Battle of Dak To
| date | November 3-22, 1967 |
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| place | Dak To, South Vietnam |
| output | Victory of South Vietnam and the USA |
| Parties to the conflict | |
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| Commander | |
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Hoang Minh Thao |
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| Troop strength | |
| 16,000 men | 6,000 men |
| losses | |
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Vietnam War
Battle of Tua Hai (1960) - Battle of Ap Bac (1963) - Battle of Nam Dong (1964) - Tonkin Incident (1964) - Operation Flaming Dart (1965) - Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-68) - Battle of Dong Xoai (1965) - Battle of the Ia Drang Valley (1965) - Operation Crimp (1966) - Operation Hastings (1966) - Battle of Long Tan (1966) - Operation Attleboro (1966) - Operation Cedar Falls (1967) - Battle around Hill 881 (1967) - Battle of Dak To (1967) - Battle of Khe Sanh (1968) - Tet Offensive (1968) - Battle of Huế (1968) - Operation Speedy Express (1968/69) - Operation Dewey Canyon ( 1969) - Battle of Hamburger Hill (1969) - Operation MENU (1969/70) - Operation Lam Son 719 (1971) - Battle of FSB Mary Ann (1971) - Battle of Quảng Trị (1972) - Operation Linebacker (1972) - Operation Linebacker II (1972) - Battle of Xuan Loc (1975) - Operation Frequent Wind (1975)
The Battle of Dak To ( Operation MacArthur ) took place during the Vietnam War in November 1967 in the South Vietnamese province of Kon Tum between US and South Vietnamese units and troops of the North Vietnamese People's Army (NVA) . The battle ended as a Pyrrhic victory for the allied Americans and South Vietnamese. Despite high military losses, the conquered hills were abandoned shortly after the conquest and could be infiltrated again by the Viet Cong and the NVA. A total of 376 US soldiers and 79 ARVN soldiers and probably between 1,000 and 1,500 North Vietnamese were killed in the fighting .
prehistory
The Battle of Dak To is one of a series of heavy skirmishes for supremacy in the Central Highlands of Vietnam near the border with Laos and Cambodia that were triggered by an offensive by the North Vietnamese People's Army in the second half of 1967. Attempts by the NVA to infiltrate the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam provoked open skirmishes with the US Army at Loc Ninh , Song Be , Con Thien and Khe Sanh , known as "Border Battles". This was intended to induce the Americans to withdraw troops from the cities on the coast and in the Mekong Delta, where the Tet offensive was to take place a little later .
Already at the beginning of the US military engagement in South Vietnam, American Special Forces units of the MACV-SOG trained local Montagnard hill tribes to CIDG ( Civilian Irregular Defense Group ) forces and built fortified outposts on the border with Cambodia and Laos. The CIDG troops were supposed to protect against the NVA infiltration via the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to protect the isolated Montagnard mountain villages from being overrun by the North Vietnamese. So far, the Montagnards have borne the brunt of the fighting in the remote border regions. Numerous special forces camps were built in the surrounding hills around the airstrip at Dak To , which were intended to serve as an early warning system in the event of a major NVA invasion. From these camps from numerous were Fernspäher patrols (LRRP, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol ) launched to the enemy activity on the Ho Chi Minh Trail on the border with Laos educate.
Dak To is located in a valley basin on the three-country border of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, framed by mountains and hills that are up to 1,200 meters high and densely overgrown with tropical mountain forest and are very difficult to access. The western Kon Tum province is covered by two- to three-storey rainforest, the few forest-free areas are overgrown with dense bamboo reaching up to 20 cm in diameter. Suitable places to drop off airborne troops by helicopter are therefore very sparse, so that troops can almost only move on foot. The daytime temperatures in the Central Highlands often reach +35 ° C and fall at night, cooled by heavy tropical rain, to below +12 ° C.
Operation Greeley
As early as the summer of 1967, fighting began in the Kon Tum Province, which is part of the II Corps Tactical Zone, as part of Operation Greeley , a search and destroy mission of the 4th US Infantry Division with support from the 173rd US Airborne Brigade , the 42nd ARVN - Infantry regiment and other paratrooper units .
In January 1967, General William R. Peers took command of the 4th Division, which was responsible for the defense of the II Corps Tactical Zone . Before the summer monsoon began , Peers had defensive positions built around the headquarters of the 4th Division at Jackson's Hole and began Operation Francis Marion in May 1967 west of Plei Cu with the 1st and 2nd Brigades . The 3rd Brigade was deployed northwest of Saigon for an operation with the 25th Infantry Division . In mid-1967, enemy activity by the NVA intensified in the Dak To area.
