Iranian-Russian relations

The Persia or Iran's relations with Russia and the Soviet Union were partly hostile, partly complicated in the past. The historical burdens include the loss of large territories of Persia to Russia at the end of the 19th century , Russian interventions in Iranian domestic politics, the military occupation by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union during the First and Second World Wars, and Soviet support for secession movements and for Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war . Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent self-dissolution of the Soviet Union , the two states have been working more closely together, sometimes they are even seen in a strategic alliance. Viewed from the outside, the development of relations between Iran and Russia is worrying because it is primarily taking place in sensitive issues such as armaments and nuclear technology . However, the two countries involved have suffered more setbacks in their relations and accuse each other of a lack of cooperation. For this reason, cooperation between these two states will also be difficult in the future; an alliance with Russia is not undisputed in Iran itself. Even so, Russia is the only country that has a lasting and effective influence on Iranian politics.

First contacts

Until the 16th century there was only sparse contact between travelers between Persia and the Grand Duchy of Moscow , which was then under the rule of the Tatars . The exchange of goods was also negligible. However, with the conquest of the Astrakhan and Kazan khanates , the way to the Caspian Sea became free for Russia . This resulted in a modest flow of fur, cloth, metals, leather, amber and crystal from Russia to Iran and of silk, pearls, carpets, embroidered cloth, fruit, rice and spices to Russia. There were no political ties up to this point.

The first conflict of interest between the two powers occurred in Dagestan in the 17th century , but after that Russia withdrew again. The piracy of Stenka Razin on the Caspian Sea, who invaded the Persian coast with his people, massacred, raped, looted and pillaged the inhabitants , also took place at the same time .

Expansion under Peter the Great

Tsar Peter the Great was very interested in Persia and Central Asia, but especially in India. After the Peace of the Prut , he turned his attention to the Caucasus and Persia. At around the same time, the Armenians and Georgians offered their support to Peter the Great in freeing them from the oppression of the Muslims. Peter sent the young civil servant Artemi Wolynski to Isfahan , where he was supposed to make inquiries about cities, settlements, ports and rivers on the way, but especially about a route to India. In Isfahan he was supposed to convince the Persians that Russia was their friend and that the Ottoman Empire was their enemy, and propose a trade agreement with a Russian monopoly on Persian silk. In Isfahan, Wolynski got an audience with Sultan Hosein and some high-ranking officials, with whom he reached an agreement that Russians could henceforth trade freely in Iran. Volynski reported to Moscow that Persia was badly governed, that the Shah's palace was only ruled by fools, that Persia was on the verge of collapse and was easy to conquer. In fact, the Safavid dynasty under Sultan Hosein was in decline, the central power had already lost control of the border areas of the empire and no foreign policy was pursued. However, Russia was militarily engaged in Europe and was only able to turn to Persia again after the Peace of Nystad .

The pretext for the attack on Persia was the sack of Şamaxı by Sunni Lesgians in 1721. In addition to numerous Shiite residents of Şamaxı , a number of Russian traders were also killed and the allegedly richest Russian trader at the time suffered great losses. Wolynski suggested occupying Persian territory and, if necessary, releasing it in return for compensation. With the agreement of the Tsar, Russian troops gathered in Astrakhan . The Georgian King Vakhtang VI. sent an envoy to Peter the Great to suggest joint action against Persia. Meanwhile, the Russian consul in Persia should offer the Shah that Russia would help him subdue its enemies if, in return, he ceded some Caspian provinces to Russia; however, this news was not brought to Sultan Hosein.

In the following Russo-Persian War (1722–1723) the Imperial Russian Army , which had come to the coast of what is now Azerbaijan with their new Caspian flotilla , took the city of Derbent . However, numerous problems thwarted the plans to deal inland with the forces of Watchtang VI. instead, the Russians withdrew to Astrakhan. In the autumn of 1722, Russian troops occupied the city of Rasht , where they in turn were besieged. The Russian outbreak in March 1723 cost the lives of more than 1,000 Persian soldiers and forced Shah Tahmasp II to negotiate. The resulting Treaty of Saint Petersburg provided that Russia would get some provinces in what is now Azerbaijan and Northern Iran in exchange for support in the fight against rebels in Persia and that Russia would support the Shah in the fight against rebels.

Tahmasp II refused to ratify the treaty, but Russia was also quickly no longer interested because troops of the Ottoman Empire had invaded western Persia. This, and the high cost of Peter's Persian adventure, led Peter's successors to resolve to make peace with Persia, even if that meant giving up the conquered territories.

