1. Fitna
As first Fitna or 1st Fitna ( Arabic فتنة'Means' severe trial', 'rebellion', 'civil war') are the names of the armed conflicts within the Islamic community, the umma , after the assassination of the third caliph ʿUthmān . During his reign, Uthmān provided family members with high posts within the Muslim ruling apparatus , especially with governor posts. The troops involved in the Islamic conquests were also ignored in their claims to the allocation of booty. Against this rebellious troops rose up and murdered ʿUthmān in Medina. The son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammed, ʿAlī ibn Abī Tālib , was proclaimed the new caliph by the mutinous troops.
The widow of the prophets Aischa and the companions of the prophets Ṭalḥa and Zubair rose up against ʿAlī , but were defeated by ʿAlī in the so-called camel battle in 656 near Basra . Here Talha and Zubair fell. The Syrian governor Muawiya appeared as a relative of ʿUthmān as his blood avenger and made ʿAlī responsible for his murder. In 657 the battle of Siffin took place between ʿAlī and Muawiya . After lengthy fighting, Muawiya had his troops pinned Koran passages to their lances in order to resolve the ruling on the legality of the opponents' positions on the basis of Islamic belief. When ʿAlī agreed to this, the so-called Kharijites fell away from ʿAlī , who were of the opinion that God alone had a judgment on the legitimacy of the caliphate. Both ʿAlī and Muawiya named an arbitrator. These passed a judgment rather to the disadvantage of ʿAlī. Thereupon Muawiya was proclaimed caliph in Syria according to Tabari. ʿAlī returned to Iraq and killed a large part of the apostate Kharijites near Nahrawan. After several years of fighting against Muawiya, ʿAlī was murdered by a Kharijite in 661. Muawiya now moved against Iraq and bought Ali's son Hasan the caliphate in exchange for an appanage. As a result, Muawiya founded the Umayyad dynasty , which ruled until 750.
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prehistory
The prehistory of the 1st Fitna is the murder of ʿUthmān.
Assassination of ʿUthmān
After weeks of fruitless negotiations about changes to the exercise of the caliphate by ʿUthmān, the 3rd caliph, there was a dispute with several dead and the storming of the palace in Medina , in which ʿUthmān was murdered. Among the murderers of ʿUthmān was probably also Muḥammad , the son of Abū Bakr . The storm was preceded by a siege. A siege is to be understood here as a kind of loose blockade rather than a siege in the military sense. ʿAlī - cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed - seems to have held back during this time and intervened at times for ʿUthmān, but also partly for the rebels. ʿAlī's son al-Hasan ibn ʿAlī was at that time among the people who stayed with mUthmān in his palace.
reasons
In retrospect, the reign of ʿUthmān is marked by the favor of his family.
nepotism
He gave his family several governor posts, as well as material advantages for members of his family and their influence on him. So he made Umayyads governors of Mecca and Basra . Rotter sees in ʿUthmān's rule the takeover of power by the “families of the Meccan plutocracy ”. In 646 he expanded Muʿāwiya's territory to include Ḥumṣ and part of Iraq . It became significant that ʿUthmān replaced ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ as governor of Egypt on the one hand and Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ , i.e. a member of the šūrā who had chosen him, as governor of Iraq and by members of his family on the other . Uthman also seems to have quarreled with ʿAbd ar-Raḥman . There was opposition to this practice among prominent Muslims. B. ʿAmr ibn al-As , who has been in opposition to ʿUthmān since his recall. While Uthmān thus alienated themselves from the majority of those who had chosen him and from a large number of the Companions of the Prophets, not all of the Companions of the Prophets came into active opposition to ʿUthman.
Discontent in the provinces
The main cause of ʿUthmān's fall is to be found in the provinces. Here also the dissatisfied among the Prophet's companions could find a contact point for their opposition. In particular Ṭalḥa and ʿĀʾiša seem to have incited the provinces to revolt.
In the provinces it turned out to be problematic that ʿUthmān assessed the entire conquered land as municipal property, whereas in the opinion of many of the conquerors four-fifths of the spoils of war should have fallen to them. The local troops had to regard it as wrong that the property they had won was administered by a central authority in the distant Medina .
In Egypt this particularly affected the booty from the campaigns in North Africa , which was probably misappropriated by the governor there. ʿUthmān did not allow criticism of this. So he banished the Prophet's companion Abū Ḏarr and Mālik al-ʾAštar , a Koran reader from Kūfa , who later became one of the most important supporters of ʿAlī. Al-ʾAštar took the lead in an uprising in Kūfa in 654-5 and drove out ʿUthmān's governor Saʿīd bin al-ʿĀṣ . In Egypt, Muḥammad bin Abī Bakr (d. 658) and Muḥammad bin Abī Huḏaifa acted against ʿUthmān. In 656, several hundred rebels from Egypt moved to Medina and stopped at Ḏu al-Ḫušub near the city. ʿAlī was sent by ʿUthmān as the leader of a group of negotiators to the insurgents, whereupon they apparently wanted to return to Egypt, but after allegedly finding a letter from ʿUthmān, they turned back and besieged ʿUṯmān in his palace in Medina.
