Iranian nuclear program

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Map with the most important locations of the Iranian nuclear policy

According to the official announcement, the Iranian nuclear program includes efforts to supplement the country's energy supply with the use of nuclear energy . These efforts were already started in 1959. The work was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution and the First Gulf War. On August 21, 2010, the Bushehr nuclear power plant was officially opened by the Iranian leadership; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, also IAEA) names July 20, 2011 as the start of commercial power generation.

However, Iran was suspected of engaging in the development of nuclear weapons . According to US data, Iran operated  a corresponding nuclear program until the late 1970s - until the end of the government under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi . Abdul Kadir Khan , a developer of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, admitted in 2004 that he had sold plans for gas centrifuges to Iran in the late 1980s. The government denied the development of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear program was only being used peacefully. An enrichment level of at least 85 percent is required for an atomic bomb, an enrichment level of 20 percent is required for the production of medical isotopes for cancer treatment . The first call for nuclear weapons development came from Rafsanjani in 1988 .

history

The world's second largest deposits of fossil energy sources ( oil and natural gas combined) are located in the soil of Iran . The then Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi thought about their limitations as early as the 1960s and came to the conclusion that crude oil was too precious to burn for energy. In his New Year address of March 21, 1974, the Shah declared:

We will use nuclear and alternative energy sources as soon as possible to reserve oil for chemical and petrochemical products. We shouldn't just use oil, this precious substance, as ordinary fuel. "

In its long-term planning from 1972 to 1992, the state planning authority assumed a global energy shortage, for which it blamed the energy policy of the western industrialized countries, whose economic development depended almost entirely on cheap fossil fuels. Iran wanted to significantly reduce the amount of energy obtained by burning oil in favor of nuclear energy, gas and hydropower. According to this plan, in 1992 nuclear energy should cover 15.5% of total energy consumption in the country.

Beginnings

Newspaper clipping from 1968 with the headline: "25% of Iranian nuclear scientists are women"

The foundation stone of the Iranian nuclear program was laid with US help. In 1959, the University of Tehran was donated a research reactor as part of the Atoms for Peace program by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower . In 1967 another research reactor ( light water reactor ) with an output of 5 megawatts was delivered from the USA and put into operation in the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). On July 1, 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , which entered into force for Iran on March 5, 1970 after the ratification was deposited with the signatory states. According to the treaty, signatory states have the right to use nuclear energy exclusively for civil purposes. Any military use is prohibited and threatened with sanctions. 1974 was Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) established under the leadership of Akbar Etemad.

Akbar Etemad - born 1931 in Hamedan - studied in Lausanne and Paris in the 1950s / 1960s, received his doctorate in 1963 and became head of the Nuclear Reactor Shielding research group at the Institute for Nuclear Shielding at the Federal Institute for Reactor Research in Würenlingen / CH. His specialty was neutron physics. Akbar Etemad returned to his homeland in 1965. As head of the research group for nuclear energy, he put a research reactor of 5 megawatts into operation.

In 1967 he was appointed Vice Minister in the Ministry of Research and Science. Etemad initiated two new universities: an open university and the Avicenna Institute in Hamedan. Akbar Etemad was supposed to run Avicenna University. At that moment Etemad was appointed by the Shah to head the Iranian nuclear program. Akbar Etemad asked for two weeks to think about it and wrote a memorandum in which he stipulated the guidelines under which he would take on this task. The organization must be granted absolute independence from the government.

A nuclear program cannot be dictated; a pragmatic approach, the necessary money, the necessary infrastructure and time for research are required. Furthermore, good political relationships with other nuclear states and stable conditions in the country are required. The 16-page paper was accepted by the Shah. Akbar Etemad subsequently got a free hand. In 1974 he founded the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency (AEOI) and became its first president. Within half a year he had a team of around 100 people together for the organization and could start planning. In a second step, the research reactor and laboratories were transferred from the university to the new organization.

The construction of nuclear facilities required conditions that were not easy to meet in Iran. The reactors needed considerable amounts of water, they had to be connected to a transport system, even for heavy equipment, and they had to be connected to the country's power grid, but as far away as possible from densely populated areas. In addition, there should be no earthquakes in the area (for earthquake hazard see Iranian plate ).

Initial analyzes showed that there are no more than ten places to build a nuclear facility in Iran. Preparations for the construction of nuclear facilities began in three locations: Bushehr on the Persian Gulf, Darkhovin on the Karun and in an area near Zayandeh Rud, southwest of Isfahan .

In 1975, the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed the National Security Decision Memorandum 292 on American-Iranian cooperation in the field of nuclear technology. It provided for the sale of over $ 6 billion worth of nuclear technology to Iran. Until the 1970s, several agreements were reached between the USA and Iran on this matter. 1976 Iran was offered a plant for extraction of plutonium to buy from the US and operate. The agreement covered a complete nuclear cycle . In October 1976, President Gerald Ford withdrew that offer . Since the negotiations with the USA could not be concluded, German and French companies got their chance.

In order to ensure the supply of the Iranian reactors with enriched uranium, as a result of Franco-Iranian negotiations in 1975 the ten percent Swedish share in Eurodif , a European uranium enrichment company , was transferred to Iran. The "Sofidif" (Société franco-iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse) was founded, which took a 25% stake in Eurodif and thus enabled Iran to acquire a ten percent stake in Eurodif. As early as 1974, Iran had made the payment of one billion US dollars available for the construction of the enrichment plant (the commitment was increased by a further 180 million US dollars in 1977 - after the increase in construction costs) and thus the right of first refusal for 10%. secured for later production. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran stopped making payments. In 1991, an agreement was reached with the French government on the repayment of the down payment made and the suspension of Iranian rights to supply enriched uranium: France reimbursed Iran 1.6 billion US dollars, in return Iran waived any supply of enriched uranium.

In addition to the cooperation agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany (1976) and France (1977), Iran acquired shares in a newly discovered uranium mine in southwest Africa, today Namibia , operated by the British Rio Tinto Group and the German uranium company. Today the French company Cogema , E.ON , STEAG and EnBW hold shares in the uranium company.

First nuclear power plants

Despite the US and French involvement, it was West German companies that signed a contract in 1974 to build Iran's first nuclear power plant near the city of Bushehr . The German Kraftwerk-Union AG , which was supposed to build the reactor, had signed a contract with the Soviet Union that was supposed to secure the supply of enriched uranium for the next 10 years after the reactor was put into operation.

However, work on the construction of the reactor was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the First Gulf War. The construction of the first of two nuclear power plants in Darkhwin with 935 megawatts by French companies did not go beyond preparatory work.

In 1984 Iran began - by then , Ruhollah Khomeini had declared atomic energy to be “un-Islamic” and prohibited all research work - with the commissioning of a new research center near Isfahan. After the end of the war with Iraq, from 1990 onwards, new foreign partners were also sought. a. China and Pakistan , wanted. On January 21, 1991, Iran signed a contract with China to build another small 27-kilowatt research reactor in Isfahan. The purchase of a small calutron from China is also said to have been agreed. In 1995, Iran signed an agreement with Russia to complete the Bushehr reactor, which lasted until 2010.

Nuclear facilities

Tehran

The Tehran Research Reactor with a capacity of 5 MW was built in 1967 with the help of the United States . It was designed for operation with fuel elements, the filling of which consisted of uranium enriched to 93% 235 U. The USA supplied the first fuel rods, which stopped all supplies after the Islamic revolution. From 1987 a contract was negotiated with Argentina for the delivery of fuel elements; to do this, the reactor was converted to operate with 20% enriched uranium . The delivery of 115.8 kg of enriched uranium took place in 1993. After the fuel for this reactor would run out within a year, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced on February 7, 2010 that the fuel for it would be enriched at the Natanz nuclear facility to want.

Bushehr

The Bushehr nuclear power plant is located 17 kilometers south of the city of the same name on the Persian Gulf . It is primarily intended to supply the inland city of Shiraz with energy.

In 1974 joined the West German Kraftwerk Union AG , a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken , signed a contract on the construction in the amount of four to six billion dollars from. ThyssenKrupp AG was commissioned to build the two reactor cores - construction began on May 1, 1975 . The construction work was originally supposed to be completed by 1982.

Construction was interrupted in January 1979 after the country's economy came to a virtual standstill during the Islamic Revolution. In July, the Kraftwerk-Union withdrew from the project because Iran was in arrears. The company had received $ 2.5 billion by then. At this point in time, one reactor was around 85 percent complete and the other 50 percent complete. During the First Gulf War , both reactor blocks under construction were badly damaged by several Iraqi air strikes from 1985 to 1987.

In 1995 Iran signed an agreement with Russia to complete the Bushehr reactor. Negotiations on this began in 1990. The construction is being carried out by the Russian Atomstroiexport concern , which is subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). The plant was originally supposed to go into operation in the course of 2005. In January 2006 the Russian company announced that it would continue work in Bushehr regardless of the escalation in the nuclear dispute. According to various statements, 3,000 to 3,700 Russian technicians will work on the project. By the beginning of January 2008, more than half of the nuclear fuel required for commissioning should have been delivered from the Russian side. The rest (38 t) should be delivered by the end of the next month. The reactor was equipped with fuel rods for the first time on August 21, 2010, and all 163 fuel rods were to be installed in the reactor by September 5, 2010. The installation of the fuel assemblies began on October 26, 2010. On February 25, 2011, it was announced that all 163 fuel assemblies would have to be removed again. On September 4, 2011, the Buschehr nuclear power plant was connected to the power grid for the first time.

