Battle for Tua Hai

Battle for Tua Hai

Part of: Vietnam War

Memorial to the Battle of Tua Hai

date	February 1960
place	Republic of Vietnam
output	Victory of the resistance fighters

Parties to the conflict
Resistance fighters (or Việt Minh )	South Vietnam
Commander
Quyet Thang	unknown
Troop strength
approx. 300 soldiers	2,500 soldiers
losses
Information from the NLF : 11 killed, 20 wounded	Source 1: 100 dead more than 200 wounded 200 deserters Source 2: 70 dead and wounded

The battle for Fort Tua Hai was the first noteworthy conflict in the Vietnam War . The Vietnamese rebels of the 1960s generally viewed the battle as the beginning of the war, the first major battle, typical of many other battles that were to come. During the battle, a group of guerrillas from Tây Ninh province managed to raid the headquarters of the 32nd ARVN regiment , killing numerous enemy soldiers, stealing large quantities of supplies and burning the camp. Although it was a quite significant event, the battle has been largely forgotten today, especially outside of Vietnam . There are contradicting statements about the number of victims, the consequences were mainly psychological.

Beginning of the uprising

Vietnam 1959/1960

Development in Indochina 1957 to 1960

At the time of the battle, Ngô Đình Diệm had been the leader of the Republic of Vietnam for almost six years. During this time there was great upheaval and unrest in the country. On June 25, 1954, Diệm was accepted as Prime Minister by Emperor Bảo Đại . Less than a year later, the first fighting broke out in Sàigòn when Diệm tried to limit the power of the country's three major sects. Diệm had to mobilize three divisions to break their resistance. But by breaking up the Cao Dai , Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao, he gained the hostility of the sect members, when their advocates suddenly emerged from the Communists.

After the power of the sects had been pushed back and most of the Việt Minh had fled to North Vietnam , Diệm tried to smash the remaining structures of the communist party in the south. In 1955 a "denunciation campaign" was launched aimed at stirring Vietnam into an uproar. Tens of thousands of people were thrown into prisons and camps. Not only Việt Minh were affected, but also sect leaders, students, critical journalists, members of small parties and trade unionists. An ordinance announced in mid-1956 threatened imprisonment for anyone who could endanger the state. Administrative and provincial chiefs used the regulation to get rid of private opponents and to intimidate the rural population. In May 1959, Diệm passed the infamous Law 10/59, which provided for the establishment of military tribunals . The defendants were denied the right to independent defense counsel, and the only sentences passed were death sentences or life imprisonment . Between 1955 and 1960 there are said to have been around 150,000 prisoners and well over 12,000 fatalities.

Under pressure from the Americans, a land reform was initiated, but this did not exactly lead to an identification of the peasant population with the Diệm regime. The land was taken from many farmers and given back to large landowners . The government took away a total of 650,000 hectares of land, but only 244,000 were redistributed. The share of the land-owning population fell sharply as a result. Even the reduction of the rent from 50% to a maximum of 25% of the yield hardly improved the situation of the farmers. Numerous large landowners did not adhere to it and the taxes had to be paid regardless of the actual harvest. In years with poor harvests this was a disaster for many farmers. Another factor that contributed to Diệm's unpopularity was the abolition of village self-government bodies. Through this paternalistic system, the population had an influence on communal issues and could, for example, decide on dike and road works. Diệm, however, transferred the tasks of the large landowners into the hands of foreign government officials. These often came from the north and were not familiar with the local conditions. These measures undermined the traditional network of relationships between landowners and farmers and led to a rapidly decreasing identification with the rural population.

The dissatisfaction in the population resulting from the denunciation campaign, the persecution, the practically ineffective land reform and violent resettlement campaigns was the ideal breeding ground for an uprising. It should only be a matter of time when and where the first armed clashes would break out.

