Prussian Federal Reform Plan 1866
The Prussian Federal Reform Plan of 1866 (actually “Basic Features of a New Federal Constitution”) was a proposal to reorganize the German Confederation . The Prussian government under Otto von Bismarck submitted it to the other German states on June 10, 1866. The plan outlined a small German federal state without Austria . The key point was a directly elected national parliament.
Bismarck had already called for such a national parliament in April 1866 and now specified his reform plan in June. At this point, Prussia had already invaded Holstein, which was administered by Austria . This escalated the conflict between the two great powers of the German Confederation and soon afterwards, on June 14, led to the German War.
The federal reform plan of June 10th still had an impact: Even during the war, seventeen northern German states confirmed to Prussia that they wanted to form a new federation on this basis. This federation, a federal state and not a federation of states , was realized in 1867 as the North German Confederation .
prehistory
Attempts at unification and division
Prussia had already tried to reform the German Confederation or to put a new state in its place.
- It was a vision that Prussia would become the dominant power of a small German federal state (federal state). “Little German” means that the federal states of the German Confederation should belong to the new state, but without the federal territories of Austria. Small Germany could then have been linked to Austria via a further federal government . Austria, however, rejected any solution that would have pushed it out of Germany.
- Another vision was a Prussian-led northern Germany or the expansion of Prussia into the remaining parts of northern Germany. Such a solution could theoretically have been realized in an Austro-Prussian cooperation that would have divided Germany into north and south.
The serious attempt at an “ Erfurt Union ” in 1849/50 was intended as a small German federal state. Prussia, however, had to quickly realize that at most northern Germany or part of it could be united in this way. In the years after 1850 the Prussian government made several attempts to expand its power in northern Germany or to divide Germany. In 1860, Prussia unsuccessfully proposed a division of the federal army into north and south.
One instrument in the Prussian argument was the demand that the German Confederation should have a directly elected parliament. If such a national parliament had been realized, this would have had the following advantage for Prussia: Its population size would have been better represented than in the Bundestag . In addition, the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck wanted to make “moral conquests” with the liberal democratic national movement. But this remained skeptical because the conservative Bismarck found himself in a constitutional conflict with the state parliament in his own country . For example, on the occasion of the Frankfurt Princely Congress in 1863, it was very clear that the demand for the national parliament was primarily a means of torpedoing the Austrian reform proposals .
Prussian-Bavarian negotiations
In February 1866 Prussia tried to win Bavaria's support for federal reform. Together, Prussia and Bavaria would overcome Austria's resistance. In addition to Austria and a Prussian northern Germany, there was to be a third part in Germany , namely a southern Germany led by Bavaria . The demand for a national parliament was intended to prevent Austria from exerting influence on the medium-sized states again, as it did at the Frankfurt Fürstentag.
In this way a war with Austria could most likely have been avoided. Either a triad of Austria, North Germany and South Germany would have arisen, or a small German state with Prussian-Bavarian dualism. In the latter case Austria would not have dared to go to war. According to Andreas Kaernbach, the experiment showed the “originality and flexibility of Bismarck's federal policy”. A war was seen only as a last resort .
In order to get the Bavarian Prime Minister Ludwig von der Pfordten on his side, Bismarck would have been content with a notable assembly that would also only act in an advisory capacity. Von der Pfordten, however, agreed to a directly elected parliament. However, Bavaria wanted to agree on a reform plan with the governments first. Only then should a parliament discuss the plan. In addition, Austria should also participate in the negotiations. Because of this, on March 29, a joint approach between Prussia and Bavaria finally failed.
On April 8, Prussia signed a secret treaty of alliance with Italy . It was limited to three months and, after a failed federal reform, was intended to ensure that Austria had to fight on two fronts in the event of war. Often one saw in this treaty Prussia's decisive step towards war, but Bismarck still tried to bring about a reform with Austria or Bavaria (for example with the Gablenz Mission ). It was important for him that a national parliament was set up and that Prussian hegemony in northern Germany was secured.
Application dated April 9, 1866
On April 9, 1866, Prussia applied to the Bundestag to elect a national parliament. Not only the national movement, but also the individual German states reacted negatively. They saw their sovereignty diminished by a national parliament and were greatly favored by the distribution of votes in the previous Bundestag.
The medium-sized states like Bavaria did not want to offend Prussia and encouraged Bismarck to work out his reform plans further. The motion was pushed into a nine-member committee, the majority of which was, however, opponents of the motion. Bismarck, on the other hand, wanted to get the national parliament through first before revealing his further plans.
In a promemoria on April 27, Bismarck had his colleague Hepke record the basic principles of Prussian politics. The reason for this was the election of the committee. In the Promemoria Hepkes, an Austro-Prussian dualism in the sense of cooperation was planned. In the north Prussia would have dominated their respective group of states, in the south Austria. In the Bundestag, both powers should have the same number of votes, in the national representation (parliament) Austria would have 128 and Prussia (including Lauenburg ) 148 members, out of a total of 460.
A federal government was not planned, the Bundestag should decide on war and peace. What was original about the Promemoria was that the national representation should vote on certain matters depending on the group of states. That should make the national representation for Austria more acceptable. It did not have to submit to federal resolutions that were difficult to implement for a multiethnic state . Prussia, on the other hand, could have standardized the structures in its group of states more and more. In practice, however, Austria would have had a difficult time realizing a trade policy that did justice to both Baden in the southern German group of states and Hungary.