At the end of May 2012, state television announced that Iran was planning to build at least two new 1000 MW plants near the existing Bushehr nuclear power plant. The new nuclear power plants are already at an early planning stage.

Natanz

Air defense position near Natanz (2006)

The underground facility at Natanz, protected by anti-aircraft systems , is located about 225 km south-southeast of Tehran in the arid center of the country. Iran is running a uranium enrichment project here . According to the IAEA, Iran obtained instructions from Pakistan in the 1980s for the construction of centrifuges with which the uranium can be enriched until it is ready for use in weapons. Was involved in it u. a. the engineer Abdul Kadir Khan , who is responsible for developing the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and distributing it to other countries. According to information from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the system can accommodate up to 50,000 gas centrifuges . According to information from the IAEA on February 22, 2007, 300 centrifuges were in operation there, which is far from sufficient for enrichment on an industrial scale.

According to Iranian statements, uranium in Natanz should only be enriched to a degree of 3.5 percent, which would be sufficient for nuclear power plant fuel, but not for military use. An enrichment level of over 85 percent is typically required to build an atom bomb.

In 2003, a confidential IAEA report came to light which stated that samples of weapons-grade uranium from Natanz had been found. At that time, Iran blamed contaminated imported equipment. This representation was later confirmed by independent research.

On April 9, 2007, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad announced at the Natanz plant that Iran could now enrich uranium on an industrial scale. In November 2009 Iran had produced 1,800 kg uranium enriched to 3.5% - of the 8,000 centrifuges installed, around half were not in operation. On February 9, 2010, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced that the production of uranium enriched to 20% had started in Natanz. According to its own information, Iran needs around 120 kg of this material to operate a research reactor in Tehran. Now three to five kilograms of uranium enriched to 20% are to be produced every month, the Tehran Research Reactor would need 1.5 kg of this.

Fordo / Qom

In September 2009, a few days before a long-awaited meeting between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, Iran informed the IAEA that the country was building a second uranium enrichment facility. The nuclear facility Fordo at Qom is because of their maximum 3000 centrifuge limited capacity of an exclusively military purpose ( high enrichment assumed). On October 25, 2009, four IAEA inspectors visited the facility. The plant in Fordo was put into operation in late 2011 / early 2012. By November, 16 cascades had been installed with a total of 2784 centrifuges, stationed in two production halls. Eight cascades were installed in UNIT 1 by November 2012, but not yet prepared for assembly. In UNIT 2, four cascades are in operation and four more are prepared for equipping. By November 2012, Iran had enriched 95.5 kg of uranium to 20% in Fordo. The IAEA confirms the information provided by Iran. The IAEA oversees the Fordo facility. The centrifuges used in Fordo, called “IR-1” in the IAEA report, are said to be technically outdated and prone to failure. Two more modern types are to run in a test facility, three other types of which the IAEA is aware are not yet being tested. Iran is therefore below its capabilities when it comes to uranium enrichment. The closure of the plant in Fordo is one of the demands of the P5 + 1 (group of 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) on Iran. On January 21, 2013, according to Reza Khalili (a pseudonym), there was a serious explosion in the facility. The IAEA declared on January 30, 2013 that there was no explosion in Fordo, thereby confirming the Iranian denial.

Isfahan

The university city of Isfahan is considered the center of Iranian nuclear research ; there is a plant for the production of fuel rods . In the Isfahan plants, uranium can also be converted into gaseous uranium hexafluoride - a necessary raw material for enriched uranium.

According to information from GlobalSecurity.org, gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment are partly imported and partly built in a factory in Isfahan. Accordingly, they will be tested in the Kaladsche plant in Ab-Ali in order to finish them off in Natanz.

Arak

IR-40 reactor, part of the Arak nuclear facility

Near Arak is heavy water for moderation made of reactors. According to official information, construction of the facility began in 1996. Its existence was confirmed in December 2002 by satellite imagery released by the Institute for Science and International Security ( ISIS ). A heavy water reactor, the IR-40, is also under construction here. Construction details are not known, but it is very likely (see IR-40 for details ) that it is a pressure tube reactor . This construction basically enables the continuous extraction of weapons plutonium in addition to normal operation.

Karaj

In Karaj (approx. 40 kilometers northwest of Tehran) there is a nuclear research center for agriculture and medicine, which is said to have had a 30 MeV cyclotron supplied by Belgium and an isotope separation system bought by China since 1995 . In the late 1990s, representatives of the National Council of Resistance of Iran reported that a reactor was being built near Karaj. Russian and Chinese experts are said to be supporting the projects in Karaj. The city is also considered the center of the Iranian missile industry .

In Laschgarabad and Ramandeh, two villages near Karaj, there are said to be uranium enrichment plants that are hidden behind trees in an orchard and are shielded by security personnel. GlobalSecurity.org analysts believe that these facilities are designed to keep uranium enrichment going in the event that Natanz is bombed. The facility is associated with laser enrichment .

Uranium mining

Iran has its own uranium deposits, e.g. B. at Yazd , Anarak and in Gchine . Uranium ore is currently being mined in a mine near Saghand .

Exploration program

An exploration program was started in Iran in the mid-1970s and lasted for about two decades. The prospecting was operated with varying degrees of intensity, the nuclear program was also stopped for a while.

First of all, geophysical methods and field studies were used to prospect around a third (650,000 km²) of the area of ​​the Iranian national territory. The data obtained was made available by the executing company both digitally and as geological mapping. AEOI and IAEA were involved in this work.

On the basis of the data obtained during the prospecting, the most promising areas in the central region were examined more closely . A total of 1,367 tons of uranium were detected in the Saghand 1 and 2 deposits and around 200 tons of uranium were suspected in Bandarabass and Talmesi. The estimated production costs are between 80 and 130 USD / kg uranium oxide (yellowcake).

geology

The uranium deposits in Iran belong to three different types of deposits :

  1. Feldspar - amphibole - metasomatic deposits
  2. Hydrothermal - Metasomatic Ganger Ore Deposits
  3. Hydrothermal polymetallic deposits

The first two come from Pan-African deposit formation, including the Saghand, Narigan, Sechahun and Zarigan deposits. The occurrences of Talmessi, Choschumi, Kale-Kafi and Arusan are of alpine origin.

Saghand mine

The Saghand mine is about 185 km northeast of Yasd. The preliminary exploration was completed in 1990 and the deposit was examined in detail until 1994. The entire deposit is divided into Saghand 1 and 2 sub-deposits. Proven reserves were stated in the report of the 2003 symposium with 1.58 million tons of ore with a uranium content of 533 ppm. This would correspond to 842 tons of uranium, which contradicts the figure from the 2002 report with 1367 tons.

Until 1997, development and feasibility studies were carried out for the Saghand project. In November 2004, the IAEA determined that the surface facilities and the infrastructure were practically complete and the alignment of the deposit had begun. Ore mining was expected to start in late 2006 . Annual production should be 50 tons of yellow cake .

processing

The uranium processing plant in Gchine (near Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf ) is estimated to produce 21 tons of uranium annually. Nevertheless, what is necessary in the reactors was uranium dioxide previously mostly imported. At the end of 2005, Iranian chemists declared that a plant had been built for the first time to extract large quantities of uranium oxide from raw uranium. A test facility for the production of uranium oxide has been in Ardakan since 2003, possibly only since 2004 .

Other plants

The military facility in Parchin is considered a possible location for atomic experiments. Research reactors are operated in Tehran, Ramsar and Bonab . In the complex of Lavisan several buildings were demolished and leveled before they could be examined by IAEA inspectors. The Iranian authorities refused to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to take soil samples. There are storage facilities for nuclear waste in Anarak and Qom, among others.

In 1992, Iran and China signed an agreement to build two 360-megawatt reactors near Ahwas in Khuzestan Province (western Iran). The construction of these large-scale power plants has not yet started, it is being planned, but no relevant entries have been published in the IAEA database at the moment. By 2017 [obsolete] Iran wants to build a 360 MW nuclear power plant (see Darkhovin nuclear power plant ) on its own. The decision was taken at the beginning of 2005. According to the parliamentary resolution, further nuclear power plants with a total output of 20,000 MW are to be built.

On March 6, 1990, a contract was signed between Iran and the Soviet Union to build two VVER-440 / 213s. The reactors were to be built in Gorgan . However, the geological conditions were unsuitable for a nuclear power plant.

Timeline of controversy

2002-2004

In 2002 it became known that Iran had nuclear facilities that had been hidden from the IAEA, including in Natanz and Arak. The secret service contacts of the journalist Seymour Hersh , statements by Iranian dissidents and military intelligence using satellite photography played a role.

On December 18, 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty through negotiator Ali Akbar Salehi, but has not yet ratified it. The additional protocol adopted by the IAEA in 1997 supplements the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. B. Carry out unannounced controls that were deemed necessary on the basis of experience with Iraq's nuclear armament plans after the Second Gulf War . The government in Tehran initially allowed IAEA inspections and even temporarily stopped uranium enrichment.

In March 2004, the IAEA asked Tehran to disclose all plans and information on its nuclear program by June. However, Iran did not comply with this demand in the following period.