In 1724, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the mediation of the French ambassador , Jean-Louis d'Usson the Treaty of Constantinople Opel by distributing Northwest Persia, the Caspian provinces were the sphere of influence of Russia, while the South Caucasus and the present Iranian Azerbaijan the Ottoman Empire leaked. After the collapse of Afghan rule over Persia, the territorial gains were partially reversed with the Treaty of Rasht . After the takeover of power by Nader Shah , Persia achieved several military successes against the Turks. Prince Golitsyn was sent to Nader Shah to offer him Russian help against the Ottoman Empire, but Nader demanded unconditionally Baku and Derbent return. Golitsyn subsequently supported Nader in the siege of the city of Ganja . Further successes by Nader against the Turks at Kars and Russia's desire to go to war against the Turks itself led to the Treaty of Ganja in 1735, in which Russia returned all of Peter the Great's acquisitions to Persia. After that, the states were of no importance to one another for half a century, and neither was one known about one another. The difference between technical and economic skills grew sharply in Russia's favor during this period.

Expansion under Catherine the Great

Under Catherine the Great , there were plans to create an Armenian and a Georgian state to serve as bulwarks against the expanding Ottoman Empire. However, plans for a military intervention by Potjomkin in 1784 were not implemented. Negotiations with Ali Murad Khan Zand, who showed willingness to surrender northern Persian territories for Russian support, ended in 1785 with no results due to the death of the latter. The lack of leadership in Iran allowed Russia to increase its influence in the Caucasus again.

Plans to build a fortress in Astarabad that could accommodate 1,000 defenders failed due to resistance from Aga Mohammed Khan . Mohammed Khan had originally approved Russian plans for trade with India, but saw the expedition led by Count Wojnowitsch directed against him. In 1781, Russia offered Aga Mohammed Khan's rival Hedayat-Allah Khan protection if he would cede the port of Anzali to Russia and leave his son hostage, which the latter refused. The Russians then encouraged Aga Mohammed to attack Gilan. Hedayat-Allah fled on a Russian ship and was handed over by the Russians to his mortal enemy, the Khan von Schaft. Aga Mohammed now asked the Russians to hand over the treasure of Hedayat-Allah, or 2 million rubles, which the Russians refused. Russia now supported a rival named Morteza Qoli Khan , who in return promised to cede some provinces and later fled to Russia.

Unlike Peter the Great, Catherine the Great regarded Georgia as a central element of her Caucasus policy. Under King Erekle II, Georgia had again asked for Russian support against the Muslims. In 1783 a Russian protectorate was established over Georgia, and in 1784 Russian troops marched into Georgia. However, they were withdrawn again in 1787 due to the Russian-Austrian Turkish War , which opened up the possibility of reconquering Persia. Aga Mohammed Khan plundered his breakaway province in 1795 and carried out terrible massacres. A Russian plan to invade Persia led by Valerian Alexandrovich Subov was abandoned in 1796.

Russian expansion in the Caucasus

One generation later it was Giorgi XII. who refused allegiance to Fath Ali Shah and asked Emperor Paul for protection. In November 1799, Russian troops again arrived in Tbilisi . This time the Russians informed the Persian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Khan Kalantar that they were planning to defend Georgia. This represented an act of aggression for Persia, because with it Georgia one of the best provinces was to be removed from Persia.

In this situation, Persia sought European allies against Russia for the first time in its history and entered into an alliance with the British . After the death of Tsar Paul I, the Russian policy towards Persia became even more aggressive. The border between the two powers saw Tsar Alexander I and his commanders, Plato and Walerian Zubov, and Tsizianov, along the Kura and the Aras , which meant that they claimed even more Persian territories for Russia. Tsizianov, who despised the Persians and Muslims in general, threatened the Baku, Shaki , Shirvan and Karabakh khanates . In Ganja, the Russians massacred between 1,500 and 3,000 inhabitants, turned the largest mosque into a church, and gave the city the new name Elisavetpol. Zizianow also planned to annex Choy , Tabriz and Gilan and undermined any peace-making efforts.

In the spring of 1804, Tsizianov threatened the city of Yerevan . The first confrontation of the Russo-Persian War (1804–1813) took place here on July 1 , although the outcome was unclear. Contrary to Russian expectations, the war was long and expensive. Zizianow drove him forward against the wishes of the Tsar, who was campaigning against Napoleon . The alliance with the British was useless for Persia, as they were now allied with Russia against Napoleon. In May 1807, Persia therefore entered into an alliance with the French that was directed directly against Russia. Even before the French mission under Claude-Matthieu, Comte de Gardane arrived in Persia, France and Russia were allies again. The alliance was dissolved again after successful unsuccessful mediation attempts.

