Operation Ajax

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Operation Ajax (actually TPAJAX , where TP stands for the CIA country prefix for Iran and AJAX for the cleaner "Ajax" from Colgate-Palmolive ) describes a historical and exemplary CIA / MI6 operation in August 1953 in Iran , with which Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh should be overthrown and Fazlollah Zahedi installed as the new Prime Minister. The plan was approved on July 1, 1953 by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and on July 11, 1953 by American President Dwight D. Eisenhower . A budget of $ 285,000 had been allocated by the two governments, with the United States pledging $ 147,000 and Great Britain $ 137,000. The plan was based on a collaboration with prominent clergy, the support of the Iranian army and a majority of the members of the Iranian parliament as well as the Shah .

The exact processes have now been largely clarified, as numerous documents originally kept secret in the USA have been accessible since 2013. It is clear from the files that the original plan to oust Mossadegh by decree of the Shah and appoint General Zahedi as the new Prime Minister initially failed because Mossadegh, who remained in office, resisted the dismissal. It was only after massive pro-Shah demonstrations across the country, organized by the clergy on instructions from Grand Ayatollah Hossein Borudscherdi , that the political situation turned and Mossadegh gave up.

Cover picture of the Tehran Mosavar weekly newspaper after Operation Ajax, August 19, 1953

prehistory

On April 29, 1951, the Shah appointed Mossadegh Prime Minister. Nine days later, Mossadegh was confirmed in office by parliament with 99 votes to 3. This was preceded on March 7, 1951 by a fatal assassination attempt on Prime Minister Hajj Ali Razmara . His successor in office, Hossein Ala ', resigned after a few days because of political pressure caused by violent demonstrations by Mossadegh's supporters. On March 15, 1951, a week after the assassination of Prime Minister Razmara by Khalil Tahmassebi, a member of Fedayeen-e Islam , parliament had passed the law to nationalize the oil production and refinery facilities. It was triggered by the British-led international oil company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, later renamed BP ), which dominated the country's oil business and refused to share the profits from the oil business to the extent newly demanded by the Iranian side. According to the agreement of April 29, 1933, which had a term of 60 years, the Persian share of profits amounted to 20%, while the state share in the surrounding oil-producing countries in more recent contracts with American oil companies is usually significant at up to 50% was higher.

In the following two years of Mossadegh's tenure, "a bitter diplomatic battle raged between the British, who wanted to reverse nationalization, and the Iranian nationalists," which developed into an international crisis, the Abadan crisis . In 1953, under Dwight D. Eisenhower , the United States turned to the British line because Churchill had succeeded in convincing him that Mossadegh would ultimately open the door to communism in Iran, an alliance between Mossadegh and the communist Tudeh party and with it a rapprochement between Iran and the Soviet Union could be imminent.

Enabling Act

The political situation in Iran, November 20, 1952

On August 3, 1952, the Iranian parliament passed an enabling law , according to which all draft laws signed by Mossadegh became legally binding, even if they had not yet been discussed and passed by the parliament and the Senate and signed by the Shah. Mossadegh justified this with the fact that the country was in an emergency situation and the government had to remain able to act. The law stipulated that the draft laws would have to be submitted to parliament retrospectively. In fact, Mossadegh took advantage of this opportunity to exclude parliament, the Senate and the Shah from the legislative process because he no longer appeared before parliament. After the six months, Mossadegh applied for an extension of his powers of attorney. After heated discussions, on January 20, 1953, parliament passed an extension of the power of attorney, with the stipulation that Mossadegh immediately submit all draft bills he had signed to parliament and submit further bills to parliament for approval within three months at the latest. Mossadegh did not comply with these requirements of parliament either.

Military purges

In February 1953, tensions between the Mossadegh government and the military grew when Mossadegh dismissed Major General Mahmud Baharmast as chief of the army and replaced it with Brigadier General Taqi Riahi, and sent several high-ranking army officers into early retirement.