Procedure of the 1st Fitna
After the murder of Uthman, ʿAlī was proclaimed caliph by the mutinying troops. ʿAlī's caliphate thus lacked the legitimacy of the previous caliphates, which was characterized by an election by the shura of the Prophet's companions and the support of the Quraysh. This lack of legitimation of ʿAlī by the Quraishite companions of the prophets and the opposition of the Umayyads to lässtAlī leads Madelung sAlī's caliphate to be referred to as the “counter-caliphate”, a term that is otherwise only used for caliphates that are directed against already established caliphates. There appears to have been some support for Talha among the troops present, while the Kufic and Basrian troops and the Ansar support Ali. The exact events of the uprising of ʿAlī are uncertain. Immediately after Alī's uprising, the influential members of the community in Medina were urged to pay homage to ʿAlī, if this was not done voluntarily, they were forced to do so, as in the case of az-Zubair and Ṭalḥa .
Most of the Umayyads present left Medina and some influential companions of the Prophets such as Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ or Mughira bin Shu'ba also followed this path. When ʿĀʾiša learned of WahlAlī's election in Mecca, she called for the overthrow of him as revenge for Uthman. Talha and az-Zubair went to Mecca, where they joined ʿĀʾiša, both probably in the hope of being able to claim the caliphate for themselves after a victory over ʿAlī. ʿAlī was held responsible for the murder of ʿUthmān by this group. Nagel emphasizes that īAlī's power base was based on the power of rebel troops from the start.
Consolidation of power
ʿAlī exchanged the governors of ʿUthmāns at the beginning of his reign. ʿAlī took Anṣār into account when filling governor's posts and thus contrasted the previous preference for the Quraysh and in particular ʿUthmān's nepotism. So he appointed the companion of the Prophet ʿUṯmān b for Basra . Hunaif of the Banu Auws, who after his arrival took control of the city from Uthman's governor. For Egypt he appointed Qais b. Sa'd , the son of the leader of the Khazraj. Here he passed over the leader of the Egyptian rebels, Muhammad b. Abi Hudhayfa, and Amr b. al-As. In Egypt, Qais had to deal with a group loyal to Uthman under Yazid al-Harith al-Mudliji, who had him levy taxes after consultation, but refused to swear allegiance to Ali.
ʿUbaydallāh b. al ʿAbbās, a son of ʿAbbās', and Saʿīd b. Saʿd, Qais' brother, appointed Ali as governors in Yemen . The governors of Uthman had already left Yemen for Mecca by this time, so that Ali's governors could take over power. ʿUṯmān's governor Abū Mūsā al-Asʿarī remained in Kūfa. In Bahrain , ʿAlī continued after the camel battle ʿUmar b. Abī Salama as governor. Even at this time, Muāwiya had to appear as an opponent of ʿAlī. ʿAlī confirmed ʿUthmān's governor in Mecca, but this remained under the control of Aisha, Talha and Zubayr, who openly turned against Ali and accused him of the murder of Uthman. The Meccan faction abandoned a well-planned advance into Medina due to the superiority of Ali's troops and, with 600 to 900 men, probably moved to Iraq towards the end of October 656 to attract stronger troops for support. Madelung is of the opinion that an affiliation with Mu nichtāwiya did not take place because he would have assumed too strong a position as governor in Syria to be able to act independently of him. The goal of the Meccan rebels seems to have been a šūrā , at the end of which there would have been the elevation of Ṭalḥa or az-Zubayr to caliph. It is noticeable that the rebellion received the support of many Quraish, including several Umayyads, such as BB Marwans. After their arrival in Basra there was a fight with the supporters of Ali under ʿUʿmān b. Hunayf. An agreement followed between the two parties, according to which the rebels were given access to the city and ʿUṯmān b. Hunayf remained as governor until Ali arrived. The rebels broke the agreement and continued ʿUṯmān b. Hunayf caught.
Clashes in Iraq
ʿAlī moved from October 25th with 700 Ansar via ar-Rabaḏa towards Iraq. Sahl b. Hunayf remained in Medina as governor. Iraq was an important target due to the presence of two army camps. On his way to Kufa, Ali received support from some members of the Banu Tayyi´. Since Abū Mūsā , Ali's governor in Kufa, had decided to remain neutral and could not be diverted from his course by several of ʿAlī 's envoys, Mālik al- ʾAštar himself to Kūfa, overthrew Abū Mūsā and gathered an army for ʿAlī, with whom he united east of Kūfa. Then ʿAlī's army moved to Basra, where there were some crossings to ʿAlī from the camp of his opponents. At the beginning of December 656 there was the so-called camel battle (named after ʿĀʾišas camel) near Basra, in which Ṭalḥa and az-Zubayr and many other Quraish and prophetic companions - the majority of the Quraish on the side of ʿAlī's opponents - perished and ʿĀʾiša was captured. After the battle ʿAlī did not treat his opponents according to the usual procedure (enslavement of families, distribution of property as booty, execution of individual opponents), but only allowed a small distribution of booty, but otherwise treated his opponents gently. He also left the families of Ṭalḥas and az-Zubairs untouched. After some time, ʿĀʾišas was sent into political sideline in Arabia.