Fath Ali Shah entered into a new alliance with the British , but from 1812 they were allied with Russia. After Napoleon's defeat, Russia was able to focus on the war with Persia again. For Abbas Mirza , heir to the throne , defeat was foreseeable due to the great technical superiority of the Russian army. Therefore, on October 14, 1813, a peace agreement brokered by the British was signed in Kurdistan . With this agreement, Persia lost most of its Caucasian provinces, accepted that only Russia could have warships in the Caspian Sea and that Russia could help determine the succession to the throne in Persia. The border was also defined, albeit so indistinctly that differences of opinion were inevitable. In 1814, Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza signed an agreement with Great Britain in which the British assured Persia financial support or military assistance from India in the event that Persia would be attacked by a European power. British officers began assisting War Minister Mirza Abulqasem Qaim Maqam in modernizing the army. On the other hand, there does not seem to have been any awareness of the huge technical and economic lag behind Russia at the Shah's court.

Drawing with Russian troops in Isfahan, 1919

The Russian Foreign Minister Karl Robert von Nesselrode sent General Alexei Petrovich Yermolov to the Caucasus as commander in chief to improve relations with Persia. Yermolov, however, despised the Persians like Zizianov before him, appeared arrogant and tyrannical as if he wanted to provoke war, disregarded etiquette and confronted Fath Ali Shah with demands that he could not possibly meet. He reported to St. Petersburg that Russia should not return any territory to Persia in order not to diminish Russia's reputation among the Caucasus peoples. In 1818 Yermolov recommended to Tsar Alexander I not to recognize Abbas Mirza as heir to the throne; however, the tsar chose to ignore Yermolov's recommendation. A few years later, Count Ivan Fyodorowitsch Paskewitsch , himself an imperialist and expansionist, criticized Yermolov's Iran policy as harmful. In 1825 Tsar Nicholas I sent Prince Alexander Sergejewitsch Mensikov to Persia in view of the unrest surrounding his accession to the throne to inform the Shah of the accession of the new Tsar and to stabilize relations between them. Menshikov's visit in 1826 coincided with the publication of a fatwa in Kerbala by Aqa Sayyed Mahammad Isfahani , who had called for jihad in the face of Yermolov's violence in the Caucasus and the waves of refugees from Caucasian Muslims and Christians to Persia . Under pressure from the clergy, Menshikov received a cool reception. Instructions from Tsar Nicholas I to make peace with Persia in order to be able to deal with open questions in relations with the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans were ignored by Yermolov. With the occupation of Mirak in the Yerevan Khanate, Yermolov provoked the Second Persian-Russian War , which the Persians started with an attack on July 28, 1826. After the initial success of the Persian troops, the war ended in a clear defeat for Abbas Mirza. In the peace treaty concluded in Turkmanchai on February 22, 1828 , Persia lost further territories to Russia, and in an attached trade agreement the Russians secured the right to open business anywhere in Persia, the Persian officials without the permission of a Russian state representative were not allowed to enter. In addition, Persia had to agree that Russian citizens were not subject to Persian jurisdiction.

After the war, Alexander Sergejewitsch Griboyedow was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary of Russia in Tehran. Griboyedov had views similar to Yermolov and Paskevich, but avoided the excesses of his predecessors. But he too disregarded etiquette and tried to persuade Persia to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. Above all, however, he tried to persuade Caucasian refugees in Persia to return home, even if they did not want to. Griboyedov stormed the houses of Georgians and Armenians who had converted to Islam and who were partly in the service of the Persian state. In February 1829 he gave refuge to the eunuch Jakub Markanian and captured some women from the harem of the former Prime Minister Allahyar Khan Asaf Al-Daula . After rumors circulated that Jakub Markanian had fallen away from Islam and that the women were being forced to do the same, the Russian embassy in Tehran was ransacked by an angry mob, which only one of the many embassy workers survived. In St. Petersburg, it was clear that Griboyedov had provoked the incident. Since Russia was preparing for war against the Turks, it wanted peace with Persia and on August 24, 1829 accepted the apology from Fath Ali Shah, which his son Khusran Mirza had brought.

