Battle for FSB Mary Ann

Battle for FSB Mary Ann

Part of: Vietnam War

date	March 28, 1971
place	Republic of Vietnam , Quang Tin Province
output	Victory of the North Vietnamese People's Army

Parties to the conflict
North Vietnam	United States South Vietnam
Commander
unknown	William P. Doyle William S. Hathaway
Troop strength
40–60 soldiers	231 soldiers 20 soldiers
losses
at least 15 fallen wounded unknown	30 killed 82 wounded 2 artillery pieces 1 wounded

In the Battle of FSB Mary Ann it was the attack of a company of the North Vietnamese national army to a fire support base (Fire Support Base FSB) of 23 Infantry Division during the Vietnam War. In the course of the gradual withdrawal of the American armed forces from Vietnam, FSB Mary Ann should also be handed over to the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). Therefore some of the equipment had already been relocated and the battalion was no longer at full strength . Due to the absence of enemy attacks for years, the defenses were inadequate and the crew had become inattentive. In the early morning hours of March 28, 1971, there was a sudden attack by North Vietnamese storm pioneers. Within 45 minutes they took large parts of the camp and destroyed the most important facilities. During the subsequent investigation into the incident, the US 23rd Infantry Division received a devastating testimony and many of its commanders were dismissed or demoted .

background

Decline in morale in 1970/71

After Richard Nixon took over government affairs in the USA, the “de-Americanization” of the war, also known as “ Vietnamization ” , which had already begun under Johnson , was resolutely continued. The troop strength of the ARVN was increased from 850,000 to over a million men by the middle of 1970. In addition, the ARVN soldiers should be involved in joint operations to familiarize them with offensive missions. On May 1, 1970, Cambodia was invaded , in which 31,000 American and 43,000 South Vietnamese soldiers took part. Initially, a narrow majority of Americans supported extending the war to Cambodia. But when the " Kent State Massacre " occurred on May 4th , in which 4 students were killed by soldiers of the National Guard , the most massive protests in the history of the Vietnam War broke out. As a result of enormous public and international pressure, the president had only to withdraw.

While the general tiredness of war in the USA continued to increase, and the broad mass of Americans no longer wanted anything to do with the war, the US soldiers in Vietnam suffered from these developments. After the battles in Cambodia, there was hardly any major fighting. The troops of North Vietnam (North Vietnamese People's Army, NVA) and the Liberation Front (NLF), i.e. the Viet Cong, had meanwhile withdrawn into the tactical defensive and avoided any major conflict. Since the withdrawal of the American combat troops was already in full swing and the ARVN was supposed to take over most of the fighting, the remaining US soldiers almost only had to take on logistical supply work and stage services. Captain William Paris said, “After November or December 1970, everyone in the infantry didn't have much to do. Every fight they were involved in was nothing more than pure coincidence. "

When it became apparent that the US was barely winning the war, it had a devastating effect on the morale of all remaining US soldiers. This meant that the last, anyway abstract war aims were lost, and the Americans drew their own conclusions from the developments: “Who wants to be the last to be killed while packing their suitcases?” Due to the uneventful service, there was a rapid decline in discipline among the soldiers . A soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division (also called “Americal” Division), the unit responsible for the Mỹ Lai massacre , reported as early as April 1968: “Was disciplined nowhere to be noticed. Everyone did what he wanted ... The commanders didn't care. ” A great many American soldiers believed that the war was over for them. They drank alcohol during the missions, applied for transfers, reported sick or refused to give orders . So-called "search and evade" patrols were also very widespread, which the men brought behind them not in the field but in hiding. A paramedic reported: “We just let the NVA or VC pass by. They went one way and we went the other, so we just passed each other. We didn't want to open fire. Nobody wanted to die. Nobody wanted anything to happen. ” When Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. took command of 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, American Division in December 1969, he too found soldiers on patrol with rusted rifles on them let the enemy go by and didn't even secure their own bases. “They hadn't provided the slightest protection. The enemy could have marched in, opened fire and killed dozens. "

Fire Support Base Mary Ann

In the course of the withdrawal from Vietnam, the bases of the American armed forces were gradually handed over to the South Vietnamese army. This also included the most northwestern base of the Americal Division in Quang Tin Province, FSB Mary Ann. Its crew consisted of the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 20 ARVN soldiers who were supposed to take care of taking over the base. The task of the unit had been to monitor the highlands 50 km west of Chu Lai and to track down North Vietnamese units. But apart from two arsenals that were found near a path, they found no evidence of opposing troops. 1970 and 1971 were the quietest of the war, with practically no major fighting in Vietnam. FSB Mary Ann, on the other hand, seemed to have been completely spared from the war. Mortar fire hit the base a few times in a year , a common guerrilla tactic , but not a single infantry attack occurred. In the meantime the battalion had relocated some of its artillery pieces and mortars to a new base further east and therefore had hardly any ammunition left. The battalion was severely understaffed, and the C company only had 75 men.

The problems of the lack of discipline and vigilance that plagued many units in the Americal Division also affected the 1st Battalion. With apparently no enemy units operating in the area and little happened for over a year, the soldiers became careless. Like practically all other FSBs, the base was surrounded by three rings of barbed wire and a few minefields. Though it had a defense plan in place, few of the soldiers knew it. The camp's defenses had already failed two checks. On March 27, Brigade Commander Col. Hathaway personally conducted another inspection. He walked through the defenses and said, despite some loose ammunition, that Mary Ann was "vastly improved ... one hundred percent improved". Battalion Commander Lt. Col. William P. Doyle even asked, "Who in their right mind would attack you?"