Iranian oil economy collapses

Preparation of the USA against a communist government takeover in Iran, March 20, 1953

From March 1953, the Iranian economy was facing collapse due to the lack of oil revenue. Mossadegh stated that he wanted to sell oil well below world market prices, including to countries in the socialist bloc. The Soviet Union had pledged $ 20 million in economic aid. General Zahedi had called on court minister Hossein Ala several times to persuade Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to depose Mossadegh. But he refused as long as the prime minister had the confidence of the majority of members of parliament. The Shah was convinced that Mossadegh's government was politically at an end and that no intervention was required from his side.

Dismissal of Hofminister Ala

In April 1953 Mossadegh dismissed the court minister Hossein Ala and appointed Abol Qasem Amini , a man he trusted, in Ala's place . On April 20, 1953, the police chief of Tehran, Mahmud Afschartus , was kidnapped and found murdered a little later. Hossein Khatibi was arrested on April 22, 1953 as the mastermind behind his kidnapping and murder . After his arrest, Khatibi claimed that Afschartus had found documents ordering the arrest of all CIA agents in Iran. On May 2, 1953, the government charged MPs Mozaffar Baqai and General Fazlollah Zahedi of having been involved in the kidnapping and murder of Afschartus, and requested their arrest. Parliament President Abol-Ghasem Kaschani denied the allegations and granted Zahedi asylum in the Iranian parliament building. Throughout June, supporters and opponents of Mossadegh had heated debates in parliament. The opponents of Mossadegh accused him of disregarding the parliamentary rights won during the constitutional revolution and of ruling like a dictator.

Soviet offer to return Iranian gold holdings

On July 20, 1953, the leadership of the Tudeh Party wrote an open letter to Mossadegh calling for the US to terminate all military and technical assistance agreements and to break off diplomatic relations with the US. The following day, a mass demonstration organized by the Tudeh Party, with an estimated 40,000 participants, took place to press for the severance of relations with the United States. On August 9, 1953, the Soviet Union asked if a negotiating team could come to Iran to offer Mossadegh economic aid and the return of eleven tons of gold that the Soviet Union had taken from Iran after the withdrawal of its troops after the end of World War II.

Referendum to dissolve parliament

NSC Draft Memorandum on How to proceed with Iran, August 10, 1953

After Mossadegh took control of the royal palaces on August 2, 1953, the Shah was no longer allowed to receive visitors without the prior permission of the Prime Minister. The majority of the members of the Iranian parliament had meanwhile opposed Mossadegh. Then Mossadegh decided to dissolve parliament via a referendum . A referendum held on August 3, 1953 to dissolve parliament received a majority of 99.94%. In the referendum there were separate polling stations for the yes and no votes. So it was clear who was voting against Mossadegh's proposal to dissolve parliament. Mossadegh supporters stood in front of the voting halls and had set up a corresponding threat. So it is not surprising that only 170 votes against were cast in Tehran.

Prepare for the operation

On July 6 or 19, 1953, Kermit Roosevelt Jr. to Iran to meet with General Fazlollah Zahedi . Zahedi, who had supported the National Front since 1949 and was interior minister in the first cabinet of Mossadegh, had fallen out with Mossadegh because he was against the cooperation initiated by Mossadegh with the communist Tudeh party. After his break with Mossadegh, Zahedi became a member of the "Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland" (Komitah-e Najat-e ​​Vatan, also called Committee of 46 ), a resistance movement among Iranian officers and civilians. Another well-known member of the committee was General Hasan Arfa . H. Norman Schwarzkopf sr. also traveled to Tehran on August 1, 1953 , but is said to have left the country days later.

“It was by no means the intention of the CIA”, as the French journalist Gérard de Villiers writes, “to trigger a military conflict”, which would not have been possible with the 900 men of the American military mission, but “to organize and to organize the resistance against Mossadegh coordinate".

