Battle of Raphia

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Raphia
date June 18, 217 BC Chr.
place Raphia, today's Rafah
output Victory of the Ptolemies
Parties to the conflict

Ptolemies

Seleucids

Commander

Ptolemy IV

Antiochus III.

Troop strength
70,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 73 war elephants 62,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 102 war elephants plus allies
losses

1,500 infantry, 700 cavalry

10,000 infantry, 300 cavalry

The Battle of Raphia was the decisive battle of the Fourth Syrian War (219-217 BC) between the Ptolemies of Egypt on the one hand and the Seleucids of Syria on the other. It took place on Schemu I (June 18) in 217 BC. Instead of. The commanders in chief were on the Seleucid side King Antiochus III. and on the Egyptian side, King Ptolemy IV. The battle ended in an Egyptian victory.

swell

The main and almost only source for the battle of Raphia is the report of the Greek historian Polybios , which is detailed and reliable. The so-called Raphia decree provides additional information, such as dates . There is a resolution on 1 Achet II (November 11th)  217 BC. The Synod of priests meeting at Memphis , which was convened on the occasion of the celebration of the Egyptian victory. The decree is in three languages ​​(hieroglyphic, demotic, Greek) and is preserved in three fragmentary steles.

prehistory

The 222 BC Antiochus III came to power. sought as a young and dynamic king to conquer Koilesyria , which was owned by the Ptolemies. He began serious military operations in this regard from the beginning of the third month (mid-April) in 219 BC. Chr. On. This marked the outbreak of the Fourth Syrian War. Since the Egyptian side was initially unable to oppose the Seleucid king militarily, they organized a radical army reform and massive armament in the greatest possible secrecy.

Meanwhile, the Ptolemaic government avoided a definitive battle, granted Antiochus III. tenacious conquests in Koile Syria and tried to prolong the war by sham negotiations. When the armaments were completed, the Egyptian king set out personally with his main forces in the third year of the war (217 BC) for the decisive battle in Koilesyria.

March

Pelusion served the Pharaoh as a gathering place for his army . On the campaign he was also by his sister wife Arsinoe III. accompanied. On 1st Schemu I (June 9th) 217 ​​BC He left Pelusion with his army, moved north past Mount Kasion as well as a swamp area known as Barathra and ended his advance roughly on the border of his empire when he found a place 50 stadia away from Raphia as a base for the fight against Antiochus III . chose. Ptolemy IV had the advantage that he could choose the place of slaughter. The Seleucid king had meanwhile left Ptolemais and marched on Gaza . From there he moved on to the nearby Raphia and initially set up camp ten stadiums from the enemy base. He later reduced this distance to just five stadiums in order to be able to move into a more suitable storage space.

At first there were only skirmishes between the opposing armies. Then Theodotos of Aetolia , who had defected from the Ptolemies to the Seleucids, tried to murder the Egyptian king at dawn in his tent. But he did not meet Ptolemy IV, but killed his personal physician Andreas and was then able to return to his camp unharmed.

Composition and formation of armies

After the enemy troops faced each other for five days, the kings decided to begin the decisive battle.

Ptolemy IV's army comprised around 70,000 infantrymen , 5,000 cavalrymen and 73 African war elephants . The Egyptian king personally assumed supreme command over the entire left wing of his armed forces.

Forty elephants were posted on the extreme left wing of the Ptolemaic troops. Then followed 700 royal and 2300 Libyan and Egyptian horsemen under the command of Polycrates of Argos , 2000 Cretans commanded by Knopias von Alloria, 1000 Neocreteers under the command of Philo of Knossos, 3000 body guards listening to the command of the mercenary leader Eurylochos of Magnesia , 2000 Peltasts commanded by Socrates the Boeoter and 3,000 Libyans with Macedonian armament led by Ammonios von Barka. The center formed the phalanx , which consisted of 25,000 "Macedonians" commanded by Andromachos of Aspendos and Ptolemy , son of Thraseas and, for the first time in Ptolemaic history, a 20,000 strong contingent of native Egyptians, whose commander in chief was the powerful minister Sosibios . Subsequent to the center stood on the right wing initially 8000 Greek mercenaries led by Phoxidas von Melita, then 6000 Celts and Thracians under the command of Dionysius the Thracian and 2000 cavalrymen commanded by Echekrates the Thessalian. In front of the cavalry on the right wing were the 33 remaining elephants.

The army of Antiochus III, who commanded his right wing, consisted of 62,000 infantrymen, 6,000 horsemen and 102 Indian war elephants.

The Seleucid troops posted 60 elephants in front of their right wing, commanded by Philip, the adoptive brother of Antiochus III. Behind these stood 4,000 royal horsemen led by Antipater, the nephew of Antiochus III. In the direction of the center there followed 1500 Cretans listening to Eurylochus , 1000 Neocreteers under the command of Zylos von Gortyn and 5000 Greek mercenaries under the command of Hippolochus the Thessalian. Then 5,000 lightly armed men led by Byttakos the Macedonian came from the races of the Hence, Karmanians and Cilikians. Then 10,000 soldiers, equipped according to Macedonian custom and drawn from all parts of the Seleucid Empire, came under the command of the defector Theodotus of Aetolia. The phalanx in the center, comprising 20,000 “Macedonians”, was subordinate to the generals Nikarchus and Theodotos Hemiolios . Then followed on the left wing initially 10,000 Arab soldiers and soldiers from neighboring peoples under the command of the Zabdibelos as well as 5,000 Medes , Kissiers (who were resident in the area around Susa ), Kadusians and Karmanians who heard the Medes on Aspasianos. Further to the left, Menedemos from Alabanda (Caria) commanded 2000 Agrian and Persian archers and slingers as well as 1000 Thracians. This was followed by 500 Lydian javelin throwers and 1000 Kardaker, who were under the command of Lysimachos the Celt, and 2000 cavalrymen commanded by Themison. In front of the left wing there were 42 elephants led by Myikos, a young confidante of the Seleucid king.