Night raid

Contrary to all expectations, there was actually someone who should dare to attack, the 2nd Company of the NVA's 409th Storm Pioneer Battalion. How many soldiers it comprised is unclear, the estimates varied widely, from 40 to more than 100. But most likely it was probably not more than 50 men. The North Vietnamese had been watching the base for several weeks. Days before, there were various signs that some of the ARVN soldiers at the base might be working for the other side. However, this information was largely ignored by the Americans. The storm pioneers had prepared very carefully for the attack. They were only dressed in short black trousers and their bodies were smeared with black grease, which made them difficult to see in the dark. They were armed with explosive charges, grenade and rocket launchers , rifles, hand and tear gas grenades and gas masks. On the night of March 28, they sneaked up to the Mary Ann Fire Support Base, carefully avoiding the mines and tripwires. Not a single American soldier in the 22 guard bunkers saw the men as they approached. An investigation report into the incident later stated: “On the night in question, the alarm status of the base was zero. In the best case, the defense measures can be described as careless and completely inadequate. "

Then, at 2:30 p.m. sharp, the 409th Battalion's mortars opened fire on the base. The pioneers entered the camp in four places at the same time and dispersed. Countless explosions rocked the hill, and after a short time the entire FSB was enveloped in a cloud of tear gas. The North Vietnamese had the element of surprise on their side as the Americans neither expected nor were they prepared for an attack. The night guards were not at their posts and did not know where the ammunition was stored. But they couldn't have made use of it anyway, since the supplies hadn't been replenished. Numerous bunkers were destroyed by explosive charges or mortar fire. American soldiers stumbled from their quarters to the trenches, but ran straight into the arms of the storm pioneers who were already in position. These in turn attacked the US soldiers with explosive charges and rifle fire, killing many of them. A group of pioneers fought their way to the two artillery pieces and destroyed them with explosive charges. Another unit dropped explosive charges and tear gas grenades into the battalion's tactical operations center, causing a large fire to break out. The Americans could offer little orderly resistance. Lt. Col. Doyle, whose quarters were near the operations center, had meanwhile been awakened by the noise and tear gas. An NVA soldier threw a 20 kg explosive charge, which injured Doyle and made him temporarily unconscious. After a while he came to and wanted to take part in the fighting. But another explosion made him pass out again. Captain Paul Spilberg was holed up in the operations center, but after a while he was driven outside by tear gas. After a few meters he fell into a ditch and was seriously injured by a grenade explosion.

Thanks to their black camouflage, the storm pioneers moved almost invisibly. Even after a nearby fire support base lit the night with field lights after 17 minutes, few Americans could see their opponents. After about 45 minutes another mortar fire began, which covered the retreat of the North Vietnamese. In the meantime, an American helicopter arrived, which opened fire on the NVA soldiers, but could only hit a few of them.

The next morning the full extent of the devastation was revealed. Fire Support Base Mary Ann was in ruins, a pilot described the result of the attack as "... the greatest destruction I have ever seen in an American facility ... Some bodies were burned to ashes. We had nine body bags full of bits of meat. ”Of the 231 Americans at the base, 30 were killed and 82 wounded, the largest loss of US soldiers in battle in four years. Only one of the 20 ARVN soldiers was injured. The North Vietnamese, in turn, left 14 dead. A 15th body was found in a nearby grave the next day. For the 409th Storm Pioneer Battalion, the attack was a complete success. Not only did they manage to defeat an American battalion with just one company, the ARVN deviated from their plan to take over the camp and gave up the base a short time later.

examination

The destruction of the FSB Mary Ann resulted in an investigation carried out by troop inspectors of the MACV (Military High Command Vietnam) and the so-called " Criminal Investigation Division ", the unit responsible for investigating war crimes . In order to determine the "effectiveness of the chain of command", most of the survivors of the incident were interviewed, as well as all officers of the 23rd Infantry Division, up to the division commander. Not least because it was ordered or tolerated that the bodies of five NVA soldiers who fell during the battle were cremated in a garbage pit, a clear disregard of the Geneva Conventions , which forbade the mutilation of opposing corpses.

In the report published in June 1971, the investigators came to the conclusion: "The insubordination of the troops is the result of inadequate leadership." US commander General Creighton W. Abrams followed the investigations personally until the officers responsible were convicted. In the course of the investigation, General James L. Baldwin, commander of the 23rd Infantry Division, was released. Four other officers, including Brigade Commander Hathaway and Battalion Commander Doyle, were demoted or deported to administrative positions. Lieutenant Colonel Doyle should even be tried in court martial because of his "below average performance" . But that never happened. "They tried to hang everyone they could get their hands on," said Captain Spilberg later, "and they did."

It should also be mentioned that the battle for FSB Mary Ann was not an isolated incident. Raids of this type became more common later in the Vietnam War. For example, a fire support base of A Company, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade , was attacked and destroyed in a very similar manner in early December 1968.

literature

• Marc Frey : History of the Vietnam War. The tragedy in Asia and the end of the American dream . Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-45978-1 .
• David Fulghum, Terrence Maitland: South Vietnam On Trial: Mid-1970 to 1972 . Boston Publishing Company, Boston 1984, ISBN 0-939526-10-7 .
• Bernd Greiner : War without fronts - The USA in Vietnam. 1st edition. Verlag Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2009, ISBN 978-3-86854-207-3 .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Frey: History of the Vietnam War. Pp. 197-198.
2. ^ ^{A b} Fulghum: South Vietnam on Trial. P. 16.
3. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. P. 438
4. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. P. 434.
5. ^ Fulghum: South Vietnam on Trial. P. 9.
6. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. P. 436.
7. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. P. 435.