Robert B. Wilson

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Robert Butler Wilson (born May 16, 1937 in Geneva , Nebraska ) is an American economist. Wilson has set global standards for the auctioning of telecommunications frequencies and has significantly shaped the theory of auctions and their application. In 2020 he received the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics for his work in this area together with Paul Milgrom .

Live and act

Robert Wilson studied mathematics at Harvard University and graduated from this degree in 1959 with a bachelor's degree . In 1961 he obtained the Master of Business Administration there and in 1963 the Doctor of Business Administration . He then was an assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley until 1964 . He then moved to Stanford University , where he was Assistant Professor, Associated Professor (until 1971), Professor (1971–76) and Atholl McBean Professor (1976–2000). He has been Adam's Distinguished Professor of Business Management there since 2000 and has been an emeritus since 2004 .

Using game theory methods , Wilson investigated trading processes such as bargaining and auctions . With David Kreps he introduced the concept of sequential equilibrium in 1982 . Wilson also dealt with pricing policy , social choice theory , mechanism design theory, and electricity exchanges .

As a doctoral supervisor, Wilson accompanied three people who later received the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics: Alvin E. Roth (2012), Bengt Holmström (2016) and Paul Milgrom (2020).

Works

  • A Simplicial Algorithm for Concave Programming. Dissertation, Harvard Business School, Boston 1963
  • Nonlinear pricing. Oxford University Press, New York [u. a.] 1993, ISBN 0-19-511582-1

Article (selection):

  • The Theory of Syndicates. In: Econometrica . Volume 36, No. 1, 1968, pp. 119-132
  • Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games. In: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics. Volume 21, No. 1, 1971, pp. 80-87
  • On the theory of aggregation. In: Journal of Economic Theory . Volume 10, No. 1, 1975, pp. 89-99
  • A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition. In: The Review of Economic Studies . Volume 44, No. 3, 1977, pp. 511-518
  • The Bilinear Complementarity Problem and Competitive Equilibria of Piecewise Linear Economic Models. In: Econometrica. Volume 46, No. 1, 1978, pp. 87-103
  • Competitive Exchange. In: Econometrica. Volume 46, No. 3, 1978, pp. 577-585
  • Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy. In: Econometrica. Volume 46, No. 4, 1978, pp. 807-816
  • with David M. Kreps : Sequential Equilibria. In: Econometrica. Volume 50, No. 4, 1982, pp. 863-894
  • with David M. Kreps: Reputation and imperfect information. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 27, No. 2, 1982, pp. 253-279
  • with Shmuel S. Oren and Stephen S. Smith: Capacity Pricing. In: Econometrica. Volume 53, No. 3, 1985, pp. 545-566

Awards

Memberships

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Who will be the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics? FAZ, October 5, 2018, archived copy ( Memento from October 6, 2018 in the Internet Archive )
  2. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2020. Retrieved October 12, 2020 (American English).