Great game

Griboyedov's successor in Tehran, Count Iwan Osipowitsch Simonitsch, supported Abbas Mirza and, from 1834, his son Mohammed Shah in his ambitions to expand Persian influence in Khorasan and today's Afghanistan . His plans for an alliance of Tehran, Kabul and Kandahar under Russian patronage were put aside when Britain openly threatened war if Russia expanded too much towards India. After losing the Crimean War , Russia expanded greatly into Central Asia, annexing areas that Persia regarded as its territory. In December 1869, the Russian envoy AF Beger simply announced that Russia recognized Persian rule as far as the Atrak River . The Russian advance in Central Asia resulted in Persia being drawn into the Great Game , in which Britain and Russia vied for influence in Central Asia. Great Britain agreed to support Persia, but Persia could not do anything against the annexation of Sarach and Merw by Russia. Russia's expansion, in turn, was halted only by British threats.

In parallel with territorial expansion, Russia and England tried to dominate Persia economically. Russia protested sharply when, in 1872, the British citizen Julius de Reuter received an extensive concession ; after this was withdrawn, the Russian Baron von Falkenhagen received a similar concession, which was revoked after British protests. All foreign attempts to build factories, traffic routes or dams in Persia failed due to the influence of a rival power. There was no economic development in Persia. Since Persia became indebted by granting and withdrawing concessions, Russia granted numerous loans to the Persian government. From 1898 onwards, on the initiative of the Russian Finance Minister Sergei Juljewitsch Witte, numerous Russian projects in the mining and transport sector began, and the Russians gained considerable influence over Mozaffar ad-Din Shah . The country's first road was laid by the Russians and led from Anzali via Qazvin to Tehran . The first railways on Iranian territory were also built by Russia, these were the connections between Jolfa and Tabriz and between Ashkhabad and Ghuchan . Tea, today's national drink of the country, also reached Persia via Russia and was considered a symbol of modernity at the beginning of the 20th century. Many Iranians were employed in Baku's burgeoning oil industry; they transported ideas back into the country via other forms of society. Some innovations came to Persia via Russia. The British bought the oil concession in the south of Persia, but their influence waned. Even after the revolution of 1905 , Russian influence increased through more loans, additional consulates in Persian cities, and incentives for Russian citizens to settle on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea.

The Constitutional Revolution in Persia was therefore also a mutiny against Russian influence. After the death of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah, Mohammed Ali Shah needed the Cossack Brigade commanded by Russian officers , the elite unit of the Persian army at the time, in order to be able to keep himself on the throne. After the practical partition of Persia in the Russian-British Treaty of Saint Petersburg , Russia treated its sphere of influence like a Russian province, its consulates took over government power, collected taxes and the American financial advisor Morgan Shuster was dismissed as a result of Russian pressure. This marked the end of the constitutionalist movement.

Three weeks after the October Revolution , the young Soviet government announced that it would withdraw the partition of Persia, withdraw Russian troops and restore power over their future to the Persians. In 1919, Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Lev Karachan informed the Persian government that the Soviet Union would cancel all debts, transfer Russian property in Persia to the Persian government, and resolve some other problems. The British took advantage of the freedom the Soviet Union left them and tried to conclude a treaty with Persia that would have made the country practically a protectorate. The Soviet government condemned this treaty as the enslavement of Persia; The relocation of British troops to northern Persia was one of the triggers of the Jangali revolt .

The Russian civil war led to a reduction in official Persian-Russian exchanges. On May 18, 1920, Russian troops landed in Anzali to bring back some of the counter-revolutionary ships. However, despite a request from the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, the troops did not withdraw. Their presence encouraged the Jangali movement to expand their activities, making them dangerous for Tehran. Foreign Minister Firuz Mirza asked the British for help, but they replied that there was nothing they could do. In direct contact, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin replied that there were no Soviet troops in Persia. Since the British repeatedly refused to help of any kind and referred to the broken treaty, the Persians saw that Tehran could easily be attacked from the north. Indeed, the Jangali under Mirza Kutschak Khan and Ihsan-Allah Khan , now supported by Bolsheviks from Baku, proclaimed the Soviet republic of Gilan and launched an offensive towards Tehran, which failed. Again, it was only pressure from London that made Moscow give in: the British threatened Lenin not to trade with the Soviet Union if it did not end its revolutionary activities in Asia.

