Reason

This article deals with reasoning and justification in terms of philosophy; on theological doctrine of justification see justification (theology) , on the classic discipline of a defense of the rationality of religious belief, see apologetics .

As justification or justification ( ancient Greek λόγον διδόναι logon didonai , English : justification ) is understood in philosophy to explain the reasons for a thesis . In the strict logical form one speaks of a proof . In the 20th century, the attempt to achieve justification through scientific explanation is very prominent . A more recent special case are arguments in the rationalDialogue can be brought to approval. Attempts to give reasons that want to arrive at a final, irrefutable reason have recently been discussed under the keyword ultimate reason .

Definitions

Judgments and decisions can be justified using the usual language. According to Wolfgang Kuhlmann , justification can be understood as a five-digit predicate: Person A justifies the judgment U or decision E with regard to the validity claim G by the argument Z for the addressee B. The creation of a justification is tied to the following conditions:

1. A has made a judgment U or made a decision E.
2. With A or others, doubts arise as to whether the judgment U is true or whether the decision E is correct.

The function of reasoning is often determined as a means of enabling true opinions or correct decisions. This view is criticized for the fact that statements or decisions are not truer or more correct than they are through justification. Therefore, justifications are more about security and control. They give us greater certainty that a statement is true or an action is correct.

Justifications are made by recourse to something other than what is to be justified. According to Kuhlmann, a distinction must be made between justification by derivation and reflexive justification (by transcendental arguments ).

The justification by derivation represents the standard type of justification. It occurs when a problematic x (judgment or decision) is inferred by one or more unproblematic y (deductive or inductive). A distinction can be made between linear and coherent justifications. Linear justifications are characterized by a direction of justification: a certain y should serve as a foundation for x and not the other way around. In the case of coherent justifications, the indication of the justification direction is omitted: x is considered to be justified if it can be understood as a node in a network of reciprocal relationships of several y.

In the case of linear justifications , it is assumed that there is already security regardless of the justification through derivation (in principles, basic sentences, etc.). This is then “transported” to the x to be justified by a derivation. The strength of the justification depends on the certainty of the available premises and the reliability of the derivation process. Linear justifications are epistemologically problematic insofar as their basis cannot be reasonably justified by derivation in order not to get involved in the problem of recourse.

Coherent justifications , on the other hand, not only convey security that already exists, but also create security themselves. The more stable the network of reciprocal justification relationships between statements about a subject area proves, the greater the security. The problem here, however, are the principles of coherence themselves, which are intended to enable the statements to be mutually supported, since they cannot themselves be substantiated in a coherentist manner.

In contrast to the other two types of justification , reflexive justifications are practically only used in philosophy to justify ultimate principles. They are only applicable if the x to be justified has a reflexive structure, i.e. H. at the same time must be used subjectively by the examiner for the examination. The security established in the reflexive justification is not transported, but generated and, according to its claim, should guarantee absolute security. According to Kuhlmann, the main problem with this type of justification is that it can only justify very little material content and the hermeneutical procedures with which these can be further explicated are not considered to be very reliable.

Epistemic justification

As epistemic justification in epistemology a condition is understood that fulfill a true ?? conviction must, to be ?? knowledge. The classic definition of knowledge as justified and true opinion is used. However, an analysis of this concept of knowledge leads to problems, the best known are the counterexamples known as Gettier problems . Roughly speaking, justification denotes the existence of good reasons for the knowledge subject to have an opinion and to believe in it with certainty. There are numerous approaches to complete the definition of the justification that the problems of the concept of knowledge are avoided. Here, let externalist and internalist approaches differ. By naming the problems of epistemological fundamentalism , the debate about justification has taken a direction that rejects the claims of a harsh realistic externalism such as that of a consciousness-theoretic ultimate justification .

Theoretical reasoning approaches

Stephen Toulmin , one of the pioneers of argumentation theory , has developed a reasoning scheme in which a connection reason (the 'warrant', a kind of transition rule) constitutes the actual reasoning in an argument. This transition rule forms the connection between the premise (ground, evidence, data) and the conclusion (claim).

