Operation Cedar Falls

Cedar Falls operation map

The Operation Cedar Falls was a military operation during the Vietnam War , mainly carried out by US forces . The goal of this massive search-and-destroy operation was to clean up the so-called Iron Triangle , an area that the Viet Cong had turned into a stronghold and that was only twenty kilometers away from Saigon . The operation began on January 8, 1967 and ended on January 28, 1967.

Operation Cedar Falls was the largest single-ground operation of the Vietnam War: two army divisions , an infantry and a paratrooper brigade , as well as an armored cavalry regiment participated; a total of 30,000 soldiers from the USA and South Vietnam were involved. However, the Viet Cong decided to avoid this massive military deployment by either fling to Cambodia or hiding in a complex, underground tunnel system. In any case, the Allied forces discovered and destroyed some of the tunnels and large quantities of Viet Cong supplies. In the course of the operation, so-called tunnel rats were used for the first time to infiltrate the Viet Cong tunnels.

With the attempt to permanently destroy the Iron Triangle as a Viet Cong retreat, Operation Cedar Falls also included the complete deportation of the civilian population to so-called "New Life" villages, the destruction of their previous home villages and the complete defoliation of the area.

Most of the senior officers of the operation later judged it to be a success. Most journalists and military historians painted a grim picture, however. They argued that Operation Cedar Falls failed to achieve its main objective as the Viet Cong's withdrawal from the Iron Triangle turned out to be temporary. In addition, the critics argue that the harsh treatment of the civilian population was morally questionable and even ran counter to US efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese, so that some defected to the Viet Cong. Because of this, some authors see Operation Cedar Falls as a prime example of the misconception of the US strategy in Vietnam and its morally problematic consequences.

background

The iron triangle

The planning of Operation Cedar Falls developed from the further goals of the MACV (American High Command in South Vietnam), which it had formulated in 1967. During the early phase of the Vietnam War, in which the supply of large US ground troops had prevented the collapse of the South Vietnamese armed forces and the Americans were building up their armed forces, the Commander in Chief of the MACV General William C. Westmoreland planned to go on the offensive in 1967. In particular, he planned to clean up the Viet Cong strongholds and push the communist forces into the more populated border areas of South Vietnam, where the US armed forces would be able to use their heavy weapons to a greater extent. A region that was designated by American military planners as War Zone C was the main area of ​​communist activity north of Saigon. On General Westmoreland's orders, Lt. General Jonathan O. Seaman, commanding general of II Field Force, with the planning of an operation called Junction City with the aim of wiping out this FLN area. Since the strength of Gen. Seaman's armed forces increased due to the ongoing expansion of troops, he suggested adding another Viet Cong stronghold as a target, the Iron Triangle . That was the nickname for an area of ​​about 155 km² about 20 km north of Saigon, bounded by the Saigon River in the southwest, the Than Dien Forest in the north and the Song Thi Thinh River in the east, making it a triangular shape Had area. Since the Second Indochina War , this area had been a main staging area and retreat for the Communists, and South Vietnamese officials and military forces had not ventured there for years. Because of the location of the Iron Triangle, its shape and the focus of Viet Cong activities there, it has also been referred to as “a dagger aimed at the heart of Saigon”. Westmoreland agreed, and it was decided that Operation Cedar Falls would precede Operation Junction City.

As previous attempts to clear the Iron Triangle of Viet Cong forces had failed, Operation Cedar Falls aimed nothing less than the complete wiping out of this area as a base and retreat for the Viet Cong. Therefore, Operation Cedar Falls should not only include an attack on regular Viet Cong forces and their infrastructure, but also the deportation of the entire civilian population of the area, the total destruction of their houses, the defoliation of the area and its classification as a special fire zone, which meant that every individual in it would be regarded as belonging to the Viet Cong (so-called free-fire zone).

Armed Forces and Terrain

The American intelligence indicated that the headquarters of the IV FLN Military District would be in this area; its destruction became a primary target of Operation Cedar Falls. In addition, the 272nd Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of the IV Military District under the command of the 165th Viet Cong Regiment plus three companies of local armed forces, as well as the 2nd, 3rd and 8th Battalions of the 165th Regiment in the Iron Triangle suspected.

To defeat these enemy forces, the II Field Force organized the US's largest ground operation in the Vietnam War with 30,000 soldiers participating, the equivalent of three US divisions. The US forces consisted of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 196th Infantry Brigade, the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. It was intended that these units should bear the brunt of the fighting, the South Vietnamese armed forces were assigned to search the villages in the area, carry out logistical tasks and organize the deportation of the civilian population.

As was often the case during the Vietnam War, the operational area posed a serious problem for the military planners. In fact, the Viet Cong succeeded in establishing itself in the Iron Triangle mainly because the terrain made access difficult for larger units. For this reason, another goal of Operation Cedar Falls was to defoliate the area and use bulldozers to provide easier access to the area later.