Peers issued guidelines to his infantry companies not to be separated from the main unit and overrun by the North Vietnamese army, the maxim of superior US firepower, but was difficult to implement in the extremely difficult landscape. Individual rifle companies should never operate more than a kilometer away from their sister company; in the event of enemy contact, the attacked unit should be reinforced from the air immediately. This should minimize the 4th division's losses.
As enemy contacts increased, Peers requested two battalions from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General John R. Deane , to be deployed in the Dak To region and to clear the jungle-covered mountains of the enemy. The 173rd Airborne Brigade was previously in the air base of Bien Hòa stationed near Saigon and had only sporadic contact with the enemy with smaller Vietcong units had. Colonel William J. Linday, a liaison officer of Peers', warned the officers of the brigade before their deployment in the highlands because regular NVA units are highly motivated and far better trained and equipped than local Viet Cong fighters. These warnings were largely ignored by the paratroopers .
On June 20, 1967, soldiers of the C Company of 1st Battalion found / 503. US airborne infantry found the bodies of a Special Forces / CIDG unit on "Hill 1338", the largest hill south of Dak To. Supported by A Company, the paratroopers set up their bivouac on the top of the hill and were welcomed by 6th Battalion / 24th in the early hours of the morning. North Vietnamese People's Army infantry regiment attacked. Due to the difficult terrain, it was initially not possible to rescue the trapped US soldiers from the ambush. Artillery support failed due to the severely limited visibility and the NVA's tactics of digging trenches in close proximity to the enemy. Air strikes were ineffective for the same reasons. The A Company survived several infantry attacks during the day and the following night, but suffered heavy losses of 76 dead and 23 wounded out of a total of 137 men. 15 North Vietnamese were later found dead on the battlefield.
The US military press later reported that 475 North Vietnamese were killed, and operation reports from the 173rd Airborne Brigade counted 513 fallen enemy soldiers. The high US losses brought the tactics of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into the greatest criticism, the liaison officer of the 4th Infantry Division even recommended that General Deane be removed from his command with immediate effect. In order not to exacerbate the damage to the public image of the US Army caused by the fiasco, only two officers from C Company were transferred to other units.
In response to the destruction of A Company, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam sent reinforcements. On June 23 and 24, 1967, three brigades of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division and two battalions of an elite South Vietnamese parachute formation arrived in the area of operations. Together with Deane's troops, they were supposed to track down and destroy the 24th Infantry Regiment of the Vietnamese People's Army. An artillery fire base was established on Hill 664 to support infantry fighting the North Vietnamese.
On July 10, 1967, the 4th Battalion / 503. Airborne infantry on the K-101 D Battalion of the North Vietnamese Doc Lap Regiment. When four rifle companies of the top of the hill 830 approached, the well-camouflaged North Vietnamese opened an armed attack with machine guns and B-40 - grenade launchers . A further advance was impossible due to the strong enemy forces and so the paratroopers had to set up camp on hill 830 for the night. The next morning the North Vietnamese had withdrawn, the 4/503 reported 22 dead and 62 wounded. Only 3 dead soldiers from the Vietnamese People's Army were found. The reason given was an alleged habit of the Vietnamese People's Army to always rescue their fallen from the battlefield immediately.
Pressure from the Vietnamese People's Army on the CIDG outposts Dak Seang and Dak Pek , 20 and 45 km north of Dak To, increased, so the ARVN 42nd Infantry Regiment was ordered to Dak Seang. On August 4, 1967, there was a battle between ARVN paratroopers and the NVA, which lasted three days. The 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion had to repel six heavy ground attacks by the North Vietnamese alone, until the losses of the ARVN became too high and the operation had to be aborted without further land gain.
In mid-August 1967, contact with the enemy dropped abruptly, which led the Americans to suspect that the NVA had withdrawn behind the Laotian border. Most of the ARVN troops were flown back to their garrisons around Saigon. On August 23, 1967, General Deane handed command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade to Brigadier General Leo H. Schweiter.
On September 17, 1967, two battalions of the 173rd were flown out to guard the rice harvest in Phu Yen Province . The 2nd/503 and 3rd ARVN Airborne Battalions remained in Dak To . They carried out a cleanup operation in the Toumarong Valley north of Dak To and were ordered to track down the regimental headquarters of the Vietnamese People's Army. After three weeks of fruitless search, Operation Greeley finally ended on October 11, 1967.
