Expanded mind
The extended mind (ger .: Extended Mind ) is the philosophical and cognitive science theory is that cognitive architecture and thus cognitive processes and states extend beyond the body's borders in the world. This thesis was advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in 1998 in the essay The Extended Mind . In English, the thesis of the expanded mind is also referred to as wide computationalism or environmentalism .
The active externalism (ger .: active externalism ) or vehicle externalism (ger .: vehicle externalism ) is a consequence of the theory of the extended mind, which was not initially distinguished from Clark and Chalmers from this, But unlike her to the Content of a mental phenomenon.
Definition
Based on Hilary Putnam , Clark and Chalmers summarize the thesis of the expanded spirit as follows:
- Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers : The Extended Mind
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In doing so, they are primarily against the localization of internalism . According to this, mental phenomena take place in the brain of the subject who has these phenomena. Advocates of the expanded spirit, on the other hand, claim that cognitive systems can extend over the entire body of the being and also into the environment, as long as external components have a suitable coupling with the core system. On the other hand, this is usually associated with the assertion that such couplings actually exist in the world and that there is therefore also external cognition. This would extend, for example, from the cognitive core system, at least temporarily, into the body of the being, (technical) aids or social communities.
Clark and Chalmers do not claim, however, that this thesis corresponds to common sense . Therefore, the expanded mind should not be an analysis of our current concept of cognition. Rather, it is about the demand that cognition should not be viewed only as an internal phenomenon. In this way, depending on the purpose of the explanation, deeper, uniform and more useful explanations could come about.
In the English-language debate, Andy Clark , Susan Hurley , Richard Menary , Mark Rowlands , Michael Wheeler , Robert A. Wilson and Alva Noë are among the main exponents of the enlarged mind, but David Chalmers also makes a point in the foreword to Clark's book Supersizing the Mind (2008 ) positive towards the thesis. Above all, Frederick Adams , Kenneth Aizawa and Robert Rupert can be named as critics .
In the German-speaking area, however, there is still no intensive discussion about the thesis of the expanded spirit. Exceptions are the philosophers Holger Lyre and Sven Walter .
The principle of parity
In the article The Extended Mind , Clark and Chalmers set out the following principle, which has since been called the parity principle :
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The Parity Principle :
- Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers : The Extended Mind
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The parity principle :
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According to the parity principle, it is not the body boundary that is decisive when it comes to whether a process is cognitive. Rather, it is about the function of a process. Thus, the parity principle is a functionalist principle.
The parity principle as such does not yet represent an argument for the expanded spirit, but already presupposes the logical possibility. To most critics, it does not seem unthinkable in principle that cognitive processes can extend beyond the boundaries of the central nervous system . The following example shows that this is possible in theory. So says Daniel C. Dennett in his 1978 essay, Where Am I? a hypothetical story about his brain being taken out of his head and reconnected to the body. This would at least be about cognition outside the body, as most critics of the expanded mind would have to admit. However, this is only a theoretical possibility.
If, on the other hand, it is to be concluded from the parity principle that cognition actually sometimes extends into the world, at least one external process is required which, if it were in the body of a being, would be a cognitive process of that being. The question of whether or not such a process can be found in the world divides the critics and proponents of the expanded spirit.
For example, Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa claim that the psychological and functional differences between internal and external processes are too fundamental to ever apply the parity principle.
Evolutionary argument
According to Mark Rowlands , an evolutionary view seems to show that there are processes that meet the requirements of the parity principle :
It would therefore be plausible to assume that in the course of evolution in some beings mechanisms have developed that are aimed at changing the environment in such a way that the body of this being itself has to perform less. Examples include spiders and their webs, beavers and their dams, and of course people and their artifacts. Mark Rowlands formulates this principle as follows:
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The Barking Dog Principle :
- Mark Rowlands : Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again
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The principle of the barking dog :
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If this principle applies, it can also be assumed that organisms have developed in evolution that outsource the cognitive architecture to the environment in this way and thus use an effective hybrid combination of internal and external processes to cope with cognitive tasks. However, this would only be an argument in favor of external cognition if we defined cognitive processes as those that help living beings in solving certain tasks. However, such a definition is not necessarily correct.