Finally, under pressure, Bismarck sent the Neuner Committee the following outline of his ideas on May 11:
- Legislation: The national parliament should be assigned to the Bundestag and participate in legislation. In the Bundestag, unanimity should not be required for any resolutions.
- Competence: The national parliament should deal with the non-profit orders according to Art. 64 of the Vienna Final Act as well as the reform of the Federal War Constitution and the establishment of a navy .
- The basis for the election was to be the Frankfurt Reich Election Act of 1849. One representative was to be elected for every 100,000 inhabitants.
The outline was received very benevolently. The committee members waited for instructions from their governments and were relieved that Prussia had not asked for a federal government. Middle-state politicians feared that if they delayed the decision on the motion, it could signal a revolution. That was what made them inclined to negotiate federal reform with Bismarck in the first place.
Reform plan of June 10, 1866
circumstances
Meanwhile, the conflict over Austria and Prussia, which was ignited by Holstein, intensified. Prussia marched into Holstein, administered by Austria, on June 7th, about which Austria appealed to the Bundestag on June 14th. The following federal decree against Prussia triggered the German war.
In this situation at the beginning of June, Bismarck tried to win over public opinion. This would work less on the Schleswig-Holstein question than on the subject of federal reform. It could be shown that Prussian interests also corresponded to those of the entire nation. On June 10, 1866, he did not send his reform plan to the Bundestag, which could no longer decide on it in time, but rather directly to the German governments. They should answer whether they would join a new covenant on this basis.
content
The new federation should consist of the old member states, with the exception of Austria and the "Dutch" areas ( Luxembourg and Limburg ; Art. I). The federal government forms a "common and uniform customs and trading area" (Art. V). For the relationship with the German parts of Austria “special treaties” have been promised (Art. X).
A “national representation” or “people's representation” or “parliament” was envisaged as a new federal body, which was to be elected “according to the provisions of the Reich Election Act of April 12, 1849” (Art. III). The governments of the individual states should then reshape the Bundestag together with the parliament. Until then, the old voting relationship would continue to exist.
The national representation and the Bundestag were jointly responsible for the legislation. A majority in both organs would be sufficient for the adoption of a federal law (Art. III). The federal authorities decided on war and peace, set up a navy and regulated the following matters (Art. VI, VII, VIII):
- customs and trade legislation;
- the order of the system of measures, coins and weights, together with the establishment of the principles governing the issuance of funded and unfunded paper money;
- the general banking regulations;
- the invention patents;
- the protection of intellectual property;
- the provisions on freedom of movement, home and settlement conditions, commercial operations, colonization and emigration to countries outside Germany;
- Organization of joint protection of German trade abroad, of German shipping and its flags at sea and arrangement of joint consular representation, which is provided by the federal government;
- the entire German railway system in the interests of national defense and general traffic;
- shipping operations on the waterways common to several states, as well as river and other water tariffs;
- the post and telegraph system;
- the common civil procedure and the common concurs procedure.
The federal government would have had a northern army and a southern army. " Federal Supreme Commander " in the north should be the Prussian and in the south the Bavarian king. The officers of the individual contingents could be appointed under certain conditions by the governments of the individual states. More precise regulations and powers were supposed to ensure that the contingents were “complete and fit for war” (Art. IX).
consequences
The nine points of the reform plan formed Prussia's actual war target program for the impending conflict. Despite all the incompleteness, they made significant demands that addressed the longstanding issues of federal reform. However, there was still no clear idea of “federal power”. In the past, for example in the question of the head of the Reich from 1848 to 1850 , an emperor , for example , but also a board of directors with several members were proposed.
On June 16, 1866, after the fighting began, Prussia turned to 19 northern German states. It offered them to forge an alliance based on the reform plan and promise them independence and territorial integrity. To do this, however, they would have to subordinate their armies to Prussia. Seventeen accepted the offer, some under pressure. Six of them had already concluded military conventions with Prussia in 1861. The other two who refused were Sachsen-Meiningen and Reuss of the older line .
In preliminary discussions with the French Emperor Napoleon III. Bismarck agreed that the reform plan could only be implemented in Germany north of the Main . The Main line was taken into account in the peace agreements with Austria and the other war opponents. On August 18, 1866, Prussia signed the so-called August Alliance with its allies . It announced the founding of a new federation based on the reform plan, which later became the North German Confederation. The proposed national parliament became the constituent Reichstag from February to April 1867.
See also
source
- No. 173 (No. 166b). Principles of a new federal constitution presented to the Federal Assembly by the Prussian government on June 10, 1866 . In: Ernst Rudolf Huber: Documents on German constitutional history. Volume 2: German constitutional documents 1851–1900. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1986, pp. 234-236.
Web links
- Principles of a new federal constitution presented to the Federal Assembly by the Prussian government on June 10, 1866 , full text on verfassungen.de
supporting documents
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 211.
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 213.
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, pp. 212/213.
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, pp. 218-220.
- ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 518.
- ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, pp. 518/519.
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 226.
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, pp. 226-228.
- ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 519.
- ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 223.
- ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, pp. 536/537.
- ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 563.