Tây Ninh

The Vietnamese province of Tây Ninh , which lies directly on the Cambodian border, was still largely under the control of the Sàigòner government in 1959. The main problem of the ARVN was not so much the rebels, but mainly Cambodian gangs who repeatedly crossed the border and robbed local farmers. In order to prevent the incursions of the gangs and the emergence of a rebel movement, the headquarters of the 32nd Regiment and a battalion of the 21st Division of the ARVN occupied the abandoned French Fort Tua Hai . It was about 5 km north of Tây Ninh , the capital of the province of the same name and about 90 km northwest of Sàigòn . The old border fortress was laid out in a rectangular shape. The earth wall that surrounded it was around two and a half meters high, in front of which 4–5 m high barbed wire barriers had been built. There were machine gun emplacements at each of the fort's four corners, and fortified bunkers along the walls. But some of the fortifications had already fallen into disrepair, as it was not considered necessary to repair them. In some places the barbed wire barn had already collapsed. Even so, the fort was still a formidable government outpost.

Cao Dai Temple in Tây Ninh

But in Tây Ninh, too, the discontent of the population grew. ARVN soldiers often roamed the villages and captured peasants who were suspected of sympathizing with the former Việt Minh. Basically, however, the soldiers only wanted to be able to pass on the highest possible number of prisoners to their provincial commander. Because the more numbers he could report to Sàigòn, the more satisfied the leaders were with the commander and the soldiers. But the terrorization of the population took on ever greater proportions.

Queyt Thang reported: "... We decided to launch the attack shortly before the Lunar New Year celebrations at the end of February 1960. The enemy's terrorist actions had reached their peak in the previous weeks. The regiment stationed in Tua Hai had just returned from a major operation in the course of which hundreds of peasants were murdered in Tây Ninh ... Their largest operation began at the end of January, the aim not only to track down all former members of the resistance movement, but also to recruit young, strong men for the army Thousands of people fled into the woods, and the enemy troops looted the huts, dragged away all the food and living inventory, and also took away the presents for the Lunar New Year ... The population was exasperated and demoralized, but secretly they were seething with anger ... There were only two ways for us: Either we took up arms or we let ourselves be slaughtered like chickens. "

Another factor benefited the resistance fighters. The headquarters of the Cao Dai was in the province of Tây Ninh. It was a sect founded by the French merchant Van Thung. In the provincial capital of the same name, Tây Ninh, the clever businessman built a church for the highest being of his sect. He named Christ, Buddha, Mohammed and Confucius as prophets of his new religion. In the first Indochina War she fought for and sometimes against the French, depending on who controlled her tribal area of ​​Tây Ninh. The Cao Dai had a well-equipped army of 20,000 men, who fought bitterly in all dangers and pursued their enemies with a particular lust for murder. Her highest being 'Aa' promised his believers the greater bliss after death, the more unbelievers they had previously promoted into the hereafter. After the end of the first Indochina War, the sect tried to expand its power in the neighboring provinces and allied itself with the South Vietnamese Prime Minister Diệm. After this began to persecute the Cao Dai, however, they joined the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam ( English : National Liberation Front (NLF), Vietnamese Mặt Trận Giải Phóng Miền Nam Việt Nam ) and became a 'patriotic force' at the end of 1960 'inducted into the National Liberation Front. In 1959, the number of armed Cao Daiists was estimated at around 4,000.

The rebels

As early as July 1959, a few smaller guerrilla groups were attacked in Tây Ninh. These first raids were often carried out with extremely primitive weapons. The insurgents often fought with self-made crossbows and pipe bombs. A company of rebels, that is 120 to 140 men, often initially had no more than ten to fifteen rifles and only a few hundred rounds of ammunition. At the end of 1959, around 1,000 guerrillas were under arms in the province .

One of these groups was led by Queyt Thang, a former Việt Minh fighter who had already occupied lower command posts in the First Indochina War . After the end of the war he returned to Tây Ninh and continued his old rural life. The unit under his command consisted of 260 men, who already had 170 firearms, and the Cao Dai provided around 100 soldiers. It is wrong to refer to these soldiers as the Viet Cong. They were neither communists nor were they members of the National Liberation Front, which was only founded in late 1960. They were old resistance fighters, young people who had fled the recruiting gangs, some deserted soldiers from the ARVN and members of the Cao Dai. Queyt Thang had been trying to train and train guerrillas for two years. But because of the bloody cleansing operations of the ARVN, he had often failed. Now, however, he had gathered a large group of rebels around him and hoped to be able to attack and conquer the fort with them.