External states
The following states come into question as external cognitive states:
Beliefs
The classic example of external mental states are beliefs. This is how Clark and Chalmers describe the fictional Alzheimer's disease Otto who uses a notebook as an external memory. Otto writes new information in his notebook about how healthy people store new information in the brain . Analogous to the neural process of remembering, Otto can, if necessary, obtain information from his notebook and process it further. For example, if he wants to go to the Museum of Modern Art , Otto consults his notebook, in which he entered the address beforehand.
To the obvious objection that Otto initially only has the conviction that the desired information can be found in the notebook, Clark replies that this would make the explanation unnecessarily complicated, since otherwise one could only assume that healthy people are initially only convinced that the the information they need is stored in their brain .
Wishes
But not only beliefs but also desires are considered by representatives of the expanded mind as external states. For example, David Chalmers writes in the foreword to Andy Clark's book Supersizing the Mind that he uses his iPhone to remember his favorite dishes in a certain restaurant. For him, the notes in the mobile phone would play the same role as neural wishes would otherwise.
State carrier
External memories such as notebooks or memory triggers such as knots in handkerchiefs have already been suggested as external intentional states. Another question is whether only changes in the environment made by the cognitive being or whether things in the environment that exist without the actions of the being, such as landmarks or books, can be external cognitive states.
It is also interesting to consider that in certain cases the cognitive states of one being could also be extended to other beings. This would be the case, for example, if Otto always calls his wife if he needs information that he has forgotten due to his illness or if the waiters in certain restaurants remembered which dishes David Chalmers particularly liked.
External processes
External cognitive processes are - according to Mark Rowlands - action loops which are necessary for the execution of cognitive tasks and which contain the manipulation of external information-carrying structures.
Memorize something and remember something
If there are external desires and beliefs, these must be outsourced by the cognitive being to the environment and, if necessary, read out of it. This outsourcing is consequently an external process of memorizing something. Reading out, on the other hand, is a process of remembering, which consists, for example, in the cognitive being concerned looking up the calendar to find out what their plans are or looking for a certain noticeable landmark in order to find the right way.
Solve problem
Another type of external mental process is problem solving. This is characterized by the fact that manipulating the environment creates new desires or beliefs. It is about epistemic (as opposed to pragmatic ) actions, the goal of which is new knowledge or wishes.
The best known example of such epistemic acts is the video game Tetris , with which Clark and Chalmers introduce the thesis of the expanded mind. So they claim that the internal trial rotation of the stones in the head, the external rotation by pressing buttons, and the internal rotation by a neural implant are equivalent epistemic actions. These should therefore all be viewed as cognitive processes. This example was preceded by research by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio , who found in experiments with Tetris that many rotations are not targeted, but rather epistemic in character. This leads to the definition of an epistemic act, the primary function of which is to improve cognition through the following factors:
- Reduction of the memory required for mental computation (complexity of the room)
- Reduction of the steps required to perform a mental calculation (time complexity)
- Reduction of the risk of errors in mental calculations (unreliability)
Further examples of epistemic action are written arithmetic or rearrangement of the letters in Scrabble .
Perceive
Perception is also seen by some representatives of the expanded mind as an external process. However, this approach has less to do with manipulating the environment than with epistemic action. The chain of perception , as a model of perception, includes the elements of stimulus, transduction, processing, perception and recognition as well as the element of action.
This can be found in visual perception, for example, in the permanent saccades , which manage to create the impression through many different fixations that we are always consciously perceiving a complete image, although we can actually fixate only a small part of the scene surrounding us.
Consequences
The thesis of the expanded mind has far-reaching consequences:
External awareness
The relationship between consciousness and external mental states is unclear . So it seems possible to have consciousness outside the body as long as the brain is outside the body. This would be the case, for example, if some parts or the entire central nervous system were removed from the body and reconnected to it. In fact, however, many representatives of the expanded mind locate phenomenal consciousness exclusively in the brain and thus see external processes and states as unconscious from the outset. In contrast, Alva Noë and J. Kevin O'Regan , among others, propose the thesis that coupling the cognitive system with the outside world leads to external awareness .
