Electricity generation in North Korea
The power generation in North Korea is based according to the state ideology on the occurring in the land primary energy sources such as water power and fossil fuels. North Korea therefore operates an island network with a frequency of 60 Hertz . There are no reliable figures on electricity generation. For the past few years, electricity generation is estimated at around 20 to 30 TWh , depending on the source . The share of hydropower is about the same as the share of fossil energies with fluctuations over the years. The current generation of electricity is significantly lower than in 1990, when around 50 TWh were produced, and thus far below the needs of industrial and private consumers. It is a weak point in the development of the North Korean economy.
History of power generation
The Japanese built the first large power plant during the colonization of Korea . The Supung hydropower plant has produced 90% of all electricity on the Korean peninsula since it was built in 1941. Further hydropower plants along the Yalu were started under Japanese occupation, but were not completed until 1945. Since the adjacent part of China was also a Japanese colony as Manchukuo at the time , the border at Yalu does not matter. After Korea's independence and the destruction of the dams in the Korean War , North Korea and China rebuilt the dams together and have since used the electricity generated in the hydropower plants on the Yalu in equal parts.
Since the high investments in hydropower overwhelmed the North Korean economy, the country expanded its power plant park to include coal-fired power plants in the 1960s, thus using the second energy resource available in the country. In addition to the coal-fired power plants, including the Pukchang power plant , the largest power plant in the country, an oil power plant was also added in the 1970s. The expansion of the fossil power plants took place with technological assistance from the Soviet Union , which was granted with interruptions, depending on the general political weather situation.
After 1990, electricity generation dropped significantly. The reasons given are the discontinuation of solidarity deliveries with oil from the Soviet Union, which also affected the transport sector, the decline in coal production (and distribution) in the country and flood damage to coal mines and hydropower plants. After North Korea established a nuclear research program with the civil use of nuclear power and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the foreign contracting states USA, Japan, South Korea and the EU ("four-party talks") decided to build the Kŭmho nuclear power plant in Sinpo in return for not continuing of the nuclear weapons program to finance and build. After the failure of this process, the well advanced construction work on the power plant was stopped in December 2003.
Current estimates of electricity production also assume that it will remain significantly below the pre-1990 results. This means that electricity generation remains a bottleneck in the country's economic development. The situation is becoming precarious because coal mines are also working below their technical capacity due to a lack of electricity and there is therefore a lack of fuel to generate electricity.
| year | installed capacity [GW] | produced energy [TWh] | comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960 | 9.1 | ||
| 1970 | 16.5 | ||
| 1976 | 4.4 | 28 | |
| 1980 | 5.4 | 25th | Global security |
| 1984 | 50 | Global security | |
| 1988 | 55 | Global security | |
| 1990 | 7.14 | 46 | Globalsecurity, Nautilus |
| 1990 | 4.29 (Hydro only) | Global security | |
| 1990 | 56.4 | North Korea Ministry of Environment | |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23 | nautilus |
| 1998 | 25.6 | North Korea Ministry of Environment | |
| 1998 | 16.6 (Hydro only) | North Korea Ministry of Environment | |
| 1999 | 7.4 | Global security | |
| 2000 | 25.9 | North Korea Ministry of Environment | |
| 2000 | 19.2 | KEEI | |
| 2000 | 12.6 | nautilus | |
| 2003 | 30.01 | ? | |
| 2004 | 20.6 | Government of South Korea | |
| 2005 | 21.6 | Government of South Korea | |
| 2005 | 16.5 | nautilus | |
| 2006 | 22.5 | Government of South Korea | |
| 2007 | 23.7 | Government of South Korea | |
| 2008 | 25.5 | Government of South Korea | |
| 2009 | 23.5 | Government of South Korea | |
| 2009 | 16.3 (1) | North Korea Statistical Bureau |
Hydropower plants
With its mountainous terrain and precipitation of over 1,000 mm per year, North Korea has great potential for the use of hydropower. Estimates assume that the installed capacity of previously built hydropower plants can be increased from a little over 4,000 MW to over 10,000 MW.