ARVN soldiers in the Mekong Delta, 1961

Tua Hai was significant to the guerrillas for several reasons. From there, the armed forces of the ARVN could control half the province. In addition, the partisans' way into the Cambodian territories was not blocked, but at least made considerably more difficult. Even then, Cambodia was a popular retreat for Vietnamese resistance fighters, who could count on Prince Sihanouk's help . He supported every movement that fought against the regime in Sàigòn, which he hated. But the most important reason for an attack was the supplies stored in Tua Hai. The government had set up large supply stores of weapons and ammunition there in anticipation of coming conflicts, and the guerrillas needed nothing more than better weapons. Queyt Thang hoped to capture at least 300 rifles with the appropriate ammunition to equip his units with.

Battle for the fort

Preparations

In the fortress itself there were numerous soldiers who sympathized with the rebels and carried valuable information outside. In addition, a few days before the attack, a few more prisoners were taken to gather more information, such as: B. to squeeze armament, equipment, defense plans and the like out of them. In some distant villages the men were able to recruit around 500 farmers as porters. Retaliation against the local population should be avoided. They were supposed to help with the transport of the captured weapons and the wounded and to fool the enemy into a sizeable attack force. Two days before the attack, the sympathizing soldiers were informed of the plans. They were also supposed to put mines at the fortifications and the soldiers' sleeping barracks, which were supposed to explode at midnight. They also wanted to hand out leaflets that were signed "The People's Self-Defense Forces". They should explain to the opponent why they switched to armed action.

The battle

One day before the attack, Queyt Thang gathered his partisans and had them march in small groups through the jungle to the fort. In the late afternoon they reached the fortress walls and dug into the forest. The fort's commander had been warned of the impending attack and radioed Tây Ninh to call for reinforcements. The provincial commander, however, considered the fortress impregnable and refused to send troops. Therefore, the commander decided to risk a sortie to forestall the attack. At 11 p.m. he moved out with a battalion (400–500 men) to look for the rebels. At that time these were already well hidden near the earth walls of Tua Hai. Queyt Thang watched the advancing troops and knew that his plan had been betrayed. But he decided to carry out his original plan without major changes. His command post was about 200 m north of the earth wall. He had left about 100 men behind on the connection road to Tây Ninh to intercept any relief troops.

At 1:45 in the morning, the previously placed mines finally exploded. The transmitters, crew barracks and ammunition depots were immediately on fire. The crew ran outside and ran straight into the gunfire of the attackers. Shortly after the fighting began, a group of rebels was able to penetrate the fort and break into a weapons depot. They abandoned their old rifles and picked up the new weapons. After that, they managed to capture some of the machine guns and bunkers. Government troops outside the fort were shot at from their own positions. But when entering from the south, the rebels had also suffered some losses. A group of guerrillas managed to occupy some army trucks. Ammunition and weapon boxes were loaded in a great hurry, while the struggling was still going on. Ten minutes later, the first trucks left the fort fully loaded. However, the convoy was intercepted and recaptured by ARVN soldiers. The drivers and some wounded managed to escape into the jungle. A truck was diverted in time and drove to the camp north of the wall.

In Tua Hai, the porters had already entered and cleared out the camps that had remained intact. There they found far more weapons than expected. Queyt Thang reported: “There were so many weapons in depot number 1, including completely new ones in unopened boxes, that it was impossible to remove them all. We saw some weapons for the first time, for example, recoilless guns of the 5.7 caliber. I didn't know about their possible uses but decided to take 5 with me. They later proved to be very effective against enemy tanks of the M 113 type and block houses. ”After a while, the remaining government soldiers surrendered to the rebels, whose strength they had overestimated during the night and whom it was considered pointless to continue to resist. More than 400 ARVN soldiers were captured. They were loaded with ammunition and weapon boxes and driven out of the fort. After an hour and three quarters of an hour, the battle was over and the rebels withdrew to their assembly points. Queyt Thang had meanwhile been informed of the trap of the troops and the loss of the vehicles, he ordered the fort to be evacuated as soon as possible. In the dark of night, he avoided the ambush and joined his men about 15 km from Tua Hai. Some of the prisoners joined the guerrillas voluntarily, the others were sent back halfway. The intimidated soldiers were told that they would not get off so lightly the next attack and that they would face severe penalties.

consequences

Development in Indochina from 1960 to 1963

The number of soldiers killed and wounded on both sides is largely unknown. Basically there are only three conflicting sources. Kuno Knöbl himself worked as a journalist in Vietnam. NLF fighters reported to him that only 11 attackers were killed and more than 20 wounded. "100 puppet government soldiers" allegedly died defending the fort and more than 200 were wounded. He himself said: "To what extent these loss figures are correct can no longer be determined, they were probably under- and exaggerated on the one hand." Wilfred Burchett was reported to have suffered around 400 dead and wounded in the enemy. Ronald Spector, in turn, reported that fewer than 70 ARVN soldiers were wounded or killed. However, these figures are most likely too low.