Confrontation with Muʿāwiya
Muʿāwiya was now the only major opponent of ʿAlī within the Islamic community. Madelung rejects all reports that there had been diplomatic exchanges between undAlī and Muʿāwiya before the camel battle. He pays particular attention to the fact that ʿUthmān's brother Walīd b. ʿUqba and also ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀs stayed in Muʿāwiya's domain. The presence of these two allowed Muʿāwiya, on the one hand, to skillfully stylize himself as the blood avenger of his relative ʿUthmān and thus gain legitimacy in the fight against ʿAlī and, on the other hand, to have a representative of the great military commanders of the conquests serving. From a military point of view, Muʿāwiya's situation was dangerous at the time, as the rest of the Islamic world was largely under ʿAlī's rule. In particular, a possible attack from Egypt could inflict the fatal blow. In the year 657 ʿAlī demanded that Muʿāwiya submit to him, but the latter refused. Muʿāwiya tried to win over the people of Syria. He also made peace with Byzantium by agreeing to pay tribute. In February 657 ʿAlī Qais, probably due to doubts about his loyalty, recalled the governorship in Egypt and installed Muḥammad, son of Abu Bakr, in his place. Some time later ʿAlī al-ʾAštar instructed to bring parts of northern Iraq and Syria under control and made him governor of Mosul for this reason . There was some fighting between ʿAlīs and Muʿāwiya's troops in this area. At this time, ʿAlī also succeeded in winning several Syrian governors of Muʿāwiyas to his side.
Battle of Chiffin
In the spring of 657 both ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya at the head of their armies moved against one another. In June and July there was the so-called Battle of Ṣiffīn , a series of individual, intensifying skirmishes (in which ʿUmar's son ʿUbaydallāh fell on the side of Muʿāwiya), at the end of which there was the appearance of Muiyāwiya's troops with copies of the Koran pinned to their lance tips. The Encyclopaedia of Islam assumes that Muʿāwiya was facing defeat at this time, Madelung evaluates the situation as being slightly in favor of Alī. This was seen as a sign to end the fight and resolve the conflict through an arbitrator based on the Koran. ĪAlī, although unwilling, had to bow to the negotiations. Already at this time there seems to have been the first disengagement among ʿAlī's troops. Muʿāwiya made ʿAmr his representative in the court of arbitration, while on ʿAlī's side the rather unreliable Abū Mūsā al-Ašʿarī, probably at the insistence of Iraqi circles against the will of ʿAlī, took on the role of arbitrator. In August 657, an agreement was finally reached that the arbitrators should judge the conflict on the basis of the Koran. VereinbarungAlī had to fall behind because of this agreement, as on the one hand he gave up his position of military strength in favor of negotiations and on the other hand negotiations with a rebel had to significantly weaken his claim to the title of caliphate.
According to the arbitration agreement
The two armies now returned to their home areas. After ʿAlī had arrived in Kūfa in September, the first protesters gathered under the slogan "The judgment belongs to God alone" to oppose ʿAlī's decision. It was crucial that they no longer recognized ʿAlī as caliph, but wanted to leave the decision to a šūrā. From this point on, ʿAlī found himself in an unsolvable situation: if he did not want to lose his credibility, he had to keep the agreements of the arbitration tribunal, but at the same time could not take action against the opponents of the agreement among his troops, who had become known as Ḫāriǧīs , if he did not want more of his supporters to lose. Action against the appeal to God inevitably had to be interpreted as a kind of disregard for religious principles or even disbelief. In the spring of 658 the referees met for the first time. The circumstances of the arbitral tribunal are controversial in research. Part of the research is based on two arbitration tribunals, one at Dūmat al-Jandal and one at Adruḥ, the other part only from one. The question that was discussed was whether ʿUthmān's murder was justified. ʿAmr naturally had to affirm this. Abū Mūsā appears to have joined ʿAmr's position. His motives are unclear. Madelung certifies that he has a neutral position.
After the end of the arbitration tribunal, Muʿāwiya was already recognized as a caliph in Syria according to at-Tabarī . At this point, at the latest, the question arises on what basis Muʿāwiya could claim the caliphate, since, according to popular belief, he did not have the qualifications that had previously applied to caliphate candidates (services to Islam, close relationship to the prophet). According to Rotter, the following points were made by Muʿāwiya's propaganda: As an avenger for ʿUthmān, he represented his claims, since according to ancient Arabic beliefs, blood avenger were the primary heirs. According to Rohe, the legal successor of the injured party is entitled to talion. He continued to have great political skills. But the argument of belonging to the prominent families of the Quraish (and to the ʿAbd Šams, who were more closely related to the Hāšim than other clans) and also the marriage to Muḥammad through his sister ʾUmm Kulṯūm seem more important. On the other hand, however, there had to be the clear stigma of Muʿāwiyas that he and his family had been opponents of early Islam, that his mother Hind bint ʿUtba had even desecrated the corpse of the prophet's uncle at the Battle of Uhud and had only converted to Islam relatively late. Muʿāwiya counted himself in his propaganda in order to counteract this, but nevertheless one of the companions of the Prophets.
ʿAlī did not recognize the outcome of the arbitral tribunal and regarded the negotiations as not taking place on the basis of the Koran. He made the same argument against the rebels against him. Those dissatisfied with Alī had become more radical in the meantime and left Kūfa in the direction of an-Naḥrawān in order to win the army camp in Basra for themselves. At this point in time there was already a military conflict between them and supporters of ʿAlī. Part of the Basra garrison joined the insurgents. Madelung reports that due to doubts about his rule at that time, ʿAlī began to spread the hadeeth about the events at the Pool of Ḫumm .
ʿAlī asked the insurgent troops to rejoin him. These, however, remained at their previous position and demanded that ʿAlī recognize his consent to the arbitral tribunal as a religiously unlawful decision. In the period that followed, the āriǧītes seem to have murdered several times, including one of ʿAlī's envoy. At the time, ʿAlī seems to have been unsure whether he should turn against Muʿāwiya or the āriǧīten, with tendencies in his army ultimately tipping the bill.