For this purpose, CIA chief Allen Welsh Dulles made one million US dollars available for "any measure" that was suitable "to lead to the overthrow of Mossadegh". His brother, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles , instructed the US ambassador in Tehran to recruit Iranians who were willing to put up a coup as helpers.

On August 3, 1953, Roosevelt had a long conversation with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In TPAJAX's planning documents it was stated that

"If the Shah does not follow the suggestions of the US government officials and signs the relevant documents, General Zahedi will be informed that the United States will act without active cooperation with the Shah."

Roosevelt had clear instructions. He should tell the Shah

“If he doesn't cooperate, his dynasty will soon be over. The United States and Great Britain had supported him in the past, despite some misunderstandings, and would continue to support him in the future. However, if he does not act now, this support would end. "

Roosevelt made it clear to the Shah that if he did not intervene, Iran would become communist or a second Korea threatened.

On August 13, 1953, the time had come. The Shah signed Prime Minister Mossadegh's certificate of dismissal and General Zahedi's certificate of appointment as the new Prime Minister.

The leadership of the Soviet Union had not remained inactive in the meantime. Anatoly Lavrentjew was recalled from Bucharest and on August 1, 1953, Soviet ambassador to Iran. Lavrentiev was ambassador to Czechoslovakia in 1948 and played a major role in the overthrow of President Edvard Beneš . Like Mossadegh, Beneš had chaired a government of the National Front. He had come under increasing pressure from the Soviet Union, so that at the end of his reign the non-communist members of his government resigned and the communists took over power. Lavrentiev, who organized the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, was undoubtedly the experienced partner who could advise the Tudeh party accordingly in the near future during this critical phase of the Mossadegh government.

Course of the operation

Dismissal of Mossadegh as Prime Minister

On August 15, 1953, Mossadegh was informed by telephone of his planned dismissal by the Shah from Noureddin Kianouri , a leading representative of the Tudeh party . Noureddin Kianouri spoke of a "coup against Mossadegh". The Tudeh party had built a secret network of middlemen in the army up to and including the Shah's Imperial Guard, and had learned of the plans to oust Mossadegh as prime minister. Colonel Nematollah Nassiri , head of the Imperial Guard, went to the house of Mossadegh on the evening of August 15 and gave him the certificate of discharge signed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Mossadegh signed receipt of the certificate of discharge. Nassiri left Mossadegh's house and went to see the Army Chief of Staff, Riahi. Nassiri was arrested there. Riahi gave orders to disarm the Imperial Guard. The officers of the guard were arrested, the guard disbanded and their relatives transferred to other units of the army.

Mossadegh said in a radio address the next morning:

“Last night, a coup was attempted against the government. Most of the traitors are behind bars. Only Zahedi and a small nucleus could escape. I am offering a reward of 500,000 rials for the capture of Zahedi. Death to all traitors! "

When the Shah learned that Mossadegh had opposed his release, he flew on August 16, 1953 from his residence in Ramsar in his private plane in the direction of Baghdad . He was accompanied by his wife Soraya , his adjutant Major Atabai, first lieutenant Khatami and a pilot. In Baghdad, the Shah met the American ambassador to Iraq, Burton Berry. After the meeting, the Shah told the international press that he had dismissed Prime Minister Mossadegh and replaced him with General Zahedi because Mossadegh had systematically violated the constitution . He had left the country to avoid bloodshed, but had not abdicated and would return immediately to continue serving his country. The Shah's onward flight to Rome on August 18, 1953 was in a chartered English private plane.

In Iran, after the departure of the Shah, the political discussion began on the subject of “regime change”, a change in the form of government from monarchy to republic. The Tudeh party and its related magazines made headlines: “The power is ours” and “We demand the proclamation of the republic and the opening of a trial against the Shah”. On the same day, the tomb of Reza Shah Pahlavis in Rey was broken into and damaged by militant members of the Tudeh party . Parliamentary speaker Ayatollah Kaschani and his deputy Ayatollah Behbahani turned against Mossadegh. Behbahani issued public calls to warn of the "red threat" that Mossadegh would lead to the downfall of Islam. General Teymur Bakhtiar , the commander in chief of the armed forces in Kermanshah , clearly sided with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and intended to invade Tehran with his troops.