In general, the losses on both sides are likely to have been rather small, the military effect was insignificant. However many people died in the battle, from a psychological point of view it was a great success for the partisans. Because in Sàigòn people reacted to the battle for Tua Hai with hysteria. At first the attack was portrayed as the work of Cao Dai insurgents, then they accused Cambodian gangs. Finally, the leaders in Sàigòn did admit that former Việt Minh soldiers had carried out the attack. A large-scale propaganda campaign was started. Loudspeaker vans rolled through the province, reporting on the attack and the alleged atrocities of the resistance fighters. The aim was to terrify the population of the partisans. Most of the time, however, it just had the opposite effect. The people noted with glee the bloody defeat of the hated government. In some of the villages where posters mentioned the atrocities of the rebels, the population applauded and openly sided with the insurgents. Often the peasants were only made aware of the existence of a resistance movement through government propaganda. Many people were only now seeking contact with the guerrillas, of whose existence they had previously known little.

The attack had a fatal impact on the morale of the ARVN troops stationed in Tây Ninh. In the same month more than 200 soldiers deserted from Fort Tua Hai, and another infantry company in Tây Ninh defected to the guerrillas. The Queyt Thangs battalion quickly received a large number of people and only two months later had 350 well-equipped soldiers whose morale was far superior to that of the government soldiers. Queyt Thang himself was rewarded for his courage and soon afterwards was promoted to regimental commander of the regular NLF units. In the next few months several other guerrilla groups formed and shortly afterwards 1,500 partisans were armed in Tây Ninh. Until the end of the war 15 years later, the government would never again be able to exercise effective administration in Tây Ninh.

The booty captured by Queyt Thang's group was larger than expected. According to the NLF, more than 1,000 rifles, 5 recoilless weapons, 40 machine guns including spare parts and over 100,000 rounds of ammunition were captured in Tua Hai. After the guerrillas had re-equipped themselves with it, the surplus rifles were deposited in secret jungle hiding spots and carried to other provinces by porters. So other guerrilla groups could be equipped with them, the old weapons were pushed into the hands of the peasants. Now Sàigòn was confronted with larger partisan units not only in Tây Ninh, but also in other provinces. Raids like the one in Tua Hai were repeated across the country. They were always about government bases, advanced garrisons, outposts, ammunition and weapons depots. The representatives of the regime, police officers, agents, teachers, officials, large landowners, civil servants, district and provincial chiefs were kidnapped, expelled, blackmailed and occasionally also killed. As in the west of the country, the population in the highlands and in the Mekong Delta soon revolted . The Việt Minh agents were finally reaping the fruits of their years of propaganda work. A whole new chapter of the Vietnam War was opened.

literature

• Marc Frey : History of the Vietnam War. The tragedy in Asia and the end of the American dream . Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-45978-1
• Wilfred Burchett: Partisans versus Generals . 1st edition, Verlag Volk und Welt, Berlin 1965
• Kuno Knöbl: Victor Charlie: Viet Cong - The Uncanny Enemy . 4th edition, Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, Munich 1968
• Ronald Spector: After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam . The Free Press, New York 1993

Individual evidence

1. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 42]
2. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 47]
3. ↑ [Spector, After Tet, p. 73]
4. ↑ [Spector, After Tet, p. 73]
5. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 266]
6. ↑ [Frey, History of the Vietnam War, p. 60]
7. ↑ [Frey, History of the Vietnam War, p. 61]
8. ↑ [Burchett, Partisanen contra Generale, pp. 18-19]
9. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 42]
10. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 44]
11. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 44]
12. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 45]
13. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 46]
14. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 47]
15. ^ [Knöbl, Victor Charlie: Viet Cong, p. 47]
16. ↑ [Burchett, Partisanen contra Generale, p. 25]
17. ↑ [Spector, After Tet, p. 73]