter Zeitung, August 5, 2014, accessed on August 10, 2014.
↑ Christian Milankovic: Bahn is fighting in the S-21 trough with the schedule . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . No. 184 , August 12, 2015, p. 19 ( online ).
↑ Christian Milankovic: Demolition of the old IHK building begins , Stuttgarter Zeitung, February 18, 2015, accessed on March 4, 2015
↑ Christian Milankovic: Bahn is fighting in the S-21 trough with the schedule. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. August 12, 2015, accessed August 18, 2015 .
^ Christian Milankovic: The first concrete flows in the station trough . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . January 27, 2016, p. 19 ( online ).
↑ Laying of the foundation stone: Bahn boss calls Stuttgart 21 a great gift . In: The time . September 16, 2016, ISSN 0044-2070 ( zeit.de [accessed on September 16, 2016]).
↑ Konstantin Schwarz: The construction of the chalice supports is a headache. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten. May 19, 2017. Retrieved October 3, 2017 .
↑ Christian Milankovic: Construction of the chalice supports has started. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. June 1, 2017, accessed October 3, 2017 .
↑ Construction progress of the platform hall: Seventh cup of the main train station concreted . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. February 3, 2020. Accessed March 1, 2020.
↑ Central bus station (ZOB) at the main train station will be closed . State capital Stuttgart, communications department. March 18, 2010. Accessed on October 9, 2010. ( Page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2
↑ Source is missing
↑ Bahn ignored the order of the supervisory authority . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 14, 2010.
↑ ^a ^b Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz (Ed.): S21 tree felling was a planned breach of law with the participation of state authorities . Press release from November 25, 2010.
^ ^A ^b Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz (Ed.): Stuttgart Administrative Court confirms the BUND's legal opinion comprehensively . Press release from October 14, 2010.
↑ ^a ^b Tree clearing for Stuttgart 21 finished . Stuttgart news . February 25, 2012. Retrieved May 7, 2012.
↑ The Eberhards group has moved . Stuttgart news . August 2, 2012. Retrieved November 1, 2012.
↑ On the construction site: Middle Castle Garden . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. Archived from the original on January 21, 2013. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved January 21, 2013. @1@ 2

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Notification according to § 18 AEG i. V. m. Section 76 (3) VwVfG and Section 18 d AEG for the major project Stuttgart 21, PFA 1.1, 5. PÄ Centralization of wastewater treatment plants . Federal Railway Office. October 23, 2012. Archived from the original on October 27, 2012. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved November 1, 2012. @1@ 2

↑ In the castle garden, drilling for the underground station begins . ( Memento from February 20, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , December 15, 2008.

↑ Groundwater management . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. Retrieved November 1, 2012.

↑ ^a ^b Stuttgart 21: BUND's action against 5th plan change (re-planning of groundwater management) successful , press release from the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg, December 16, 2011 (accessed on December 16, 2011).

↑ Markus Heffner: Bahn can complete groundwater system construction , Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 25, 2012, accessed on October 1, 2013

↑ Markus Heffner: Groundwater management: regional council is considering continuation , Stuttgarter Zeitung, September 14, 2013, accessed on October 1, 2013

↑ Federal Railway Office (Ed.): Notification according to § 18d AEG i. V. m. Section 76 (1) VwVfG and Section 18 AEG for the "Large-scale project Stuttgart 21: PFA 1.1, 7th PÄ, plan amendment water law" (...) . Gz: 591pä / 006-2304 # 00. Karlsruhe September 22, 2014, p. 1, 13, 14, 40-45 ( PDF file ). Notification according to § 18d AEG i. V. m. Section 76 (1) VwVfG and Section 18 AEG for the project "Large-scale project Stuttgart 21: PFA 1.1, 7th PÄ, plan amendment water law" (...) ( Memento of the original from March 4, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link became automatic used and not yet tested. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2
^ Thomas Durchdenwald: Stuttgart 21 critics report. Stuttgarter Zeitung, August 1, 2014, accessed on August 21, 2014
↑ Thomas Durchdenwald: Railway has to check water more closely. Stuttgarter Zeitung, August 22, 2014, accessed on August 22, 2014
^ Bahn puts out tunnel construction tenders . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , May 6, 2010.
^ D-Stuttgart: Construction work for tunnel . Document 2010 / S 87-130705 of May 5, 2010 in the electronic gazette of the European Union.
↑ "The time of discussion is over" . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung , No. 30, July 31, 2011, p. 2. online .
↑ On the construction site: Federal Railway Directorate . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. Archived from the original on October 25, 2012. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved November 1, 2012. @1@ 2

^ House in the Sängerstrasse demolished , Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 7, 2013, accessed on October 8, 2013

↑ DB Netze: Stuttgart-Ulm project: Construction work in 2013 , as of February 14, 2013.