This seems possible, for example, if - above all phenomenal - consciousness could be explained in a purely functionalist manner . If this were the case, then the parity principle could also be applied here and consciousness processes in the environment would at least not be ruled out. Whether a purely functionalist explanation of consciousness is possible, however, is highly controversial.
In parapsychology , too, there are theses that are similar to the expanded mind. For example, Rupert Sheldrake claims with the idea of morphic fields that the consciousness of a being cannot only be localized in its body. In this way he hopes to be able to explain various phenomena, such as telepathy .
New frontier of cognition
Since the expanded mind rejects the limit of the body as the limit of the mind, conditions are needed to determine when external processes and states are cognitive. One criterion is the parity principle, which demands that processes which, if they were to take place in the body, would clearly be cognitive, are also cognitive outside the body.
Clark and Chalmers set the following conditions for external beliefs:
- The information must be constant and easily accessible.
- The information must have been processed before.
- Information recorded must be approved immediately.
Neither these conditions nor the principle of parity seem to establish clear rules as to whether a state is cognitive or not. So it seems that the expanded mind includes a blurred boundary of the mental.
This has been criticized by critics who believe that a clear definition of the term “cognition” is needed. They believe that the representatives of the expanded mind can only show that cognition can also be external once they have defined the term “cognition”.
Do people extend into the environment?
Another consequence of the expanded mind seems to be that, along with cognitive processes and states, people also extend beyond the body into the world. If the thesis of the expanded mind is true, one steals memories from an Alzheimer's patient if one takes away his notepad. Natural cognitive beings should therefore no longer be viewed as purely biological, but as a combination of biological and external components. Obviously , this seems to have social , moral, and legal consequences. For example, when it comes to changing organizers , calculators or other people's notepads, or even just searching through them.
Another implication of the expanded mind is that the beings themselves can no longer be clearly distinguished from the rest of the world due to a blurred boundary of the mental. It is also possible that the cognitive architectures and states of different beings overlap or that, from a legal point of view, the cognitive architecture of one being belongs to another. This would be the case, for example, if, in the course of neuro-enhancement, the brain could directly access knowledge databases.
Relation to other theories
The thesis of the expanded mind has a special relationship to the following theories:
Externalism
The logical consequence of the expanded mind is active externalism or vehicle externalism. While externalism claims that the mental states of a system do not only depend on the internal states of this system, the thesis of active externalism can be expressed as follows:
- Active externalism : The content of a mental state of a system S depends not only on the internal states of S, but also on the environment of S, in such a way that this variation of the content can have a fundamental behavioral relevance for S.
In this way, active externalism differs from the semantic externalism attributed in particular to Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge , since the difference in the mental content does not bring about any change in the behavior of a system. Active externalism also makes a claim about the location of a mental phenomenon, while semantic externalism only makes a claim about the content of such a phenomenon.
Both variants of externalism have in common that they are directed against internalism .
This can be seen, among other things, from the fact that a twin- earth thought experiment can be made for both variants , in which the inner factors of a being remain the same, but the mental content changes:
While in semantic externalism, for example, the composition of water differs and thoughts about water no longer relate to H 2 O, in active externalism the difference would be an entry in the notebook of Otto, who has Alzheimer's disease. This entry could ensure, for example, that Otto no longer has the true belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street, but that it is on 51st Street.
Despite all the differences, both theories are compatible. There is nothing against intentional states outside of the brain, which are also individuated externally.
functionalism
The parity principle - like functionalism - makes use of the argument that mental states can be realized multiple times . So it is not important how or where exactly mental phenomena are realized as long as their function remains the same. Because of this similarity, the following connection seems at least plausible:
- If functionalism is true, then the principle of parity also applies.
