Gerold monster

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Gerold Ungeheuer (1971)

Gerold Ungeheuer (born July 6, 1930 in Karlsruhe-Durlach ; † October 12, 1982 in Bonn ) was a communication scientist , phonetician and linguist . He carried out basic research and worked on a communication theory based on social science and action theory. The terms communication semantics and individual world theory come from him .

Life

Gerold Ungeheuer began studying philosophy, musicology and mathematics at the University of Heidelberg in 1950/1951 . After two semesters he switched to the Technical University of Karlsruhe to study telecommunications technology and physics, which he graduated with a diploma in spring 1955 . After graduating, he studied phonetics and communication research and musicology at the University of Bonn , where he was awarded a doctorate on February 26, 1958. phil. received his doctorate.

From April 1961 to April 1963 Ungeheuer taught mathematics and communication sciences at Cauca University in Popayán in Colombia. At the same time , he completed his habilitation in phonetics and communication research with a thesis on phonetic aspects in language understanding (June 28, 1962). After his final return to Bonn in 1963, Gerold Ungeheuer became a research assistant , senior assistant and lecturer at the then Institute for Phonetics and Communication Research at the University (IPK). He gave guest lectures at the Institute of Phonetics at Uppsala University in Sweden. In March 1967, Ungeheuer was appointed full professor and director of the institute. The institute later found its premises in the old observatory in Bonn . The successor institutes exist there to this day.

Due to his earlier courses, Gerold Ungeheuer came to the institute with a broad, partly technically oriented theoretical foundation. He conducted phonetic studies and founded "linguistic data processing" (LDV; today computer linguistics ) in Germany. Phonetic and computational linguistic research and teaching remained in the institute during the subsequent developments.

In the 1960s, Ungeheuer turned away from questions of telecommunications technology and from communication models that were influenced by the mathematical theories of the transmission of signals ( information theory ). These approaches had become popular in the first half of the 20th century. The demarcation to information theory is short; The application of information theory was no longer discussed on a large scale by Monster.

Ungeheuer also dealt with linguistic-semantic theories in which meaning is modeled as a component of language systems. Instead, he resorted to the writings of sociologists and psychologists at the turn of the 20th century and also to the classical philosophers. In these writings, Ungeheuer showed descriptions and models of processes of perception and experience and of social conditions and brought them into connection with communication.

In the 1970s, Ungeheuer gave communication research a broader focus at his institute in Bonn. He conducted research on communicative problems of witnesses in court cases. In addition, Ungeheuer expanded his research to include historical investigations into sign processes , which he viewed as an essential element of the communicative process.

Gerold Ungeheuer shaped the development of the institute for 15 years. He wanted to develop, present and teach a comprehensive communication theory. He demanded that communication theory should be based on an "anthropological problem theory". Due to his unexpected death from a heart attack at the beginning of the winter semester 1982/1983 - Ungeheuer was 52 years old - his plans remained unfinished.

“Communicative experience” as the empirical basis of a communication theory

In many of his publications, Ungeheuer repeatedly asks the question of the empirical area for a communication theory, i.e. the question of which experiences (which observations and descriptions) should be modeled and explained with the help of a communication theory. It is always about a communication theory that can be used and helpful in daily communication (“communication practice”). Questions about understanding , the relationship between communication partners and persuasion (creating acceptance among communication partners) are increasingly in the foreground.

Ungeuer's dedication to an empirical area to be investigated, which he later referred to as “communicative experience”, becomes clear in his distinction between two modes of observation as “communicative” and “extracommunicative”, which he presented in 1967 at a phonetic congress. The difference in the observation and description of communication lies in the extent to which one's own performance and the experience of communication are included or not:

  1. Communicative execution: everyone is involved in communication processes as a participant, he experiences these processes under the conditions of this participation and the use of communicative means. He is in communication, he experiences it, partly without reflection and partly reflected.
  2. Extra-communicative observation: Anyone can observe communication without intervening directly, and later classify and systematize their observations. This happens, for example, in records of communication processes, which are analytically divided into linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena.