↑ DB Netze: Stuttgart-Ulm project: Construction work in 2013/2014 ( memo of November 2, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), as of September 30, 2013.

↑ Thomas Durchdenwald: The tunneling in the city center is at a standstill. Stuttgarter Zeitung, November 26, 2013, accessed on November 26, 2013

↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Bahn must reckon with lawsuits against compensation. Stuttgarter Nachrichten, November 26, 2013, accessed on November 26, 2013

↑ After the agreement, the railway continues digging . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung online, November 29, 2013

↑ Start of construction for S21 tunnel: Protests accompany the ceremonial tapping , online article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung from December 4, 2013.

↑ ^a ^b History of the Stuttgart 21 rail project - tunnel tapping, investigations against Mappus, water cannon trial , SWR, December 9, 2014, accessed on February 5, 2015

↑ Christian Milankovic: Feuerbacher Tunnel under construction , December 11, 2014, accessed on February 5, 2015

^ Tunnel construction for Stuttgart 21: driving and excavation. (PDF) In: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. December 18, 2017, accessed January 6, 2018 .

↑ Obertürkheim tunnel broken through: 70% of all tunnel meters driven from Stuttgart 21. In: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. June 21, 2018, accessed June 23, 2018 .

↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Stuttgart 21: Bahn terminates the drive for the Filder Tunnel. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. September 2, 2019, accessed September 8, 2019 .

↑ The Bad Cannstatt tunnel is finished. 3.5 kilometer long tunnel under the Rosensteinpark cut through. In: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. Deutsche Bahn, February 17, 2020, accessed on February 18, 2020 .

^ Tunnel construction for Stuttgart 21: driving and excavation (pdf) Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. February 24, 2020. Accessed March 1, 2020.

↑ Thomas Braun, Achim Wörner: Expert opinion: major deficiencies in fire protection. Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 10, 2012, accessed on October 11, 2012

↑ Thomas Braun: Fire protection concept only 2014 , Stuttgarter Zeitung, September 19, 2013, accessed on October 1, 2013

↑ C. Engelhardt, catalog of additional demands on the statement of the developer , 29 September 2014 ( rp.baden-wuerttemberg.de ), pp. 77 ff, 63 ff

↑ Südwest Presse : Bahnhof S 21: “Fire protection is an unsolvable problem” , from May 23, 2018, accessed on July 29, 2019

↑ Stern (magazine) : Security expert assesses fire protection at Stuttgart 21: "It's a state crime" , from June 10, 2018, accessed on July 29, 2019

↑ The slab of the Neckar Bridge in Bad Cannstatt is concreted. In: swr.de. May 15, 2019, accessed January 7, 2020 .

^ Michael Isenberg: Own road for truck caravan . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , February 27, 2011.

↑ Light rail has to make way . ( Memento of the original from September 10, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , July 4, 2010. @1@ 2

↑ SSB build tunnels even without Stuttgart 21 , online article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung from January 25, 2013.

↑ Construction of the U12 light rail tube with tunnel stop started , online article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung from July 20, 2013.

↑ Markus Heffner: The north exit at the train station will soon be open again . Online article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung from October 9, 2013.

↑ S21 and the follow-up measure relocation of the Staatsgalerie stop . Stuttgart trams . Retrieved March 1, 2020.

↑ Christian Milankovic: Former railway management is now down without. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung. July 27, 2017. Retrieved December 29, 2017 .