In 2007 the report surfaced that the Iranian leadership had already tried to accommodate Washington in 2003 with an extensive "roadmap". Via the Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann , she had sent Washington a list of points through which she allegedly wanted to achieve a balance: In addition to extensive cooperation in the war on terrorism , Tehran provided "full transparency" on the issue of the development of weapons of mass destruction and the " full cooperation ”with the IAEA in prospect, the so-called Swiss Memorandum . According to Michael Rubin, Guldimann could have written the memorandum without involving the Iranian leadership.

2005

change of direction

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in September 2007

With the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on August 3, 2005 as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program intensified. The previous chief negotiator, Hassan Rohani , a moderate reformer, was removed from his post on August 18, 2005 and replaced by Ali Larijani , an opponent of reform. At the same time, the head of state Ali Khamene'i issued a fatwa in August banning the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and announced it to the IAEA. In mid-December 2005, President Ahmadinejad approved a law that would allow the country to suspend international control of its nuclear facilities at any time. The hardliners in the Tehran leadership have also been calling for the complete termination of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for some time.

The Ahmadinejad government called the position of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) "hypocritical" and "duplicitous" and referred on the one hand to the original goal of the treaty, namely to advance global nuclear disarmament, and on the other hand to the behavior of the three de facto nuclear powers Israel , India and Pakistan who have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. These three states appropriated nuclear weapons in secret projects (Israel 1968, India 1974, Pakistan 1990). According to Deutsche Welle, Israel's admission reduced the pressure of the West (USA and EU) on Iran to absurdity, since Israel joined the IAEA but not the NPT.

Iran vehemently denies its pursuit of nuclear weapons: the nuclear program serves to diversify its energy supply, especially against the background of the doubling of the Iranian population in the past 20 years and global concerns about the depletion of oil supplies. In view of the rising oil prices , it is also of economic interest for Iran to have more oil available for export and to produce electricity domestically with nuclear power. Iran currently consumes around 40 percent of its oil production itself.

The US in particular opposes that Iran does not need a nuclear program, since the country has extensive oil and natural gas reserves and their exploitation is cheaper than efforts to generate nuclear energy. In return, Iran accuses the US of merely wanting to maintain what it believes is Israel's illegal nuclear monopoly in the Middle East .

Two of the main reasons against an Iranian nuclear program are the shift in power in the Middle East to the Iranian side and fears of the Israeli government. High officials of the Iranian government, such as the former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , have repeatedly and publicly threatened the annihilation of the “Zionist regime”, which means the elimination of the Israeli state, which is dubbed the “unjust regime” and “occupying state”. Added to this are the z. Some strongly pronounced fundamentalist structures as well as the support of militant groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah by the government in Tehran, which is considered to be assured in most western media .

This is not the only reason that the IAEA and numerous states, particularly Israel, have increased distrust of the government in Tehran. In particular, uranium enrichment is a so-called dual-use technology , i.e. a process that can be used for both civil and military purposes. However, according to experts, enriched uranium is not required for the current state of Iranian nuclear power generation. Should that be an objection, however - from a purely legal point of view - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself invalidates it: Signatories of this agreement are even entitled to support with uranium enrichment.

Compromise proposals and transparency efforts

Various compromise proposals by the EU and Russia envisaged deliveries of non-weapons-grade nuclear technology to Iran (including light water reactors ), but without any indication of the time and without taking into account the resulting costs for Iran. The condition was that those components of the atomic cycle that could also be used for military purposes were transferred abroad or liquidated. A Russian proposal to carry out uranium enrichment in Russia was rejected by Tehran in late autumn 2005 - like the aforementioned ones - until early 2006. On January 16, 2006, however, the Iranian ambassador in Moscow, Gholam-Reza Ansari, expressly welcomed the proposals of Russian President Vladimir Putin to enrich uranium in Russia. The initiative could allay international concerns about Tehran's nuclear ambitions. The day before, Iranian Foreign Minister Manutschehr Mottaki had accused the EU-3 of “overreacting”, but nevertheless urged them to return to the negotiating table. It remained unclear to numerous observers whether the contradicting signals from Iran are part of a widely assumed strategy of delay.

In January 2005 and again in November, Iran granted the IAEA access to the Parchin military site with the opportunity to visit all the buildings selected by the IAEA in the preliminary negotiations. Sampling revealed no evidence of nuclear material, dual-use equipment, or unusual activity.

2006

EU-3; "Dead point"

As a preliminary climax of the dispute, Iranian uranium enrichment facilities sealed by the IAEA were put back into operation in January 2006. In the event that the UN Security Council is called on , as has now also been announced by the EU, the country threatened to break off all negotiations. The "EU Troika" ( EU-3 ) of the foreign ministers of Great Britain , France and Germany , which was involved in mediating the dispute, saw the negotiations with Tehran "at a dead point".

So far, the IAEA had found no evidence of the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, the then head of the IAEA, Mohammed el-Baradei , noted that Iran had not been able to provide credible evidence over the past three years that its nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes.

France refused to resume negotiations with Iran unless the country "completely suspends" its controversial nuclear program. The French chief of staff, Henri Bentégeat , described military intervention as a serious mistake: “From today's perspective that would be completely crazy,” Bentégeat said in a radio interview. In such a case he warned of a “terrible drama” in the Middle East, but at the same time called the idea that the regime in Tehran could acquire nuclear weapons a “real nightmare”.

A U-turn in France's previous nuclear doctrine meant - albeit only in parts of the insufficiently informed public - statements by the then French President Jacques Chirac , who more or less openly threatened those states with retaliation in the form of nuclear strikes should they attack France with terrorist methods . Without addressing Iran directly, on January 19, 2006, during a visit to the naval base in Ile Longue ( Brittany ) , he announced retaliation to “leaders” of such states in an “unconventional” manner. However, Chirac explicitly alluded to "the temptation of certain states" to "equip themselves with nuclear weapons in breach of the treaties". Neither the reservation nor the terminology was new; What was new was the way of expressing itself calculated on the date - and the obvious addressee -. Nonetheless, Chirac's statements met with some sharp criticism, especially in Germany, and the left-wing party PDS even called for a discussion on this subject in the Bundestag. Among other things, he was accused of violating international law .

The tensions with Iran were also reflected on the stock exchanges : oil prices rose , the gold price even rose to its highest level in 25 years (on January 17, 2006, the troy ounce was traded at 564 US dollars).

Analysis of the BKA

According to a confidential report by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Customs Criminal Police Office (ZKA) that became known at the end of January 2006, Iran is to work intensively on the construction of NBC weapons. According to the news magazine Focus , the report also mentions illegal arms transfers by German companies. As it is said, "evidence of a secret military nuclear program" of Iran is increasing. Customs investigators are investigating six German companies: They are said to have delivered parts via Russia that would be used to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The ZKA confirmed the investigation, but did not want to comment on the details. For the nuclear and delivery system program, however, the Islamic Republic is trying to procure material in Germany, France and Great Britain. The procurement organizations are not easy to expose.

The IAEA resolution of February 4, 2006

Extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna (February 2, 2006)
Dschawad Waidi in front of the press in Vienna (February 4, 2006)

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency decided on February 4, 2006 with 27 votes out of 35 (with three votes against from Cuba, Venezuela and Syria; Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa abstained) to bring the dispute to the UN body . The Iranian leadership immediately declared that it would again enrich uranium on an industrial scale in the future and end its voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. The uranium enrichment program, which was frozen in October 2003, will be restarted “immediately”, said the deputy head of the Iranian Security Council, Jawed Waidi.

The resolution urges Iran to take "confidence-building measures" and "deems it necessary" that Iran u. a.

  1. guarantees the "complete and sustained suspension of all activities in the field of enrichment and reprocessing, including research and development in this regard" and has this checked by the IAEA,
  2. "Rethinking the construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water",
  3. "Ratified and fully implemented the additional protocol [to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] without delay" and
  4. "Pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol signed by Iran on December 18, 2003".

In addition, the resolution instructs the Director General of the IAEA to report on the implementation of these and previous decisions at the beginning of March and, “immediately afterwards”, to report to the UN Security Council - together with any resolutions of the meeting on March 6, 2006 forward.

Jawed Waidi also underlined in Vienna that Iran does not recognize the resolution as an expression of the will of the international community: “More than 100 countries support the Iranian nuclear program, which is in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the positive vote of 27 states cannot be considered representative to be respected for the international community ”.

The Board of Governors' decision was originally expected on February 2nd. The non-aligned countries had caused the delay - they provide 16 of the 35 country representatives on the IAEA Executive Board. The states of this group - including z. B. Cuba, Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa - worry that the crackdown on Iran could set a precedent. The US government is striving to prohibit all states from using uranium enrichment for the production of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants that have not yet mastered this technology. The non-aligned insists, however, on the right of all states to civilian use of atomic energy without any discriminatory restrictions. They had insisted on including in the resolution the demand for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, which would also affect Israel's nuclear arsenal , which is estimated at 100 to 200 warheads . The demand is now contained in the IAEA resolution without addressing Israel directly. However, many UN resolutions already speak of the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East; however, this demand has always been vehemently rejected by the United States. In Israel, people in secret were less impressed with the resolution than was officially announced.