Observations that arise while communicating, that is, under the conditions of the implementation of communication, and their descriptions are increasingly becoming the basis of a communication theory for monsters. He describes this area of ​​experience to be examined in terms of communication science as communicative . The active (acting) creation of meanings in the execution of communication forms an area to be examined, which monsters calls communication semantics.

Ungeheuer contrasts this area of ​​“communicative experience” with the linguistic methods of observation and description as “extra-communicative”. In this comparison and demarcation to linguistic empiricism and theory, Ungeheuer developed his answer to the question of a communication-scientific empiricism. This becomes clear in various places. For Ungeheuer, for example, understanding does not consist in assigning sentences and texts a semantic interpretation, as is customary in linguistic science. Interpersonal communication is not about understanding sentences, but about communicating people. What is understood is not an aggregation of “linguistic prefabricated elements”, but the product of a “complex structure of external and internal actions”. In connection with the question of the understanding monster also refers to the speech act theory of John Searle . It is unbelievably difficult to reconcile Searles' analysis of the illocutionary effect with communicative experience, since Searle disregards those phenomena of linguistic communication that “dominate in communication through speech”. Ungeheuer quotes Searle with a statement that phenomena such as what is not literally meant, vagueness, ambiguity and incompleteness ( nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness ) are not essential for linguistic (description of) communication, and rates this as “insufficient reflection the determination of the empirical basis ”. Elsewhere, Ungeheuer says that a linguistic-semantic theory cannot simply be turned into a communication theory by adding additional “pragmatic predicates”. Instead, additional elements from communicative experience are necessary (including: dialogic contact, interaction, initiating and accepting topics, conclusions, the problem of the effectiveness of communication and success control). The basis for understanding is not a system of linguistic signs and meanings (obtained from extra-communicative description and modeling), but rather the individual world theory functioning as a dynamic background of experience .

Ungeheuer gives the most comprehensive answer to the question of the empirical area to be treated in terms of communication science in one of his last essays: “Prejudices about speaking, communicating, understanding”, which was published after his death. In it, Ungeuer outlines the area of ​​experience that he would like to explain through a communication theory based on three basic assumptions: It is about people (M) who are engaged in joint action (H) and use symbols (Z). Ungeheuer describes human experience as individual, dichotomous (divided into an inside and an outside area) and of a theoretical nature (experiences serve to explain and justify actions). The individuality of every experience and the separation of the experience into an inner and an outer area are the starting point of communication for Ungeheuer: The communication goal (to be achieved first) consists in understanding, i.e. in a successful production of individual inner experience by the listener based on the formulations of the speaker, which can be understood as instructions to the listener.

Action theory and problem theory approach

From the end of the 1960s, Ungeheu's approach to modeling and theory building became increasingly action-theoretical , that is, Ungeheuer used the term action / action as a fundamental theoretical (explanatory) element. The phenomenon of communication , which can be explained with the help of a communication theory, is set as an “action between human individuals” (as a social act). In connection with the conditions of communication, Ungeheuer asks the question of how people can be described and conceptually represented as (acting) communicators. In doing so, he dispenses with terms that already have a specific meaning in other thought traditions ( subject , mind , soul , spirit , cognition ) because, in his view, prejudices enter communication theory. When describing actions, he adopts the metaphor of inside and outside and differentiates “inner actions” from “outer actions” on the basis of the criterion of accessibility: “Inner actions” are accessible to the individual. “External actions” are in principle accessible to everyone.

The problem-theoretical approach of Ungeheuers is closely connected with the action-theoretical approach. The basic train of thought is as follows: There are ends in action. To have clarity about the purposes to be achieved does not, however, mean knowing how these purposes can be achieved. This is the case of a practical problem : a plan needs to be developed that can be put into action. In everyday activities, this often happens very quickly and sometimes unconsciously on the basis of existing experience.

Since there are usually several options (alternative courses of action), it is also necessary to justify and justify one of the alternative courses of action as the most suitable solution under the given conditions. Justifications and justifications are only possible with the help of theories. Action plans that have not yet been realized therefore have a hypothetical character for monsters, that is, they can be justified and justified by theories like hypotheses. If no justification or justification can be developed due to a lack of theory, a theoretical problem has arisen . An existing theory must first be 'activated' or - in more complex cases - a theory developed before a plan of action can be justified as a solution.