For August 17, 1953, Kermit Roosevelt Jr. organized a pro-Shah demonstration. To this end, Roosevelt hired a well-known strength athlete from the Zurchanehs by the name of Shabân Jafari ( called Shaban the Brainless by his opponents ) to stir up 300 to 400 hooligans - they should chant pro-Shah slogans. US Ambassador Loy Henderson changed approx. 400,000 US dollars in Tehran on August 18, 1953 at the Persian state bank Melli in Rial and Toman . Passers-by who shouted “Long live the Shah” received a 10- rial banknote from Jafari .

Failure of TPAJAX

Soldiers surround the parliament building in Tehran, August 19, 1953

On the evening of August 18, 1953, the British and American governments concluded that the attempt to depose Mossadegh had failed. The CIA agents have been ordered to leave Iran. A memorandum written for the US president recommended supporting Mossadegh. US Ambassador Loy Henderson went to the Prime Minister's residence and was received by Mossadegh. Henderson asked Mossadegh if he could explain to him exactly what had happened in the past few days so that he could inform his government. He himself was on vacation and only returned today. Mossadegh said he had dissolved parliament "because it has not proven itself worthy of the Iranian people". The Shah had been requested by the British to have him arrested. When Nassiri came to arrest him, he was arrested himself. Mossadegh also stated that he was unaware of any decree issued by the Shah after he was deposed as Prime Minister. And even if this decree had existed, he would not have recognized it, since in his opinion the Shah had a purely ceremonial function. Henderson said goodbye after this lengthy conversation, and Mossadegh was convinced that the US was now on his side.

Mossadegh had banned all demonstrations for the following days and informed the leaders of the Tudeh party that he would not allow any further violent acts.

Pro-Shah demonstrations - the military and police unite with the demonstrators

A tank on the way to the house of Mohammad Mossadegh, August 19, 1953

On August 19, 1953 (Mordad 28, 1332) the day turned out completely different from what Henderson expected and Mossadegh had hoped. Pro-Shah protesters marched through the streets of Tehran early in the morning. Around noon, police and military units joined the Mossadegh opponents and stormed the Foreign Ministry, the police headquarters and the headquarters of the Army General Staff . In order to make the people aware of the Shah's decree that the Shah dismissed Mossadegh as prime minister and General Zahedi was appointed new prime minister, General Zahedi's son, Ardeschir Zahedi , had already printed 10,000 copies in a printing house on August 16 distributed among the population and to the press. On August 18, a copy of Mossadegh's certificate of discharge and Zahedi's certificate of appointment, signed by the Shah, was printed on the front page of the Shahed newspaper , published by Mozaffar Baqai . Other newspapers published the documents on August 19. The news of Mossadegh's dismissal spread rapidly in Tehran. Pro-Shah demonstrations gathered in the bazaar area around nine o'clock and then marched through the streets of Tehran with shouts of pro-Shah. Pro-Shah demonstrations also took place in the provinces. In Tabriz, Esfahan and Shiraz, civilians and military officials were on the streets shouting "Long live the Shah". Public buildings were occupied by the demonstrators and announcements were made on local radio stations in support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The pro-Mossadegh troops, although alarmed and had occupied important positions in Tehran, behaved neutrally or, after a speech by General Zahedi on the Baharestan Parliament Square, defected to his side. "Basically, the army brought about the decisive turning point", so de Villiers, "the mass of demonstrators were only used for a few special tasks [...] but in particular to give the intervention of the military a spontaneous populist character." Leader of the Tudeh party Kianouri called on Mossadegh to “mobilize the masses and distribute weapons to the population”, but Mossadegh refused.

