Battle of Skalitz

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Battle of Skalitz
Part of: German War
Area map of the battle of Skalitz
Area map of the battle of Skalitz
date June 28, 1866
place Skalitz , Bohemia
output Victory of the Prussians
Parties to the conflict

Prussia KingdomKingdom of Prussia Prussia

Austrian EmpireEmpire of Austria Austria

Commander

Prussia KingdomKingdom of Prussia Karl von Steinmetz

Austrian EmpireEmpire of Austria Archduke Leopold

Troop strength
unknown unknown
losses

62 officers and 1,305 soldiers dead or wounded

approx. 5600-5900 dead, wounded and prisoners

Chronological sequence of military conflicts in the
German War and
3rd Italian War of Independence (both 1866)

The Battle of Skalitz ( Bitva u Skalice in Czech ) was a skirmish between Prussians and Austrians in the German War on June 28, 1866. The Austrian VIII Corps under Archduke Leopold was attacked and defeated by the Prussian V Army Corps.

prehistory

The Prussian deployment plan stipulated that the 2nd Army of Crown Prince Friedrich-Wilhelm would march through the Giant Mountains to Bohemia to unite with the other two armies under Prince Friedrich Karl Nikolaus of Prussia and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld . The left wing of the 2nd Army formed the V Corps under General von Steinmetz and the VI. Corps under Mutius .

The Austrian Commander-in-Chief Benedek planned a march west with his northern army to defeat the Prussians advancing from Saxony before they could unite with the Crown Prince. In order to achieve this goal, Archduke Leopold and his VIII. Corps were supposed to stop the advance of the Prussians near Skalitz. In the battle of Nachod on June 27, Steinmetz had already the Austrian VI. Corps of General Wilhelm Freiherr von Ramming defeated and conquered the important height of Vysokov .

Situation before the battle

With the Austrians

On the morning of June 28, 1866 around 10:30 a.m., Feldzeugmeister Benedek appeared in Skalitz with his Chief of Staff Gideon Krismanic . During a conversation with General Ramming, he wanted to strengthen the VIII. Corps with the parts of his corps that were still operational and then defeat the Prussians here together with the IV. Corps under FML Tassilo Festetics, advancing from the south . The terrain was suitable for defense and the Austrian artillery was able to bombard almost the entire valley up to the level of Vysokov. Benedek initially seemed to agree to this plan and went to see Archduke Leopold around 11:00 a.m. Here Benedek decided against this advance after consulting his chief of staff and ordered Ramming to march westward, away from Skalitz.

The reasons for this were, among other things, a loss of time for further operations. Furthermore, it would have been difficult to get the troops into position quickly enough over the only available bridge over the Aupa . An Austrian attack through the almost six kilometer wide depression between Skalitz and Vysokov would have been hopeless. Benedek also assumed that Steinmetz would not attack after the heavy battle of the previous day. Benedek therefore did not want to fight a battle at this point and therefore ordered a retreat of the VIII. Corps. If there was no serious fighting by 2 p.m., Archduke Leopold Skalitz should evacuate and move towards Jičín . Benedek snapped to an officer who was present and asked what to do if the battle came by then, "What do you have to say?" Prussian infantry had been in position on both sides of the Vysokov Strait since 6:00 a.m. and the artillery units were firing at each other since 10:00 a.m. When the first units of the Prussian 9th Division under Major General von Loewenfeld advanced around 12:00 p.m. and the artillery fire intensified, Benedek was still walking from a bluff by Steinmetz and even invited Leopold to have lunch with him in Josephstadt, but this refused.

With the Prussians

Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz

The Prussian V Corps under General Steinmetz stood at the level of Vysokov and was only slowly reinforced by Mutius. He knew that there were a total of three corps facing him and therefore had only sent a few troops (six battalions) towards Skalitz and was still on par with the main force of his corps. The target for this march set by the army was Gradlice, a village behind Skalitz. Mutius would still need the whole day to bring his troops up from Nachod and the Guard Corps could not provide any help as it had to develop northwards towards Trautenau. The Prussian defeat there thus had effects as far as Skalitz. Steinmetz had waited until around 10 a.m. for him to get in touch with the guard, but then received the message that the guard would not be able to support him. A reconnaissance had shown that his left flank was not currently threatened, but the Austrian IV Corps was soon able to deploy.

Steinmetz was often compared to Blücher during the late liberation wars, to whom he corresponded in age, demeanor and appearance. Like Blücher, Steinmetz was a man of great energy who sought attack and did not shrink from taking risks. He could assume that in the worst case Benedek could push him back, where he would receive reinforcement from Mutius, or would push him off in the direction of the guard. So he ordered his soldiers to attack.

