Tragedy of the commons

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Tragedy of the commons (Engl. Tragedy of the commons ), tragedy of the commons , Allmendeklemme or the Commons refers to a sociological and evolutionary theoretical model , after the freely available but limited resources are not used efficiently and overuse are threatened, what the users themselves threatened .

Concept history

The literal expression tragedy of the commons is attributed, among other things, to considerations by William Forster Lloyd (1795–1852) on population development. It goes back to the rights of the commoners - individual farmers who jointly farmed the crown property (especially shepherds who shared grazing land ). The German translation is derived from the common economic form known since the Middle Ages .

Garrett Hardin

The microbiologist and ecologist Garrett Hardin expanded the term in a 1968 essay for Science magazine entitled The Tragedy of the Commons . According to Hardin, the tragedy of the commons would be an inevitable fate of mankind if only one were to look for a technological solution. In order to avoid this fate, one must rather change one's perspective and no longer regard and approach the problem as individual individuals, but also as a community. H. Scott Gordon wrote in 1954 using the example of fishing: “Nobody attaches any value to a property that is freely available to everyone because everyone who is so foolhardy to wait their turn finally finds that Another has already taken his part away. ”Hardin, who follows the tradition of Robert Malthus , expanded the term into a metaphor for, among other things, overpopulation and, in addition to regulated access to public goods, also called for global birth control .

According to Hardin, as soon as a resource is fully available to all people, everyone will try to generate as much income as possible for themselves. This works as long as the good is not exhausted. As soon as the number of users rises above a certain level, however, the tragedy of the commons takes hold: everyone tries to maximize their income. But now the goods are no longer enough for everyone. The community bears the costs of the overexploitation . For the individual, the current profit is much higher than the costs that can only be felt in the long term. But ultimately everyone contributes to their own as well as to the ruin of the community. “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all,” Hardin's conclusion.

Joachim Radkau

Joachim Radkau finds the terminology in a whole series of writings that have been discussing an alleged or actual commons problem since the 18th century. In addition to the almost proverbial “arid common cow ”, Radkau also names the Aristotelian polemics against the Platonic polis as a permanent argument of the agricultural reformers . He quotes Aristotle as saying that “the good that is common to the greatest number is given the least care” in order to abolish traditional rural common property.

According to Radkau, the use of the commons in economics has little to do with the actual, well-functioning and ecologically interesting commons. In the early days, he sees the main motivation in economics as an ideological turn against traditional forms of common property and an increasing rationalization of agriculture based on private property , later, conversely, in the demand for rigid international restrictions on the use of resources.

Evolution theory

In the theory of evolution , the model is used as a possible explanation for evolutionary suicide .

The model in economics

Goods from whose use other potential customers cannot be excluded , but which rival the use claims of the customer , are called common goods in economics .

If, in a world of scarce resources, completely rival goods are freely available, i.e. at a price of zero (→  commons ), rationing over the waiting time will usually result. The result is a resource-consuming appropriation competition in which everyone will try to be the first.

Examples of problematic use of natural resources for which no exclusive rights of disposal are defined:

  • Overfishing of the world's oceans
  • Looting of wildlife and forests, especially in developing countries ( overexploitation )
  • Discharge of sewage into streams and rivers
  • Contamination of these by agricultural pesticides and eutrophication
  • illegal conversion of forest into arable land (Indonesia, Latin America, Africa)
  • Overuse of soils resulting in desertification
  • Use of the atmosphere as a sink for air pollutants with air pollution as a result.

Acts as a motor when the demand for the common good increases sharply in comparison to the supply. Then a tragic escalation occurs due to the faster consumption of the commons. See positive feedback .

This can be caused, among other things, by locally exploding population populations that need to be supplied. In this case, approaches to solving the social dilemma that rely on the definition of rights of disposal under state control or the regulation of scarce resources, e.g. B. through catch quotas or emissions trading .

Elinor Ostrom

Elinor Ostrom looked at the tragedy of the commons from an institutional economic point of view in a highly acclaimed book Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (German title: Die Verfassungs der Allmende. Beyond State and Market ) . According to her, functioning solutions to the common commons problem with local commons are often based on the affected individuals administering the resource within the framework of a suitable institution that is based on the self-organization of those involved. For a corresponding agreement to come about, both a credible self-commitment of those involved and the establishment of effective control options are necessary. Such institutional arrangements at the community level or at the cooperative level are often more successful than central government control or market mechanisms resulting from privatization because local knowledge can be used.