Battle plan

Operation Cedar Falls was planned as a hammer-and-anvil operation. Under the guise of maneuvers that simulated routine relocations, the 25th Infantry Division and the 196th Infantry Brigade were stationed west of the Iron Triangle, a brigade of the 1st Infantry Division was deployed east of the triangle, while the remaining formations swiftly traversed the area as a hammer should pull and drive the Viet Cong formations before them against the anvils . This was to clear the area of ​​enemy troops, bases and civilians. Closely encircling the area should cut off the retreat of communist units.

Operation Cedar Falls was scheduled to begin on January 5, 1967, as the weather forecast was most favorable for that day. In addition, the operation was divided into two phases. During preparatory phase I from January 5th to 9th, the anvil was brought into position by the units provided for it taking up their positions west and east of the triangle, and on January 8th an air raid on Ben Suc, a village that was a key position in the Viet Cong defense. This should be successfully completed by the encirclement of the area before a concentrated attack by the US forces (the hammer ) from the west and south into the triangle should take place in Phase II .

The battle

Phase I.

Beginning on January 5, the Anvil Armed Forces moved to the west ( 25th Infantry Division and 196th Infantry Regiment) and east ( 1st Infantry Division ) of the Iron Triangle. The remaining units took up positions to swing the hammer . On D-Day (January 8, 1967) parts of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division carried out the planned attack on the village of Ben Suc.

Ben Suc was the main pillar of Viet Cong rule in the Iron Triangle. This fortified village acted as the main supply base and political center, the population was organized as hinterland service teams. The Americans managed a complete tactical surprise attack, so that they were able to encircle and encircle the village against only light resistance. A South Vietnamese battalion was then flown in to search the village and interrogate the population. As a result of this action, a complex underground tunnel and storage system was discovered, and large quantities of supplies were seized and later destroyed. However, the Allied forces were only able to arrest FLN soldiers and low-ranking politicians.

After the search of the village, 106 residents were arrested, the remaining residents of Ben Suc and the surrounding villages, around 6000 residents, two thirds of whom were children, were deported. Together with their belongings and cattle, they were taken to resettlement camps by trucks , river boats and helicopters. After the deportation of the villagers, Ben Suc was systematically wiped out by American pioneers by first burning down the buildings completely and then using bulldozers to razor the remains along with the surrounding vegetation. The area was then subjected to heavy aerial bombardment to collapse tunnels that were too deep for demolition teams to collapse.

General Bernard William Rogers, who served as deputy division commander of the 1st Infantry Division during Operation Cedar Falls, noted that the residents were treated as "as humanly as possible" during the forced evacuation of Ben Suc, allowing them and their possessions Bringing cattle with them and receiving medical care. However, he also admitted, "The uprooting of these villagers was expected to provoke resistance and it did." He went on to describe "the sight of the people of Ben Suc with their field carts, chickens, pigs and sacks of rice" as "pathetic." and pitiful ”. He also reported serious difficulties in relocating residents to Phu Loi Village. He quoted General Westmoreland as saying: “Unfortunately, the move was not as well organized and carried out as the evacuation. For the first few days, the families went through unnecessary hardship. ”Journalist Jonathan Schell, who wrote an extensive article on Operation Cedar Falls for The Newyorker , confirmed these assessments. The South Vietnamese officials charged with moving the villagers learned of their job of organizing a refugee camp less than 24 hours before the forced evacuation. As a result, the surprised residents of Phu Loi were forced to temporarily quarter the deportees from Ben Suc in their already overcrowded huts. Schell also described the deportees as “people who have lost the appearance of healthy villagers and are now showing the passive, gloomy, waiting expression of the uprooted.” The inhabitants of Phu Loi were finally resettled in so-called “New Life” villages. Although it is not clear to which village the inhabitants were resettled, their new living conditions are usually described as gloomy in the literature on the Vietnam War . In his book on America's involvement in the Vietnam War, Guenter Lewy describes the majority of these camps as "mostly below the minimum standards of accommodation, economic viability, and employment opportunities."

Phase II

After phase I was largely completed, the US armed forces began phase II. After heavy air bombardment and artillery fire, units of the 1st Infantry Division, along with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, began their massive advance into the Iron Triangle First divided the area into two parts and then, as General Seaman asked, conducted a thorough search of the areas for which they were responsible. Meanwhile, the 25th Infantry Division and the 196th Infantry Brigade carried out search-and-destroy operations west of the Saigon River, including making the river impassable with patrol boats.

However, most of the massive military strike hit air. Since the Viet Cong were either forewarned or had foreseen the attack, they decided to avoid the Allied forces and either fled to Cambodia in time or hid in the extensive tunnel system. The result was that one of the largest military operations since the Korean War and the largest single-ground operation of the Vietnam War was marked by small gun fights and other small skirmishes rather than large-scale combat. Most of the Allied forces were busy searching and patrolling during the day and ambushing at night; the losses were mostly the result of sniper fire, mines or traps.