This could have two types of consequences. As an advocate of functionalism, one could see the parity principle as a logical consequence of functionalism and thus try to make the expanded spirit at least plausible as a possibility. On the other hand, critics of functionalism could point out the parity principle as an unintuitive weak point of functionalism and thus find an argument against it.
Whether external processes can have the same function as internal processes depends above all on how the input and output of the functions are determined. For example, we can look at Otto, who has Alzheimer's disease and uses his notepad as an external memory , in two different ways:
- On the one hand, we can say that he receives an invitation to the Museum of Modern Art as input and, as a result of this invitation, runs to the museum. In such a way of looking at things, the notepad in which he looks to find out the location of the museum plays the same role as the brain would play in others.
- On the other hand, we can also consider individual acoustic , visual and tactile signals to the brain as input and signals to the muscles as output. From this point of view, the notepad clearly has a different function than neural mental states would have, since it is not in the system but must first be perceived.
This limit of perception and action appears to be the greatest threat to the thesis of the expanded mind, even for Chalmers.
New artificial intelligence
The expanded mind is also associated with recent developments in cognitive science . In particular, the embodiment thesis, the closely related enactivism and dynamicism , which understands cognitive systems as a certain class of dynamic systems , seem to ensure that the intuitive boundary between the cognitive system and the outside world no longer seems to be clearly defined . Above all, these theories reflect the idea that cognitive systems are situated and have complex interactions with the environment. This is necessary for the expanded mind, since only embodied systems interacting with the environment have causal contact with external factors in order to be able to use them for their own functions.
The other way around it can be said that embodiment and also enactivism do not necessarily have to go hand in hand with the expanded mind, since these are initially only theories about causal and not mereological relationships. Even dynamicism does not necessarily contain the correctness of the expanded mind.
The expanded mind is compatible with both connectionism and classical artificial intelligence .
criticism
The main critics of the thesis of the expanded mind are Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, who show potential problems with this thesis in their book The Bounds of Cognition , published in 2008 .
The coupling-constitution fallacy
In doing so, they assume the representatives of the expanded spirit to assume the following fallacy :
- Coupling constitution fallacy: The process or state x is coupled to the cognitive system S, so x is part of S.
So a process or a state that is strongly linked to a cognitive system is not necessarily constitutive for that system. For the external states that are considered cognitive for the representatives of the expanded mind, according to Adams and Aizawa, there is a strong causal relationship to cognitive systems, but this does not mean that they should be viewed as cognitive.
Lack of intrinsic content
Furthermore, critics claim that external states lack intrinsic content, an important key characteristic of the mental . For example, with candidates for external cognition, language is often the carrier of meaning. This apparently gets its meaning through public use and social practice. The meaning of words and sentences would therefore not be intrinsic. According to Adams and Aizawa, the same applies to other external conditions. So they write:
- Adams and Aizawa : The bounds of cognition
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Even if it is logically and nomologically possible that external states have intrinsic content, according to Adams and Aizawa this seems contingently not to be the case. Since intrinsic content is a characteristic of the cognitive, there are no external cognitive processes and states.
This criticism is open to attack in many places. For one thing, it is not clear what intrinsic content is supposed to be. Furthermore, the claim that this can occur in the brain and only in the brain seems to be unfounded. Finally, of course, the question arises whether intrinsic content is really necessary for cognitive states.
Cognition tied to the nervous system
A similar objection to that of intrinsic content is also raised by Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa. From the fact that we have only found cognition in nervous systems so far, they deduce that cognition only takes place in these. A cognitive system that extends beyond the limits of the nervous system is therefore not possible. This criticism is therefore an empirically justified rejection of the thesis of multiple feasibility .
Low connection bandwidth
Another objection that Clark and Chalmers address in The extended Mind is that external states cannot be attributed to the cognitive system because they are less accessible than internal states. An analogy makes this objection clear. So we would have little problem counting the contents of an external data storage device as part of the computer's contents , as long as this access is almost as fast. The situation is different, however, if we wanted to free up the memory of a computer by printing the contents of some files on paper and scanning them in if necessary.