Relationships from the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty to the end of the Soviet Union

On February 26, 1921, Chicherin and the Persian Foreign Minister Mushavir al-Mamalik signed the Soviet-Iranian friendship treaty with 26 articles in Moscow . This treaty reversed the policy of the tsarist government, the Soviet Union renounced all colonial privileges, the treaties of Golestan and Turkmanchai were annulled and the surrenders were abolished. However, the Soviet Union secured extensive powers to combat threats to its borders on Iranian territory. This article, intended to allow the Red Army to fight White Army units even after they had withdrawn across the border, was used by the Soviet Union in 1941 as a license to occupy Iranian territory. The treaty was signed a few days after the Cossack Brigade coup , which led to a new government with Reza Khan as Minister of War. Reza Khan got Britain to withdraw its troops from southern Persia so the Soviet Union had no justification for stationing soldiers in Gilan. Moscow got Baku to stop its support for the Jangali, so that by the end of 1921 there were no more foreign soldiers in Persia.

After World War II and the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran , both Iran and the United States viewed the Soviet Union as a threat. They allied themselves against the spread of communism in the Middle East; Iran became the US's most important partner in the Middle East. The border with the Soviet Union was closed because both sides were not interested in an exchange of ideas. The USA set up observation posts in Iran; in order not to provoke the Soviet Union, the Shah refrained from deploying missiles. He procured vehicles from the Soviet Union for his armaments program and had the Isfahan steelworks built by the Soviet Union. The Soviets discreetly supported the Iranian Tudeh party , but viewed the Shah's regime as too stable to be able to bring about an overthrow.

The Soviet government was all the more surprised when the Islamic revolution overthrew the Shah. However, it was unable to fill the vacuum left by the US because it was too busy even in Afghanistan and because Iran under Khomeini wanted to be neither West nor East and was thus anti-American and anti-Soviet at the same time. Under Khomeini relations with the Soviet Union were particularly hostile, Khomeini used the term Little Satan for them , while the term Great Satan was reserved for the USA . At the same time, the Soviet Union was aware that Islam and Islamism were an ideology more attractive to Muslims in the Middle East and the Soviet Union than communism. After the success of the Islamic revolution, numerous members of the Tudeh were executed from 1983 onwards. The Soviet leadership did nothing about it. During the Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet Union supported Iraq, but still conducted secret negotiations with Iran over the supply of military equipment. Khomeini condemned Soviet materialist atheism but did nothing else against the Soviet Union. When political changes had to be initiated in the Soviet Union, Khomeini tried to export his top-level revolution to the Soviet Union. On January 1, 1989, Khomeini wrote a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev , in which he explained to him that both the West and the East were ideologically bankrupt, and that the Soviet Union had abandoned Marxist fantasies, but was not going to the prison of great Satan should go. He declared that the problem of the Soviet Union was a long and useless struggle against God, the origin of creation and existence, and recommended works by al-Fārābī , Avicenna , ibn Arabi and Suhrawardi . He announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran as the largest and most powerful base in the Islamic world could help the Soviet Union to fill the vacuum created with Islamic values.

Relationships since the end of the Cold War

Putin and Rouhani 2013 in Bishkek

After the end of the Cold War , Iran and Russia under Boris Yeltsin entered a phase of pragmatic and strategic cooperation. For Russia, financial and opportunistic motives predominated. During mutual visits in 1989, military cooperation was agreed to limit US influence in the Persian Gulf. Russia appreciated that the Iranian side emphasized the importance of the territorial integrity of Russia and pledged not to support the Chechen separatists in the First Chechen War . In 1995 Russia accepted the order to complete the unfinished Bushehr nuclear power plant , which had been damaged in the Iraq-Iran war , and cooperation in natural gas and oil production was agreed. In the year XXX Mohammad Khatami visited Moscow and promised the Russian leadership to cooperate in the fight against Islamist movements in the former Soviet republics. Again, a military cooperation directed against the political influence of the USA was agreed. Russia and Iran subsequently cooperated in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and in settling the civil war in Tajikistan .

Despite the cooperation, the two states have plenty of potential for conflict. Russia, Iran and the other countries bordering the Caspian Sea are arguing over the status of the waters and, above all, the rights to the raw materials that are suspected to be underneath. Several times there were dangerous confrontations between Russian and Iranian warships. Russian efforts to resolve the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program have failed. Despite all promises of cooperation, Russia's relations with the West were more important and it supported the imposition and repeated tightening of sanctions because of the nuclear program, even if it only implemented them half-heartedly.

In 2007 Russian President Putin visited Iran and promised to deliver fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Also, the 1921 treaty was updated and Putin promised to deliver S-300s . In the months that followed, a game of confusion developed in which the Iranian side announced the procurement of the S-300 several times and Russia denied it. Selling the S-300 to Iran was tricky for Russia in that Iran wanted to protect itself from a potential Israeli attack; However , to the great displeasure of Iran, Israel and Russia have good relations. The first components of the S-300 system were only delivered in 2016. The completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was delayed several times by several years, which the Iranian leadership was angry about.