Operation Mac Arthur
preparation
At the beginning of October 1967, the US intelligence service reported that the NVA was withdrawing units from the Plei Cu area and massaging in division strength in the Kon Tum province. In response, two U.S. battalions were moved to Dak To to take part in a counter-operation called Operation Mac Arthur . On October 29, 1967, the 4th / 503 of the 173rd Airborne Brigade was flown in from their garrison near Ben Het to guard the construction of Artillery Fire Base 12.
On November 3, 1967, Sergeant Vu Hong, an artillery specialist from the 6th NVA Infantry Regiment, went over to the South Vietnamese Army and provided them with detailed information about the deployment plans and operational goals of several NVA regiments at Dak To and Ben Het. Four infantry regiments (66th, 32nd, 24th and 174th) and an artillery regiment under the command of the 1st Division were to take Dak To and eliminate a US unit of brigade strength. As it later turned out, this was part of an overall plan drawn up by General Nguyen Chi Thanh to tie up as many US troops as possible in the western highlands in preparation for the Tet Offensive .
Although these plans were discovered by the Americans, the North Vietnamese forces were well prepared for the impending strikes of the US military machinery. According to estimates, some of the bunker and tunnel systems had been built six months earlier. General Peers later noted that almost every strategically important part of the site had been developed into a difficult defensive position with elaborate bunker and tunnel complexes. Large quantities of supplies and ammunition had been moved into the area and enabled the NVA to remain in the positions for months.
When it was on 4th / 5th November 1967 came again to heavy enemy contact and firefights on the hills, General Schweiter was ordered to relocate his entire brigade back to Dak To. Your job was to build a base of operations and defend Ben Het against the increasing attacks. Furthermore, the headquarters of the 66th NVA regiment should be located and destroyed. Furthermore, almost all units of the 4th US Infantry Division and two battalions (1/12 and 2/8) of the 1st Cavalry Division were sent again to the Dak To area, as well as the 42nd ARVN Regiment and the 2nd and 3rd ARVN Airborne Battalion. The small town of Dak To and the airstrip were converted into a large logistical base camp for the incoming and outgoing US troops, large quantities of supplies and ammunition were flown in day and night to transport a complete US division, an airborne brigade and six ARVN- To supply battalions and prepare for a major battle.
battle
The first fighting broke out on 3rd / 4th. November 1967, when units of the 4th Infantry Division ran directly into defense positions of the NVA. The following day the same thing happened to units of the 173rd Paratrooper Brigade. The American and South Vietnamese troops then developed a tactic according to which North Vietnamese hill positions discovered in this way were shot ready to be attacked by artillery fire and air strikes and cleared of vegetation until they could be captured.
The unusually stubborn resistance of the NVA infantrymen was surprising, as they held their positions tenaciously and did not allow themselves to be driven away by air raids. The NVA offered bitter resistance, engaged in protracted firefights with the Americans, caused the greatest possible losses and then withdrew again overnight - a tactic that wearied and demoralized the Allies.
The 4th Battalion of the 173s was supposed to supervise the construction of a fire base on hill 823 on November 6th, 120 men of the B-Company were deposited with helicopters on the hilltop and got directly into the fire of the 66th NVA regiment. 100 North Vietnamese were killed and 9 US soldiers. The next morning, Bravo Company was replaced by 1st Battalion / 503. Paratrooper Regiment replaced by Colonel David J. Schumacher and, contrary to Colonel Livsey's orders, split into two smaller combat units. Combat unit Black consisted of C Company and two platoons from D Company, Combat Unit Blue from A Company and the remaining platoons from D Company. Combat Unit Black left Hill 823 and was ambushed on November 11, 1967. Combat unit Blue had to give up its operation and Black came to the rescue, in the firefights with the 8th and 9th Battalion of the 66th NVA Regiment, 20 Americans were killed and 154 wounded. The commanding officer of the Black Combat Unit Captain Thomas McElwain reported that 80 enemies had been killed, but was sent back to the bush by Schumacher to count the dead, as his statements were not believed. He revised his report to 175 enemy soldiers killed. He later admitted that he had to justify the unit's own losses with excessive enemy losses. Schumacher and Mc Elwain later clashed violently, as Mc Elwain suggested Corporal John Andrew Barnes III, who intercepted a hand grenade and thus protected the lives of his comrades, for the award of a medal of bravery. Schumacher refused his request on the grounds that men who commit suicide are not awarded medals of valor. Barnes later received the Medal of Honor .