In several directions of argumentation theory, attempts are made to expand the deductive structure of logic with quasi-logical inferences that are suitable for creating transitions in justifications. Christoph Lumer develops argumentation schemes that are defined by conditions of validity and specified by conditions of adequacy. The truth requirements are fulfilled in that the practical justification is at the same time a valid epistemic justification for a certain thesis; the epistemic justification and this thesis together then form a valid and adequate argumentation.

In order to avoid relativism when giving reasons, Josef Kopperschmidt suggests enriching the argumentation theory with Jürgen Habermas' universalization approach. The “Universal Auditorium” provides a reason for the validity criterion “convincing”.

For Harald Wohlrapp, the justification principle is one of four principles of argumentation:

“Assertions show their orientation in justifications. Reasons are constructions with which new theory is linked back to epistemic theory (proven orientations). "

- Harald Wohlrapp: The concept of the argument. 2008 p. 224

Justification in a rational dialogue

The Good Reasons Approach (position of the good reasons) is a direction of moral philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon area which, among other things, investigates the question of why one should be moral. An attempt is made to provide a rational justification against positive and emotive understandings. Representatives of this direction are Kurt Baier , Kai Nielsen, Marcus George Singer , Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, Paul W. Taylor and Stephen Toulmin.

From approaches of “reasonable advice” with Wilhelm Kamlah , Paul Lorenzen and Oswald Schwemmer and the “ideal speaking situation” with Jürgen Habermas , Friedrich Kambartel developed characteristics for a justification in rational dialogue.

• Impartiality. Willingness to postpone assumed orientations.
• Casualness. There are no acts of approval or rejection that can be traced back to constraints.
• Not persuasive . Common ground is not stolen due to weak arguments of some participants.

The success of a justification for expressed validity claims is tied to the implementation of such a rational dialogue.

Deductive justifications

One can question the reasons for a thesis itself and ask about its justification. The statements used to justify this can also be questioned.

Many justifications, such as the axioms of mathematics, are based on agreement. The same applies to sentences that reflect an immediately accessible perception such as "The thermometer in front of me currently shows more than 100 degrees Celsius". An intersubjective and permanent consensus can usually be established without problems about such a statement by saying: "Convince yourself with your own eyes that the statement is correct!"

However, such statements are not indubitable, as Karl Popper has shown in his criticism of the concept of the " basic sentences " (or "protocol sentences ") of the positivists . So one could doubt in the example given that it is a thermometer. It could maybe also be a hygrometer.

The question is whether one wants to accept the concurring perceptions of several observers as a sufficient justification. Different positions are represented on this. A widespread position says: As long as there is no concrete reason for a doubt, the consistent perceptions of the individuals form a solid basis for empirical theories that build on them.

In contrast, representatives of fallibilism such B. Hans Albert here an arbitrary termination of the reasoning. Albert rejects the concept of justification altogether because, in his opinion, it cannot escape the Münchhausen trilemma of circular reasoning , infinite recourse or arbitrary termination. According to Mittelstraß's constructivist view, it is again nonsensical to demand a justification of the justification basis, not only because this would result in the infinite regress or circular reasoning, but because the justification is based on "life-world production contexts, which in turn have a theoretical basis, be it in Form of an empirical physical or formal geometry (in the sense of Hilbert) does not need. ” Harald Wohlrapp sees a refutation of Albert's argument in the fact that“ the whole scenario is completely abstract, ignores and [...] the reality of the people who justify and criticize the thesis instead generalized an artificial modeling of scientific experimentation. "

Rejection of justification concepts

The opposite position to the concept of justification is 'non-justification criticism ' (a synthesis of skepticism and absolutism ), which attacks claims per se and which is mainly advocated by some proponents of critical rationalism : WW Bartley , David Miller and Karl Popper . (But not all supporters of critical rationalism are radically opposed to the strategy of justification; it is represented, for example, by John WN Watkins ). From their point of view, there are no reasons; if they existed, they would be useless; and they have nothing to do with reason either.