Diplomatic negotiations

The Iranian authorities officially notified the Russian Embassy in Tehran on February 15, 2006 of their intention to host a delegation on February 20 for negotiations and the like. a. on the establishment of a joint venture for uranium enrichment to Moscow. Iran had temporarily suspended the talks originally scheduled for February 16.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that Iran now has a few weeks to stop uranium enrichment. Otherwise, measures that could include sanctions are "as good as inevitable".

The Iranian President Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, commented on the IAEA resolution in a report by the state news agency IRNA with the words: "No matter how many resolutions of this kind you can pass and dream on, you cannot prevent progress in Iran."

The dispute with Iran caused the price of oil to rise further. In Asian trading, a barrel of light US oil rose by just under one US dollar to 66.34 US dollars on February 6, 2006.

On February 13, Iran put into practice its announcement that it would resume uranium enrichment on an industrial scale. Tehran will no longer wait for the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on March 6, announced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's spokesman, Gholamhossein Elham.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with her Egyptian counterpart Ahmed Abul Gheit in Cairo on February 21, 2006

However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made the offer conditional and declared in Vienna on February 13 that Iran must first freeze uranium enrichment in its own country indefinitely. Only when Iran has re-established trust, there could be talks about whether and how the country could set up a comprehensive nuclear energy program. Iranian circles reported that they wanted to prevent the UN Security Council from intervening. The Iranian government spokesman Gholam-Hussein Elham had previously underlined in Tehran that the Russian proposal could only be viewed as a supplement to uranium enrichment in Iran itself.

Iranian controversy

The conservative newspaper Dschomhuri-e Eslami , which is regarded as the mouthpiece of revolutionary leader Seyyed Ali Khamene'i , accused Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of provoking the West, which was ultimately harmful to Iran, as it enabled sanctions to be initiated against Iran. Quote: "Your statements on the nuclear conflict are aggressive and by no means clad in nice words, so that they give the impression that the discussion on the nuclear issue is being conducted with obstinacy".

sabotage

According to an article in the New York Times on August 20, 2008, the CIA is said to have deliberately sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program with the help of three Swiss engineers who were involved in the Khan network. As a result, 50 centrifuges are said to have exploded in the Natanz enrichment plant at the beginning of 2006 due to manipulation of a power supply unit .

2007

Ardeshir Hosseinpour , co-founder of the "Nuclear Technology Center" in Isfahan and a specialist in uranium enrichment, died in January 2007 of gas poisoning under previously unexplained circumstances.

Involvement of the World Security Council

In the meantime, the veto powers China, Russia, France, Great Britain and the USA had agreed on the involvement of the UN Security Council . The foreign ministers of the five veto powers declared on January 31, 2007 in London before the highest body of the UN decides on concrete measures, however, they will wait for the report of March 6, 2007.

Iran is the opinion of the US - intelligence not as it was in possession of nuclear weapons, in messages early February of 2007. Iran has probably not yet produced or acquired any fissile nuclear material necessary for nuclear weapons production, said US secret service director John Negroponte . Still, the possibility that Iran could manufacture nuclear weapons and equip missiles with them was "a cause for extreme concern." According to him, the biggest problem is still the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

Agreements with the IAEA

In the agreement of 21 August 2007 between the negotiator of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Larijani , and the IAEA, represented by Mohammed el-Baradei , agreements were made that included cooperation in the area of ​​uranium enrichment. The Arak heavy water reactor should be allowed to be visited, 5 new inspectors were recognized by the IRI, the issuing of 14 entry visas for inspectors was approved. On July 23, 2007, the agency confronted Iran with unanswered questions regarding the contentious issue of Iranian plutonium experiments. Iran had stated that the experiments with plutonium had ended in 1993. On August 7, 2007, Iran wrote a letter to the agency that issued statements on some open issues. On August 20, 2007, the agency stated that previous statements by Iran were consistent with the agency's findings and that this matter had been resolved.

To clarify all existing open questions about the nuclear program, a work plan was drawn up with the following sequence:

  • Questions about the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology should be resolved by November 2007.
  • After completing these questions, the last open question about traces of highly enriched uranium should be clarified, this concerned finds at a technical university in Tehran.
  • Uranium metal document: The questions that have been open since 2005, which had arisen from documents submitted by Iran from the 1980s, here on the question of procedural requirements for the enrichment, depletion, casting and processing of uranium metal, which had been part of the Iranian nuclear program until then disputed should be processed next.
  • Polonium 210: Now that all of the previous points have been resolved, the issue of the extraction of Polonium 210 by Iran should be addressed. The IAEA undertook to submit its open questions on this topic by September 15, 2007.
  • Ghachine Mine: Also by September 15, 2007, the IAEA should submit its questions on this subject. After the polonium 210 matter was closed and published in the IAEA Directorate's report, this issue should be dealt with.

In the final paragraph of this work plan, the matter of alleged studies that were submitted to the IAEA on questions of the possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program, introduced into the discussion in 2005, are discussed. The allegations related to the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF6 (as "Green salt"), to experiments with high explosives and experiments with rockets that are suitable for nuclear equipment. Iran rejected these allegations as politically motivated and baseless, but agreed to look at these documents and to discuss them with the agency as a token of goodwill. There was general agreement that these open questions covered all disputed points and that no further questions would be asked. The agency also confirmed that it had found no evidence of the diversion of nuclear material, thus concluding that the Iranian nuclear program had been for peaceful purposes up to now. The agency expressed the hope that the completion of this work plan would facilitate the implementation of the additional protocol to the NPT (“safeguards”).

In February 2008 the IAEA reported on the results of the worked plan.

Computer simulations

The Ispra research center, which is part of the European Commission , came to the conclusion in a computer simulation of the Natanz centrifuges published on February 21, 2008 that Iran "could have produced the 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium required for a nuclear explosive device by the end of this year" .

2008

Diplomatic negotiations

Ali Larijani giving a talk during his presidential campaign at Sharif University of Technology in March 2005

During a visit by the IAEA Director General Mohammed el-Baradei to Tehran on January 13, 2008, Iran promised to clarify all outstanding questions about its nuclear program - “within the next four weeks”. On the occasion of the World Economic Forum in Davos, the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged a diplomatic solution and made an offer of talks to Tehran. On January 30, 2008, in a speech televised on state television, President Ahmadinejad announced that "his country [...] will have nuclear power in a year." On February 22, 2008, the IAEA reported on the results of the completed work plan from 2007. It stated that the answers to the open questions in the work plan were in line with its own findings or did not contradict it. These issues would thus be removed from the open questions agenda. There was still disagreement over the question of the so-called "alleged studies", which Iran rejects as baseless and politically motivated allegations.

On June 14, 2008 in Tehran, EU Foreign Affairs Representative Javier Solana handed over a new “package of proposals” to the Iranian government to persuade it to suspend uranium enrichment. In it, the six-party negotiating group (China, Germany, France, Great Britain, Russia and the USA) promised Iran technical and financial aid for the development of civilian nuclear energy, including nuclear reactors and supplies of nuclear fuel. In return, the Middle East state would have to suspend uranium enrichment.

On June 28, 2008, the Iranian parliamentary leader and former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani described the latest proposals of the so-called group of six to resolve the ongoing nuclear dispute as "empty promises" on state television. They are an attempt to prevent the Iranian nation from exercising its right to civilian nuclear energy.

USA participation

At a new round of negotiations on July 19, 2008 in Geneva, a high-ranking representative of the US State Department, William Burns, was at the negotiating table for the first time. "The US participation in the talks for the first time is seen as a turning point in US policy towards Tehran."

A new IAEA report dated September 19, 2008 accuses Iran of a lack of cooperation in the nuclear dispute. According to this, Iran "is also further expanding its uranium enrichment, but is still a long way from producing enough of the fissile material for the construction of an atom bomb." In concrete terms, Iran is currently operating 3820 centrifuges. Furthermore, Iran has “now accumulated 480 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. To build an atomic bomb, 1700 kilograms would be required, which would then have to be highly enriched. "

2009

Opening of the first fuel rod factory

One month later, at the beginning of April 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced the opening of an operational uranium factory in Isfahan , which will, among other things, supply the 40-megawatt research reactor in Arak with fuel rods. The country also has 7,000 uranium centrifuges ready for use. Iran's nuclear program has thus reached the final stage.

In June 2009, Shahram Amiri , a physicist at Malek Ashtar University (MUT), did not return from a pilgrimage to Mecca. He did not reappear until July 2010 at the Pakistani embassy in Washington. The Washington Post reported that Amiri received $ 5 million from the CIA for information on Iran's nuclear program.

Assessment by el-Baradei

In September 2009, the head of the Atomic Energy Agency saw no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. According to Mohammed el-Baradei, Iran will not be building nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. The threat posed by Tehran's nuclear program is "exaggerated".

Compromise by Iran

At the Geneva talks between the five UN veto powers and Germany on October 1, 2009, the Iranian negotiator Said Jalili declared "in principle" that his country agreed to relocate uranium enrichment to Russia. However, Iran insists on its right to conduct nuclear research. However, the country will meet its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, Iran announced full cooperation with the IAEA. The recently announced second enrichment plant in Qom may also be inspected. A week later, on October 7th, the Iranian government accused the US of being involved in the mysterious disappearance of nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri and questioned its approval.

Breaking off the talks

On December 1, 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that there would be no further talks on the Iranian nuclear program. He also announced that Iran would not enrich its uranium abroad because Iran itself has such resources.