The disadvantage of hydropower is the high development effort in often mountainous terrain that is difficult to access, the lack of heavy technology and the seasonal differences in water drainage (e.g. snowmelt) with reduced availability in winter.
| Surname | province | completion |
installed capacity in MW |
flow | status | Remarks | Coordinates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anbyon hydroelectric power station (Kumgangsam) | Kangwon-do | 199? | 810 | Bukhangang | in partial operation / under construction | Several reservoirs are supplied with water via tunnels. Final expansion questionable | |
| Supung dam | P'yŏngan-pukto | 1941 | 765/2 | Yalu | in operation | 50:50 division with China | 40 ° 27 '40 " N , 124 ° 57' 43" E |
| Hydroelectric power plant Sodusu 1 - 3 | Ryanggang-do | 1982 | 455 | in operation | Several reservoirs are supplied with water via tunnels | ||
| Yunfeng Reservoir (Ounbong) | Chagang-do | 1967 | 400/2 | Yalu | in operation | 50:50 division with China | 41 ° 22 ′ 51 ″ N , 126 ° 30 ′ 52 ″ E |
| Wiwon reservoir | Chagang-do | 1989 | 400/2 | Yalu | in operation | 50:50 division with China | 40 ° 54 ′ 4 " N , 125 ° 58 ′ 23" E |
| Hochonggang reservoir | 1958 | 394 | in operation | ||||
| Changjin Reservoir | Hamgyŏng-namdo | 1958 | 360 | Changjin-gang | in operation | ||
| Pochongang reservoir | 1956 | 260 | in operation | ||||
| Kangae Reservoir | 1965 | 246 | in operation | ||||
| Bujong-gang reservoir | 19 ?? | 226 | in operation | ||||
| Taedong Gang Reservoir | P'yŏngan-namdo | 1982 | 200 | Taedong gang | in operation | 39 ° 46 ′ 20 " N , 126 ° 20 ′ 55" E | |
| Nam gang reservoir | 1994 | 200 | in operation | ||||
| Taepyongman barrage | P'yŏngan-pukto | 1989 | 190/2 | Yalu | in operation | 50:50 division with China | 40 ° 21 '10 " N , 124 ° 43' 55" E |
| Janjia gang reservoir | Chagang-do | 1986 | 90 | in operation | 40 ° 22 ′ 30 " N , 124 ° 44 ′ 25" E | ||
| Tonno gang reservoir | 1959 | 90 | in operation | ||||
| Taepenmang reservoir | 1989 | 90 | in operation | ||||
| Huichon Reservoir | 2012 | 300 | Ch'ŏngch'ŏn | in operation |
Thermal power plants
Fossil power plants use the rich coal deposits, especially in the western part of the country. In contrast, North Korea has practically no proven oil or gas reserves. Petroleum is imported from Russia via a pipeline and processed in a large petrochemical complex in Sunbong (Unggi), which also includes a petroleum power plant. A second refinery, which is supplied with crude oil by pipeline from China, is located near Sinŭiju . It is unclear whether this also includes a power plant.
Other power plants
In addition to the large power plants that are connected to the electricity grid, there are an unknown number of small power plants based on coal, biomass (wood) and water in the country, which both supply local electricity networks and provide heat, but not to the national grid are connected.
power grid
A power grid consisting of 220, 110 and 65 kV lines connects the power plant locations with each other and with the major consumption areas in cities and industrial centers. Also in official documents of the North Korean government, the power grid is named as one of the weak points next to the outdated and inefficient power plant park (UNFCCC) due to high line losses. As far as is known, there are no direct connections between the North Korean network and other countries. Due to the different network frequency (60 Hz in North Korea versus 50 Hz in China and Russia), this would also involve technical effort and conversion losses. According to South Korea, there are political reasons against it.
Exceptions are the supply of the Kaesong special economic zone from South Korea in border areas and the hydropower plants on Yalu that are shared with China.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on globalsecurity.org (English).
- ↑ The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral Redevelopment (PDF file; 1.1 MB). The Nautilus Institute dated March 6, 2003.
- ↑ DPRG's First National Communication under the Famework Convention on Climate Change (PDF file; 4.2 MB) Ministry of the Environment North Korea, p. 6. (April 2000; English).
- ^ Understanding North Korea 2012 ( Memento from December 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ). Ministry of Unification
- ↑ quoted in: Hamhung Hydropower Plant No.1 CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROJECT DESIGN DOCUMENT FORM (CDM-SSC-PDD) (PDF file; 568 kB)
- ↑ Note / 2 means: North Korea receives half of the benefit
Web links / literature
- A Country Study: North Korea Library of Congress (2009)
- Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals Sector (PDF file; 429 kB). Edward Yoon; The Nautilus Institute of January 6, 2011 (English)
- Fueling DPRK Energy Futures and Energy Security: 2005 Energy Balance, Engagement Options, and Future Paths (PDF file; 3.4 MB). The Nautilus Institute of June 30, 2007 (English)