↑ ^a ^b ^c On the construction site: Feuerbach train station . Stuttgart-Ulm rail project. Archived from the original on December 16, 2012. Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved December 17, 2012. @1@ 2

↑ Georg Friedel: The elevators at the station will be built in 2019 . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . tape 73 , no. 141 , June 22, 2018, p. 1 ( stuttgarter-zeitung.de ).

Comments

↑ Departure and arrival are evidently viewed as a separate “train” in the present documents.

[pfa1.1-1-erl-1-59-1] DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 59–67.

[kübler-1905-2] Hugo Kübler: The expansion of the Stuttgart main station . Reprint from Neue Tagblatt No. 253, 254, 255, 256., ZDB -ID 125445-5 , Stuttgart, October 1905.

[tunnel-2009-7-12-3] Hany Azer , B. Engel: Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. In: tunnel. Issue 7/2009, ISSN 0722-6241 , pp. 12-24 ( PDF file , 290 kB).

[stz-chronik3-4] Achim Wörner: The main station in the mirror of the times (3) . Stuttgart newspaper . January 22, 2008. Archived from the original on August 14, 2009. Retrieved on December 3, 2010.

[stn-1970-202-17-5] Hans-Martin Heuschele: A train station under the main train station . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 202 , August 27, 1970, pp. 17 .

[turmforum-2006-47-6] Gerhard Heimerl : Winding paths to the goal. Detours and obstacles on the way to Stuttgart 21 . In: Turm-Forum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. A milestone in the European high-speed network . Stuttgart 2006, "Sonderedition 678-1006", pp. 47–49.

[heimerl-1988-7] Gerhard Heimerl: Routing of the DB high-speed line Stuttgart – Augsburg (–Munich): Notes and Considerations for the documentation of the preliminary examinations of the ABS / NBS Plochingen-Günzburg. Stuttgart 1988.

[pfa1.1-1-erl-1-50-8] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 50–58.

[stz-1990-242-19-9] Dieter Schubert: Planner suggestion: New city via the station tunnel . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 242, October 19, 1990, p. 19.

[ftd-2010-12-24-10] Controversial billion dollar project: The man who invented Stuttgart 21 ( Memento from December 27, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: Financial Times Deutschland , December 24, 2010.

[tunnel-1993-288-11] Planned tunnels in the course of the new Stuttgart – Ulm line . In: tunnel. Issue 5/1993, ISSN 0722-6241 , pp. 288-292.

[db-dr-1993-09-06-12] Deutsche Bundesbahn / Deutsche Reichsbahn (Ed.): New line Stuttgart - Ulm: The railway applies for the regional planning procedure . Press release from September 6, 1993.

[db-1995b-5-13] A ^b ^c Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, projects (publisher): "Stuttgart 21" project. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, approx. 1995, pp. 5, 8, 16 f., 20-25, 32 f., 36 f (similar version as PDF file online, 14 MB).

[bda-1996-16-14] Meinhard von Gerkan : Renaissance of the railway stations as the nucleus of urban development . In: Renaissance of the railway stations. The city in the 21st century . Vieweg Verlag , 1996, ISBN 3-528-08139-2 , pp. 16-63, in particular pp. 56 f.

[bda-1996-156-15] Association of German Architects u. a. (Ed.): Renaissance of the railway stations. The city in the 21st century . Vieweg Verlag , 1996, ISBN 3-528-08139-2 , pp. 156-163.

[sz-1994-89-10-16] Stuttgart is to be tunneled under for long-distance trains . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 89, 1994, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 10.

[sz-1995-13-08-17] underground station for long-distance travelers . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 13, 1995, ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 8.

[stz-1995-01-17-18] Armin Käfer: Experts: The underground train station in Stuttgart can be built . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . January 17, 1995.

[s21-mbs-1995-19] Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, project (ed. :): "Stuttgart 21" project: The feasibility study (overview) . Four-page information brochure, no year (approx. 1995).

[sz-1996-88-900-20] Stuttgart is gearing up for the future of transport policy . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 88, 1996 (supplement), ISSN 0174-4917 , p. 900.

[ei-1996-5-8-21] Gerhard Heimerl : Efficient transport as a location factor . In: The Railway Engineer . 1996, No. 5, ISSN 0013-2810 , pp. 8-12.

[57] Departure and arrival are evidently viewed as a separate “train” in the present documents.