2010

Uranium enrichment to 20 percent

On February 9, 2010, a spokesman for the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency announced that it would begin enriching uranium to 20% after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced this on Iranian television on February 7, 2010, in contrast to the possible willingness to negotiate, according to an interview dated February 2, 2010. The IAEA was informed of the project on February 8, 2010 by the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency. Iran's Foreign Minister Manutschehr Mottaki made an offer to the West on February 5, 2010 at the Munich Security Conference to have low-enriched uranium exchanged for high-enriched uranium "at the same time". A compromise proposal by the international community had provided that Iran could have its uranium enriched abroad. According to the IAEA's draft contract, Iran would have to bring 1200 kilograms of its slightly enriched uranium abroad in a single shipment and would receive fuel elements for its research reactor within twelve months.

The enriched uranium in the order of 120 kg is to be produced in the Natanz facility for the Tehran Research Reactor , in which isotopes for medical use are to be produced. A spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry said on February 8, 2010 that enrichment to 20% would not violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ali-Akbar Salehi, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, added on February 10, 2010 that Iran needed radioisotopes for medical purposes for 850,000 patients.

On February 10, 2010, the American President Barack Obama announced extensive sanctions against Iran.

On February 11, 2010, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that Iran had produced initial quantities of 20% enriched uranium in Natanz. However, the Iranian nuclear program would be under the full oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency, adding that Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to levels above 20 percent. However, nuclear weapons are built by those who are not signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty . According to a report by IAEA inspectors on February 18, 2010, Iran continued to work on nuclear warheads after 2004. At the same time it became known that Iran could enrich a maximum of 100 g uranium per day; it would therefore take a few years to produce the necessary quantity for a warhead.

Two new uranium enrichment plants

On February 22, 2010, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced to the Iranian news agency ISNA that Iran would build two new uranium enrichment plants; the start of construction should take place after March 21st. Iran wants to bring about enrichment using a new generation of centrifuges.

Iran approves uranium enrichment abroad

On May 17, 2010, Iran signed an agreement with Turkey and Brazil to exchange low-enriched uranium for fuel rods in Turkey. According to this agreement, 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium from Iran should be stored on Turkish territory for as long as one year later, in return, Iran will receive 120 kilograms of uranium (for its medical research reactor in Tehran), which has been enriched to 20 percent.

Computer virus

A completely new type of computer virus (“ Stuxnet ”) has meanwhile sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program - apparently as a digital weapon . The attack apparently targeted the Siemens industrial control systems used by Iran. According to the Iranian government, industrial plants in Iran have been massively infected with the virus. An IT expert from the Iranian government said that around 30,000 computers were infected, including computers at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

The commissioning of the first Iranian nuclear power plant, originally planned for November 2010, was delayed by several months. This is possibly a consequence of the computer virus. According to the Hamburg computer expert Ralph Langner, it is said to be "targeted sabotage" with the "largest malware operation in history".

Attacks on Iranian nuclear experts

On January 12, 2010, the Iranian particle physicist Massud Ali-Mohammadi was killed by a remote-controlled bomb. Iran then accused the US and Israel of political murder. The death of the physicist marks the beginning of a series of attacks. In November 2010, the Iranian nuclear researcher Majid Shahriari was killed and another, Fereidun Abbassi , now head of the national nuclear program, was injured in two further bomb attacks in Tehran . The Iranian government blames the Israeli and US intelligence services for these attacks as well.

2011

Independent production of fuel rods

In January 2011, the head of the Iranian nuclear program, Ali Akbar Salehi, told the Fars news agency that Iran was now able to manufacture fuel rods itself. He said a fuel plate manufacturing unit has been set up at the Isfahan facility.

New underground nuclear facility in Fordo

Iran started operating its Fordo underground facility 30 km north of Qom . Centrifuges were relocated from Natanz, but a new generation of centrifuges was also put into operation. The aim is to triple the production capacity to 20% enriched uranium. Whether Iran reported the construction of this plant to the IAEA in time is controversial. Iran claims to have shot down an unmanned US spy plane over the Fordo facility in July 2011. In January 2012 the IAEA reported the production of uranium enriched to 20 percent at the facility. This was done under the control and supervision of the IAEA.

Another attack on Iranian nuclear experts

On July 23, 2011, the 35-year-old scientist and university lecturer Dariusch Rezaie was killed in front of his daughter's kindergarten when two perpetrators were shot. His wife was injured. Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak replied, when asked whether Israel was involved in this act, with "Israel is not responding". The US has rejected participation.

On August 28, 2011, a court spokesman announced that the Revolutionary Court had sentenced Majid Jamali Fashi to death on the same day for being responsible for the death of particle physicist Massoud Ali-Mohammadi in January 2010. (see also Iran # death penalty )

Military base explosion

On November 10, 2011, an explosion occurred at a Revolutionary Guard missile test site. According to the official information, 17 members of the military were killed, including General Hassan Moghaddam, head of the development of Iranian missile systems of the “Shahab” and “Silsal” type . Unofficial sources speak of up to 36 dead. According to official information, the accident was caused by an exploded ammunition dump.

Downing a drone

On December 4, 2011, the state TV broadcaster al-Alam reported the shooting down of a Lockheed Martin RQ-170 drone near the city of Kashmar . The mission is one of the most secretive US operations with the aim of gathering information about Iran's nuclear facilities, according to the New York Times . The apparently undamaged drone was presented on Iranian state television on December 8, 2011. According to Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajisadeh, the drone was brought under Iranian control by a cyber attack .

2012

Iran begins uranium enrichment in Fordo

At the beginning of January, the head of the Iranian nuclear energy organization, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani , announced in a newspaper interview that the Fordo plant would soon be commissioned. It is suitable "for the enrichment of uranium to 3.5 percent, 4.0 percent and 20 percent". The Fordo complex is said to be around 90 meters underground. Iran's Permanent Representative to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh stated that the IAEA oversees all activities in Fordo. The 20 percent uranium enrichment in Fordo is used to feed the reactor in Tehran to produce radioisotopes and other drugs. The IAEA confirmed the start of 20 percent uranium enrichment in Fordo. In its negotiations with Iran, the G5 + 1 demanded that the Fordo plant be closed and the uranium that had already been enriched to be transferred abroad.

In its November 16 report, the IAEA stated that since the previous report, Iran has installed an additional 644 centrifuges in the UNIT 1 production unit in Fordo. The 8 cascades in UNIT 1 are now completely installed, as are those in UNIT 2. In UNIT 1, no centrifuges have been equipped with uranium so far. In UNIT 2 up to now 4 cascades, 2 each connected, have been equipped with uranium enriched to 5%, the 4 further cascades are prepared for assembly. As the Institute for Science and International Security writes in its analysis of the IAEA report of November 16, 2012, Iran has not increased the number of operated centrifuges since the last reports of May and August 2012. The institute also reports with reference to the IAEA report that of the 12 installed cascades in the plant that have not yet been commissioned, only 4 are ready for production. ISIS suspects that Iran on the one hand is deliberately not pushing the enrichment of uranium to 20% in order not to provoke even stronger sanctions or a military strike. At the same time, the increased installation of centrifuges in Fordo could be a signal that the underground facility would prevent Israel from destroying the Iranian enrichment facility in the event of a military attack.

Attack on Mostafa Ahmadi Roschan

On January 11, Mostafa Ahmadi Roschan , a chemist and a director of the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, was killed in Tehran by means of a magnetic bomb. In June 2012, Iranian Information Minister Heydar Moslehi announced the arrest of 20 suspects in connection with the murders of Iranian nuclear scientists. Moslehi accused Israel as well as American and British intelligence services of involvement in the attacks. In July Heydar Moslehi extended his allegations to Germany and France and also accused the secret services of both countries to be involved in the attacks.

EU sanctions

On January 23, the EU decided on comprehensive economic sanctions for the Iranian nuclear program, which are directed against the oil industry and the central bank of Iran, among others. As part of this, an oil embargo came into force on July 1, 2012 , for the imposition of which the First Vice President of Iran, Mohammad Reza Rahimi , threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, which is important for the global oil supply, at the end of December 2011 .

Two visits by the IAEA delegation to Iran

An IAEA delegation was in Iran from January 29th to 31st. Their aim was to clarify all significant open questions. “The team in our organization goes to Iran in a constructive spirit. We trust that Iran will work with us in the same spirit, ”said IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano . According to Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, the delegation should have access to all nuclear facilities in Iran. It was hoped that she could also visit the new Fordo underground uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom. Another visit, led by IAEA chief inspector Herman Nackaerts at the end of February 2012, did not produce any tangible result: Iranian authorities denied the IAEA access to the suspected Parchin military facility, southeast of Tehran. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said that there had been constructive negotiations on access to Parchin but that it was unsuccessful. The Iranian IAEA Ambassador Soltanieh said two days after the departure of the IAEA delegation that, at the request of Yukiya Amano, it would have had to return to Vienna before negotiations on the modalities of an inspection of Parchin were concluded. Soltanieh pointed out that a visit to military facilities according to the IAEA status is not provided. A legal basis must first be created for Iran to accommodate this issue. At the beginning of March, the Iranian mission in Vienna announced that the IAEA would be allowed another visit after 2005. Neither visit to Parchin in 2005 revealed any abnormalities.