At the same time as the battle for Huegel 823, there was an NVA attack on three companies of the 3rd Battalion / 8. Infantry Regiment (4th Infantry Division) held on Hill 724. After a massed mortar fire, the North Vietnamese went out of the jungle to attack infantry with the bayonet . 18 Americans died, 118 were wounded and 92 North Vietnamese were killed in action.
On the night of November 12, 1967, the NVA took the Dak To airfield under mortar fire for the first time. On November 15, two C-130 Hercules transport planes were destroyed in a fire attack and the ammunition and fuel depot were also hit, which exploded in a fireball and caused a cloud of mushroom-shaped smoke to rise from the valley. A mechanic later reported that it was felt that the Viet Cong were now in possession of nuclear weapons. Despite this success, the NVA went on the defensive due to the massing of the Allied forces. Previous operations had badly affected the 66th and 32nd NVA regiments, and some combat units had to be replaced by reserves from the 174th regiment. The Americans and South Vietnamese were now embroiled in tough retreat skirmishes.
In order to thwart a repetition of the artillery attacks, the 12th Infantry Regiment (4th US Infantry Division) was sent again against the hill 1338, which offers a good view of the village of Dak To. For two days the Americans fought their way up the steep slope and fought most of the bunker complexes, which were connected by telephone cables.
After combing the area for the troops attacking Task Force Black, the three companies of 1st Battalion / 503 were deployed southwest to take Hill 882. They were accompanied by about a dozen war correspondents. On the morning of November 15, 1967, the command company reached the top of the hill and discovered position systems also connected by telephone lines. When the Americans were suddenly attacked, they took up defensive positions on the hill. The NVA started fire attacks with light weapons and machine guns and started a series of ground attacks. The US commander requested helicopter evacuation for the seriously injured, but this request was rejected by Colonel Schumacher, who ordered that the civilians must first be flown out. At the end of the fighting for Hügel 882 on November 19, 1967, 7 dead and 34 seriously injured were counted, the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment lost 51 men.
The ARVN troops were also involved in intense fighting. On November 18, 1967, the 3rd Battalion / 42. ARVN infantry at Hügel 1416 (near Tan Canh ) to the 24th NVA infantry regiment. The NVA operated from well-developed positions and was attacked in the rear by paratroopers from the 3rd and 9th ARVN Airborne Battalions. The ARVN soldiers were able to take the hill on November 20th and lost 66 soldiers and 290 wounded in hard hand-to-hand fighting. The NVA had 248 dead.
According to the US reconnaissance, the 174th NVA infantry regiment was moving west of Ben Het and took up positions on Hill 875, only 6 km from the border. It was apparently intended to cover the withdrawal of the 66th and 32nd NVA regiments to Cambodia. On November 19, General Schweiter learned that a Special Forces company had been ambushed by the NVA in this area. He then ordered his 2nd Battalion to take the hill in 875.
Hill 875
On November 19th at 9:40 am, three companies (330 men) of the 2./503 began their attack on Hill 875. At 10:30 am, about 300 meters from the top of the hill, the first two companies were caught in the fire of machine guns, B -40 missiles and recoilless guns from bunker positions and were forced to dig in. A company, which had remained a little lower on the slope, was attacked by NVA troops from hidden positions at the foot of the hill at around 2.30 p.m. and withdrew up the hill. The battalion was caught in a well-prepared ambush by the 2nd battalion of the 174th NVA regiment.
Artillery and air strikes were immediately requested, but these were ineffective in the dense foliage. Six UH-1 helicopters were shot down trying to land with supplies of ammunition and water. In one of the worst friendly fire incidents of the war, 42 Americans were killed and 45 wounded when two 500-pound bombs from the US Marine Corps fighter-bombers were dropped on the battalion positions that evening. One of the bombs fell on the battalion command post, where the wounded were being tended.
The following morning the 4th Battalion / 503 was dispatched to relieve the men at Hill 875. Due to sniper fire, mortar fire and difficult terrain, it was not until nightfall before the troops could reach their comrades. On the afternoon of November 21, 1967, both battalions launched a joint attack on the hilltop. After bitter hand-to-hand combat, they penetrated the enemy positions, but were ordered back to their starting positions at nightfall.
