Iranian-Turkish relations

The Iranian-Turkish relations are characterized by simultaneous cooperation and rivalry due to the geostrategic location of the two states, due to the differences in denominational orientation and due to belonging to different geopolitical power blocs. Today's Turkey pursues the legacy of the Ottoman Empire with its regional ambitions and therefore rivals Iran in numerous areas. Turkey is neither a friend nor an enemy for Tehran, and from an Iranian point of view it does not represent a military risk like Iraq once did. However, to a certain extent it is a competitor on the politico-religious level because Turkish Islam is revolutionary with Iranian Islam Islam competes.

history

Reza Shah visits Ataturk in 1934

The border between the Ottoman Empire and what was then Persia , which had fought numerous armed conflicts in the previous 150 years, was drawn in 1639 with the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin . The 484-kilometer border was confirmed in 1931; at the same time, numerous regional disputes that had been revived by the First World War and that had led to massacres of Christians, the genocide of the Armenians , an influx of Armenians into Iran and uprisings by Kurdish tribes ended. At the same time, today's Turkey was for hundreds of years the gateway to Europe for the Persian Empire, where numerous Persian dissidents also found refuge. The Turkish-speaking city of Tabriz was an international center during the Ottoman Empire, where Turkish-speaking Azeris, Persians, Armenians and Christians from Russia and Georgia settled.

In 1923 Turkey became a republic under Kemal Ataturk, while in Iran efforts to make a republic by analogy with Reza Khan as the first president failed due to opposition from the clergy . Iran became a monarchy . In June 1934 the Persian Shah Reza visited Turkey and met Mustafa Kemal Ataturk there . He found in him a model for the modernization of Iran and for the changes in traditional religious culture. In July 1937 Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan signed a non-aggression pact ( Treaty of Saadabad ), and in general, the Soviet ambitions in the Middle East resulted in closer cooperation between the two neighbors. After Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the Baghdad Pact, directed against the Soviet Union, was signed in 1955, followed in 1964 by a treaty on economic cooperation between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan within the framework of the Central Treaty Organization . The CENTO, however, had little practical impact.

ideology

The Islamic Revolution in 1979 ended this phase. Iran now admitted to being “neither West nor East” and announced that it would export its revolution to other Islamic states . A new policy was pursued in Tehran, especially anti-Americanism, which collided with values that Turkey pursued. Iran withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, while Turkey condemned the hostage-taking in the American embassy and ideologically stuck to Kemalism . Iran condemned this as disobedience to the Prophet and Islam . Nonetheless, both parties pursued a cautious and pragmatic policy in order to avoid unnecessary confrontations, especially with regard to the uprisings in the Kurdish provinces and with regard to the refugees and deserters who poured into Turkey from Iran.

However, there were also provocations and misunderstandings. Turkey suspected Iran of being behind the rise of Islamic extremism when journalists and professors defending Kemalism and secularism were murdered . Iranian politicians who visited Turkey repeatedly refused to visit the Ataturk mausoleum - this included Mir Hossein Mousavi and Ali Akbar Hāschemi Rafsanjāni in 1996 because Iran viewed Ataturk as an ally of Reza Shah against Islam. For this reason, on the 50th anniversary of Ataturk's death in 1988, the Iranian embassy refused to hoist the flag at half mast on its embassy in Ankara.

Turkey countered this with a pragmatic policy. She recognized the legitimacy of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime and when he died, she set her flags at half-mast on the diplomatic missions in Iran as requested by the Iranian regime. When the Turkish military government took action against pro-Soviet left forces and Islamic fundamentalists, Iran felt called to help and proposed a federation of all Islamic countries. The government in Ankara forbade such interference. The Iranian side repeatedly called for an uprising against the secular government in Ankara in the 1980s and 1990s. She demanded a tough stance from Turkey in the discussions about the novel The Satanic Verses and Threatened Muftis in Eastern Anatolia with death. Turkey has repeatedly had to call on Iran to respect its governance. The provocations peaked in 1989 and 1997, when the respective ambassadors were withdrawn.

Iran is particularly disturbed by the good relations between Turkey and the United States of America and the cooperation between Turkey and Israel . In particular, Iran asked Turkey to be neutral in the poor Iran-US relations . Indeed, Turkey did not endorse the US embargo on Iran following the hostage-taking in its embassy in Tehran. When the United States attacked Iraq in 2003, Turkey did not allow the United States to use Turkish territory for deployment. Iran sharply criticized the 1996 military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel. Tehran repeatedly suspected so-called Zionist agents in Turkish politics and blamed them for deterioration in mutual relations.

For its part, Turkey is bothered by the good Armenian-Iranian relations with which the two isolated states are trying to break the embargoes imposed on them and which have resulted in closer cooperation with Russia .

Kurds

Starting in the 1980s, clashes with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) began in the border area between Turkey and Iraq . Iraq allowed Turkey to attack the PKK from the air on its territory. Iran refused to do so on Turkish request and condemned the Turkish air strikes on the Kurds in northern Iraq. The criticism was particularly sharp after Kurds were also hit on Iranian territory. However, the Iranian side agreed to a treaty with Turkey in which both parties undertook to warn each other of attacks by the Kurds. However, Iran tolerated arms smuggling on the Iranian-Iraqi border and denied the existence of Kurdish training camps on Iranian territory. In the 2000s, the Ankara government suspected Iran of supplying the PKK with weapons and Russian missiles. PKK prisoners did not deny this.

Iran only changed its policy when the activities of the United States around the establishment of the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan could lead to calls for an autonomous Kurdistan on Iranian territory as well. At that point, Iran's support for the PKK ended.

