Air raids on Moscow

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Red Square in Moscow on September 10, 1941

The air raids on Moscow by the German Air Force took place as part of the German-Soviet War . Most of the attacks carried out between July 21 and December 6, 1941, killed 1,088 people. The Luftwaffe encountered well-prepared Soviet resistance and was unable to achieve its goals.

Starting position

On June 22, 1941, the German Wehrmacht crossed the border to the Soviet Union . In the first few days, the Luftwaffe mainly attacked Soviet airfields near the border and beyond. After this first phase was completed by the beginning of July, it switched to direct and indirect tactical army support. In directive No. 33 on the continuation of the war in the east, the Wehrmacht High Command requested air strikes on Moscow . Hitler's goal was Moscow as: "To meet the center of the Bolshevik resistance and to prevent the orderly withdrawal of the Russian government apparatus." According to a diary entry by Joseph Goebbels of July 21, 1941, the attacks "should contribute significantly to the shaking of the hostile resistance." Official "retaliation for the Soviet Russian air strikes against Bucharest and Helsinki " should be carried out. The commander of the 8th Air Corps, Wolfram von Richthofen , who were not involved, hoped the air strikes would trigger a catastrophe, since he assumed that there would be famine in Moscow.

Soviet preparations

Moscow was fully prepared for air strikes. On August 20, 1939, it was decided to build air raid shelters in the Moscow Metro for large crowds, which should be completed by December 1940. With the resolution "On the duty of the population to train in air and gas protection" of July 1, 1941, all Moscow citizens were trained for air protection. For this purpose, the population was trained by means of films, press, brochures, posters, leaflets, lectures, etc. Fighting incendiary bombs was practiced in parks. 13,000 fire fighting teams were formed from 205,000 volunteers. The Moscow air defense consisted of the 1st Air Defense Corps and the 6th Air Corps - with 585 fighters (200 I-16 , 170 MiG-3 , 95 Jak-1 , 75 LaGG-3 and 45 I-153 ), as well as over 1000 anti- aircraft guns , 618 spotlights and 303 tethered balloons . The air defense of Moscow had 580 air signaling post 200 observation towers and radars of type 2 RUS-1 and a type RUS-2 the attacking aircraft which could be detected at an early stage. A total of 600,000 service providers were deployed in civil air protection.

Camouflage of the Bolshoi Theater against air raids, August 1941

The shop windows were barricaded with sandbags or boards, some of which had huge propaganda posters on them. At night there was strict blackout and traffic was minimized to the bare minimum. No effort was spared in the camouflage efforts in front of the German Air Force. The outlines of almost the entire city have been redesigned in great detail. For example, Sverdlov Square and the Bolshoi Theater looked like a group of small houses from the air. The Kremlin walls were redesigned with paint to make row houses, the golden domes of the churches were painted green. Zigzag lines were drawn on all the major streets, which from above looked like house roofs. All large squares were painted with house roofs and open spaces such as sports stadiums were covered with mock wooden house roofs. Even some loops of the Moskva were completely covered with wood to make orientation difficult for the German airmen. Hundreds of anti-aircraft floodlights and heavy anti-aircraft batteries were set up in the forests of the suburbs, and tethered balloons rose from Moscow's arterial roads to deter low-flying aircraft . Moscow's air defense was more developed than that of Berlin and London together. About 70% of Moscow's residential buildings were wooden structures.

course

Bombing raids on Moscow in 1941 (selection from 76 attacks)
date Number of
aircraft
22.7. 195
23.7. 125
24.7. 141
25.7. (Day) 3
27.7. 65
29.7. 93
31.7. 17th
1.8. 23
6.8. 66
7.8. 58
9.8. 67
11.8. 83
19.8. 5
9.9. 12
21.10. (Day and night) 58
28.10. (Day and night) 59
29.10. 32
Soviet air defense position in Moscow

On the night of July 21-22, 1941, 195 fighter planes were to attack the Soviet capital for the first time. Under the leadership of the II. Fliegerkorps of Luftflotte 2 , Kampfgeschwader 2 with the Dornier Do 17Z , Kampfgeschwader 3 with the Junkers Ju 88A and the Dornier Do 17Z and Kampfgeschwader 53 "Legion Condor" with the Heinkel He 111 assembled at their airfields. According to a later statement made by Hitler on February 1, 1943 at the Fuehrer's headquarters , the Heinkel He 177 strategic bomber was to carry out bombing raids on Moscow on June 22, 1941. However, this was not yet ready for use at this point.