During the night the 1st Battalion / 12. The 4th Infantry Regiment ordered to intervene in the fighting at Dak To. In just 12 hours, it was withdrawn from an operation in the southern highlands and relocated by helicopter to the main artillery fire base at Dak To . The following day, Hügel was exposed to 875 heavy air and artillery attacks that deprived him of all natural cover. On November 23, the 2nd and 4th Battalion / 503 renewed their attack on the hill and were supported by the 1st Battalion / 12 attacking from the south. This time the hill could be completely taken, but the North Vietnamese had already fled west to Cambodia and Laos during the night and left only burned corpses and a few weapons.
The Battle of Hügel in 875 cost the 2nd of 503 87 dead, 130 wounded and 3 missing, the 4th of 503 had 28 dead, 123 wounded and 4 missing. Together with non-combat losses, the 173rd Airborne Brigade lost a fifth of its total strength. The 173rd Airborne Brigade was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation for the fighting for Dak To . The Puerto Rican machine gunner Carlos Lozada was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for extraordinary bravery after his death on Hill 875 .
aftermath
At the end of November 1967, the NVA was forced to leave the region around Dak To and to withdraw to their staging area in Laos and Cambodia. It had not succeeded in completely destroying a large US combat unit as planned, but the US forces suffered heavy losses. In the fighting for Dak To, the Americans recorded 376 dead and missing and 1,441 wounded, and an additional 40 helicopters were lost. The severity of the fighting is also reflected in the ammunition consumption : 151,000 artillery shells were fired, 2,096 tactical aerial missions and 257 B-52 bombs were also flown. The US Army , according to the North Vietnamese lost 1,644 soldiers, but this number is disputed.
In his memoirs, General William C. Westmoreland reports 1,400 North Vietnamese killed, while Major General Wiliam P. Rossen (MACV Vice-Commander) estimated only 1,000. Some US generals were dissatisfied with the loss ratio between their own soldiers and enemy soldiers ( body count ). In the words of US Marine Corps General John Chaisson : “ Is it a victory when you lose 362 friendlies in three weeks and by your own spurious body count you only get 1,200? ”(German:“ Can one speak of a victory if one loses 362 of one's own soldiers in three weeks and the enemy, according to one's own dubious counts, only 1200?
Three of the four NVA regiments that took part in the Battle of Dak To were so badly damaged that they no longer played a role in the winter-spring offensive. Only the 24th NVA regiment took part in the Tet Offensive in January 1968. The 173rd Airborne Brigade and two battalions of the 4th Infantry Division were hardly in any better shape. General William Westmoreland defended Operation Mac Arthur: “ We had soundly defeated the enemy without unduly sacrificing operations in other areas. The enemy's return was nil. ”(German:“ We really beat the enemy without endangering operations in other regions. The result of the enemy was zero. ”)
The North Vietnamese had achieved at least part of their strategy by pulling around half of the operational US battalions out of the cities and the densely populated lowlands and tying them up in the central highlands. Some generals on Westmoreland's staff saw dire parallels with the Viet Minh campaign of 1953, in which seemingly peripheral attacks led to the French defeat of Dien Bien Phu . General Võ Nguyên Giáp had warned the Americans of such a fate back in September, but was not taken seriously as a comparable situation did not seem to exist. That changed in early 1968 with the Battle of Khe Sanh .
literature
- Michael Casey et al. a .: The Army at War . Boston Publ., Boston MA 1987, ISBN 0-939526-23-9 (The Vietnam Experience; 17).
- Albert N. Garland: A Distant Challenge. The US Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972 . 2nd Edition. Berkeley Publ., New York 1985, ISBN 0-515-08107-8 .
- Terrence Maitland, Peter McInerney: A Contagion of War . New edition Time-Life-Books, Alexandria VA 1999, ISBN 0-7835-0150-1 (The Vietnam Experience; 5).
- Edward F. Murphy: Dak To. America's Sky Soldiers in South Vietnam's Central Highlands . Ballentine Books, New York 2007, ISBN 978-0-89141-910-5 .
- Edward F. Murphy: The Hill Fights. The First Battle of Khe Sanh . Ballentine Books, New York 2003, ISBN 0-89141-810-5 .
- Dave R. Palmer: Summons of the Trumpet . Presidio Press, Novato CA 1995, ISBN 0-89141-041-4 (reprint of the New York 1984 edition).
- Shelby L. Stanton: The Rise and Fall of an American Army. US Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 . Presidio Press, Novato CA 1995, ISBN 0-89141-232-8 (reprint of the New York 1985 edition).