Course of the battle on June 28th

Advance of the Prussians

Steinmetz ordered a brigade of the 9th Division (Lieutenant General von Loewenfeld) to attack the left Austrian flank and to advance into the forest of Dubno. At the same time the 10th Division (Major General von Kirchbach ) was to attack the enemy center. Reinforcement against this attack was hardly possible for the Austrians at this point, as the village of Skalitz was completely clogged with retreating troops and could hardly be passed. By 11 o'clock the 9th Division had worked its way up to about 3 km on the left wing of the Austrians and was facing the Brigade Fragnern . The artillery of this brigade took the Prussians under fire, but achieved very little with it, as many of the shells did not explode on the soft ground. The Prussians occupied the Dubno forest and drove out an Austrian battalion that was occupying the forest . The Prussians pursued the escaping Austrians to the edge of the forest and continued to fire the escaping troops. Only about half of this battalion managed to cover the approx. 1,400 m to their own positions.

Attack by the Fragnern Brigade

General Fragnern and his brigade held the ridge in front of the Aupa and formed the left wing of the Austrian position. He had received no orders from Leopold and assumed that his own attack was planned. Reasons for this were the presence of Benedek and von Ramming's corps as well as the increasingly violent use of artillery in the center. Furthermore, he had to assume that the Prussians would soon advance through the Dubno forest in the direction of the place Zlic and would bypass and flank it.

At 12:30 p.m. Fragnern ordered his brigade to attack the Dubno forest. This attack was accompanied by music and was also accompanied by the artillery, which also gave up their position on the ridge and joined the attack. Within an hour, 3,000 out of 6,000 soldiers were killed, wounded or captured. The first wave was already half crushed by the first volley, and most of the officers of the first wave were among the dead. The second wave with the 15th regiment, which consisted of Poles and Ukrainians, rushed forward in a kind of ecstasy, even overtaking the first wave in the process. The Prussians fired their rapid fire from 400 meters into these two waves . Part of the 15th regiment had managed to establish themselves on the edge of the forest, but no further action was possible. In addition to the Fragners themselves, there were also all regimental commanders among the fallen. The Prussians captured six cannons here.

The surviving Austrians of the first wave fled the battlefield and could only be stopped on the right wing by the Schulz Brigade . Schulz had to let his soldiers take action against his own comrades with bayonets in place in order to stop them.

Attack by the Kreyssern Brigade

Colonel Kreyssern saw the Fragnern brigade being wiped out. In order to save the soldiers who remained there, he sent five of his battalions to attack without having received an order. The goal was the southwest corner of the forest. Like Fragnern, he, too, had received no orders from Archduke Leopold and was therefore unaware of the planned withdrawal of the corps. Kreyssern led the attack personally, but fell after a short time.

Between the position of Kreyssern and the Dubno forest, a railway line also runs on a dam and makes a swivel to the east. Theoretically, this dam offered excellent cover for the Austrians, but the Prussians got ahead of them. A regiment of Prussian grenadiers had already occupied the embankment as flank protection for the 9th Division. The Prussians were exposed to heavy artillery fire from the Austrian center, but were able to take the battalions of Kreyssern under rifle fire from the flank. The Austrians had advanced in massive half battalions and the first wave was thrown back. The second wave managed to reach the embankment with heavy losses, but the Prussians also reinforced their troops in the center. A brigade of the 10th Division advanced along the railway embankment to attack the Austrians. In this section, both sides suffered heavy losses, the Prussians particularly from the Austrian artillery, which was set up on the outskirts of Skalice and took the Prussians under fire from a short distance. The Prussian artillery also advanced and positioned themselves on the edge of the Kleny forest and returned fire.

Archduke Leopold dispatched one of his staff officers to the railway line to have the fight broken off. The retreating Austrians were pursued by two Prussian battalions. The Prussians could load and fire while running and managed to advance to the train station of Skalice and thus to occupy the center of the Austrian position. Within an hour, between noon and 1 p.m., Leopold had lost two brigades and the Schulz brigade had Prussia on its flank.

More fights

At 12 o'clock Benedek had ordered the withdrawal of the VIII Corps. This order did not reach Major General Schulz until an hour later, around the time when the Prussians had already taken the station and a counterattack was being prepared. The Schulz Brigade had set up above and to the right of the station to throw the Prussians back. The soldiers initially refused to obey the order to withdraw. The soldiers had been in position since 6 o'clock in the morning and had to watch as their comrades had been worn out in two attacks. Whenever the warrant was called, the men answered with shouts of hurray. In all Austrian brigades the soldiers were given a double serving of wine at around 11:45 a.m. Since the men had not been fed regularly for several days, the alcohol had a significant effect. The last 400 men of the 15th regiment still standing in the Dubno forest went even further into the attack, pursued some Prussian fusiliers and could not be stopped by their own officers. Almost all of these soldiers fell or were captured, so that the 15th Regiment was completely wiped out.