Whilst the Allied forces' attempt to find and crush significant contingents of the FLN failed, they did manage to track down parts of the tunnel system where they secured large quantities of supplies and documents from the Viet Cong. In order to infiltrate these extensive tunnel complexes, the US troops used specially trained teams, so-called tunnel rats, for the first time in the Vietnam War . After they were searched, the tunnels were mostly blown up with a mixture of acetylene gas and conventional explosive charges.

Large-scale combat pioneering and chemical operations were a major part of Operation Cedar Falls. Armored bulldozers ( tank dozers), bulldozers and bulldozers were used for so-called jungle cleanup operations, with the vegetation being cleared in the enemy area in order to then carry out search-and-destroy operations and destroy enemy devices. Chemicals were used to defoliate parts of the area and poison rice plants and supplies.

Results and aftermath

losses

Operation Cedar Falls was officially ended on January 26, 1967. The American military claimed that 750 Viet Cong were killed, 280 captured and 540 defected in the course of so-called Chieu Hoi programs (translated: open arms); In addition, 512 suspects were arrested and around 6,000 were deported. In addition, the Allied forces seized 23 manpower weapons as well as 590 individual weapons, over 2,800 explosives, 60,000 pieces of ammunition for light weapons and enough rice to supply 13,000 men for a whole year. In addition, large amounts of enemy documents were found and a massive complex of underground tunnels, bunkers and other facilities destroyed. A total of around 100 bunkers, 25 tunnels and over 500 buildings were destroyed. Finally, in order to no longer grant the FLN cover in the future and to make penetration into this area easier, 11 km² of jungle had been cleared.

In comparison, the Allied losses were small. There were 72 dead and 337 wounded in the US armed forces, and 11 dead and 8 wounded in the South Vietnamese. There were also 2 tanks and 5 armored personnel carriers that were destroyed and 3 tanks, 9 armored personnel carriers, a tank dozer, two jeeps and two light observation helicopters that were damaged.

The Iron Triangle after January 1967

The FLN suffered a brief setback, but its members soon managed to re-establish their rule over the Iron Triangle. The first FLN forces entered the area just two days after the operation was over, and within ten days an official US report reported that the area was "teeming with everything that looks like the Viet Cong." Just a year after the end of the operation, the FLN used the area as a preparation room for its Tet offensive against Saigon in 1968. In addition, the heavy bombardment and resettlement of the residents of Ben Suc caused serious anger among the South Vietnamese people inside and outside the Iron Triangle caused. After Operation Cedar Falls was over, the Viet Cong returned to an area whose population was now much more hostile to the Allies and much friendlier to the Viet Cong than before the operation. In summary, the US and South Vietnamese armed forces failed to wipe out the Iron Triangle as a Viet Cong base of operations; in fact, the operation probably made things even worse.

Consideration

The leading US commanders during Operation Cedar Falls believed it was a success. According to General Rogers, General Westmoreland described them as "very impressive in their results". General Seaman argued that it hit the enemy's offensive force. He even predicted that the losses of the Viet Cong had a "serious psychological impact" on the "Viet Cong-dominated population" and that they would now have to "rethink their relative abilities compared to us." General William DePuy, the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, noted a "complete breakdown in self-confidence and morale on the part of the Viet Cong" and called Cedar Falls "a decisive turning point in the III Corps' territory, a huge boost to the morale of the South Vietnamese government and army and a blow which the Viet Cong will never recover in this area. "

In the literature on the Vietnam War, Operation Cedar Falls is rated much more negatively. Philipp B. Davidson is one of the few who sees it as part of a significantly broader strategy. While acknowledging that Cedar Falls failed to achieve some of its short-term goals, he states that it, along with its successor Junction City, would have had beneficial long-term, strategic implications. It was a severe blow to the FLN's guerrilla tactics, as it drove them from the more densely populated areas to the Cambodian border. This assessment is shared by Shelby L. Stanton. He sees the same effect as Davidson, but sees exactly the opposite effect of American military strategy. Instead of placing the Viet Cong in a vulnerable position, as intended by the MACV, they were actually driven across the Cambodian border, but there they were outside the Allied control and, together with the North Vietnamese Army, were able to establish a protection zone that was immune to the US Attacks was set up.

Most authors, however, focus on the short-term results of the operation. They argue that, despite the impressive statistics, Operation Cedar Falls failed to achieve its primary goal: although it was a serious blow to the Viet Cong, the communist forces were able to quickly regain their dominant position in the Iron Triangle. In addition, the heavy bombing and the deportation of 6,000 civilians would not only have been morally questionable, but also militarily counterproductive. Though they write from completely different political angles, authors Stanley Karnow and Guenter Lewy nonetheless agree that the deportations of Operation Cedar Falls as an example of the larger military strategy that resulted in the relocation of several thousand others were the population of the South Vietnamese Estranged regime and the allied USA.

Some authors see Operation Cedar Falls as a prime example of what they call a fundamental mishandling of American military involvement in Southeast Asia, which has caused moral ambiguity and downright atrocities; one author even cites the operation as an example of how an asymmetrical war should never be waged.