Armed clashes between Mossadegh supporters and troops loyal to General Zahedi mainly took place in front of Mossadegh's house and left over 200 dead and 300 wounded. General Rihani reached Mossadegh on the phone and told him to give up. At five in the afternoon, Mossadegh gave up. In a brief statement, he stressed that he was the rightful Prime Minister , but that the security forces were no longer following his instructions. Protesters outside Mossadegh's house broke into the building and ransacked it. Mossadegh had climbed over the garden wall into the neighboring house and hid there for the night. The next day Mossadegh wanted to face the security forces. He first went to the house of one of his ministers and was discovered and arrested by police officers who had been looking for him.

The highest Islamic clergyman, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Borudscherdi, is said to have said at a meeting of the Iranian clergy, at which the assessment of political events and the attitude of the clergy was concerned: "The country needs a king" (mamlekat Shah mikhahad) , whereupon the Ayatollahs Behbahani and Kaschani called on the "usual activists" to take to the streets and demonstrate. After the fall of Mossadegh, the Shah sent a telegram from Rome to Borudscherdi and Behbahani thanking them for their support. Borujerdi replied: "I hope that Her Majesty's safe return will put an end to the evil here, bring glory and honor to Islam and prosperity to Muslims." According to de Villiers, the operation of the restoration of the Shah cost the CIA exactly 32.643 million rials, which at the time was equivalent to $ 390,000.

consequences

Every government ratified by parliament after the fall of Mossadegh worked closely with the Shah . Reforms such as B. the White Revolution were explicitly presented by the Shah and passed by means of a referendum. The establishment of the Iranian secret service SAVAK can also be seen as a result of Mossadegh's reign. After these events, the Shah wanted to consolidate his position at all costs. The SAVAK fought vigorously against Marxist and Islamist guerrilla movements . Resistance to the politics of the Shah was suppressed until the so-called “opening of political space” in 1978, which then led to the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah.

As far as oil policy was concerned, an international consortium took over the production and marketing of Iranian oil for the next 25 years in 1954. The British share was reduced to 40%, with the entry of five American oil companies with a 40% share, 14% went to Royal Dutch Shell and 6% to the French company CFP (later Total ). The Iranian profit share in the oil revenues was initially 25%. The treaty was changed several times after the establishment of OPEC, which was initiated by the Shah , so that the Iranian share of oil revenues reached more than 50% in the end. The term of the consortium agreement ended in 1979.

In 2007, author Tim Weiner cites a statement by analyst and CIA member Ray S. Cline from 1976 regarding the role of the CIA in Operation Ajax:

"The problem with this seemingly brilliant achievement" was "the extravagant impression of the CIA's power it created," wrote Cline. "It was not evidence that the CIA could overthrow governments and install rulers; it was an isolated case where the right amount of aid was given at the right time, in the right way. "By buying the followers of soldiers and street rabble, the CIA was able to create the level of violence sufficient to carry out a coup Sums of money went into certain hands, and these hands brought about a change of government. "

Anatoly Lavrentiev , the Soviet ambassador to Iran, was initially recalled from Iran after the fall of Mossadegh. In Moscow he was blamed for the “failure of the Soviet agenda”. Lavrentiev is said to have attempted suicide on August 19, 1953. A short time later, however, Lavrentiev returned from Moscow and took over the post of Soviet ambassador in Tehran.

Relations with neighboring Iraq deteriorated dramatically after the fall and Iraq severed diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom and Iran.

On the involvement of the CIA in the 1953 coup

In 2009 President had Barack Obama in his speech to the Islamic world as the first US government publicly the admitted what had the CIA for decades denied: "middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government."