In order to make detection by listening devices more difficult, the German aircraft throttled their engines a little when approaching the target. The attacking formations could, however, be identified near Vyazma , which enabled an air alarm to be triggered in good time. The battle group 100 led as a target finder / target marker association, the combat aircraft, of which 127 eventually reached the finish area. These dropped 104 tons of high explosive and 46,000 incendiary bombs. The Moscow air defense was able to shoot down 1 attacking aircraft according to German information and 22 aircraft according to Soviet information. She fired 29,000 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition.

According to the memories of Ludwig Havighorst, who flew the attack as an observer in a Heinkel He 111, the flak fire was a huge surprise and exceeded everything that had come before. Before the attack, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring , Commander in Chief of Air Fleet 2, spoke of a “walk” in contrast to the attacks against Great Britain. Another surprise was the blocking balloons, which were able to reach twice the height of the British, of a maximum of 2200 meters. He observed extensive fires in some places. The British journalist and eyewitness Alexander Werth reports on the flak fire:

“What impressed the most was the huge flak fire; the shards of the grenades pelted the streets like hailstones, and dozens of spotlights lit the sky. I had never seen or heard of anything like it in London. Fire stations were organized on a large scale. "

The central German press agency DNB reported on July 23, 1941 of an alleged "sea of ​​flames" that could already be seen over 140 kilometers and was as big and extensive as the bombing of Manchester and Sheffield. The Großdeutsche Rundfunk broadcast on July 24th:

"To moskau! The propellers are started, the engines are singing their powerful attack song again. To moskau! From many airfields, our strong air force launches explosive bombs [...] so that these fortresses of world misery and cultural shame burst and break, followed by fire bombs so that they burn out and sink in ashes [...] and flames are already beating out the windows. The fortress of Bolshevism is on fire [...] The house of the Soviet arsonists is now going up in flames itself. Moscow is on fire! "

Alexander Werth, on the other hand, reports on the consequences of this attack on July 21:

“The next morning there were a lot of broken window panes, here and there a bomb crater (also one in Red Square), a few places where fires had broken out that could be put out quickly. No serious damage anywhere. The second attack followed on the night of July 22nd; he also caused only limited damage "

The British Under-Secretary of State in the Aviation Ministry, Harold Balfour, who was in Moscow with Lord Beaverbrook at the end of September, hardly noticed any damage.

By October 25, 1941, the Luftwaffe had carried out another 58 attacks on Moscow. Only in the first three more than 100 fighter planes took part. For this purpose, Kampfgeschwader 4 , 54 and 55 were brought in from other sections of the Eastern Front , and Kampfgeschwader 28 from the west .

According to Soviet information, the first air attack was flown at an altitude of 3,000 to 3,500 meters, the second at an altitude of 4,000 to 4,500 meters, all later due to the Soviet air defense at an altitude of 6,000 to 7,000 meters. The Soviet anti-aircraft gun followed the tactic of a "fixed fire curtain". This resulted in low numbers of kills, but was supposed to prevent the enemy aircraft from breaking through. "Accompanying concentrated" fire was fired at illuminated targets. According to Olaf Groehler , only about 3% of all German aircraft used managed to break through to the city center. The commander-in-chief of Luftflotte 2 Albert Kesselring wrote: "The anti-aircraft effect and the glare effect from headlights made an impression even on our British pilots" and that the attacks caused him "a lot of worry".

Since German soldiers were now standing at the gates of the city, the further attacks had a more tactical character in support of the army. On December 6, 1941, the 75th and, after a break of several months, the last air raid on Moscow took place on April 25, 1942.

The Soviet pilot Viktor Wassiljewitsch Talalichin was celebrated as a war hero by the Soviet press, who was the first to carry out a pile-up at night against an He 111 .