Battle of Naḥrawān
The exact dating of the following battle at Naḥrawān is uncertain, it must have taken place around the middle of 658 and, due to the size of ʿAlī's army compared to the number of the assembled Ḫāriǧītes, led to a kind of massacre of the latter. ʿAlī allowed the survivors to return to their tribes but refused to bury the dead. The massacre-like nature of the conflict may have done one more thing to ruin ʿAlī's reputation. The shedding of Muslim blood was a novelty and the massive killing of people who invoked the Koran had to weigh heavily on īAlī's religious legitimation. There were great disengagement movements among ʿAlī's troops, so that a continuation of the campaign against Muʿāwiya was impossible. In ʿAlīs area there were uprisings since 658 at this time, which were inspired by the Ḫāriǧītes at Naḥrawān.
Muʿāwiya had initially assembled his troops in anticipation of an attack by ʿAlī, but after gaining knowledge of the events at Naḥrawān, ordered various smaller actions against ʿAlī. In Egypt, Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, meanwhile, failed in fighting the Egyptian rebels. ʿAlī sent al-ʾAštar to Egypt to relieve Muḥammad, but he was murdered on the way. Muʿāwiya sent ʿAmr to Egypt with an army. There he defeated ʿAlīs governor Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr in the summer of 658, where he died. Muʿāwiya had significantly improved his position by conquering Egypt. The extent of the apostasy that īAlī experienced at this time can be seen from the fact that his cousin ʿAbdallāh ibn al-ʿAbbās also went to Arabia. At this time, Muʿāwiya managed to win supporters in Basra through Ibn al Hadrami, so that Basra passed over to him and could only be won back after another fight for ʿAlī.
The meeting of the referees at Adruh falls in the beginning of 659. Much research focuses on the events of a tribunal here alone. Others, e.g. B. Madelung, see in the court of arbitration at Adruh a propaganda event of Muʿāwiyas, to which Abū Mūsā came of his own free will, but no longer as a representative of ʿAlī. The Cambridge History reports that Abū Mūsā did not consider either ʿAlī or Muʿāwiya to be suitable caliphs, but ʿAmr clearly preferred Muʿāwiya.
Ali's death
The following period was marked by a guerrilla war between Muʿāwiyas and führteAlī, which the former waged in the form of raids against ʿAlī's territory. The disputes over the calf tribes west of the Euphrates became significant . In 659-60 Muʿāwiya failed in the attempt to conquer Medina and Mecca. Several campaigns against western Iraq followed, as well as a campaign in Yemen, which first led to the conquest of Medina and Mecca, Ta'ifs , then Yemen. It was possible for ʿAlī to retake the conquered areas shortly afterwards. Supported by these relative setbacks by Muʿāwiyas in 660, ʿAlī prepared a third campaign to Syria. On January 26, 661 ʿAlī was murdered in the mosque of Kūfa by the Ḫāriǧīten tenAbd ar-Raḥman. According to tradition, ʿAlī did not appoint a successor, but noted that he did not mind if his son al-Hasan followed him. Hasan was then also made his successor, but initially remained inactive. Muʿāwiya moved his army to Iraq and attacked Kūfa. After negotiations with Hasan, the latter renounced the caliphate with the assurance of a pension. In the period that followed, Muʿāwiya had to deal with some uprisings from discontented troops and Ḫāriǧītes.
Social groups and structures in the 1st Fitna
The conflict, which lasted for several years, was a novelty for the Muslim community in that it was the first time that Muslims fought against Muslims.
Social break
In the practice established up to that point, according to the teaching of the Prophet, there was a prohibition on the killing of fellow believers - unless they had committed serious crimes - which the first caliphs, according to their definition, had observed by Muslims. One of the first to be affected by such actions, which are illegal according to Islamic practice, was the caliph ʿUthmān. In addition to this recognizable break with tradition, the decision of the ǧāriǧītes to declare other Muslims to be unbelievers on the basis of the Koran is also important.
Reasons for this outbreak of intra-Islamic violence must be looked for in the changes compared to the time of the prophet and the first caliphs. While at the time of the Prophet there was a close bond with the community through spatial proximity to almost all other members and the unifying charisma of the Prophet , in the wake of the Islamic expansion there was a spatial distribution of the Islamic armies over widely spaced areas with varying degrees cultural background and different local interests. In addition, many of the Arab tribes had only converted to Islam shortly before the Prophet's death and some had had to be forcibly returned to the community during the ridda wars. The loyalty of these groups to all Islamic commandments can therefore be questioned. In addition, with the spread of Islam, there were further conversions from previous non-Muslims. These groups were decisive for the effectiveness of the Islamic armies during the time of the great conquests. Subsequently, they formed a military potential that could be called up in the large army camps such as Fustāt , Basra or Kūfa, divided into tribes and clans to which their primary loyalty could apply, but which increasingly no longer had a warlike task. The relationship between the Islamic armies and the caliphs as well as the way in which the booty from the conquering campaigns was distributed is important.
The Koran stipulated that a fifth of the booty was to be given to the community (later represented by the caliph), while the rest could be kept by the fighters themselves. The fifth to be given should be used for "general concerns of the Ummah ". The question of how to deal with the conquered land was prone to conflict. According to Noth, the conquering groups could only be persuaded after the conflict to recognize this land as common land, 'fay' . These conflicts could presumably have been resolved more easily if they had appeared more strongly as military leaders who, in the eyes of the fighting troops, had gained a share of the booty themselves through their personal merits in battle. Due to the fact that the caliphs stayed away from Medina, they had to appear as beneficiaries of the work of others and offer themselves as a projection surface for economic conflicts. ʿUthmān in particular offered himself for this because of his dependence on and favored by his relatives, which fell back negatively on ʿUthmān in the form of corrupt governors. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Islam advocates the thesis that with the lack of new, major conquests and thus new booty, the discontent of the troops in the army camps must increase. Nagel sums up: “Apparently it was no longer possible to control the emerging Islamic state from Medina. The army camp cities had gained such a level of dead weight within two decades that the notables there would not let the reins be taken out of their hands. ”Thus it can be said with Krämer that the“ brilliant triumphant march [...] for the winners at the same time relief and Load ”meant.
