Federal Decree of June 14, 1866

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Map of the German Confederation

In the federal decree of June 14, 1866 , the Bundestag , meeting in Frankfurt am Main , ordered the mobilization of the armed forces against Prussia at the request of Austria . The majority in the Bundestag wanted to counter Prussia's invasion of Holstein . This invasion had violated the constitutional laws of the German Confederation as unauthorized self-help .

Prussia under Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck considered the resolution to be illegal and declared the German Confederation dissolved. In fact, however, the affairs of Schleswig and Holstein were entirely a matter for the federal government, since the federal government had the right to take measures against a violation of federal law.

The federal decree led to the German War in the summer of 1866, in which Austria and her remaining allies were defeated. In the subsequent peace agreements such as the Peace of Prague , the losers had to acknowledge the dissolution of the German Confederation .

Austro-Prussian antagonism

At the end of the 1850s, the rivalry between Austria and Prussia became more prominent again, and a new reform debate arose in the German Confederation. For a short time, both great powers worked together in the war against Denmark in 1864, but soon afterwards fell out over the future fate of Schleswig and Holstein . Prussia wanted to annex these areas that were detached from Denmark and ruled together as a condominium .

The Schleswig-Holstein question escalated when Austria wanted to convene the estates in Holstein and Prussia saw its rights violated as a result. Prussian troops marched into Holstein. Austria saw this in turn as a violation of its common rights and asked the Bundestag to mobilize the armed forces against Prussia . That was not a provocation, so Jürgen Angelow , but rather an act of desperation by Austria. It had recognized too late that Prussia was headed for war. Now it was looking for support from the Confederation to discourage Prussia.

The Austrian proposal was changed before the vote. Only the four mixed corps were mobilized as the federal army, not the three Austrian ones. It was more important that a common federal general had not yet been appointed. According to Kaernbach, in the decisive session, the Bundestag “once again showed all the weaknesses of the German Confederation when its leading powers were at odds. In the vote [...] almost all states expressed their own reasons and special reservations. ”According to Prussian opinion, Denmark had transferred the sovereignty of Schleswig and Holstein to Austria and Prussia, so that it was not a federal matter. The motion and the vote in the Bundestag are contrary to the federal government.

Result and consequences

Meeting room of the Seniors Council of the Bundestag, in the Palais Thurn und Taxis in Frankfurt am Main

The vote in the Senate Council of the Bundestag on June 14th resulted in:

In terms of votes, this resulted in a majority of nine votes for and five votes against the motion, with one abstention. Of the 33 member states in total, twelve voted in favor of the motion and 17 (including Prussia) either against it or not in the vote. Four votes cannot be counted (Holstein, Baden, Reuss younger line, Schaumburg-Lippe).

Prussia considered the motion to be a breach of the Confederation, since Austria did not follow the complicated route of ordinary federal execution . It is a federally illegal declaration of war against a member state. With the adoption on June 14, the federal government ceased to exist. The Bundestag did not take part in the war. Kaernbach: "He went about his normal business in Frankfurt until he had to flee to Augsburg from the approaching Prussian troops ."

evaluation

Badisches Dragoon Regiment. The armed forces consisted of contingents from the member states. This often led to complaints from the great powers about the inadequate equipment and fighting strength of the troops agreed under federal law.

The mobilization decision of the Bundestag raises constitutional and moral questions. The primary concern is whether Prussia's actions and his view that the federal government had been dissolved were justified. This is followed by the question of who was responsible for the end of the German Confederation and the German War.

Remedy for self-help in Prussia

Austria and Prussia had made selfish agreements about Schleswig-Holstein outside the German Confederation. In doing so, they disregarded the rights of the Augustburg dynasty and the will of the inhabitants. Both great powers have also made secret agreements with Italy and France , respectively , in case of war - such agreements against another member state were forbidden by federal law. Austria's measures and armaments were rather excusable, since it was a reaction to Prussia. The Prussian invasion of Holstein represented unauthorized self-help against an actual or alleged breach of law (Art. 19 Vienna Final Act ), as the majority of the Bundestag also determined.

In addition, Holstein was permanently a federal member. If Austria had called the Bundestag to clarify the situation there, this could not be an alien issue. The invasion of Prussia was an attack on the sovereignty that Austria and Prussia had jointly exercised over Holstein (and Schleswig) since 1864.

Even if Austria was allowed to apply for mobilization in material terms, the form remains a problem. Prussia decided: Should a member state actually practice unauthorized self-help, one could only react with a formal federal execution. Austria had renounced this because it would have required a lengthy procedure. Huber agrees with Austria: "The federal decision of June 14, 1866 was rather a preparatory measure in the context of an informal federal execution to prevent Prussian self-help actions or other acts of violence." He sees this as covered by Article 19 of the Vienna Final Act. It would not have made sense either if the Bundestag had been forbidden to prevent unauthorized self-help in good time. The federal decision was therefore covered by constitutional law. In addition, in the event of a conflict between the federal government and the member state, the Bundestag was entitled to react in terms of a supra-legal federal emergency. Even an inadmissible federal resolution did not automatically lead to the dissolution or allow a member state to leave (Art. V Vienna Final Act made this clear).

"Law of the Nation"

A decisive moment is the question of whether the German Confederation was understood as a pure confederation of states or as something else. Under international law one could argue that a member state does not have to adhere to a treaty if the circumstances have changed, if the basic right to honor and existence made it unreasonable to remain in the confederation. Although the Federal Basic Laws did not provide for such a formula rebus sic stantibus , the decision as to whether it was unreasonable lay with the individual state.

Lion Monument ” in Dortmund for those who fell in the war of 1866

However, the German Confederation had not only elements of international law, but also federal elements. That is why a member state ultimately had to bow to federal compulsion. The unity of the federation was also based on the German nation to which Prussia had just relied. In addition, Prussia had only brought about the coercive measures of the federal government through its own behavior.

From a Kleindeutsch- Prussian point of view, however, there was an over-positive law that Prussia could invoke: the “law of the German nation”, which opposed the old law of particularism . The old law may have legality , whereas the law of the nation had legitimacy . The opposite side saw it the other way round: the radical federalists were still considered legitimate after 1866 by the old law of the German Confederation. Which law to obey was ultimately a political decision. Contemporaries increasingly viewed Bismarck's policy as legitimate because it was successful and guaranteed the security and welfare of the German people more reliably than the German Confederation.

See also

supporting documents

  1. ^ Jürgen Angelow: From Vienna to Königgrätz. The Security Policy of the German Confederation in European Equilibrium (1815–1866) . R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1996, p. 246.
  2. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 541.
  3. ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 237.
  4. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 540.
  5. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 541 f.
  6. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 542.
  7. ^ Andreas Kaernbach: Bismarck's concepts for reforming the German Confederation. On the continuity of the politics of Bismarck and Prussia on the German question. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 237.
  8. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 544/545.
  9. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 545/456.
  10. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 547/548, 850.
  11. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 550 f.
  12. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 551.
  13. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 552-554.