Experts of the expanded mind can counter this, however, by saying that the connection between Otto, who has Alzheimer's disease, and his notebook is significantly better than that between a computer and printed files. For example, we would not deprive a person who has slow access to their own internal memories due to an accident, as long as they are accessed with sufficient reliability and without outside help.
But even if critics cannot be convinced by this argument, it is far from clear that neural processes are faster than epistemic action in the outside world. For example, Kirsh and Maglio found that when playing Tetris, direct manipulation of the game is faster than mental rotation.
literature
- Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken (2008): The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chalmers, David (2008): Foreword to Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. PDF
- Clark, Andy (2001): Reasons, robots, and the extended mind. Mind and Language 16: 121-145.
- Clark, Andy (2003): Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, Andy (2005): Intrinsic content, active memory, and the extended mind. Analysis 65 (1): 1-11.
- Clark, Andy (2007): Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy 104 (4): 163-192.
- Clark, Andy (2008): Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998): The extended mind. Analysis 58 (1): pp. 7-19. Text as HTML
- Hurley, Susan (1998): Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hurley, Susan (2001): Perception and action: Alternative views. Synthesis 291: 3-40.
- Hurley, Susan (2010): Varieties of Externalism. In: R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind.
- Hurley, Susan and Noë, Alva (2003): Neural plasticity and consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18: 131-168.
- Menary, Richard (2007): Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Menary, Richard, ed. (2010): The Extended Mind. MA: MIT Press.
- Rowlands, Mark (1999): The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rowlands, Mark (2003): Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Chesham: Acumen
- Rowlands, Mark (2006): Body Language: Representing in Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rowlands, Mark (2010): The New Science of the Mind. From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. MA: MIT Press.
- Rupert, Robert (2004): Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8): 389-428.
- Rupert, Robert (2009): Cognitive systems and the extended mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wheeler, Michael (2005): Reconstructing the Cognitive World: the Next Step. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wilson, Robert (1994): Wide computationalism. Min 103: 351–372.
- Wilson, Robert (2004): Boundaries of the Mind. The Individual in the Fragile Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Web links
- "The Extended Mind" - by Andy Clark and David Chalmers
- further literature on "The Extended Mind"
- "Active Externalism" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- The Extended Mind Thesis - by Holger Lyre and Sven Walter
swell
- ↑ Putnam, Hilary (1975/1985): The meaning of 'meaning'. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality., Cambridge University Press.
- ^ A b Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998): The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1): p. 8
- ^ A b Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998): The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1): p. 14
- ^ Dennett, Daniel C. (1978): Where Am I? In: Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Daniel C. Dennett, Bradford Books. ( Text as HTML )
- ↑ Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken (2008) The Bounds of Cognition , Malden, Mass. [u. a.]: Blackwell. P. 136 f.
- ^ Rowlands, Mark (2003): Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Chesham: Acumen p. 166
- ^ Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998): The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1): pp. 12-14
- ^ Clark, Andy (2006). Memento's Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended. In Richard Menary (ed.), Objections and Replies to the Extended Mind. Ashgate. P. 7f. ( As a PDF ( Memento of the original from February 3, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. )
- ^ Rowlands, Mark (2003): Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Chesham: Acumen p. 175
- ↑ a b Kirsh, David & Maglio, Paul P. (1994): On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action, in Cognitive Science 18 p. 514 [1]
- ↑ Dennett, Daniel C. (1978): Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Bradford Books. ( As HTML )
- ^ The Extended Mind: Recent Experimental Evidence
- ^ Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998): The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1): p. 17
- ^ Chalmers, David (2008): Foreword to Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. S. XI
- ^ Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken (2001) 'The Bounds of Cognition', Philosophical Psychology 14, 48.
- ^ Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken (2001) 'The Bounds of Cognition', Philosophical Psychology 14, p. 63
- ↑ Clark, Andy (2005) Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind , Analysis 65.1, pp. 1-11
- ↑ Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken (2008) The Bounds of Cognition , Malden, Mass. [u. a.]: Blackwell. P. 70
- ↑ Examples from Victor, Ryan: The Extended Room, Or, What Otto Didn't Know
- ↑ Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998): The extended mind. Analysis 58 (1): p. 15