The aforementioned philosophers hold a view that, contrary to the Aristotelian concept of knowledge, sharply distinguishes the questions of truth and certainty or the decidability or certainty of truth from statements. Since a final justification is considered unattainable for them, it is based on the changing process of construction and criticism. No argumentative justifications are used in this approach. To maximize criticism, he uses the construction and comparative evaluation of critical alternatives to any proposed solution. It is therefore complemented by the pluralism of theories ; the methodical procedure that is offered is a comparison of theories .

Bartley also mentions a third position, which he describes as critical rationalism in a narrower sense, and which he ascribes to Popper's socio-philosophical work The Open Society and Its Enemies . She has given up the reason, but has not yet found a 'non-justification criticism'. Instead of referring to criteria and authorities, she tries to describe and explain them .

literature

• Hans Albert : Treatise on Critical Reason. Tubingen 1968.
• Karl-Otto Apel : Explanation in: H. Seiffert / G. Radnitzky (Hrsg.): Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie . Munich 1989, pp. 14-19.
• Frans van Eemeren , Rob Grootendorst : A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
• Friedrich Kambartel : Rationale in: Jürgen Mittelstraß : Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. Second edition. Volume 1, Metzler 2005, ISBN 978-3-476-01372-9 , p. 392ff
• Wolfgang Kuhlmann : Explanation in: Marcus Düwell, Christoph Hübenthal, Micha H. Werner (Ed.): Handbook Ethics. 3rd act. Edition. Metzler, Stuttgart et al. 2011, ISBN 3-476-02124-6 , pp. 319-325
• Christoph Lumer: Explanation in: Hans Jörg Sandkühler Encyclopedia Philosophy. Vol. 1, Meiner, Hamburg 2005. 149–156
• Christoph Lumer: Practical Theory of Argumentation, Braunschweig 1990.
• David Miller: Overcoming the Justificationist Addiction. (PDF; 124 kB) 2007.
• Karl Popper: On the sources of knowledge and ignorance. Conjectures and Refutations. 1963.
• Richard Swinburne: Epistemic justification. 2001.

Web links

Wiktionary: Justification  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Wikiquote: Justification  - Quotes

• Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Practical reason. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

swell

1. ↑ See Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Explanation in: Marcus Düwell, Christoph Hübenthal, Micha H. Werner (eds.): Handbuch Ethik.
2. ↑ See Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Explanation in: Marcus Düwell, Christoph Hübenthal, Micha H. Werner (eds.): Handbuch Ethik. , P. 322
3. ↑ Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek: Justification, epistemic. ( Memento of the original from January 31, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 114 kB) 
4. ↑ See Stephen Toulmin: The Uses of Argument. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. (German: The use of arguments. Beltz Athenaeum, Weinheim 1996, ISBN 3-89547-096-1 .)
5. ↑ Harald Wohlrapp : The concept of the argument. About the relationships between knowledge, research, belief, subjectivity and reason . Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann, 2008 ISBN 978-3-8260-3820-4 , p. 30
6. ↑ Christoph Lumer, 1990
7. ↑ Christoph Lumer, 2005 p. 258
8. ↑ Harald Wohlrapp The concept of the argument. 2008 p. 34
9. ↑ Reiner Wimmer : Good Reasons Approach in: Jürgen Mittelstraß: Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie. Second edition. Volume 3, Metzler 2008 p. 176
10. ^ Friedrich Kambartel : Reason in: Jürgen Mittelstraß : Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. Second edition. Volume 1, Metzler 2005, ISBN 978-3-476-01372-9 , p. 393
11. ^ Carl Friedrich Gethmann : Dialog, more rational in: Jürgen Mittelstraß: Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. Second edition. Volume 2, Metzler 2005, ISBN 978-3-476-02101-4 , p. 191
12. ↑ J. Mittelstraß, Possibility of Science . Suhrkamp, ​​1974: p. 89.
13. ↑ J. Mittelstraß 1974 p. 95.
14. ↑ Harald Wohlrapp: The concept of the argument. 2008 p. 234