Role of the Quraish
Another point lies in the original community itself and its relationship to the Quraish tribe. Islam's promise of equality had never been fully enforced in practice. After Mohammad's death, the Quraish of the Prophet's companions, in alliance with the ancient Meccan aristocracy, gained the upper hand over the other forces, including the Medinan Anṣār . This mixed situation of favoring one's own relatives and the discontent of the garrison troops led to a kind of alliance of the latter and leading prophetic companions, which led to the overthrow of ʿUthmān. In the period that followed, Alī was dependent on these tribal groups, who had made him caliph, and had to take their interests into account. The fact that the murderers of Uthmān were among these groups must have negative propaganda effects for ʿAlī. Had he punished the murderers, he would have declared the protest against ʿUthmān to be unlawful and thus cast doubt on the legitimacy of his own uprising. By leaving her unpunished, however, he gave his opponents the opportunity to present himself as an avenger for ʿUthmān and to blame him for his murder. The grouping of armies according to tribes and clans with their own interests became a problem for ʿAlī, especially after the battle of Ṣiffīn, when some of these groups fell away from him in part or as a whole. Muʿāwiya, on the other hand, was able to build on his longstanding ties to the Syrians, who remained loyal to him despite the initial superiority of ʿAlī.
Reception history
The conflict between'Alī and Mu'awiya, nestled on a larger scale in the first and second Fitna, is still one of the central themes of the history of Islam. The current Shiite position sees in the death of'Alī and Husain , the concoction infidel forces that the denied rule to rightful successors of the Prophet. The Sunni position is less clear, but nowadays the majority also assumes an unlawful takeover of power by Muʿāwiya, who, by establishing a hereditary monarchy and a secular kingship (mulk), eliminated the earlier rule of the rightly guided caliphs, which was based on the consensus of the influential members of the Umma. The negative assessment of Muʿāwiyas and the Umayyads arises at the core of the historiography of the Abbasid period, which tried to portray the predecessors of the Abbasids negatively in contrast to the ruling dynasty in order to justify the latter's takeover. The Umayyad dynasty was often measured against the central actions of Muʿāwiyas: the revolt against ʿAlī, the establishment of the hereditary monarchy and the introduction of a royal rule.
The history of reception up to the 19th century
Since the prominent reports on the first century of Islamic history (e.g. the great historical works of Ṭabarī and al-Balāḏurī ) were only written during the Abbasid period, it makes sense to use contemporary sources such as Rajaa for the beginning of a reception history Nadler undertakes in her treatise on the Ummayad poets. Even if the poets are not given the status that Radler assigns to them by calling them “the most important element for the assessment and classification of these caliphs [of the Umayyads]”, one must recognize them as an authentic contemporary source, and possibly that too had not a small influence on the general opinion and their views may have partly drawn from this.
Representations from the Umayyad period
The poets of the Umayyad period attributed the Umayyads to various properties in their poems, "following the example of pre-Islamic tribal society and its ideals", that is, without any recognizable influence from the Islamic religion. These characteristics can be described in a certain way as a classic ruler typology, which was not uncommon for monarchies of other cultures either. These characteristics include the origin of the Umayyads from the noble Quraish clans (descent from ʿAbd Manāf and Qusai etc.), then various virtues such as bravery, perseverance, honesty, loyalty, generosity. When it comes to negative judgment, they are most likely to be accused of a lack of loyalty to allies. Special emphasis is placed on the legitimacy of their rule in the succession of ʿUthmān (e.g. to be found with the court poet al-Aḫṭal). Muʿāwiya in particular is sometimes seen as the keeper of Islamic unity and the avenger of ʿUthmān. The properties attributed to Muʿāwiya partly coincide with those of the Umayyads in general, but an emphasis is placed on his righteousness and political skill. The emphasis on Muʿāwiyas as the avenger of ʿUthmān falls within the early Arabic idea that inheritance can be won through blood revenge. With reference to the poetry collections, Watt emphasizes that the Umayyads saw themselves as predestined to rule through divine legitimation. For this reason, opposition to the Umayyads was also found in Qadarism, which rejects a doctrine of predetermination.
Especially in the final phase of Umayyad rule, there are poems from the Alidic and āriǧītic sides, which deny the Umayyads (in the case of the Ḫāriǧītes also ʿAlī) the legitimation of power. If one looks at the poetry with caution, as it is often court poetry, it must be noted that during the Umayyad rule the “public” did not necessarily have a negative image of the Umayyads. To what extent the products of early poetry are of a purely propagandistic nature and whether they partly reflect the opinion of the general public of the Muslims of the Umayyad period must remain open. In any case, there are voices in oriental studies who believe that the Umayyads will only lose their reputation through Abbasid historiography.
Such a thesis could be supported by a report by the geographer al-Muqaddasi (lived in the 2nd half of the 10th century), who reported in his 985 report of an Umayyad cult in Wasit . Ende assumes that a kind of " nostalgia " for the Umayyad period had already developed in the Abbasid period .
