Battle of Maiwand

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Battle of Maiwand
The Royal Horse Artillery withdraws from the battle
The Royal Horse Artillery withdraws from the battle
date July 27, 1880
place Maiwand in Afghanistan
output British defeat
Parties to the conflict

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland United Kingdom

Emirate of Afghanistan

Commander

George Burrows

Ayub Khan

Troop strength
2,599 men and 18 cannons 8,500 men and 30 cannons
losses

1,757 dead and 175 wounded

1,250 regular soldiers and between 800 and 1,500 irregular fighters

Afghans after the victory

The Battle of Maiwand was a military clash on July 27, 1880 between the British Army and Afghan warriors in the Second Anglo-Afghan War .

prehistory

After the declaration of war, British troops marched into Afghanistan on November 21, 1878 and occupied Kabul , Kandahar , Jalalabad and Khost .

The Afghan Emir Sher Ali Khan fled to Russian Help hoping to Mazar-i-Sharif , but died in February 1879. His son and successor, Mohammed Yakub could not last long and he was succeeded be supported by the British nephew Abdur Rahman on Throne after. After the Gandamak Treaty , the British determined the foreign policy of Afghanistan and controlled the country with garrisons.

Herat , however, was beyond effective British control and in the spring of 1880 there were increasing signs that the local ruler Ayub Khan was gathering troops.

On June 21, 1880, the British learned that this 6,000 to 8,000-strong army had marched off towards Kandahar on June 15.

By July 11, in anticipation of the Afghan attack, 2,599 soldiers and six cannons had been concentrated on the Hilmend under Brigadier George Burrows . There they united with an Afghan army of more than 6,000 men and six cannons under the command of Sher Ali. The loyalty of these troops was increasingly doubted by both commanders. Before they could be disarmed, their infantry and artillery units mutinied and set out to join Ayub Khan's army. In the pursuit of the mutineers, the guns could be captured.

Ayub Khan now outnumbered Burrows and the latter decided to retreat to a road junction near Kushk-i-Nachud. Retreating to fortified Kandahar would have left Ayub Khan free to move around the country. Burrows decided to beat the Afghan cavalry vanguard before the main enemy force could approach.

course

British units before the Battle of Maiwand

On July 26, the British intelligence reported that the enemy vanguard had reached Maiwand and the rest of the army would arrive the next day and comprise 10,500 men with 34 cannons. Burrows didn't believe the news. On the morning of July 27th, the British brigade marched to Maiwand, where reconnaissance discovered that the main Afghan army was actually only two hours away. It was now too late to retreat, as otherwise the enemy army would have been able to occupy Kandahar because of their greater speed. 2599 British with 18 cannons faced 8500 Afghans with 30 cannons, who were also joined by numerous tribal warriors from the area.

The British were technically far superior in infantry weapons while they were inferior in artillery. Burrows advanced from south to north and left the entourage of troops secured in the village of Mahmudabad. To the west of Mahmudabad a gorge ran from southwest to northeast and then turned in a northwest direction. The British crossed the gorge shortly after Mahmudabad in a northwesterly direction. A little over a kilometer behind her their guns took position and fired from 10:45 on the Afghan column . The infantry took position in two lines to the right and left of the artillery . The cavalry formed columns on the right flank . Four companies of infantry remained in reserve . The British had succeeded in being the first to line up in this encounter and to open fire.

The Afghans had seen the British go left across the ravine and were turning right in turn. Ayub Khan realized that the enemy defensive position in the open area was vulnerable on both flanks, and ordered the cavalry on his right flank and irregular infantry and tribal warriors on his left flank, where they took up positions in the ravine that bends to the northwest. In the center he positioned regular infantry to keep the line intact. Half an hour after the fire opened, the superior Afghan artillery intervened and shelled the British line.

Shortly after noon, the tribal warriors attacked the right flank of the British, but were repulsed by their superior rifled infantry and had to seek shelter in the gorge.

On the other hand, the Afghan cavalry threatened the left flank of the British. The two outermost infantry companies swung in a little and were extended by the reserve to meet the danger. The British fire forced the cavalry to stay out of range. Meanwhile, the Afghan artillery moved closer to the action. At the same time the regular infantry regiments of the center marched in columns towards the center of the British line. Burrows let infantry go forward to prevent the Afghan columns from being set up with volley fire. The superior range of their rifles forced the Afghans out of range with heavy casualties.

Now the Afghans regrouped their troops and brought the artillery closer to the battle, gathered infantry in the center and continued to threaten the flanks of the British as a diversion. At the same time, irregular forces attacked and tied the British left behind to protect the train. At 1.30 p.m. the first British guns ran out of ammunition. A cavalry attack on the left flank could be repulsed. From 2 p.m. the Afghan artillery fire died down.

At 2:30 p.m., irregular Afghans attacked the center and left flank from the ravine. The British left wing began to disintegrate and the artillery left the battlefield. The center also began to shake. A cavalry attack ordered by Burrows was repulsed and the horsemen withdrew to Mahmudabad. The British defenses collapsed and the units withdrew to Mahmudabad and Chik. 100 men of the 66th (Berkshire) Regiment of Foot stood in the orchards near Chik to fight and were killed to the last man.

The British fled towards Kandahar and suffered great losses, which would have been even greater if the Afghans had not stopped to loot.

The British had 1757 dead and 175 wounded and lost large amounts of supplies and ammunition. The Afghans lost 1,250 regular soldiers and between 800 and 1,500 irregular fighters.

consequences

Although Ayub Khan had won a victory, he failed to achieve his goal of taking Kandahar. Had he tied Burrows with his vanguard, he could have occupied Kandahar with his main army. Even after his victory, he let eight days pass before appearing to siege Kandahar, whose defense had been better organized by then.

The British had made the mistake of distributing their troops to Kandahar, Helmand and Kalat instead of using them against Ayub Khan in Herat. When they finally got their troops together, General Frederick Roberts defeated Ayub Khan on September 2 at the Battle of Kandahar . However, the British realized that there was no military solution to the pursuit of their political interests and soon withdrew from Afghanistan.

The catastrophic defeats at Maiwand and in the battle of Isandhlwana against opponents who were perceived as inferior caused a great response in Great Britain.

reception

In Arthur Conan Doyle's A Study in Scarlet is mentioned that Dr. Watson in 66th (Berkshire) Regiment of Foot was wounded in Maiwand on the shoulder.

In Afghanistan, the young woman Malalai , who cheered on the Pashtun side and fell during the battle, is revered as a folk heroine.

literature

  • Ali A. Jalali, Lester W. Grau: Expeditionary Forces: Superior Technology Defeated - The Battle of Maiwand. In: Military Review. Vol. 81, No. 3, May / June 2001, ISSN  0026-4148 , pp. 71-82 (reprinted in: Harold E. Raugh, Jr (Ed.): The British Army 1815-1914. Ashgate, Aldershot et al. 2006 , ISBN 0-7546-2564-8 , pp. 345-356).

Web links

Commons : Battle of Maiwand  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ali A. Jalali, Lester W. Grau: Expeditionary Forces: Superior Technology Defeated - The Battle of Maiwand. In: Harold E. Raugh, Jr (Ed.): The British Army 1815-1914. 2006, pp. 345-356, here pp. 348, 354, 355.