Moscow congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad immediately after his re-election in 2009 , which was followed by months of protests . Moscow described Ahmadinejad's second presidency as legitimate, while the protests were also directed against Russia. A poll in the same year showed that more than 90% of Iranians have a bad opinion of Russia. Russia is interested in strong anti-American leadership in Iran, whereas it does not want a nuclear-armed Iran either . There are forces within the political leadership of Iran who are in favor of an alliance with Russia and forces who instead seek normalization with the Western states, especially the USA. This is shown not least of all by negative reactions when Iran made an Iranian air force base available to Russian fighter jets for their use in Syria in the summer of 2016, and when the general permit was withdrawn.

Web links

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Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b Mark N. Katz : Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 167 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Bernard Hourcade : Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 210 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 314 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 315 f .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 316 f .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 318 f .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 322 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 320 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 324 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 325 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 326 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 327 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 329 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 331 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 332 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 333 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 334 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 336 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 335 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 337 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 338 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 339 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 340 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 341 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 342 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 343 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 344 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 345 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 346 .
↑ ^a ^b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 347 .
↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 348 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 211 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 168 .
↑ Rouhollah Ramazani Karegar: Iran's export of the Revolution . In: Rouhollah Karegar Ramazani (ed.): Independence without freedom: Iran's foreign policy . University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville 2013, ISBN 978-0-8139-3498-3 , pp. 135 .
↑ ^a ^b Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 212 .
^ Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 169 .
^ Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 170 .
↑ ^a ^b Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 213 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 171 .
↑ Parts of the Russian S-300 air defense system arrived in Iran. Der Standard, April 11, 2016, accessed March 2, 2018 .
^ Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 176 .
↑ Gudrun Harrer : Trump welds Russia, Iran and Assad together. Der Standard, April 11, 2017, accessed March 2, 2018 .

[Katz167-1] Mark N. Katz : Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 167 .

[Hourcade210-2] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Bernard Hourcade : Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 210 .

[Kazemzadeh314-3] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 314 .

[Kazemzadeh315-4] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 315 f .

[Kazemzadeh316-5] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 316 f .

[Kazemzadeh318-6] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 318 f .

[Kazemzadeh322-7] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 322 .

[Kazemzadeh320-8] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 320 .

[Kazemzadeh324-9] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 324 .

[Kazemzadeh325-10] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 325 .

[Kazemzadeh326-11] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 326 .

[Kazemzadeh327-12] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 327 .

[Kazemzadeh329-13] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 329 .

[Kazemzadeh331-14] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 331 .

[Kazemzadeh332-15] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 332 .

[Kazemzadeh333-16] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 333 .

[Kazemzadeh334-17] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 334 .

[Kazemzadeh336-18] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 336 .

[Kazemzadeh335-19] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 335 .

[Kazemzadeh337-20] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 337 .

[Kazemzadeh338-21] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 338 .

[Kazemzadeh339-22] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 339 .

[Kazemzadeh340-23] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 340 .

[Kazemzadeh341-24] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 341 .

[Kazemzadeh342-25] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 342 .

[Kazemzadeh343-26] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 343 .

[Kazemzadeh344-27] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 344 .

[Kazemzadeh345-28] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 345 .

[Kazemzadeh346-29] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 346 .

[Kazemzadeh347-30] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 347 .

[Kazemzadeh348-31] Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 348 .

[Hourcade211-32] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 211 .

[Katz168-33] Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 168 .

[34] Rouhollah Ramazani Karegar: Iran's export of the Revolution . In: Rouhollah Karegar Ramazani (ed.): Independence without freedom: Iran's foreign policy . University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville 2013, ISBN 978-0-8139-3498-3 , pp. 135 .

[Hourcade212-35] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 212 .

[Katz169-36] Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 169 .

[Katz170-37] Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 170 .

[Hourcade213-38] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 213 .

[Katz171-39] Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 171 .

[40] Parts of the Russian S-300 air defense system arrived in Iran. Der Standard, April 11, 2016, accessed March 2, 2018 .

[Katz176-41] Mark N. Katz: Iran and Russia . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-82743-0 , pp. 176 .

[42] Gudrun Harrer : Trump welds Russia, Iran and Assad together. Der Standard, April 11, 2017, accessed March 2, 2018 .