From Ostrom's point of view, there are therefore more solutions to the common land problem than have been proposed by Hardin, but also by traditional economic theory in general. In particular, the scope of the theory that emerged from Hardin's article needs to be reassessed. Between the extreme forms of the state model (with a “benevolent dictator”) on the one hand and the corporate model (with a profit-maximizing entrepreneur) on the other hand, there are in reality a large number of collective forms of use that have to be taken into account (see article on Commons ).

Game theory and social psychology

This behavioral pattern of individual utility maximization, which may lead to mutual ruin, is also examined by game theory , in particular the prisoner's dilemma and its variants. Among other things, the question of why individuals in many cases stabilize social norms through altruistic sanctions despite high individual costs will be investigated . The social psychology also shows maxims based, not purpose- confidence as a possible solution.

Systems theory

From the point of view of systems theory , the tragedy of the commons is the result of the behavior of positively fed back systems , whose tendency to "build up" leads to a vicious circle . This behavior can also be simulated in a simple mathematical model, the “logistic equation” .

This means that the positive feedback has a reinforcing effect on itself: the more the common good is used, the scarcer it becomes - and the scarcer it becomes, the stronger the competition among users for the rest of the property. This leads to a downward spiral, so that ultimately the common property is almost or completely used up. If the survival of users depends on it, it is also endangered or excluded. A popular example is the thesis published by Jared Diamond in his bestseller Kollaps of the overexploitation of the natural resources of Easter Island , which is said to have led to the disruption of the ecological balance on the isolated island and thus to an extreme decimation of its population.

Comedy the commons

Carol M. Rose described in 1986 the so-called comedy of the commons ( English comedy of the commons ). In certain cases the exploitation of a resource could be positive for the general public. This is the case if the respective resource - according to the principle: "The more, the better" - achieves greater profits with greater use. Rose cites dance events as an example where greater participation by individuals creates a greater diversity of potential dance partners, a better atmosphere, and a greater sense of community. Other examples would be the market or Wikipedia.

The problem with the comedy of the commons is lack of investment or "underinvestment". This describes the unwillingness of those involved to claim the resource, especially at the beginning. The example of the dance event shows this with an empty dance floor, as none of the guests is ready to be the first person on the dance floor.

reception

According to Clemens Knobloch , anti-commons (Lloyd 1833 / Hardin 1968) are narratives for the purpose of legitimizing enclosures (“privatizations”) from the Enclosure Movement .

See also

  • Commons , refers to resources (code, knowledge, food, energy sources, water, land, time, etc.) that result from self-organized processes of joint, needs-based production, administration, maintenance and / or use (commoning).
  • Rationality trap , falling apart between what is reasonable for the individual and what is reasonable for the whole of individuals
  • Moral hazard , more frivolous behavior due to collective coverage of the risk of damage
  • External effect , uncompensated effects of economic decisions on uninvolved market participants
  • Free rider behavior , similar to the problems raised here, but also for purely public goods
  • The tragedy of the anti-commons , a large number of rights holders prevents the achievement of a socially desirable result