In this action- and problem-theoretical approach, action is therefore not possible without theory; Theories function as an important part not only of scientific, but also of everyday (social) life. Practical and theoretical problems always arise together; after monster, one of the two stands in the foreground; the other is "adjoint". This applies irrespective of whether theories can be formulated in everyday life as connections between statements and logical deductions.

The consideration of communication in connection with problem solving also encompasses two further areas. Problem and problem solution are to be understood as neutral terms without negative evaluation:

  1. Problems that cannot be solved alone, but only together. Establishing common ground in relation to the problem (those involved know what the problem is and how it is to be solved) as well as cooperation to solve the problem (controlling the activities of various participants through instructions or questions) is only possible with the help of communication ; Communication is therefore both a prerequisite for problem solving and a component of the solution process.
  2. As such, communication becomes a problem. This is the case when communication becomes difficult or cannot be achieved. (In the example above, this would mean that the participants cannot agree on the problem to be solved together - either the problem or the solution is not understood or accepted by all participants.) The simplest example of communication that is problematic as such is communication between people who speak different languages. Understanding is often a problem even among people who speak the same language.

On the basis of the order in which these problems are solved, Ungeheuer describes mutual understanding as the communication goal and that which is to be achieved through communication and is subordinate to communication as the communication purpose . Persuasion can be mentioned as one of the most important communication purposes that go beyond understanding : the listener should be convinced of the correctness of the facts meant by the speaker. He should accept that what the speaker said is correct.

Conditions and basic properties of communicative processes

Ungeuer divides the conditions for communication processes into the conditions of human experience (M), social action (H) and the use of linguistic signs (Z). An essential condition that has to be fulfilled in order to be able to communicate is, for example, submission to the communicative instructions of the speaker (“subjection”: “the control of the listener's internal experiences relevant to understanding, which is permitted by the listener for the purpose of communication”). Ungeheuer combines this with a clear criticism of the concept of “freedom of domination” in the - then current - theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas . Ungeheuer, on the other hand, describes the relationship between speaker and listener with the metaphor 'master and servant' or writes of "communicative rule over the communicatively submitting listener". In everyday descriptions this means: Communication is only possible if you listen and talk to your communication partner; own thoughts are to be put on hold for the moment. This creates a momentary asymmetry in the communication process.

Regarding subjection (submission) as an "essential moment of communicative social action" shows parallels to Karl Bühler , who saw suggestion as an essential social element in mutual control. Ungeheuer referred several times to Karl Bühler in his publications; it can be assumed that he assumed its axiomatics and language theory in his teaching as known.

The basic characteristics of communication also include currently uncertain knowledge about the success of communication, i.e. whether the other has understood. In this context, Ungeber also discussed means of ensuring successful communication.

In the extension of everyday notions, according to which persuasion (both in the form of persuasion and in the form of persuasion) are only considered to be certain cases of communicative actions, persuasion is for monsters a "structural feature of any communication that pursues communication purposes beyond its goal". A communication purpose, which consists for example in that another does something, is only achieved when the other, as the listener, not only understands but also accepts what he is supposed to do and how he is supposed to do it. This acceptance is an essential characteristic of persuasion. Even beyond that, the “communicative fundamental act” - that is, the communication process as such - inevitably has a persuasive character, since the listener has to follow the speaker's linguistic formulations with understanding and to do so has to submit to the speaker in his understanding acts.

Ungeheuer describes communication as a social act that cannot be broken down into individual acts. The dialogical form - or the conversation - can therefore be seen as the main form of interpersonal communication. Ungeeuer generally sees conversation as a complex act in which several people solve problems. For him, the structure of the contributions is fundamentally argumentative : it can be mapped to an argumentative context that consists of conclusions and justifications of these conclusions.