Controversy over the Parchin military facility

Parchin is an Iranian military complex 30 km southeast of Tehran. The IAEA suspects Iran of conducting prohibited research into the construction of nuclear warheads in Parchin. In its November 2012 report to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, the IAEA goes into detail on satellite-monitored activities in Parchin, including major earthworks, the demolition of some buildings and the covering of the building where the agency suspects a blasting chamber. The IAEA sees a connection between its request to inspect the Parchin facility and this work. Since 2005, the year in which the IAEA was allowed to carry out two inspections in Parchin, there had been no relevant work in Parchin, but since the beginning of 2012 the request for an inspection had been made, however. The Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has rejected the remarks made by the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano regarding the alleged “cleanup” of the Parchin site as unprofessional and technically unacceptable. Former IAEA inspector Robert Kelley believes that the suspicion that there should be an explosive chamber in Parchin for up to 70 kg of explosives is not valid and that such a chamber is also unsuitable for testing nuclear weapons. The IAEA repeatedly mentions in its reports that it suspects this explosion chamber was installed in 2000. In 2005 the IAEA carried out two inspections in Parchin without any abnormalities. The IAEA, however, says in its report that the activities on the Parchin site have seriously undermined the possibilities for verification and requires access to Parchin without any further delay and answers to their questions about the facility. Iran has in principle declared its willingness to allow another visit to Parchin, but has so far not been satisfied with the preparations and is demanding further agreements. According to the NPT, Iran is not obliged to grant the IAEA access to the Parchin military facility, as it is not part of Iran's nuclear program.

Negotiations from April 14, 2012

The earlier talks between Iran and the 5 + 1 group, consisting of the five UN veto powers and Germany, were broken off in January 2011 without any result. The talks were scheduled to resume on April 13; in the end, the Iranian leadership was reluctant to go to Istanbul as the venue for negotiations. This increased doubts among Western diplomats whether the Iranians want to negotiate seriously. On April 14, 2012, the talks were resumed in Istanbul. In the run-up to the talks, the West's specific demands on Iran were made known. The western states demanded the immediate closure of the underground nuclear facility in Fordo. In addition, Iran should stop uranium enrichment to 20 percent. The existing stocks of around 100 kilograms of this highly enriched material would have to be moved outside the country. After all, Iran should demonstrate at the beginning of the new round of negotiations that it would discuss its nuclear program without any preconditions.

The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said in the run-up to the talks that she expected Tehran to make a clear commitment to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program, which Tehran denied anyway.

The Iranian positions were as follows:

  • Observance of the fatwa of the religious head of state of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i , regarding the religious ban on the production, distribution and use of weapons of mass destruction.
  • A “step-by-step plan”: The softening of sanctions leads to increased concession by Iran and vice versa.
  • Mutual steps: Every positive or negative action on one side is followed by a corresponding reaction on the other side.
  • Based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which grants Iran the inalienable right to uranium enrichment.

After this first round of talks, the mood was described as constructive. EU Foreign Affairs Representative Catherine Ashton announced a step-by-step approach to resolving the dispute. The talks should be based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby the 5 + 1 group - Germany, China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the USA - will respect Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

"What is important is that the rhetoric of the world powers has changed, and results can then be achieved in an atmosphere of mutual respect," said Iran's negotiator Said Jalili .

Before continuing talks in Baghdad on May 21, 2012, IAEA Secretary General Yukiya Amano visited Tehran. He described the talks there as constructive, an agreement on the inspection of the controversial military facility in Parchin had also been negotiated and an agreement was imminent.

Talks between P5 + 1 and Iran continued on May 23, 2012 in Baghdad. In the run-up to this, Iran again rejected requests to cease its uranium enrichment, as did the closure of the underground enrichment facility in Fordo. According to the IAEA, Iran should already have disclosed the planning of this facility. The Iranian ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh , said the facility was safe and under the control of the IAEA, and from the Iranian perspective there was no reason to close it.

At the Baghdad talks, Iran is said to have submitted a proposal for a step-by-step program to resolve the conflict. The P5 + 1, in turn, is said to have made the cessation of uranium enrichment a precondition for further talks, which Iran again refused, citing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In return for discontinuing uranium enrichment, Iran was offered, among other things, the delivery of medically usable isotopes and urgently needed spare parts for Iranian aircraft, as well as cooperation in nuclear safety. The negotiator of the P5 + 1, Catherine Ashton , assessed positively that Iran had agreed to negotiate uranium enrichment to 20%. Finally it was agreed on another meeting on 18. + 19. June in Moscow.

After a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors ended on June 6, 2012 in Vienna without an Iran resolution, another round of talks between the IAEA and Iran took place in Vienna on June 8, 2012. The chief inspector of the IAEA, Herman Nackaerts , was disappointed afterwards. Iran had already questioned topics that had already been dealt with and raised new questions. Iran insists that issues that have already been negotiated with the IAEA should not be reopened and also does not want to provide any information on foreign sources of supply for nuclear material.

The talks on June 18 and 19 in Moscow ended without any concrete results. It had not been possible to resolve the crucial points of contention, said the EU foreign policy representative Catherine Ashton , who headed the delegation of the five UN veto powers and Germany. In two weeks there should be a "technical meeting" in Istanbul. It will depend on whether there will be further diplomatic talks with Iran. The technical expert meeting took place on July 3rd in Istanbul. The talks are to be continued at the next higher level between the EU's Deputy Foreign Representative Helga Schmid and Ali Baqeri , Vice for Foreign Policy and International Security of the Secretary General of the High Council for National Security of Iran.

In August 2012, talks between senior IAEA officials and Iranian officials ended without agreement on the issues at stake and without agreeing to a new meeting.

On September 18, a meeting took place between the IAEA General Secretary Yukiya Amano and Fereydoun Abbasi , Vice President of Iran and Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency. No concrete agreements were made, only the need for and mutual readiness for further negotiations was emphasized.

On November 9, 2012, IAEA spokeswoman Gill Tudor announced that both sides had agreed to hold further talks on December 13 in Tehran. The aim is to agree on a way to resolve the open questions about the Iranian nuclear program.

On December 13, 2012, the meeting between senior officials of the IAEA and Iranian representatives took place in Tehran as planned. The IAEA Vice Director General Herman Nackaerts spoke after his return that there had been progress in drafting the text for a “structured approach” to address the outstanding issues. During this visit, the delegation was not allowed access to the military facility in Parchin, but this was part of the "structured approach". The atmosphere during the discussions was good and it is hoped that the agreement will be concluded and implemented quickly at the next meeting on January 16, 2013. The Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh , also described the talks as constructive and said that positive progress had been made.

Iranian statements

In June 2012, the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh , expressed strong criticism of the decision-making processes within the IAEA and of the fact that, according to Iranian opinion, the IAEA deviated significantly from its statutes and its tasks at the regular meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna with regard to global support for research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Among other things, he addressed the following points: The financing of the relevant tasks was still unsolved after five decades. Instead of fulfilling these tasks, the agency interfered in the internal affairs of some member states, including Iran, wanted to impose voluntary safety measures (“safeguards”) on the states and allowed its inspectors to be pressured to participate in secret service activities. The agency would work in its department for security measures (“Safeguards”) with secret service employees who would be made available by some states as “cost free experts”. This would lead to the leakage of confidential information and endanger the security of member states. He also criticized the fact that, under pressure from the UN, the IAEA treats voluntary elements such as the additional protocol to the NPT as mandatory conditions. The IAEA is not obliged to the UN, including the UN Security Council , but to its member states. Soltanieh announced a structural reform initiative in the IAEA.

On September 12, Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, delivered a statement entitled “Facts about Iran's nuclear policy”. This document contains statements of the late revolutionary leader and state founder Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor and incumbent head of state Ayatollah Khamenei. These statements include the condemnation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as an unforgivable sin. It is assured that the Islamic Republic of Iran has followed this policy since its inception and has never operated a military nuclear program and will not do so in the future. Iran has proposed the creation of a nuclear-free Middle East and feels bound by it. The fact that the Iranian file at the IAEA has not yet been closed is not due to the results of the IAEA's routine controls, but to accusations by Western countries. Iran feels obliged to the NPT, but will not give up its rights to a non-military nuclear program including uranium enrichment. The letter ends with an appeal for a dialogue without preconditions and at eye level.

Another sabotage

In 2012, the Iranian nuclear facilities were sabotaged with the help of a computer worm that played the song Thunderstruck by AC / DC at full volume at night .

2013

Report from the Institute for Science and International Security

On January 14, 2013, five experts from the US Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a 154-page report on America's non-proliferation strategy for a changing Middle East. In this report, they warn of the advanced Iranian nuclear program: "Against the background of the development curve of Iran's nuclear program, we estimate that Iran in mid-2014 [date] . Could reach critical capacity" in the report, the experts recommended the United States and its partners, intensify existing sanctions before Iran's nuclear program reaches its critical point in mid-2014 [obsolete] .

Negotiations in Almaty in February

On February 26 and 27, 2013, another round of negotiations between the “5 + 1” group (the UN veto powers plus Germany) with Iran took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan. As in the previous year, the negotiator of the "5 + 1" was Catherine Ashton , and Said Jalili on the Iranian side . Asthon said that Iran had been presented with an unspecified "confidence-building offer". It was agreed to hold further talks at expert level on March 18 in Istanbul and on 5/6. To meet again in Almaty April at the level of Political Directors. Jalili said that from an Iranian point of view, some of the statements made by his negotiating partners were more realistic and that attempts had been made to move closer to the Iranian positions in some cases.