Representations from the Abbasid period
A change in the image of the Umayyads and with it the conflict between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya occurred in the Abbasid period. Naturally, the Abbasids had to be interested in denying the Umayyads the right to rule, since their own basis of legitimacy arose from the demand that rule belonged solely to a descendant of the Hashim, the great-grandfather of the Prophet. In this respect, a large part of the historiography under the Abbasids was adapted to the prevailing doctrine and, according to today's consensus in science, justified the negative judgment of the Umayyads. The Abbasid court historiography played an important part in this, z. B. the work of Ibn Isḥāq. Nevertheless, some independent or Umayyad-friendly traditions continued to exist. The latter can be found e.g. B. at al-Balādhurī (died late 9th century). Ṭabarī (839–923) does not seem to evaluate the Umayyads as specifically negative either.
The establishment of the Sunni canon of doctrines in the course of the 9th century through the development of the Sunni schools of law became important for the further development, in particular the concept of the four rightly guided caliphs is relevant here. The concept of the four rightly guided caliphs assumes the infallibility of their actions. This judgment can be exemplified by a quote from Ahmad ibn Hanbal : “The best (khayr) according to the Prophet is Abuu Bakr, then Umar then Utman, then Ali […] According to these four, the companions of God's Messenger are the best of men. Nobody may mention their bad qualities, nor accuse any of them of any shamefulness or deficiency. ”Such a dogmatic definition of the rightly guided caliphs and their uncritability, together with the anti-Umayyad trend of Abbasid historiography, had to create a dogma that would make it effective has not failed for centuries. The negative image of the Umayyads and the portrayal of ʿAlī as one of the rightly guided caliphs subsequently remained largely consensus in the Muslims' view of history. According to Ende, the fall of the Abbasid caliphate (1258) represented a certain turning point.
With the dissolution of the Abbasid rule over the remnants of their empire in Iraq, the specific pressure to justify the currently ruling caliph was no longer applicable, and later authors no longer had to face the religious prestige that belongs to a current ruler. So wrote Ibn Tiqtaqa (d. 1309) the Umayyad represents a more positive role by establishing the Islamic state and special attention here is the connection between religion and monarchy. Likewise, the mystic ibn al-ʿArabī (1165-1240) rated the Umayyads rather positively. Ibn Ḫaldūn goes in a similar direction , who, following a cyclical historical picture of rise and fall, assigns the Umayyads an essential place in the creation of the Islamic world empire. The conflict between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya is also judged by him in favor of the latter. While Ibn Ḫaldūn and Tiqtaqa can be regarded as forerunners of the later nationalist interpretations, Ibn Taimīya (1263-1328) can be classified as a forerunner of the Wahhābītic and neo-Hanbalism mediated reassessment of Muʿāwiyas. Ibn Taimīya emphasized Muʿāwiya's rank as a companion of the prophets, taking into account that his rebellion against ʿAlī was unlawful, but assumes that al-Hasan's transfer of power to Muʿāwiya made the latter the legitimate leader of the Muslims.
In contrast, al-Maqrīzīs (1364–1442) work on the conflict between the Hashimites and Umayyads reflects the classic Sunni assessment as it remained generally anchored into the 19th century. Al-Maqrīzī also puts the later Abbasid caliphate in the foreground and evaluates the struggles of the early Islamic period as a dispute not between the ʿAlīs and the Umayyads, but the greater ahl al-bayt of the Prophet , i.e. the Hashimites .
The change in the Umayyad image in modern times
The change in the Umayyad image in modern times has several sections.
19th century
A change in the Umayyad image did not begin until the 19th century, when in the course of the conflict with western colonial rule, on the one hand, an Arab-nationalist tendency emerged, on the other hand, calls for a reinterpretation of the classic Sunni religion became louder. The latter have become known under the term Islamic modernism and are associated with names such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā (1865-1935) or Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). In the course of Islamic modernism, there was a reception of Ibn Taimīyas and his Umayyad image in Salafism at the end of the 19th century , also mediated via Wahhābīsm . For example, Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā takes from Ibn Taimīya the view that Muʿāwiya as a companion of the prophets should not fall prey to the Shiite curse, but at the same time criticizes Muʿāwiya for the introduction of the hereditary monarchy. Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā is considered to be representative of the early Islamic reformers in that he rejects an overly negative judgment of the Umayyads, but at the same time strongly criticizes the end of the šūrā government. Muḥammad al-Ḫudari (1872–1927), a student of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, presented ʿAlī as a rather narrow-minded person, not willing to compromise, whereas Muʿāwiya is seen as a pragmatic politician. Through his university contacts, Ḫudari shaped the teaching of universities in the Arab world for a long time.
The influence of Ibn Taimīya is also evident in theologians who are distant from Salafism such as Yūsuf an-Nabhāni (1849–1932) (even if he was hostile to Ibn Taimīya). For an-Nabhani, both ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya were of the opinion that they represented the correct position according to Islam. This alone justifies an-Nabhani ascribing moral qualities to them and avoiding the curse of Muʿāwiya, although he was in the wrong against Ali.
The second important source for a revision of the traditional view of history was characterized by Arab nationalism and a rampant secularism , both influenced by European models. This can partly be traced back to Ibn Ḫaldūn's interpretation of the Umayyads as a stabilizer of the Islamic-Arab Empire. The influence of Ibn nsaldūn can be found e.g. B. in Ǧamīl al-Mudawwar (1862-1907). Another point is the spread of western oriental studies in the Arab world, especially French histories from the Umayyad and Abbasid periods. It should be noted that both currents are by no means to be viewed completely separately from each other, but can be seen in their view of the Umayyad period and ʿAlī interactions on a large scale.
