Dalehurst railway accident
The railway accident Dalehurst was the head-on collision of a freight train with a passenger on the transcontinental route of the Canadian National Railway (CN) in Canada on February 8, 1986, near Hinton , Alberta . 23 people died.
Starting position
Infrastructure
The transcontinental route of the CN is developed differently: There are single-track and double-track sections . The traffic on the line was controlled in this section from a central signal box in Edmonton . There was a dependency between points and signals , but there was no train control .
Passenger train
Long-distance train No. 4 of the Via Rail (VIA) was traveling east from the Pacific coast. It consisted of two train parts , the Super Continental from Vancouver and the Skeena from Prince Rupert . These had been united in Jasper . The train thus comprised a total of 3 locomotives and 11 cars . 115 people were on the train, 94 of them travelers . The train was led by two diesel locomotives , at the top the number 6566 of the FP7A series , followed by the number 6633 of the F9B series. The locomotives were followed by a baggage car , an open seating car , a viewing car and two sleeping cars . This was followed by the second part of the train. This consisted of the inactive, carried locomotive of the FP9A No. 6300 series, a generator car, a baggage car, a passenger car , a viewing car, a sleeping car and another generator car.
freight train
The CN freight train No. 413 was heading west. It consisted of 118 vehicles: First three locomotives, EMD GP38-2W No. 5586 and the two. EMD SD40 with numbers 5062 and 5104. At the 5586 at the head of the procession were the locomotive engineer and a Beimann . The locomotive had a relatively simple dead man's mechanism , a pedal that the engine driver had to press down with his foot. If this was not the case, an emergency brake was applied . The facility had to be bridged by the engine driver placing a heavy object on the pedal. The following locomotives, No. 5062 and 5104, had the more modern dead man's device, in which the locomotive driver had to press and release the button at certain intervals. No. 5586, however, had the more comfortable driver's cab and there was an agreement with the trade union responsible to always put the locomotive with the more comfortable driver's cab at the head of the train in the case of multiple traction. The 114 freight cars that followed had mostly pipelines and bulk cargo loaded, including sulfur . At the end of the train a freight train escort car ran , which was manned by a train driver . The train was 1.8 km long and weighed just under 13,000 tons . When the train reached the Hargwen transfer point , where a single-track section of the line changed into a double-track section, it was directed from the central signal box in Edmonton to the northern track. A little later, the central signal box set the switch at the end of the double-track section at Dalehurst for VIA train No. 4 on the southern track , so that the signal for the oncoming freight train on the northern track indicated "stop". The transfer point was not secured by a protective switch .
The locomotive driver of the freight train had health problems: he was an alcoholic and chain smoker , suffered from pancreatitis and diabetes .
the accident
The freight train traveled the northern track at 95 km / h at a speed that was higher than the maximum speed of 80 km / h permitted here . The distant signal in front of the Dalehurst operation point showed "expect stop". However, the engine driver did not brake. Also, contrary to the regulations, the position of the distant signal was not mutually confirmed by the engine driver and the train driver at the end of the train. The engine driver also passed the following main signal without reducing speed. Due to the lack of train control, the train protection did not intervene either. The train pulled open the dull switch and drove into the single-track section. Immediately afterwards, at around 8:40 a.m., it collided with oncoming VIA train No. 4.
consequences
Immediate consequences
23 people died and a further 71 people were injured. Among the dead were the four-man personnel from the two leading locomotives. Of the 36 passengers who were currently in the open-plan car, 18 were killed.
All seven vehicles in the front section of the VIA train derailed . Leaking diesel fuel ignited and set the two locomotives and the first two cars of the passenger train on fire. The observation car was badly damaged by an impacting freight car, and the following two sleeping cars tipped over.
Many of the freight train's wagons also derailed. Its three locomotives and 76 freight cars were destroyed or badly damaged. The sulfur , which in some cases caught fire, developed sulfur dioxide vapors, which considerably hindered the rescue work.
Accident investigation
The autopsy of the body of the locomotive driver of the freight train revealed that he was neither under the influence of alcohol nor drugs .
An investigative commission of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta heard 150 witnesses in 56 days and published an investigation report on January 22, 1987, which came to the conclusion that an operating culture had developed among the railway workers that was extremely lax with safety regulations. The train driver did not intervene because of the excessive speed, nor when the distant signal showing "expect stop" was passed without reducing the speed. He should have triggered an emergency braking according to regulations . Also - contrary to the regulations, albeit without any influence on the actual accident - no brake test was carried out during the last change of personnel before the accident , because it had become common practice that the team to be relieved simply left the slow moving train and the relieving team jumped up. The commission of inquiry also criticized the fact that it was not the locomotive with the safest dead man's equipment that was put at the top, but the one with the most comfortable driver's cab. The investigation could not explain why the locomotive crew of the freight train ignored the signals in front of Dalehurst. The specific cause of the accident remained unclear.
See also
literature
- Peter WB Semmens: Disasters on the rails. A worldwide documentation. Transpress, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-344-71030-3 .
Web links
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g Report of the investigation committee. ( PDF ) Library and Archives Canada, accessed July 17, 2017 .
- ↑ a b List of the Hinton City Archives. Retrieved July 17, 2017 (English).
- ^ A b Peter WB Semmens: Catastrophes on rails. A worldwide documentation. Transpress, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-344-71030-3 , p. 210.
- ^ Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration. Retrieved July 17, 2017 (English).
Coordinates: 53 ° 28 ′ 39.2 " N , 117 ° 24 ′ 47.9" W.