literature

  • James M. Acheson: Management of Common-Property Resources. In: Stuart Plattner (Ed.): Economic Anthropology. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1989, pp. 351-378
  • Martin Beckenkamp : Sanctions in the common good dilemma . Beltz, Weinheim 2001
  • C. Dustin Becker, Elinor Ostrom: Human Ecology and Resource Sustainability. The Importance of Institutional Diversity. In: Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics. 26/1995, pp. 113-133
  • Fikret Berkes (Ed.): Common property resources. Ecology and community-based sustainable development. Belhaven, London 1989, Review
  • Andreas Diekmann , Carlo C. Jaeger (ed.): Environmental sociology. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1996 (= Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft, 36) (Recommended in it: Bonnie J. McCay, Svein Jentoft: Unfamiliar terrain. Common property under the magnifying glass of the social sciences . Pp. 272-291)
  • David Feeny, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J. McCay, James M. Acheson: The tragedy of the commons. Twenty-Two Years Later. In: Human Ecology. 18/1/1990, pp. 1–19 ( PDF )
  • Garrett Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons . In: Science. 162/1968. P. 1243–1248 (German translation in: Michael Lohmann (Ed.): Endangered Future . Munich 1970, pp. 30–48)
  • Garrett Hardin, John Baden (Ed.): Managing the Commons. WH Freeman, San Francisco 1977
  • Arne Kalland: Religious Environmentalist Paradigm. In: Bron Taylor (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature. continuum, London / New York 2005, pp. 1367–1371
  • Bonnie J. McCay, James M. Acheson (Eds.): The question of the commons. The culture and ecology of communal resources. The University of Arizona Press, Tucson / Arizona 1987
  • Margaret A. McKean: Success on the commons. A comparative examination of institutions for common property resource management. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 4/3/1992, pp. 247-281
  • Christian Müller , Manfred Tietzel : Commons Allocations. In: Manfred Tietzel (Ed.): Economic Theory of Rationing , Munich 1998, pp. 163–201
  • National Research Council (Ed.): Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. National Academy Press, Washington (DC) 1986
  • Mancur Olson : The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge / MA 1965
  • Elinor Ostrom : The constitution of the commons. Beyond the state and the market . Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1999 (The Unit of Social Sciences, 104) (German translation by Ostrom: Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York / Victoria 1990)
  • Joachim Radkau Nature and Power , CH Beck, 2002 ISBN 3-406-48655-X
  • Paul C. Stern, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, Susan Stonich: Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research . In: Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, Elke U. Weber (eds.): The Drama of the Commons . National Academy Press, Washington (DC) 2002, pp. 445-489
  • Hans G. Nutzinger : Nobel Prize in Economics for Elinor Ostrom: An overview of her main economic work [2010], available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/23-2010_nutzinger.pdf

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ William Forster Lloyd: Two Lectures on the Checks to Population . Oxford University Press, 1833
  2. ^ A b Garret Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons . Science No. 162 (1968), pp. 1243-1248
  3. ^ Garrett Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons . In: Science . tape 162 , no. 3859 , December 13, 1968, ISSN  0036-8075 , p. 1243–1248 , doi : 10.1126 / science.162.3859.1243 , PMID 5699198 ( sciencemag.org [accessed May 3, 2018]).
  4. ↑ Yanling Guo: Hardin and his "The Tragedy of the Commons" . In: LinkedIn . April 30, 2018 ( linkedin.com [accessed May 3, 2018]).
  5. ^ H. Scott Gordon: The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Research: The Fishery. In The Journal of Political Economy , 1954, vol. 62, no.2
  6. ^ Garrett Hardin: The Social Contract. The Feast of Malthus Living within limits. 1998, pages 181-187
  7. ↑ a b c d Joachim Radkau: Nature and Power. A world history of the environment. CH Beck, 2002, ISBN 3-406-48655-X , pages 15, 55 and 90ff.
  8. ^ Daniel J. Rankin, Katja Bargum, Hanna Kokko: The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology. (PDF file; 493 kB) In: Trends in Ecology and Evolution No. 22 (2007), pages 643–651
  9. ↑ Manfred Tietzel, Christian Müller: Regulatory implications of contract theory. Published in Order Theory and Order Policy: Conceptions and Development Perspectives. Lucius & Lucius , 2000, ISBN 3-8282-0145-8 , p. 316
  10. ^ Elinor Ostrom et al .: Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. In: Science 284 (1999), p. 278.
  11. ↑ B. Bärmann: When does self-organization work? keimform.de, June 29, 2009 (short description)
  12. ^ Yanling Guo: A Reconsideration of Inter-Group Cooperation with Defect Problem . ID 2996583. Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY August 31, 2016, doi : 10.2139 / ssrn.2996583 ( ssrn.com [accessed May 3, 2018]).
  13. ↑ - ( Memento of the original from February 7th, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Pitsoulis: Resource Management on the Basis of Social Sanctions, economag.de No. 2/2007 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.economag.de
  14. ↑ Jared Diamond: Collapse. Why societies survive or perish , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 103 ff.
  15. ^ Carol M. Rose: The comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property. The University of Chicago Law Review, 1986, accessed January 6, 2020 .
  16. ↑ Clemens Knobloch: "The Tragedy of the Commons" - Anatomy of a Success Story . In: The culture of neoevolutionism. On the discursive renaturalization of people and society (eds. Deus, Dießelmann, Fischer, Knobloch). Bielefeld 2015, p. 170.