Azerbaijani-Iranian relations

Iranian Embassy in Baku

The relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran are contradictory. The two states share a long history and religious identity. Ethnic Azerbaijanis live on both sides of the border and have significant influence on political and economic affairs in Iran. However, due to political tensions, Christian Armenia , not Shiite Azerbaijan, is Iran's most important partner in the Caucasus. The contrast between the secular Azerbaijani and the clerical Iranian government system is difficult to bridge for both sides. Iran rivals Turkey for influence over Azerbaijan. The two countries are competitors in the market for raw materials (mainly oil and natural gas).

history

The territory of today's Iran was already under Persian influence in pre-Islamic times. The Persian language was the lingua franca well beyond what is now Iran and Azerbaijan, and it remained the administrative language in the areas of the Caucasus populated by Turkic peoples . The Safavids , who re-established a state in what is now Iran after the devastation of the region by the Mongols, were of Azeri-Turkmen origin. They also made Shiite Islam, which separates Iran and Azerbaijan from the rest of the Islamic world, the Persian state religion. Although the Azerbaijani language is one of the Turkic languages , Azerbaijan was and is part of the Persian cultural area ; the city of Ganja was an active center of Persian art and literature.

In the 18th century the Caucasus came more and more under Russian influence. Prevailing in Persia Qajar failed to win European allies against the expansion of Russia in the Caucasus. In the Treaty of Golestan of 1813, Russian influence in southern Caucasus was enshrined; after another Russo-Persian war, Persia had to cede Georgia to Russia and Armenia to Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Turkmanschai in 1828 , while the area populated by Azerbaijanis to a Russian one Part was divided around Baku and a Persian around Tabriz . The conflicts between Russia and Iran and the Soviet Union and Iran were settled in a friendship treaty in 1921 . Nevertheless, after the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 , the Soviet Union briefly supported the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, which was proclaimed in northeastern Iran and existed from 1945 to 1946 . In 1957 another contract was signed in which the construction of a dam and a hydroelectric power station on the Aras and the opening of a border crossing in Astara were agreed. In 1970, the construction of the Iran Gas Trunkline was agreed upon, which crossed Azerbaijan and allowed the Soviet Union to import Iranian gas and export gas to Europe. An iron curtain was built on this border during the Cold War, and the border was considered impassable. In 1989, before the fall of the Iron Curtain, the citizens demolished border fortifications and unofficial border traffic began. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain there has been lively border traffic: Iranian travelers enjoy the relative freedom of Baku, while Azerbaijani travelers shop for subsidized groceries in Iran.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the emergence of new republics on Iran's northern border within a few months, for which the Iranian leadership was not prepared. Since then, Iran and Azerbaijan have shared a 475-kilometer-long border, which is interrupted by the 40-kilometer border between Iran and Armenia. Azerbaijani Nakhichevan can only be reached from Azerbaijan via Iranian territory as long as the Armenian-Azerbaijani border is closed.

Question of ethnic Azerbaijanis and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Tehran and Moscow wanted to avoid Azerbaijani and Turkmen nationalists being inspired by the reunification of Germany and trying to found nation states from parts of Iran and former Soviet republics. The religious Iranian leadership, which came to power in 1979 as a result of the Islamic revolution and ruled over a country that was badly destroyed after the Iraq-Iran war , first tried to exert influence through the cultural and religious similarities in the Caucasus. This approach was hardly successful, in Azerbaijan the population was strongly secularized after decades of Soviet politics, and the Azerbaijani Shiites oriented themselves towards Najaf instead of towards the Islamic Republic. On the contrary, the missionary efforts of Iran led to resistance from the secular government of Azerbaijan, which was more open to the vision of the then Turkish President Turgut Özal of wanting to create a home for all Turkic peoples from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China (concept of Panturanism ). This meant that Iran was competing for influence in Azerbaijan with Turkey, which is allied with the US ( Great Satan in the eyes of the political leadership of Iran).