Negotiations in Almaty in April

On 5th / 6th As planned, the next round of talks between Iran and the “5 + 1” group took place in Almaty on April 4th. The final statement by Catherine Ashton announced that the details of the “confidence-building offer” presented by the “5 + 1” in February had been discussed in depth, but that the positions were still far apart. It was agreed to first discuss the status of the negotiations in the respective government seats and then to clarify how to proceed between Catherine Ashton and Said Jalili . In the interview, Asthon praised the quality of the negotiations. For the first time she saw an exchange between the other side and the "5 + 1", said the EU diplomat. All questions were discussed in more detail than before. Jalili said in his final statement that Iran's “plan of action”, which was updated after the first negotiations in Almaty and the meeting of experts between this and the current negotiations, had been discussed in detail and in substance. Iran answered numerous questions from the negotiating partners. The positions are still distant as the Islamic Republic of Iran has drawn attention to the rights of the Iranian people, including the right to uranium enrichment, on many occasions and has called for an end to hostile behavior. Their suggestions, which should contribute to a constructive further procedure, were based on this. Now it is up to the P5 + 1 members to respond to the new proposals of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to show their willingness and seriousness to take confidence-building measures.

Negotiations in Geneva in October

The first round of negotiations with the negotiators of the new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani took place in Geneva on October 15 and 16 . The Iranian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Mohammed Jawad Zarif , who was part of the negotiating team together with Rouhani from 2003 to 2005. The Iranians surprised the participants of the 5 + 1 group with a performance that stood in clear contrast to the performances of the previous delegations around Said Jalili in terms of speed and professionalism . This time the talks were held in English and Iran presented a three-step plan that requires concessions from both sides within a month, a medium-term and a long-term phase. The proposals and the appearance of the Iranian side signaled the will for a quick solution. The Iranians' PowerPoint presentation was entitled: "Ending an unnecessary crisis and opening up a new horizon". Both sides expressed confidence after the meeting. EU chief diplomat Catherine Ashton praised the talks as "a very intensive and important contribution". For the first time, a joint declaration was drawn up. Another round of negotiations was agreed for November 7th and 8th. According to the Iranian media, a meeting between the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the American State Secretary Wendy R. Sherman took place on the sidelines of the official meeting. Subsequently, the Iranian proposals were also cautiously praised by the White House.

Transitional agreement

The 5 + 1 states ( UN veto states and Germany) and Iran agreed on a transitional agreement on November 24, 2013 in Geneva (Switzerland) after years of dispute . Iran undertakes in it for the next 6 months u. a. to limit uranium enrichment to 5 percent, not to commission any further centrifuges, to end work on the heavy water reactor in Arak and to give IAEA inspectors access to the designated facilities. In return, the sanctions for the transition period will be relaxed and Iran will be granted economic aid of 7 billion US dollars. The transition agreement comes into force on January 20, 2014. First payments in the amount of 550 million US dollars are to be made on 1 February.

2014

Negotiations in Vienna in July

The Palais Coburg in Vienna served as a negotiation venue several times in 2014.

In July, negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program were resumed in Vienna's Palais Coburg . The five foreign ministers of the UN veto powers , Germany and Iran were present . After the negotiations ended unsuccessfully after a few days, another date was set for November and the expiry of the transitional agreement was extended until then.

Negotiations in Vienna in November

Again the foreign ministers of the so-called 5 + 1 states (UN veto powers + Germany) sat at a negotiating table in Vienna with the foreign minister of Iran, Mohammed Dschawad Sarif, and continued the negotiations in the Palais Coburg. The talks were initially described as constructive by all sides, but this round of negotiations also ended apparently without results after a few days. Those involved, above all US Secretary of State John Kerry , did not speak of a failure of the negotiations. One had come very far in the few days , but the positions of the individual parties had now got stuck . The foreign ministers present agreed on a further extension of the JPOA (Joint Plan of Action) until June 30, 2015, during which time Iran should have the opportunity to ease international sanctions with a volume of 560 million euros per month.

The foreign ministers emphasized that there should be another round of negotiations in Oman this year . Meanwhile, Austria's Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz pointed out that Vienna was also planned as a conference venue for the negotiations in summer 2015.

2015

Negotiations in Lausanne in March

On April 2, the five veto powers, Germany and Iran agreed a framework agreement - the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”). According to this compromise, Tehran is subjecting its nuclear program to control until 2025. It limits Iran's uranium enrichment capacity. Already enriched uranium is brought abroad. Among other things, the following was agreed:

  • reduce the number of 19,000 centrifuges to 6104,
  • Not to enrich uranium above 3.67 percent for at least 15 years,
  • reduce the stock from around 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg,
  • increase the breakout timeline (the time it takes Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon) from 2 to 3 months to one year,
  • do not carry out any enrichment in the Fordo nuclear power plant by 2030 and dismantle two thirds of the centrifuges there,
  • to redesign the heavy water reactor in Arak to prevent the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

In return, the sanctions will be lifted step by step.

Reactions

US President Barack Obama spoke of an "historic agreement", his Secretary of State John Kerry of an "historic agreement". The German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called the agreement a “big and decisive step forward”, the British Foreign Minister Philip Hammond spoke of a good basis for a possibly “very good agreement”. The Israeli government called the JCPOA plan "a historic mistake" if it became the basis of an agreement. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas described the negotiations as "Iran's greatest achievement", with which the Iranian nuclear program would be recognized by the West. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani spoke of a "first step towards constructive cooperation with the world."

Iran's top spiritual and political leader, Ali Chamene'i , warned of a bad deal in a televised speech. Preserving the "achievements of Iran in nuclear technology" is a condition for an agreement. He also refused to monitor military facilities due to the international control of the nuclear program and to only gradually lift the sanctions. Rohani agreed: No agreement would be signed "unless all sanctions are lifted on the same day".

Negotiations in Vienna

Conclusion of negotiations in Vienna

From June 27th, the more than 250 negotiators of the 5 + 1 group (USA, China, Russia, Great Britain and France plus Germany) and Iran met again in Vienna's Palais Coburg and continued their talks. The original goal of a final solution by the end of the already several times extended deadline on June 30th was quickly discarded. The also present, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini , however, stated that there was flexibility in the negotiations and would take several days the talks. Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammed Jawad Sarif was convinced of an agreement on the nuclear conflict, provided the West does not make "excessive demands".

agreement

On the night of July 14, 2015, after 13 years of nuclear dispute, an agreement was announced. On January 16, 2016, seven months after the Geneva nuclear treaty, the Vienna nuclear agreement came into force and western sanctions were lifted.

2016

Several missile tests in March 2016 were viewed by the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany in a letter to the UN Security Council as a violation of the agreement. “Appropriate responses” should be discussed. The missiles tested could "basically transport nuclear warheads".

2018

The future US President Donald Trump had already criticized the nuclear deal with Iran in the 2016 election campaign . Also encouraged by his stance, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned of an alleged Iranian nuclear program. At a press conference held in English, he presented alleged evidence of Iran's nuclear weapons. However, none of the information was new and substantiated his claim. Nevertheless, he warned that by lifting the sanctions, Iran could enrich itself and enrich itself on a large scale at the same time. He called for the agreement to either be renegotiated or terminated.

On May 8, 2018, Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran. At the same time he wants to put the sanctions against the country back into force. On the same evening, French President Macron expressed his regret over the United States' unilateral exit from the agreement on behalf of the heads of government of Great Britain and Germany. The US sanctions against Iran should come into force on August 6, 2018.

2019

In January 2019, the three EU member states Germany, France and Great Britain founded the special purpose vehicle INSTEX in order to be able to process payment transactions for Iran transactions, as private banks are exposed to penalties for using the US dollar . However, the European Union turned out to be unwilling to turn Instex into a viable instrument, so that the apparent political opposition of the Europeans against the USA in reality had no consequences. Without the promised European support, it would make no sense to stick to the nuclear agreement for President Rouhani, Mathias Brüggmann concluded in the Handelsblatt.

2020

On January 5, 2020, Iran announced that it would withdraw completely from the nuclear deal. This step came two days after the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed by a US air strike

Intelligence reports

2006

The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) informed politicians in Berlin on January 19, 2006 that Iran could build an atomic bomb within a few months. In addition, numerous other hidden facilities are suspected in Iran - according to the German Federal Intelligence Service , there are at least 20. Of these, there are also supposed to be verified satellite images. In September 2005, the Israeli foreign minister, Silwan Shalom, warned that Iran could acquire the knowledge to build a nuclear weapon within six months. According to BND boss Ernst Uhrlau , the secret services - not specified in more detail in media reports - have knowledge that Iran is trying to acquire laser technology on the international market that could also be used in the construction of modern missiles.

