Berlin crisis

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M48 tanks of the United States Armed Forces: the American sector ends between the tanks and the people in the foreground.

The Berlin crisis , also known as the second Berlin crisis , began on November 27, 1958, when the Soviet Union under Nikita S. Khrushchev sent a note to the three western occupying powers of Berlin, the USA , Great Britain and France . The note announced that the Soviet Union would transfer control of the connecting routes between West Germany and West Berlin to the GDR if an allied agreement was not reached within six months that would transform West Berlin into a Free City . This note linked the Berlin , Germany and disarmament issues ; it is known as the Khrushchev ultimatum or Berlin ultimatum .

prehistory

The basis for this note was the cancellation of the four-power status for Berlin and Germany as a whole by the Soviet Union. Two weeks earlier, on November 10, 1958, Khrushchev gave a speech at the Moscow Sports Palace in which he claimed:

“The imperialists have made the German question a constant source of international tension [...]. It has to be said frankly that militarism in West Germany has not only not been eliminated, but on the contrary is raising its head higher and higher [...] Speeches by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss , the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr and various maneuvers point to a clear one political trend of the ruling circles in West Germany [...]. Obviously the time has come for the powers that signed the Potsdam Agreement to renounce the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin and thus give the opportunity to create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union for its part will transfer all functions in Berlin that are still incumbent on Soviet organs to the sovereign German Democratic Republic. "

- Nikita S. Khrushchev : Speech on November 10, 1958 in the Moscow Sports Palace

Note and reaction of the western powers

In the note, the Soviet leadership called for West Berlin to be transformed into an “independent political entity” into a so-called Free City , which should be demilitarized. It insisted on the withdrawal of the troops of the Western Allies from West Berlin and thus formulated the three-state theory .

The Soviet note put the US in a dilemma. If the US gives in, it will jeopardize its prestige as a regulatory power in Europe. However, a new Berlin blockade was looming if the US administration stood firm. In this case, the government under President Eisenhower had already decided in 1954 to counter a new Berlin blockade with limited military means instead of an airlift. Smaller armed convoys should try to break through. If the blockade persists, the US government wanted to threaten a nuclear strike. However, the US government decided not to use the military option. At a conference in Paris on December 14, 1958 , the foreign ministers of the three Western powers France , the United Kingdom and the USA as well as the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirmed their determination to protect their rights in Berlin.

On December 16, 1958, the foreign ministers of the NATO states once again declared that Berlin (West) belonged to the protection area of ​​the NATO alliance. Two days later, the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) protested in Paris against the ultimate threat from the Soviet Union on the Berlin question .

In a note to the Soviet Union on January 5, 1959, the Adenauer III cabinet rejected the establishment of a “Free City of West Berlin” and the recognition of the GDR and a confederation of the two German states. The Soviet Union then presented a draft peace treaty with Germany on January 10th . Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano immediately rejected this proposal, calling on the 29 participating states of the war against Germany as well as the Federal Republic and the GDR to convene a peace conference with German participation within two months.

From May to August 1959, the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers met in Geneva for a “ Germany Conference ”. Delegations from the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic participated as observers. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower described respect for the rights and duties of the Western powers in Berlin as a minimum requirement for his participation in a summit conference with the Soviet Union.

In May 1959, the Soviet Union strengthened its negotiating position with the secret stationing of nuclear-armed R-5M missiles in Vogelsang and Fürstenberg / Havel . After Eisenhower had bilateral negotiations with Khrushchev, they were withdrawn in August 1959.

On September 8, 1959, Berlin's governing mayor , Willy Brandt ( SPD ), named four principles of German Berlin policy:

  • Berlin (West) belongs to the free part of Germany.
  • The Berliners' right to self-determination must not be curtailed.
  • Four powers responsibility in and for Berlin;
  • Right to free access to Berlin.

As a military reaction, the Western allies founded the secret organization Live Oak , whose task it was to plan countermeasures in the event of new Soviet obstacles on the transit routes. It existed until October 2, 1990.

New demands

Khrushchev responded in January 1959 by demanding that a peace treaty be concluded with all of Germany. At the same time, NATO should give way to a pan-European security system to which Germany could join. In March of the same year, the Soviet Union threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and transfer state sovereignty to it if the demands were not met within six months, so that it would have control of all traffic routes to West Berlin. This was intended to try to stop the movement of refugees from east to west via West Berlin. In addition, the Soviet Union threatened a war in which all Warsaw Pact states would participate. The reaction of the three Western powers and the Governing Mayor Brandt was resolute rejection, so that the ultimatum expired after six months without any results.

At his first meeting with the new US President John F. Kennedy on June 3 and 4, 1961 in Vienna, Khrushchev renewed the Berlin ultimatum. Kennedy countered in a radio and television address on July 25, 1961 with the Three Essentials , the three indispensable principles:

  1. the inviolable right of the Western powers to be present in their respective sectors of West Berlin
  2. the right of access of the western powers to the former imperial capital Berlin
  3. the safeguarding of the security and the rights of the citizens of West Berlin by the Western occupying powers.

The Three Essentials were secured in June 1972 with the entry into force of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin .

consequences

Confrontation between Soviet and American tanks on October 27, 1961

Since the Soviet Union had to reckon with the use of nuclear weapons if it violated the Allies in West Berlin, it changed its approach. At the beginning of August 1961, the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact took note of the proposal by the SED leadership and the Soviet Union to seal off West Berlin. On August 13, 1961, the Wall was built in the hope of persuading the Western powers to make concessions. As a result of this attempt to restrict allied rights of the Western powers in Berlin, on October 27, 1961, Soviet and American tanks stood ready to fight at " Checkpoint Charlie ". Today we know that the commanders on both sides had orders to use their tanks if necessary. In November 1961, the US responded to the recent Berlin crisis with Operation Stair Step . Over 200 fighter planes were relocated from the United States via Canada and the Azores to France and did not return to the United States until August 1962. The Cuba crisis followed , and in the Berlin crisis there was no progress in resolving the conflicting positions. Until the beginning of September 1963 there were still disruptions to the Allied access to Berlin, but today the end of the Berlin crisis is given as 1962.

See also

Web links

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Dieter Krüger, On the Abyss? The Age of Alliances: North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact 1947 to 1991. Fulda 2013, p. 69 f.
  2. ↑ a b Cf. Dieter Krüger, Am Abgrund? The Age of Alliances: North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact 1947 to 1991 , Fulda 2013, p. 69.
  3. ↑ The foreign ministers at that time were Maurice Couve de Murville (F), Selwyn Lloyd (GB), John Foster Dulles (USA) and Heinrich von Brentano (D).
  4. ^ Matthias Uhl : Stalin's V-2. The technology transfer of German remote control weapon technology to the USSR and the development of the Soviet missile industry 1945 to 1959 , Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn 2001, ISBN 978-3-7637-6214-9 , pp. 236–241.
  5. ↑ a b Cf. Dieter Krüger, Am Abgrund? The Age of Alliances: North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact 1947 to 1991 , Fulda 2013, p. 70.
  6. ↑ Cf. Dieter Krüger, Am Abgrund? The Age of Alliances: North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact 1947 to 1991 , Fulda 2013, p. 71.