Economic Cooperation

The election of Ali Akbar Hāschemi Rafsanjāni as Iranian president ushered in a period in which Iran pursued a conciliatory policy towards Turkey. The goal of the new government in Tehran was to break out of isolation and focus on regional issues. Under Rafsanjani’s successor, Mohammad Chātami , cooperation with Turkey intensified, which was promoted by the strategy of Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gül to improve relations with all his neighbors. With President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 2001, Gül in 2003 and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2004, there were three high-ranking visits by Turkish politicians to Iran within a short period of time. During the Iraq war in 2003, Iran and Turkey agreed that they would not tolerate attacks on their territory, that Iraq's territorial integrity must be maintained and that a power vacuum must be prevented. However, Turkey subsequently supported the Sunni government, while Iran sided with the Shiites of Iraq. The electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the policy of having zero problems with its neighbors led to attempts by the Turkish government to solve the Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Syrian problems and the conflict over Iran's nuclear program .

When Mahmoud Ahmadineschād was elected President of Iran in 2005 , Iran returned to its revolutionary goals. Ahmadinejad visited Turkey in 2008 and signed a treaty on the fight against terrorism and drug smuggling. The goal was to reach a bilateral trade volume of 20 billion US dollars in 2011 - it had climbed from 1 billion in 2000 to 10 billion in 2008. Contracts on investment, double taxation, customs and transport followed.

The great economic influence of Turkey, which has gone through industrialization and opened up to the world market, is today also an indication to the Iranians that their own country is lagging behind. About a third of all imports from Iran flow through Turkey, which gives the Bāzargān border crossing a strategic importance comparable to the Strait of Hormuz . Today Turkey is a role model for many Iranians in terms of modernization, because many large Turkish companies are active in Iran and numerous Iranians are leaving Iran to spend their holidays in the relatively liberal and western-oriented Turkey.

Back in 1996, Turkey and Iran had signed a 22-year agreement for the delivery of 190 billion barrels of Iranian natural gas. However, technical problems and disagreement over the price prevented the successful implementation of this agreement. In 2008, a preliminary agreement was signed for the development of three natural gas fields and the construction of two pipelines for around 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas via Turkey to Europe. In 2010 a project began to build a pipeline for 60 billion cubic meters of gas to be delivered to Europe. This made Iran the second largest gas supplier to Turkey.

Nevertheless, nationalist issues often hinder economic exchange between the two countries. This is illustrated by the cancellation of a mobile phone license for the Turkish company Turkcell or the cancellation of the order for the operation of Tehran's Imam Khomeini airport by the Turkish company TAV. For similar reasons, President Mohammad Chātami's visit to Ankara in 2004 was canceled.

Nuclear program

Turkey recognizes Iran's right to use atomic energy as long as its activities are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency . However, Turkey is vigilant about potential Iranian nuclear weapons and is alarmed about its cooperation with Russia. Turkey has therefore repeatedly tried to mediate in the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program . On May 17, 2010, Iran agreed to a contract brokered by the Turkish government, according to which 1200 kilograms of Iranian uranium, which is only weakly enriched with 3.5%, were to be exchanged for 120 kilograms of uranium enriched at 20% on Turkish territory. However, this contract was not implemented because of the sanctions applied at the same time.

Turkey voted against the sanctions of the world community as a result of the Iranian nuclear program and had to be accused by third parties - above all Israel - of having been instrumentalized by the Iranian government. On the other hand, Turkey wanted to avoid military strikes against Iran and, in view of the Iranian isolation, became an important partner for Iran, which at the same time held more and more power in its hands. The deterioration in Israeli-Turkish relations since 2009 has mostly resulted in an improvement in Iranian-Turkish relations.

Arabic spring

The secular Turkey welcomed the protests in the Arab world originally. The Iranian government compared the events of the Arab Spring with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and at the same time accused Turkey of spreading a westernized Islam. In the Syrian civil war , Turkey supported the Syrian opposition, while the regime in Damascus had been one of Iran's most important allies many years before the Arab Spring. A possible overthrow of the Assad regime would have posed a major security problem for Iran. Turkey is critical of the Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria and especially wants to prevent Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The two states are thus in a battle for influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, where Shiites and Sunnis face each other.

Web links

Commons : Iranian-Turkish Relations - Collection of Pictures, Videos and Audio Files

Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 176 .
↑ Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 177 .
↑ ^a ^b Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 91-92 .
↑ ^a ^b Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 175 .
^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, London 2000, ISBN 1-86064-258-6 , pp. 315 .
^ Gavin RG Hambly: The Pahlavi autocracy: 1921-1941 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 223-224 .
↑ ^a ^b Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 210 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 92-95 .
↑ ^a ^b Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 95-96 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 96-100 .
↑ ^a ^b Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 99-101 .
↑ Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 101-108 .

[Hourcade176-1] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 176 .

[Hourcade177-2] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 177 .

[Yakacikli91–92-3] Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 91-92 .

[Hourcade175-4] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 175 .

[Ghani315-5] Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, London 2000, ISBN 1-86064-258-6 , pp. 315 .

[Hambly223–224-6] Gavin RG Hambly: The Pahlavi autocracy: 1921-1941 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 223-224 .

[Hourcade210-7] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 210 .

[Yakacikli92–95-8] Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 92-95 .

[Yakacikli95–96-9] Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 95-96 .

[Yakacikli96–100-10] Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 96-100 .

[Yakacikli99–101-11] Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 99-101 .

[Yakacikli101–108-12] Lebriz Yakacikli: Iran-Turquie, Fin de la période de rapprochement? In: Firouzeh Nahavandi (ed.): L'Iran dans le monde . Harmattan, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-343-01460-9 , pp. 101-108 .