An example of the change from reformist to secular nationalist view of history is in Ende (1977) Mustafa Nagib (1861–1901), an Egyptian official who was part of the nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk . Nagib rated the Umayyads as "defenders of Islam". Nagib regards the conflict between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya as a battle between two religiously led persons who should not be condemned because of this religious leadership. He also considers the Umayyad dynasty founded by Muʿāwiya to be the just ruler of early Islam.
Rafīq Bey al-ʿAzm (1865–1925), a well-known Riḍās and reform-oriented politician who worked towards a more decentralized administration of the parts of the empire in the Ottoman Empire, rated Muʿāwiya in his work published in 1903 as a companion of the Prophet, who was not criticized because of this status may. What is significant about his approach is that he regards the conflict between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya as an entirely secular power conflict. However, ʿAzm condemns Muʿāwiya for his establishment of the hereditary monarchy. It is particularly noteworthy that ʿAzm wanted to detach religious interpretation from historiography.
According to Ende, the work Ǧurǧī Zaidāns (1861–1914), published 1902–1906, represents a further step towards a secularization of the historical image . In contrast to ʿAzm, however, Zaidān evaluates Muʿāwiya's takeover of power negatively - on the basis of traditional sources - as being purely guided by power interests "Recovering the rule that (the Umayyads) held in the age of Jāhilīya ". Zaidān's work was very popular in the Islamic world of his time. A lively debate ensued against Zaidān's view, in which Riḍā, al-ʿAzm and Sibli an-Numani (1858–1914) took part. ʿAzm sees the traditional sources of the Abbasid period overrepresented in Zaidān's work and emphasizes the cultural achievement of the Umayyads for Islamic civilization, but both Zaidān and ʿAzm emphasize that they are by no means guided by religious motivation. Ende sees this conflict as particularly momentous because two historians negotiated a historical topic on a secular basis.
20th century
Muḥammad Ḥusain Haikal (1888–1956), later Egyptian minister of education, can be classified in a similar secular direction , who sees historiography as the goal of better classifying what is happening in the present. Rašīd Riḍā criticized Zaidān's work because, in his opinion, he only used the methods of Western science (which he rates positively), but as a Christian without religious training he lacked the necessary knowledge base to properly classify the sources. Riā also criticized the fact that the work put the national cause of the Arabs against the Ottomans at a disadvantage. For Ende this point is crucial, since Riḍā as well as ʿAzm took a political position for the self-government of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire at this time. Thus, the criticism would have to be assessed partly as nationalist-political. Riā's acquaintance, the Indian religious scholar an-Numani , continues, who accuses Zaidān of complete violation of neutrality and emphasizes the work of the Umayyads for the further development of the Arabs and Islam. Numani sticks to the view that the rightly guided caliphs are to be assessed far more positively than the Umayyad caliphs. This discussion clearly shows the extent to which the nationalist movement and reform Islam were linked at the time and how the interaction of the two currents and their interests was reflected in the assessment of the early Islamic period.
The Copt Salāma Mūsā (1889–1958) took clearly nationalist positions . Mūsā emphasizes that it is irrelevant to Egyptian history whether ʿAlī and Muawiya quarreled. The influence of the Arabs had rather harmed Egyptian culture, also from a racist point of view.
A second phase of the targeted westernization of historical studies began in the 1920s, with the writer and historian Tāhā Husain (1889–1973) in a prominent position . In debates that followed various negative evaluations of the first centuries of Islamic history, Ḥusain referred in particular to Ibn Ḫaldūn as a neutral evaluator of history. Ḥusain emphasizes that he is opposed to a religious valuation of history and calls for a neutral writing of history that ignores neither the light nor the dark side.
Another important voice of the 1920s is Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876–1953), Syrian Minister of Education and founder of the Arab Academy in Damascus, who praised the Umayyads for their achievements in Arab culture and their rulership and at the same time their importance for the development of the Arab world Civilization praises, so a clear nationalistic commitment. Kurd Ali was heavily influenced by the works of Western orientalists. He judged Muʿāwiya that he had ruled comparable to the rightly guided caliphs.
The Salafist movement , which emerged from Neo-Hanbalism , shaped the image of the Umayyads and ʿAlī. Tāhir al-Jazā'irī (1851 / 2-1920), a friend of Riḍās and al-ʿAzm, who led a kind of intellectual circle in Damascus, is significant here . Al-Jazā'irī was in many ways a focal point in the reception of the Umayyads in the 20th century. One of his students was Muḥammad al-Din al-Ḫatib (1886–1969), an influential publicist and friend of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Ḫatib is indicative of the support of the Umayyads in large parts of later Salafism. He also counts Muīāwiya, following Ibn Taimīya, among the companions of the prophets and one of the most important Muslims after the rightly guided caliphs. Al-Ḫatib assumes a falsification of the early tradition and accordingly applies a strict methodical format to the early sources. Ende sees his al-Ḫatibs position particularly under the impression of al-Ḫatib's support for the Egyptian king. (Late 1977)
Shaiḫ Muḥammad al-Ġazzālī (1917-1996), a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was particularly critical of the succession of Yazīd , as it had destroyed the principle of šūrā. He represents the anti-monarchist stance within the Muslim Brotherhood that finally prevailed. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) was originally influenced by al-Ḫatib. However, like Saiyid Quṭb (1906–66), she was critical of Muʿāwiya because of his abolition of the šūrā principle. In 1970, Salah ad-Din al-Muna gebid (born 1920) assumed that the Umayyads were still shaped by the traditional doctrine of the Abbasid period in the second half of the 20th century. Al-Munaǧǧid particularly complains about the falsification of history from the Abbasid period.