About twice as many Azerbaijanis live in Iran as in Azerbaijan; the Iranian government speaks of 15 million Azerbaijanis in Iran, Azerbaijani nationalists of 30 million. The Iranian leadership avoided capitalizing on this fact because the multi-ethnic state of Iran itself has to deal with numerous ethnic conflicts. However, the first elected President of Azerbaijan Abulfas Eltschibei called for the creation of Greater Azerbaijan, that is, the separation of the areas populated by Azerbaijanis from Iran and unification with its republic. He claimed that this was the will of the people and openly supported various movements that had made the creation of such a state their goal. However, the Azerbaijani nationalists in Iran are weakly organized and at odds with one another, their most important figure is Mahmudali Chehregani , their most important organization the South Azerbaijani National Liberation Movement . Azerbaijan tolerated the presence of secessionist Iranian groups in Baku as long as they kept quiet; After an attempted assassination attempt on the chairman of the South Azerbaijani National Liberation Movement, Piruz Dilanchi , suspicions fell on Iran. The attempts by the government of Azerbaijan to organize the Azerbaijanis abroad for their own purposes repeatedly lead to tensions with Tehran. Hardliners in Tehran, on the other hand, have repeatedly made suggestions that the Azerbaijanis could unite under Iranian leadership, i. This means that Azerbaijan will join the Islamic Republic, which would solve the question of the Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijanis in Iran can develop by adapting to the Persian majority. They play an important role in the Iranian armed forces, hold large parts of the Tehran bazaar in their hands and, with Ali Khamenei, provide the religious leader . The inhabitants of the Republic of Azerbaijan feel more progressive and less religious and are therefore skeptical of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Tehran refused to open a consulate in Tabriz to Azerbaijan until 2004 .

In the armed Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , religious forces in Iran demanded support for the Azerbaijani brothers in faith in the fight against the Armenian Christians. However, foreign policy officials in Iran preferred to weaken the Republic of Azerbaijan to counter the threat of unification of all Azerbaijanis. The latter were able to prevail and the Islamic Republic supported Armenia as long as there was not too much resistance from the Iranian public. Iran became the most important supplier of electrical energy and everyday goods, and the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave was supplied via Iranian territory. There is also evidence that Armenia has received arms shipments that have entered the country via Iranian territory. Thus Iran made the expansionism of the Republic of Armenia possible in the first place, at the same time Iran condemned the Armenian aggression. However, the war threatened to spill over into Iranian territory several times, so it represented an immediate danger and a risk to the stability of Iran. In 1991 Iran brokered unsuccessfully, in 1992 it repeatedly negotiated a ceasefire between the parties, but it was accepted immediately broken by Armenia at the instigation of Russia. To this day it remains a source of distrust between the two neighbors. The war resulted in a flow of Azerbaijani refugees onto Iranian territory, which in turn posed a real threat of destabilization in Iran. The Iranian Army, Revolutionary Guards and the Red Crescent therefore built refugee camps on both sides of the border. Iran feared a kind of fraternization of Azerbaijani refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with the Iranian Azerbaijanis. Furthermore, Iran was destroyed after the Iraq-Iran war and at the same time had to accept large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan . The Iranian army also briefly invaded Azerbaijani territory to protect a dam on the Aras and to avoid an Armenian invasion of Nakhchivan. In this way, a virtual Washington-Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku-Tashkent axis was established, to which Iran, Russia and Armenia responded with an axis Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran. Since US troops have been stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran has been dependent on Russian support and can therefore hardly pursue a policy in the Caucasus that conflicts with Russia's interests.

Areas of conflict

The good relations between Azerbaijan and the USA are an aggravating factor for the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. Against the wishes of its neighbors Iran and Russia, Azerbaijan under Hejdär Aliyev allowed western companies to search for oil in the part of the Caspian Sea claimed by Azerbaijan and signed the so-called treaty of the century with them. Also bypassing Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey agreed in December 1998 to build the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline . It went into operation in 2006.