Conclusion

According to the Soviet account, the self-sacrificing struggle of the population meant that the German goals could not be achieved. The fire brigade was used to fight fires during the air raids. Part of the population also stood on the roofs during the attacks and made the incendiary bombs harmless. Children also fought the incendiary bombs. Instead of the provided pliers, the population used mere gloves and spades and no longer used the designated masks. The effective fight of the population against the incendiary bombs is said to have resulted in the Wehrmacht only dropping explosive bombs in later air raids.

Horst Boog, on the other hand, points to the clear discrepancy between the specified goals and the measures actually implemented. The wear and tear of forces and the overuse of the air force were already well advanced. Of the 76 air strikes, the majority of 59 were carried out with three to ten aircraft. A further 19 attacks involved 15 to 40 aircraft and 6 around 50 aircraft. More than 100 aircraft took part in only three attacks, and they were responsible for the majority of the damage. A total of around 1000 tons of explosive bombs and large quantities of incendiary bombs were dropped. According to Soviet information, 1,088 people were killed.

literature

When looking at Soviet and GDR sources that were published up to 1989, the activities of censorship authorities in revising various contents in line with Soviet propaganda must be taken into account. (→ censorship in the GDR , censorship in the Soviet Union )

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn undated, Part 2, p. 1022. Quoted by: Horst Boog, p. 689 f.
  2. ↑ Elke Fröhlich (ed.): The diaries of Joseph Goebbels . Munich 1996, part II, volume 1, p. 142.
  3. ↑ Horst Boog, pp. 689-691.
  4. ^ Williamson Murray: Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945 . Alabama 1983, p. 84.
  5. ^ Lev Alexandrowitsch Besymensky : Stalin and Hitler . Berlin 2002, p. 412.
  6. ↑ AM Samsonow, p. 54 f.
  7. ↑ Wilfried Copenhagen : Fighter aircraft of the air defense of the USSR in Flieger Jahrbuch 1982, Transpress , Berlin 1982, p. 50.
  8. ^ Olaf Groehler : History of the Air War 1910–1970 . Berlin 1981, p. 322 f.
  9. ^ Overy, p. 240.
  10. ↑ Wilhelm Arenz mentions these attacks in the introduction to the translation by: A. Svetlišin: The defense against the first mass attack of the German-fascist air force on Moscow . In: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 1970, No. 2, p. 98 ff. There without reference to the source.
  11. ↑ Helmut Heiber : Hitler's situation discussions : The protocol fragments of his military conferences 1942-1945 . Stuttgart 1962, p. 141.
  12. ^ Overy, p. 226.
  13. ↑ Svetlišin, p. 114.
  14. ↑ a b Horst Boog, p. 692.
  15. ↑ Samsonow, p. 57; Svetlišin, p. 114.
  16. ^ Overy, p. 225.
  17. ^ Franz Kurowski: Ludwig Havighorst, As a fighter pilot and parachutist at the focal points of the front . Würzburg 2007, p. 146 ff.
  18. ↑ Alexander Werth : Russia at War . Volume 1, p. 155.
  19. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz : Air War 1939–1945 . Munich 1978, p. 308.
  20. ^ Waldemar Kuckuck: The first bombs on Moscow . Broadcast on Großdeutscher Rundfunk on July 24, 1941. Quoted from Walter Weidauer : Inferno Dresden . Berlin 1983, p. 183.
  21. ↑ Wert, p. 155.
  22. ^ Overy, p. 219.
  23. ↑ a b c Horst Boog, p. 693.
  24. ↑ Samsonow, p. 58.
  25. ^ Raymond L. Garthoff: The Soviet Army. Essence and teaching. Cologne 1955, p. 406.
  26. ↑ Svetlišin, p. 114.
  27. ↑ Groehler, p. 322.
  28. ^ Albert Kesselring: Soldier until the last day . Schnellbach 2000, p. 128.
  29. ^ Wilfried Copenhagen: Soviet fighter planes . Transpress, Berlin 1985, p. 34 ("The ramming as an extraordinary weapon").
  30. ↑ Samsonow, p. 60 ff.