Terms shaped by monstrous things

Communication semantics
this term describes the development of meaning in carrying out communicative action, in experiencing and acting in communication. Communication semantics encompasses a problem area that belongs to the communicative approach. It is delimited from linguistic semantics insofar as it is a result of extra-communicative description and systematization.
Individual world theory
This term describes a field of experiences and assumptions affecting the individual , which enables the explanation of new experiences, the prognosis and the justification and justification of actions. The field is dynamic and at the same time regular, it exists as a varying network of relationships, and it is influenced by memory and feelings . The field of experience is given in different degrees of awareness. It can - recursively - itself be experienced as an externally closed unit. As such a unit, the individual world theory forms the basis of the " I ". - "Individual world theory" can thus be seen as the designation for a personal background from experiences (world / I), from which questions about the "why" of one's own interpretation, thinking, opinion and action are answered (theory function).

effect

Ungeheuer's work has remained fragmentary. There is no monograph through which his comprehensive approaches to communication theory have become known to a larger academic and non-academic audience. He leaves behind over a hundred research reports, essays and contributions that have appeared mainly in linguistic, but also educational journals. Important parts of his work have been summarized and published in collections of articles. The essays “Communication Semantics” (1974) and “Pre-Judgments about Speaking, Communicating, Understanding” (written shortly before his death in 1982) are particularly well received, because they clearly demarcate the monster from linguistic-semantic approaches and his turn to an empirical basis which includes the implementation of communication, and which monsters referred to as "communicative experience". The foundation of this empiricism by a problem theory is also clear.

The institute IPK, at which Ungeheuer worked, was renamed under his direction in 1969 to the "Institute for Communication Research and Phonetics" (IKP) in order to indicate the weighting of the subjects he intended. After his death in 1982, research and teaching there with phonetics / signal processing and computational linguistics were given a technical focus again. From the 2006/2007 winter semester up to and including the 2012 summer semester, the former IKP formed the “Language and Communication” department of an interdisciplinary institute. The "Institute for Linguistics, Media and Musicology" has existed at the University of Bonn since 2012.

Ungeheuer's communication theory has been taught by his students at the University of Duisburg-Essen since the 1990s . The monster's estate is also accessible there. In this way, Ungeheuer's approach to the phenomenon of communication and his action-theoretical modeling of people who solve communicative problems is still used today in theses, scientific studies and professional careers.

Publications

  • Introduction to communication theory . Hagen: Fernuniversität , 1983. - Three course units (Ungeheuer 1983). New edition: Karin Kolb, Jens Loenhoff and H. Walter Schmitz (eds.), Nodus, Münster 2010. - ISBN 978-3-89323-657-2 (Ungeheuer 2010)
  • Communication theory writings I: speaking, communicating, understanding. Edited and introduced by Johann G. Juchem. Afterword by Hans-Georg Soeffner and Thomas Luckmann. With list of fonts. Alano, Rader Verlag, Aachen 1987 (Aachener Studien zur Semiotik und Kommunikationforschung, Vol. 14), ISBN 3-89399-062-3 (Ungeheuer 1987).
  • Communication-theoretical writings II: Symbolic knowledge and communication . Edited and introduced by H. Walter Schmitz. Aachen: Alano, Rader Verlag, 1990 (Aachen Studies on Semiotics and Communication Research, Vol. 15). - ISBN 3-89399-077-1 ; ISBN 3-89399-078-X (monster 1990)
  • Phonetics and related areas . Edited from the estate by Wilhelm H. Vieregge and Joachim Göschel. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1993 (journal for dialectology and linguistics, supplements). ISBN 3-515-06296-3 (monster 1993)
  • Language and communication . Research reports of the Institute for Communication Research and Phonetics of the University of Bonn, No. 13. Buske, Hamburg 1972. New edition: Karin Kolb and H. Walter Schmitz (Eds.), Nodus, Münster 2004. ISBN 3-89323-654-6 (Ungeheuer 2004 )

literature

  • Rainer Lengeler, Winfried Lenders, Heinrich P. Kelz and Johann-Georg Juchem (1985): In Memoriam Gerold Ungeheuer: Speeches held on December 5, 1984 at the memorial ceremony of the Philosophical Faculty of the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn . Bonn: Bouvier, 1985 (Alma mater; 57) ISBN 3-416-09152-3
  • Krallmann, Dieter; Ziemann, Andreas (2001): "Gerold Ungeheuer's anthropological communication theory", in: ders .: Basic course in communication science: with an in-depth hypertext program on the Internet . Fink, Munich 2001. (UTB for Science; 2249) pp. 257–280. ISBN 3-8252-2249-7 (UTB) and ISBN 3-7705-3595-2 (Fink)