The Prussians storm Skalitz

After the uncoordinated attacks by the Austrians, Steinmetz had managed to take the enemy center with the 10th Division. At the same time his 9th Division had encompassed the left wing of Leopold, taken the heights in front of the Aupa and two regiments advanced against the place and the only bridge over the Aupa. The position had become untenable for the remaining Austrians and reinforcement was not possible. Ramming was too far away and the II Corps under Thun was also about 20 km away. It was around 2 p.m. when Steinmetz personally led the 47th regiment to attack the railway station and entered the town. Only with the help of the reserve artillery of the VIII Corps standing behind the Aupa was the Austrian rearguard able to hold up the retreat long enough for the remnants of the Fragnern and Kreyssern Brigades to break away. At 2:15 p.m. Leopold ordered the general withdrawal of all troops, which quickly grew into a panic escape. The streets of Skalice were completely clogged with wagons, cannons and soldiers. Many soldiers swam through the Aupa to get to safety from the Prussians, others tried to take cover in the houses that were already burning. In total, the Prussians captured approx. 3000 Austrians by 3 p.m., of which 1287 were not wounded. There was no further persecution across the river.

Escape of the Austrians

The panicked and disorganized Austrians fled and even overran the VI. Corps, which until now had withdrawn in an orderly manner and had to clear the streets before the fleeing people. In total, the Austrians lost 205 officers, including a general and 5,372 soldiers to fallen, wounded and prisoners. The Prussians lost 62 officers and 1,305 soldiers.

The thunder of Skalice

After the war Benedek declared that he hadn't noticed anything about the fight, as a strong summer thunderstorm drowned out the noise of the battle on his ride from Skalice to Josephstadt. General Ramming disagreed with this. Benedek could have clearly heard the noise of the battle in Trebisov, about three kilometers west of Skalice, when he spoke to Ramming there around 1:30 p.m. Ramming protested here against the order to march in the direction of Jicin, because the battle was fierce in front of you and asked for permission to support the VIII. Corps. This was forbidden by Benedek, who had more important and greater reasons than a battle here.

Benedek had also noticed on the way to Josephsstadt to an accompanying officer that the Prussians would probably attack again.

Strategic consequences of the battle

The battle of Skalitz had strategic consequences. On his return to Josephsstadt around 2 p.m. Benedek had ensured that the Northern Army was on the march to Jicin. It was only towards evening that he found out that Gablenz had been cut off and Skalice lost. Thereupon he ordered the march to Jicin, which had been running since June 17, 1866, to be broken off and now to front against the army of the Crown Prince. This maneuver required all troops to be stopped and rearranged. He needed at least a day for this maneuver. Turning an entire army around like that was considered one of the most confusing and difficult maneuvers ever. At around 9:30 p.m. on June 28, 1866, Benedek gave the order to take a central position at the Königshof . These orders were not passed on to the commanders until about 8 a.m. the next day. Benedek's own staff officers declared after the war that they themselves had only received this order on the morning of June 29, 1866.

One consequence of this change of march was that in the battle of Gitschin the Austro-Saxon troops were not reinforced as intended, but had to try unnecessarily to hold the position and suffered considerable losses.

By changing the march of Benedek, the Prussians lost contact with their opponent and were only able to restore them in the battle of Königgrätz .

Historical sources

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h Geoffrey Wawro: The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's was with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge Univ. Press 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-62951-5 .
  2. ↑ Geoffrey Wawro: The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's was with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge Univ. Press 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-62951-5 , page 175
  3. ↑ According to Geoffrey Wawro, Leopold gave no orders at all during the battle, only a few belated instructions to stop attacks that were already in progress. Geoffrey Wawro: The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's was with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge Univ. Press 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-62951-5 .
  4. ↑ According to "The Campaign of 1866 in Germany", War History Department of the Great General Staff Online Available at Google Books , page 193, the Austrians lost a total of 5899 men
  5. ↑ Geoffrey Wawro: The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's was with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge Univ. Press 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-62951-5 , page 175
  6. ^ Helmut von Moltke, De l´influence des armes perfectioneès sur le combat, military weekly paper 1865
  7. ↑ Geoffrey Wawro: The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's was with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge Univ. Press 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-62951-5 , p. 178