As early as the 1990s, Azerbaijan decided to orient itself towards Europe instead of towards its Islamic brothers. The country joined the OSCE in 1992 and the Council of Europe in 2001 . Militarily it was oriented towards NATO , today the country is a participant in the Partnership for Peace . On January 25, 2002, US President Bush lifted the export restrictions enacted in 1992 and granted Azerbaijan extensive military aid, above all to modernize the Azerbaijani Navy on the Caspian Sea. In return, Azerbaijan sent soldiers to participate in NATO peacekeeping missions. In 2005 the US and Azerbaijan agreed to serve US soldiers on three bases in Azerbaijan; from 2007 onwards, NATO was allowed to use Azerbaijani military bases for its operations in Afghanistan . In the same year a new partnership agreement was signed with NATO. Iran fears that these developments will also bring American military to the country's northern border; In 2003 and 2006 rumors circulated in Russian media of an impending US invasion of Iran from Azerbaijani territory, leading to direct military threats from Tehran towards Baku. In 2004 there were rumors of the establishment of a US military base on Azerbaijani territory. In 2005, Azerbaijan and Iran signed a non-aggression pact in which Azerbaijan also undertook not to make its territory available for third-party attacks on Iran. Azerbaijan thus addressed public concerns about the possible consequences of Iranian retaliatory strikes or the consequences of a regime collapse in Iran. The declining US interest in Azerbaijan then led to a relaxation in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. On several visits to the neighboring country, President Ahmadinejad tried to find a way out of the isolation in the wake of Western sanctions. He offered the landlocked country of Azerbaijan favorable terms for transit services to the Persian Gulf - the closest to the oceans - and agreed to supply Iranian electrical energy. With Iranian help, Azerbaijan survived the Russian punishment for allegedly taking sides with Georgia in the August 2008 Caucasus War .

The international legal status of the Caspian Sea is another source of conflict between the two neighbors. In treaties of 1921 and 1940, the Soviet Union and Iran declared the Caspian Sea an inland sea and in fact divided it. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were suddenly more neighboring countries; Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan wanted the sea to be divided into sectors based on the length of the coastline. Iran tried to maintain the status quo because otherwise the Iranian share would have shrunk to 13-14%. In May 2003, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed on their shares, while Iran submitted new proposals based on the population of the neighboring regions. An agreement is still a long way off. About 90% of Azerbaijan's oil and gas reserves are located offshore off the coast, some in waters that are also claimed by Iran. Tehran has therefore repeatedly asked Baku to stop exploration in the Alborz field . Iran is drilling for oil and natural gas in the sectors it believes it deserves, some of which Azerbaijan claims, even though oil production in the Persian Gulf is cheaper. On July 23, 2001, the Iranian Navy threatened the Azerbaijani exploration ship Geophysicist-3, and fighter planes penetrated Azerbaijani airspace. It was only when Turkey took sides in favor of Azerbaijan that the Iranian threats ended. On July 18, 2012, Iranian helicopters penetrated Azerbaijani airspace and caused panic among the population in the overflown towns.

Baku is concerned about Iranian efforts to export the Islamic Revolution to Azerbaijan . Even in the days of the Soviet Union, Iran was seen as a threat and source of Islamism and destabilization in the Caucasus. In the 1990s, Iran sent mullahs to recruit supporters for the ideas of the Islamic Republic in Azerbaijan; this was banned by the Azerbaijani government a few years later. Thereafter, the Iranian side recruited militant supporters from refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh. Iran financed Islamic schools in Azerbaijan, most of which were closed again. The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan and the pro-Iranian Social Democratic Party received support from Tehran. Iran also supported violent Shiite movements in Azerbaijan, including the Jeyshullah and the Azerbaijani branch of Hezbollah . In 1999, 14 alleged members of the Jeyshullah were arrested in connection with the murder of the physicist Etibar Erkin . In 2000, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested 7 members of Hezbollah in connection with the murder of Vice President of the Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences, Ziya Bünyadov . Iranian support has diminished since 2005 as it turned out to be counterproductive from Tehran's point of view in alienating Azerbaijan even more from Iran. Nevertheless, 15 members of an alleged Iranian network were arrested in 2007 that were supposed to spy and recruit Azerbaijani members.