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ The data in this section are based on Schmitz, H. – W .: “Necrologia Gerold Ungeheuer”, Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft 2.2 (1983), pp. 159–168. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. See also: Krallmann, Dieter; Ziemann, Andreas (2001), pp. 257-259.
  2. ↑ Claude Elwood Shannon called his theory, which is commonly referred to as "information theory", mathematical theory of communication . It is not about interpersonal communication, but about signal transmission, for example for the remote control of missiles (rockets); see also Axel Roch: Claude E. Shannon. Toys, life and the secret history of his theory of information , gegenstalt Verlag, Berlin 2009.
  3. ↑ From information theory, according to Ungeheuer, one should "expect at most a marginal contribution to the understanding of interpersonal forms of communication", essay "Language as information carrier", in: Sprache und Kommunikation , Ungeheuer (2004), p. 20. Further references to and evidence for the distance that Ungeheuer took from his early publications, see Karin Kolb / H. Walter Schmitz: “Introduction”, Ungeheuer (2004), p. XVII f.
  4. ↑ In his late essay “Pre-judgments about speaking, sharing, understanding” (Ungeheuer 1987, pp. 290–338) Ungeheuer mentions among others: Plato , Immanuel Kant , Edmund Husserl , Wilhelm Wundt , Alexius Meinong , Willy Hellpach , Heinrich Gomperz , Fritz Mauthner , Max Weber , Alfred Wegener , Karl Bühler , William James , Alfred Schütz . In other writings, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Friedrich Nietzsche, among others, play an important role for Ungeheuer ; see Ungeheuer (1990): Communication Theoretical Writings II: Symbolic Knowledge and Communication .
  5. ^ "Witness and expert statements as a communication problem", in: Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 129-143; "Communicative problems of police officers as witnesses and experts in court", in: Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 223–289; The reason for the second, detailed publication was the so-called "terrorist trials" after the German autumn of 1977.
  6. ↑ Published mainly in Ungeheuer (1990): Communication Theoretical Writings II: Symbolic Knowledge and Communication .
  7. ↑ Article “Pre-judgments about speaking, sharing, understanding”, first publication in Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 290–338, here pp. 337 f.
  8. ↑ At one point, Ungeheuer describes the “improvement of human communication practice” as a “central problem for communication research”; see article "Kommunikationssemantik", in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 85.
  9. ↑ Phonetics and linguistic data processing (today computational linguistics ) remained the subject of research at the institute headed by Ungeheuer. The following remarks refer to those publications by Ungeheuers in which he refers to interpersonal communication as an empirical basis.
  10. ↑ The lecture is published as an article “Communicative and extra-communicative approaches in phonetics”, in: Ungeheuer (2004), p. 22 ff .; see also Karin Kolb / H. Walter Schmitz, “Introduction”, ibid., p. XIII.
  11. ↑ For monsters, for example, the “semiotic tripartite division” loses its “classificatory power” “in confrontation with communicative experience taken seriously”; second introductory sentence of the essay “Kommunikationssemantik”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 70. Ungeheuer refers to the division of sign theory into the areas of syntax, semantics, pragmatics; see Charles William Morris . - Further examples from the essays published in Ungeheuer (1987): “communicative experience” (p. 44), “communicative difficulty” (p. 74), “communicative field of action” (p. 158), “mass of experiences related to the communicative” ( P. 336), “social reality of linguistic communication” (p. 290).
  12. ↑ “What does 'understanding through speaking' mean?”, In Ungeheuer (1987), p. 58.
  13. ↑ “What does 'understanding through speaking' mean?”, In Ungeheuer (1987), p. 44 f.
  14. ^ “Communication semantics”, in Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 73 ff.
  15. ↑ In both of the passages mentioned above, Ungeheuer uses the concept of individual world theory that he coined .
  16. ↑ “Pre-judgments about speaking, sharing, understanding”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 290–338; the essay was published after Ungeheuer's death.
  17. ↑ a b “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 300 f.
  18. ^ "Prejudices about speaking, communicating, understanding", in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 315 f. The fact that Ungeheuer strongly emphasizes the hypotheses of individuality and dichotomy of experience (e.g. on p. 308) can meanwhile be interpreted against the background of the scientific discussion at the time; it was the time when Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, for example, also developed their theories and began their work.
