Bo Gu

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Portrait of Bo Gu, 1930s
Bo Gu (left) with Zhou Enlai , Zhu De and Mao Zedong in Yan'an
Bo Gu (right) with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, Yan'an, 1937

Bo Gu ( Chinese  博古 , Pinyin Bó Gǔ , W.-G. Bo Ku ; born June 24, 1907 in Hangzhou , Zhejiang ; † April 8, 1946 ), real name Qin Bangxian ( Chinese  秦邦宪 , Pinyin Qín Bāngxiàn ), was a a senior member of the Chinese Communist Party and had a great influence on its politics in the early 1930s. He was one of the 28 Bolsheviks trained in Moscow and effectively led the party when it was able to establish and defend several Soviet republics. At this stage he was in a power struggle with Mao Zedong . After the loss of the Jiangxi Soviet , he was blamed for military errors by the Chinese Red Army on the Long March and ousted by Mao Zedong and his supporters at the Zunyi Conference . Nevertheless, he was able to hold high positions in the party until his death.

Life

Bo attended a craft school and was involved as a youth in the movement against the warlords and against foreign imperialism. In 1925 he entered Shanghai University , where he came into contact with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism , especially through early Chinese communists such as Qu Qiubai and Deng Zhongxia . He became part of the May 30th Movement , joined the Communist Party and boycotted foreign products.

Later he was sent to study at Sun Yatsen University , where he received Bolshevik training from his friend Wang Ming , but also from Zhang Wentian and Yang Shangkun . After his return to China he belonged to the group of 28 Bolsheviks whom the Comintern expected to steer the revolution in China in their favor. After his return, he and his fellow students initially only got subordinate positions or activities.

Bo's steep career began with the arrival of Comintern envoy and former rector of Sun Yatsen University Pawel Mif in October 1930. Mif began to reorganize the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party according to his ideas and therefore convened an extended plenary in January 1931, one third of which was Sun Yatsen University students, including Bo Gu. After the Communist Party leadership had to leave Shanghai and move to the Jiangxi Soviet , he became de facto chairman of the provisional Politburo. His firm belief in the universal applicability of the Soviet way of revolution brought him into conflict with the communists, who came from the Chinese communist movement itself, above all Mao Zedong . Bo tried with some allies to actively undermine Mao's position in the party, although he could not openly question Stalin's policy of also supporting Mao.

In January 1932, Bo Gu and Luo Fu issued the directive that revolution should be successful in one or more provinces and that Nanchang , Ji'an and other cities in Jiangxi should be attacked for this purpose . The directive also reminded people to fight right deviators . Mao rejected these instructions as unrealistic. Bo then tried again with the help of Luo Fu, Ren Bishi , Xiang Ying , Deng Fa and Gu Zuolin to force Mao out of his positions. Fearing a negative reaction from the Comintern, they sent a notice to the Comintern in English that there were no open discussions against Mao. Within the party, they distributed a directive in Chinese that Mao should be criticized. This directive had to be withdrawn in January 1933 after the arrival of the new Comintern envoy Arthur Ewert .

After the Shanghai Communist Party had to be closed, Bo Gu also moved to the Jiangxi Soviet and became responsible for the entire party leadership. He avoided Mao, although Mao was held in high regard as the founder of the Jiangxi Soviet. In February 1933, Luo Ming , the party secretary of Fujian , had the provincial party committee endorse the guerrilla tactics against the Kuomintang. Bo then started a campaign against Luo Ming, Mao Zetan , He Zizhen and other members of Mao Zedong. He also made charges of alleged opportunism against Deng Xiaoping , who had been active in the Soviet since 1931; Deng did not give in, however.

Otto Braun arrived in the Soviet in autumn 1933 . Since he did not speak Chinese, he limited his communication to the graduates of Moscow University. Bo Gu developed a friendly relationship with him; together they took command of the Red Army. At the height of this battle with Mao, Mao called in sick - Bo Gu called this a diplomatic illness and tried to get rid of him after Moscow. The Comintern refused, however, they saw through Bo's plan and wanted to keep Mao as a counterweight to the 28 Bolsheviks in China. In Mao's absence from party and army leadership, the Kuomintang troops succeeded in the fifth attempt to decisively weaken the Jiangxi Soviet. The trench warfare according to Soviet doctrine, which Braun and Bo waged, was partly to blame. Bo, Zhou Enlai , Luo Fu and Braun therefore initiated measures to evacuate the Soviet from June 1934.

The military situation deteriorated further on the Long March . The dissatisfaction of the participants with the tour grew. During this time Mao managed to poach Bo's supporters, especially Luo Fu and Zhou Enlai. At the Zunyi Conference , Bo gave objective reasons for the loss of the Jiangxi Soviet. Luo and later Mao sharply criticized Bo and Braun in their speeches and accused them of serious military mistakes. In the end, only Kai Feng supported Bo and Bran. Bo was initially allowed to keep his party offices, but Mao, Luo and Wang Jiaxiang took control of the party. In February 1935, Bo had to give up his party leadership to Luo.

At the end of the Long March, Mao and Bo's forces united with those under Zhang Guotao . A power struggle developed between Zhang and Mao: Mao wanted to move north with the united troops to join the communist base of Liu Zhidan . Zhang wanted to set up his own base in Sichuan . Bo took Mao's side. Once the communists had established themselves in Yan'an , Mao made Bo chairman of the Northwest Bureau of the central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In this position he was involved in the negotiations surrounding the Xi'an incident. He took part in the talks with the Kuomintang that led to the formation of the Second United Front . From 1937 he was chairman of the party's organization department and controlled the nomination and promotion of cadres.

In 1936 Bo Gu joined the faction around Wang Ming , who had set up a communist power base in Wuhan parallel to Mao's base in Yan'an and wanted to cooperate more closely with the Kuomintang against the Japanese. Bo distanced himself from Wang after Stalin dropped Wang Ming in favor of Mao Zedong. When the Communist Party reinterpreted history as part of the establishment of the personality cult around Mao Zedong in the 1940s, Bo was one of the people who were stigmatized because of their opposition to Mao.

Bo was killed in a plane crash near Yan'an in 1946.

Web links

Commons : Qin Bangxian  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b c d Lawrence R. Sullivan: Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party . Scarecrow Press, Lanham, Md. 2012, ISBN 978-0-8108-7470-1 , pp. 216-218 .
  2. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 252-253 .
  3. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 256-257 .
  4. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 264-266 .
  5. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 267-268 .
  6. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 269-273 .
  7. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 277-281 .
  8. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 290 .
  9. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 313 .
  10. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 321 .
  11. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 333-334 .
  12. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 340 .