2007

Iran is the opinion of the US - intelligence not as it was in possession of nuclear weapons, in messages early February of 2007. Iran has probably not yet produced or acquired any fissile nuclear material necessary for nuclear weapons production, said US secret service director John Negroponte . Still, the possibility that Iran could manufacture nuclear weapons and equip missiles with them was "a cause for extreme concern." According to a report by all 16 US intelligence agencies published on December 3, 2007, Iran in all likelihood suspended its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. The report states: “The Iranian government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is less determined than previously thought to develop a nuclear arsenal. The country would not be technically capable of producing highly enriched uranium for the construction of nuclear weapons until the end of 2009 at the earliest. But that is also very unlikely. ”The production of enough highly enriched uranium for the manufacture of a single warhead is also possible for Iran in 2015 at the earliest [out of date] .

2009

The Reuters news agency quoted the American national secret service chief Dennis C. Blair on March 10, 2009 : "According to the US secret services, Iran has no weapons-grade uranium and has not yet decided on its production."

According to a report in the New York Times on September 9, 2009, according to estimates by the American secret service, Iran has now gathered enough fuel to be able to "quickly" build an atomic bomb. The inspectors would immediately sound the alarm, however, should Tehran pursue the enrichment of uranium stocks into weapons-grade material. Before building an operational nuclear weapon, Iran would have to develop or purchase a warhead system that would have the necessary triggering technology for the bomb. The IAEA inspectors counted more than 8,000 centrifuges on their last visits to Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment center . However, according to the investigation report, only half were in operation.

2010

According to a report in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on February 4, 2010, Iran has plans for an advanced nuclear warhead. The plans come from a scientist in a former Soviet nuclear weapons laboratory. Western intelligence agencies and diplomats confirmed relevant information from a paper that summarizes the knowledge of the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

According to estimates by the American secret service, the CIA , by June 28, 2010, Iran had been producing low-enriched uranium in such quantities that two atomic bombs could be produced with it in 2012 if Iran decides to do so. According to Gary Samore, President Barack Obama's chief adviser on nuclear weapons, quoted in the New York Times on August 20, 2010, Iran is believed to be at least a year away from building nuclear warheads.

2012

According to US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in January 2012, Iran could build an atomic bomb within twelve months, and it would take another one to two years to produce a delivery system to use the weapon. Panetta continues to assume that Iran has not yet made a decision to build a bomb. According to the head of the Israeli military intelligence service, Aviv Kochavi, from February 2012, Iran is said to have uranium for the construction of four atomic bombs. "The world's secret services are in agreement with Israel that Iran has 100 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent."

In late January, James R. Clapper , director of all 16 US intelligence agencies , told the US Senate that there was no solid evidence that Iran was building a nuclear weapon and that current reports match those from 2007 that Iran had given up its nuclear weapons program several years earlier. The possibility of building a nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out. The CIA director David Petraeus , who was also present at the hearing, confirmed this. Senior US officials had previously provided similar information.

UN Security Council resolutions

On March 29, 2006, the President of the United Nations Security Council urged Iran to comply with the IAEA resolution.

  • With the resolution 1696 (2006) Iran was given instructions that are binding under international law in this regard. After Iran failed to comply with this resolution, the panel imposed on December 23, 2006 by its
  • Resolution 1737 (2006) an embargo on certain goods. These were material, equipment, services and other support that could serve the Iranian nuclear program. The report of the Director General of the IAEA dated February 22, 2007 indicated that Iran had continued to fail to implement the IAEA orders and resolutions 1696 and 1737. Therefore, the Security Council expanded these sanctions to include a number of institutions and private individuals, and gave Iran sixty days to
  • the Resolution 1747 (2007) to meet. All of these resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and are therefore binding and enforceable decisions under international law; however, they were passed under the restrictions of Article 41 of the UN Charter, which means that a military solution to fulfill the resolutions is excluded.
  • Resolution 1803 (2008) of March 3, 2008 reaffirmed the previous resolutions and extended the sanctions to trade in goods that can be used for both civil and military purposes. According to the US ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad , Iran is looking for plans for a nuclear warhead and ways to miniaturize it for installation on a nuclear missile.
  • The Resolution 1929 (2010) of 9 June 2010 increased sanctions against Iran. With 12 votes - Turkey and Brazil voted against, Lebanon abstained - the names and addresses of 40 companies and research institutions are named in three appendices, whose foreign accounts are to be frozen and whose investment activities abroad are to be stopped. In the future, tanks, combat helicopters, warships and missile systems may no longer be sold to Iran. Ships with cargo for Iran can be stopped and searched for smuggled weapons and weapons technology.

Diplomatic and military aspects

Iran is surrounded by states with which there is a tense or hostile relationship. Not only Wahhabi Saudi Arabia , but also the Arab Gulf States, Pakistan and Azerbaijan are - more or less - allied with the USA . The neighboring country Turkey is a member of NATO . Although all US soldiers were withdrawn from Iraq at the end of 2011 , the political situation in Iraq is very fragile and the risk of civil war still exists. US troops are still stationed in Afghanistan ; In the Persian Gulf, an aircraft carrier association already present was reinforced by the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis , which arrived on February 20, 2007 . According to many observers, the Islamic Republic can hardly counter this - from an Iranian point of view - deployment of enemy troops on Iran's northern, southern, eastern and western borders with anything militarily, although other experts have massive doubts about the allegedly inadequate defense of the Iranians.

The Iranian government dismisses links between the nuclear issue and the security situation. For fear of Iran's nuclear armament, however, there are considerations in Arab countries to start nuclear programs.

Actions by the US and Israel

Military bases in Iran

In connection with the Iranian nuclear program, US President George W. Bush had already reserved a military strike against Iran since January 2005. Bush declared at the time that he would “never take any option off the table,” and criticized Iran's information policy. At that time, from different sides u. a. It was claimed that American special forces had already scouted around three dozen targets in Iran for possible bomb and missile attacks and that US planes had deliberately penetrated Iran's airspace in order to locate defensive positions using their radar.

On February 12, 2006, the British Sunday Telegraph reported on detailed US plans for an attack on Iran. The plans to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities are about much more than the "usual risk assessment", the newspaper quoted an advisor to the US Department of Defense. Logistics, targets and bomb loads would already be calculated in detail. These are plans that go beyond the "standard assessment of military contingencies". Military planners of the Central Command and the Strategic Command in the Pentagon have been commissioned with the drafting. Massive air raids and simultaneous sea-based rocket attacks are planned. The participation of allies is not planned. Because it fears an escalation of violence in the Middle East, the British government is very skeptical of a military strike against Iran, the newspaper reported at the time.

One reason for the military actions is that Israel feels threatened by possible Iranian nuclear weapons. This also brings NATO into play. According to a report in the Sunday Times (London) on March 5, 2006, Israeli special forces were already operating in Iran; They are therefore primarily intended to clear up hidden systems for target planning of a possible attack.

On January 7, 2007, the Sunday Times reported that the Israeli Air Force had begun training with tactical atomic bombs to destroy Iran's underground nuclear facilities, such as the one in Natanz . The report was immediately denied by the Israeli government. On February 20, 2007 the BBC reported that the US contingency plan provides for attacks with bunkering bombs to be dropped by B-2 stealth bombers in order to destroy the 25 m underground halls with the centrifuges.

According to a report in the "New York Times", the Israeli air force practiced an attack on Iran in early June 2008, in particular the bombing of the Iranian nuclear research center Natanz, in one maneuver. The maneuver under the name "Glorious Spartans 08" was held on the Greek island of Crete . More than 100 F-16 and F-15 combat aircraft should therefore prepare for a far-reaching mission.

According to a report in Jane’s military magazine on August 27, 2008, the US rejected the application to deliver modern KC-767 tanker aircraft to Israel. This could make a possible Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear program more difficult. In contrast, signed on 5 August, the head of the US Missile Defense Agency , Henry Obering, a treaty with Israel, which the common "David's Sling" (Project David spin ) 2015 [date] safeguards. This is a defense system that should work equally against long-range missiles and cruise missiles. Raytheon (USA) and Rafael (Israel) are involved. This is intended to guarantee Israel the best possible protection against Iranian attack weapons.

A detailed expertise from the Center for Strategy & International Studies from March 14, 2009 describes three attack scenarios involving 80 F-16 and F-15 aircraft or 42 Jericho-3 missiles on the Isfahan , Natanz and Arak facilities . A military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities was discussed in Israel and the USA until 2012.

Iranian reactions

Range of the Iranian medium-range missile Shahab 3

Iran acquired 29 modern Tor-M1 medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems for combat aircraft and guided missiles from Russia in mid-January 2006 for $ 700 million after a purchase of the long-range S-300P MU-2 systems was canceled after US protests.

On July 9, 2008, the Iranian TV broadcaster al-Alam reported on various rocket launches with a series of spectacular photos which, in retrospect, turned out to be digital forgeries in terms of the number of rockets launched. The focus of the Iranian missile program is the Shahab 3 , a further developed North Korean medium-range missile, which is used both militarily and in the extended version ( Safir ) for the Iranian space agency .

On June 28, 2008, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards , Mohammad Ali Jafari , told the local media that u. a. the Jam-e Jam newspaper that Iran would respond to an air strike with retaliation. Literally: “The Zionist regime will not be able to compete with our armed forces and our capabilities.” At the same time, the head of the Revolutionary Guard threatened to block the passage through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, which is important for oil exports from the Gulf region .

On February 25, 2009, an American fighter jet shot down an Iranian drone over Iraqi territory . The Iranian manufacturing company Farnas Aerospace Company announced the possible series production of the drones shortly afterwards. On August 22, 2010, a type of drone was presented to the public.

literature

Web links

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