  19. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 5, p. 6; Article “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 300 f.
  20. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 9; Article “Pre-judgments about speaking, sharing, understanding”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 305 ff.
  21. ↑ See the following: Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 11 f .; Essay "Problems, theoretical and practical" in: Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 101-109.
  22. ↑ Ancient Greek πρᾶξις prãxis : "deed", "act", "performance".
  23. ↑ In the words of Ungeheuers: “That cognitive variable which is to establish a hypothesis, i. H. able to prove as correct and accurate is always of the nature of a theory ”( Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 12); Emphasis in the original.
  24. ↑ See the concept of individual world theory below.
  25. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 12 f.
  26. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 10.
  27. ↑ Ungeheuer writes of “three basic assumptions” in the essay “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in Ungeheuer (1987), p. 300 ff.
  28. ↑ a b essay “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in Ungeheuer (1987), p. 317.
  29. ↑ Article “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in Ungeheuer (1987), p. 318.
  30. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 74.
  31. ↑ For example in the article “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in Ungeheuer (1987), p. 315.
  32. ↑ "Social" in contrast to the individual reactive adaptation of one's own behavior. Bühler used the metaphor of the “lead wire” on which the listener hangs. Karl Bühler, The Crisis of Psychology, Stuttgart: G. Fischer 1965, p. 92 f.
  33. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), pp. 27, 28, 45; as well as in the essay "What does: 'Understanding through speaking'?", in: Ungeheuer 1987, pp. 34–69, here p. 42.
  34. ↑ For example in the article “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in Ungeheuer (1987), p. 319 ff.
  35. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 70.
  36. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 69. Note: The individual understanding (understanding in the broad sense) that takes place in the process of understanding is also understood here as action.
  37. ↑ Introduction to Communication Theory (2010), p. 74; At this point, however, Ungeheuer also suggests not to extend the concept of persuasion “into the communicative fundamental process”, but to describe the fundamental persuasive character with other terms, for example as communicative dominance and communicative subject (p. 75).
  38. ↑ See the article "Kommunikationssemantik", in: Ungeheuer (1987), here p. 95.
  39. ↑ Article “Communication semantics”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 96 ff .; Essay “Conversation analysis and its theoretical requirements”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 158 ff.
  40. ↑ Article “Communication Semantics”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 70–100.
  41. ↑ Essay "Kommunikationssemantik", in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 74; Essay “Pre-judgments about speaking, communicating, understanding”, p. 308 ff. Ungeheuer speaks of both an “experience system” and a field of experiences, ibid., P. 311 and 312.
  42. ↑ For monsters, unity is the “result of synthetic work”; At this point, Ungeheuer refers to Immanuel Kant (“Prejudices about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 312).
  43. ↑ This dynamic field of experience, which monster described with the term "individual world theory", could be used today, for example, as a basis for the description and modeling of cognitive dissonance , heuristics and risk perception , provided that it is taken into account that unconscious parts are also meant, and that the action-theoretical context is preserved.
  44. ↑ "Kommunikationssemantik", in: Ungeheuer (1987), pp. 70-100; see especially p. 73 ff; “Prejudices about speaking, communicating, understanding”, pp. 290–338; see especially p. 324, p. 325 f.
  45. ↑ “Kommunikationssemantik”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 78; “Prejudices about speaking, communicating, understanding”, in: Ungeheuer (1987), p. 337 f.
  46. ^ The estate of Gerold Ungeheuer (University of Duisburg-Essen).
personal data
SURNAME Monster, Gerold
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German communication scientist
DATE OF BIRTH July 6, 1930
PLACE OF BIRTH Karlsruhe-Durlach
DATE OF DEATH October 12, 1982
Place of death Bonn