As far as is known, this was the only battle in which Indian versus African war elephants fought. However, this is repeatedly discussed in research, as Polybios reports that the Asian elephants are larger than the African. It has already been considered whether Ptolemy used forest elephants, which, however, seems unlikely according to the latest research: In fact, a genetic analysis of the elephants in the Barka area - the area from which the Ptolemaic elephants presumably came from - indicated that they were African elephants a cross with forest elephants were not recognizable.

Course of the battle

At the beginning of June 18, 217 BC The battle that was held in BC let the warring kings form their armies. Then they rode down the ranks of their armed forces, supported by the commanders of the phalanges, encouraging their soldiers with encouraging speeches, and promising them great rewards if they succeeded. This particularly affected the core troops of the Macedonian armed phalanx, the use of which was most important for a victory.

After Ptolemy IV and his sister Arsinoe III. at the end of her left wing and Antiochus III. had reached the end of his right wing with his cavalry, they sent signals to initiate the struggle with the advance of the elephants. The Seleucid side succeeded in frightening the Ptolemies' African elephants so that they turned on their own people. Antiochus III. attacked the riders of Polycrates with the cavalry on his right wing, and at the same time the Greek mercenaries of the Seleucid King, positioned closer to the phalanx in the middle, attacked the opposing Peltasts and pushed them back. So the left wing of the Egyptians was thrown back.

The Echekrates standing on the Egyptian right wing now ordered the attack by the Greek mercenaries of Phoxidas, who were able to successfully drive the enemy’s Arab and Median troops into flight. Echekrates and his horsemen simultaneously succeeded in defeating the cavalry on Antiochus' left wing.

The as yet inexperienced Seleucid king felt confident of victory through his personal success on the right wing, but neglected the rest of the development of the fight. Ptolemy IV, who had sought cover in the ranks of his phalanx, stepped before his troops and encouraged them to be more eager to fight. Only now were the phalangites used. Sosibios and Andromachos attacked the enemy phalanx and were able to defeat them. This success decided the victory in favor of the Ptolemies. Antiochus III. had pursued the fleeing enemy too far on his victorious right wing and came back too late to the main battlefield to be able to save the situation. He had to admit defeat and withdrew first to Raphia, then to Gaza.

Ptolemy IV buried his fallen with honor and also gave the defeated enemy permission to do the same with his war dead. According to the numbers given by Polybius, Antiochus III. 10,000 infantrymen and 300 horsemen were lost, and 4,000 of his warriors were captured. The Ptolemy King's losses amounted to around 1,500 infantrymen and 700 cavalrymen. Furthermore, Polybius states that 16 of the Pharaoh's elephants died as a result of the war and almost all of the others were captured by the enemy, while the Seleucid king only lost five trunk animals. In contrast, the Raphia decree claims that all elephants of Antiochus III. would have fallen into the hands of the Ptolemaic king. The ancient historian Werner Huss considers this information to be truthful and believes that Polybios misrepresented his source.

consequences

After the Battle of Raphia, Ptolemy IV remained in Koilesyria for three months, arranged the situation there according to his ideas and plundered when he negotiated with Antiochus III. Some Seleucid cities were too slow. In the peace that was then concluded in Antioch , the Ptolemaic king was essentially content with maintaining the status quo, so that the border line was largely restored before the war. Then the Pharaoh returned to Alexandria triumphantly . But since the Egyptians had contributed significantly to the victory of Ptolemy IV, their national awareness increased significantly.

literature

Notes and individual references

  1. a b c Dates: June 18 in the Gregorian calendar (corresponds to June 22 in the proleptic / Julian calendar ); see. Friedhelm Hoffmann : Egypt - culture and living environment in Greco-Roman times: a representation according to the demotic sources . Akademie, Berlin 2000, ISBN 3-05-003308-8 , p. 161.
  2. Polybios , Historíai 5, 79-86.
  3. Dates: November 11th in the Gregorian calendar (corresponds to November 15th in the proleptic / Julian calendar); see. Friedhelm Hoffmann: Egypt - culture and living environment in Greco-Roman times: a representation according to the demotic sources . Academy, Berlin 2000, p. 161.
  4. G. Hölbl: History of the Ptolemaic Empire. Darmstadt 1994, pp. 144f.
  5. Dates: June 9 in the Gregorian calendar (corresponds to June 13 in the proleptic / Julian calendar); see. Friedhelm Hoffmann: Egypt - culture and living environment in Greco-Roman times: a representation according to the demotic sources . Academy, Berlin 2000, p. 161.
  6. Polybios, Historíai 5, 80, 1-6; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 396f.
  7. Polybios, Historíai 5, 80, 7-81, 7.
  8. Polybios, Historíai 5, 65 and 82; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 397f.
  9. Polybios, Historíai 5, 79 and 82; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 398.
  10. Polybios, Historíai 5, 83.
  11. Polybios, Historíai 5, 84.
  12. Polybios, Historíai 5, 85, 1-5.
  13. Polybios, Historíai 5, 85, 6-13.
  14. Polybios, Historíai 5, 86, 1-6.
  15. ^ Raphia decree (demotic), line 14; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 399, note 139.