Azerbaijan's good relations with Israel are seriously disrupting the Iranian leadership. Israel is the second largest buyer of Azerbaijani oil, which is exported through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline . Azerbaijan is a buyer of Israeli armaments, and in 2012 the two states signed a contract for the delivery of military goods worth 1.6 billion US dollars (drones, missile defense).

Web links

Commons : Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

^ ^A ^b Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 81 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c Bernard Hourcade : Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 196 .
↑ Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 197 .
↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 35 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
↑ ^a ^b Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 198 .
^ Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 82 .
^ ^A ^b Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 83 .
^ Svante E. Cornell : Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, ISBN 0-7656-3003-6 , pp. 318 .
^ Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 85 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 323 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 327 .
^ ^A ^b Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 328 .
↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 36 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 319 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 336 .
↑ ^a ^b Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 40 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 321 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Houman A. Sadri and Omar Vera-Muñiz: Iranian relations with the South Caucasus . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, pp. 147 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 322 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 329 .
^ Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 86 .
↑ ^a ^b Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 199 .
↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 20 .
^ Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 84 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 326 .
^ ^A ^b ^c Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: history, culture, politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 87 f .
↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 50 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 52 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 332 .
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 331 .
↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 41 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
↑ ^a ^b ^c Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 54 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 333 .
^ ^A ^b Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 334 .
↑ Houman A. Sadri and Omar Vera-Muñiz: Iranian relations with the South Caucasus . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, pp. 148 .

[Gumppenberg81-1] A ^b Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 81 .

[Hourcade196-2] Bernard Hourcade : Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 196 .

[Hourcade197-3] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 197 .

[Moniquet35-4] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 35 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Hourcade198-5] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 198 .

[Gumppenberg82-6] Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 82 .

[Gumppenberg83-7] A ^b Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 83 .

[Cornell318-8] Svante E. Cornell : Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, ISBN 0-7656-3003-6 , pp. 318 .

[Gumppenberg85-9] Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 85 .

[Cornell323-10] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 323 .

[Cornell327-11] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 327 .

[Cornell328-12] A ^b Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 328 .

[Moniquet36-13] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 36 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Cornell319-14] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 319 .

[Cornell336-15] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 336 .

[Moniquet40-16] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 40 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Cornell321-17] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 321 .

[Sadri147-18] Houman A. Sadri and Omar Vera-Muñiz: Iranian relations with the South Caucasus . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, pp. 147 .

[Cornell322-19] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 322 .

[Cornell329-20] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 329 .

[Gumppenberg86-21] Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 86 .

[Hourcade199-22] Bernard Hourcade: Géopolitique de l'Iran . 1st edition. Armand Colin, Paris 2010, ISBN 978-2-200-35116-8 , pp. 199 .

[Moniquet20-23] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 20 .

[Gumppenberg84-24] Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: History, Culture, Politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 84 .

[Cornell326-25] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 326 .

[Gumppenberg87-26] A ^b ^c Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg: The Caucasus: history, culture, politics . 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-56800-8 , pp. 87 f .

[Moniquet50-27] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 50 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Moniquet52-28] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 52 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Cornell332-29] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 332 .

[Cornell331-30] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 331 .

[Moniquet41-31] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 41 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Moniquet54-32] Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 54 ( esisc.org [PDF]).

[Cornell333-33] Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 333 .

[Cornell334-34] A ^b Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 334 .

[Sadri148-35] Houman A. Sadri and Omar Vera-Muñiz: Iranian relations with the South Caucasus . In: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.): Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 . Routledge, Abingdon 2013, pp. 148 .