Web links
- The war for Muslim minds: an interview with Gilles Kepel . opendemocracy.net, November 11, 2004, accessed May 4, 2016.
- Fitna. Guerre au coeur de l'islam . Interview with Gilles Kepel in: El Watan Newspaper , September 7, 2004, accessed on May 4, 2016 (French).
literature
- Ende, Werner (1977). The Umayyads as Judged by 20th Century Arab Authors. Beirut: Arab Nation and History.
- Haarmann, Ulrich et al. (2004). History of the arab world. Munich: CH Beck. DNB 960410856
- Halm, Heinz (2005). The Shiites. Munich: CH Beck. DNB 1063969522
- Krämer, Gudrun (2005). History of islam. Munich: CH Beck. DNB 984322728
- Madelung, Wilferd (1997). The succession to Muhammad A study of the early Caliphate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nadler, Rajaa (1990). The Umayyad Caliphs in the mirror of their contemporary poets. Erlangen-Nuremberg. DNB 910264023
- Nagel, Tilman (2008). Mohammed life and legend. Munich: Oldenbourg. DNB 986981680
- Rotter, Gernot (1982). The Umayyads and the Second Civil War (680-692). Wiesbaden: DMG. DNB 820079758
- Veccia-Vaglieri, L. in Holt, PM (1970). The Cambridge History of Islam Volume I The Central Islamic Lands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Watt, William M. (1985). Islam II Political Developments and Theological Concepts. Translation of the first edition 1973. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. DNB 840299591
Individual evidence
- ^ Role of Muhammad
- ↑ s. Madelung, 1997, p. 139; Veccia-Vaglieri in Cambridge History of Islam, 1970
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, pp. 112-3
- ^ Veccia-Vaglieri in Cambridge History, 1970
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 133
- ↑ Rotter, 1982, p. 18
- ^ Veccia-Vaglieri in Cambridge History of Islam, 1970
- ↑ Rotter, 1982
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 111
- ^ S. for the discussion of ʿUthmān's letter: Madelung, 1997, pp. 126–7
- ↑ Madelung, p. 141
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 141
- ↑ Madelung, p. 141
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 158
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, pp. 147, 157
- ↑ Nagel, 2008, p. 615
- ^ Nagel, 2008
- ↑ Madelung, p. 153
- ↑ Madelung, p. 157
- ↑ Madelung, p. 158
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 159; Madelung assumes diplomatic contact between Muʿāwiya and az-Zubair, in which Muʿāwiya az-Zubair promised recognition as a caliph.
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 157
- ↑ Madelung, p. 165
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, pp. 179-80
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 184
- ^ Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1963
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 238
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 239
- ^ "His [ʿAlīs] acceptance of the arbitration proposal, in contrast, was a serious and unjustifiable political blunder. He could have arranged a simple military truce with Muʿāwiya […] the principle of arbitration […] handed Muʿāwiya a moral victory even before it caused the disastrous split in the ranks of ʿAlī's men. "(Madelung, 1997, p. 245)
- ↑ z. B. Madelung, 1997, pp. 254-5; Encyclopedia of Islam, 1963
- ↑ Madelung, 1977, p. 255
- ↑ Madelung, 1997, p. 257
- ↑ Rotter, 1982; Watt, 1985, p. 73; Rohe, Mathias 2009: Islamic Law. Munich: CH Beck.
- ^ Rohe, p. 138
- ↑ Rotter, 1982
- ↑ Rotter, 1982
- ↑ Madelung, 1977, p. 253
- ↑ Madelung, 1977, pp. 260-1
- ↑ slaughter of Nahrawan (University of Freiburg Islamwissenschaft)
- ^ Nagel, 2008
- ↑ Madelung, 1977, pp. 255, 283-5
- ↑ Cambridge History, 1970
- ↑ "The purpose was to undermine ʿAlī's reign by terrorizing and intimidating his subjects in concert with his campaign of bribery among the tribal chief's in ʿAlī's army." (Madelung, 1997, p. 287)
- ^ Noth, in Haarmann, 2004, p. 91
- ^ Noth, in Haarmann, 2004, p. 91
- ↑ Noth, in Haarmann, 2004, p. 95
- ^ Veccia-Vaglieri, in Cambridge History of Islam, 1970
- ^ Cambridge Encyclopedia, 1970
- ↑ Cambridge Encyclopedia of Islam, 1970
- ↑ Nagel, 2008, p. 601
- ↑ Krämer, 2005, p. 37
- ↑ Noth, in Haarmann, 2005, pp. 88–9
- ^ Radler, 1990, p. IV
- ^ Radler, 1990, p. 32
- ↑ Watt, 1985, p. 73
- ↑ Watt, 1985, pp. 75-80
- ↑ end of 1977
- ↑ End, 1977, p. 16
- ↑ Watt, 1985, p. 292
- ↑ end of 1977
- ↑ See general end, 1977, on which the following paragraph is based
- ↑ End, 1977, p. 32
- ↑ End, 1977, p. 27
- ↑ end of 1977
- ↑ End, 1977, p. 37
- ↑ End, 1977, p. 40
- ↑ Ende, 1977, pp. 41-2
- ↑ Ende, 1977, pp. 46-7
- ↑ end of 1977