For the first time in 60 years, the CIA itself has publicly admitted its participation in Operation Ajax. The declassification of relevant documents on August 19, 2013 was at the urging of the independent National Security Archive at George Washington University . It welcomed the CIA's decision to release the materials and expressed the opinion that this could have happened many years ago without endangering national security. Last but not least, its deputy director Malcolm Byrne pointed out:

“There are no longer any good reasons to keep such a crucial period in our recent past a secret… The basic facts are widely known to every schoolchild in Iran. Suppressing the details only distorts the story and leads to the formation of myths on all sides. "

The National Security Archive also made the CIA files available to the public on the Internet.

Ray Takeh rated Obama's statement in an article published in 2014 as “ well known… but not well founded. ... In reality, the CIA's impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power "(German:" well known ... but not well documented ... In truth, the influence of the CIA was on the events of 1953 ultimately meaningless. Regardless of what the CIA did or did not do, Mossadegh would fall and the Shah was about to regain his throne and expand his power. "

In the spring of 2017, the State Department's Office of the Historian published extensive documentation entitled “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954”.

literature

  • Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited . palgrave macmillan, New York 2010, ISBN 978-0-230-57927-9 .
  • Stephen Kinzer : In the service of the Shah. CIA, MI6 and the roots of terror in the Middle East . Wiley-VCH, Weinheim 2009, ISBN 978-3-527-50415-2 .
  • Ray Takeyh: What Really Happened in Iran - The CIA, the Ouster of Mosadeqq, and the Resoration of the Shah. Council on Foreign Relations. July / August 2014. ( foreignaffairs.com ).
  • Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 .
  • Tim Weiner: CIA. The whole story . S. Fischer Verlag, 2008, ISBN 978-3-10-091070-7 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Hugh Wilford: America's great game: the CIA's secret Arabists and the shaping of the modern Middle East . Basic Books, New York 2013, ISBN 978-0-465-01965-6 , pp. 164 .
  2. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 86.
  3. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 230 .
  4. ↑ a b Wilfried von Bredow: late effects. The coup in Iran in 1953. (Review). FAZ.net, February 12, 2009, accessed on February 13, 2009 .
  5. ^ Enabling Acts of August 3, 1952
  6. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 82 f.
  7. ^ Mehdi Shamshiri: A Documentary Research Revealing the Secrets of Afshartoos Assassination. 2011, ISBN 978-0-578-08304-9 (farsi).
  8. ^ Kristen Blake: The US-Soviet confrontation in Iran, 1945–1962. University Press of America, 2009, pp. 84 f.
  9. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 271 .
  10. ↑ a b Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 265 .
  11. ↑ Jürgen Martschukat: This is how we get rid of the mad! In: Die Zeit ONLINE . No. 34 , August 14, 2003 ( zeit.de [accessed October 29, 2008]).
  12. ^ Stephanie Cronin: The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran. In: Tauris Academic Studies. London 1997, p. 245.
  13. ↑ a b Rainer Traub: In the name of democracy . In: Spiegel Special History . No. 3 , July 29, 2008, p. 57 ( spiegel.de ).
  14. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 92
  15. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 92.
  16. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 94.
  17. ↑ a b Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 101.
  18. ^ Office of the Military Governor of Tehran: Black Book on Tudeh Officers Organization. 1956, ISBN 978-3-8442-7813-2 . epubli.de
  19. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York, 2010, p. 95.
  20. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 276 .
  21. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 277 .
  22. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 99.
  23. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 286 .
  24. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 287 .
  25. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 291 .
  26. ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press, 2008, pp. 244f.
  27. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 125.
  28. ↑ a b Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 154.
  29. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 294 .
  30. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 111.
  31. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 299 .
  32. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 112.
  33. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 153.
  34. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 300 .
  35. ↑ Unsuccessful Attempts at solving the oil issue ( Memento of March 27, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
  36. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. University of California Press, 2009, 263f.
  37. ↑ Tim Weiner: CIA: The Whole Story . S. Fischer Verlag, 2008, ISBN 978-3-10-091070-7 , pp. 136 .
  38. ↑ Suicide Attempt by Russian Envoy Reported After Red Defeat. In: The New York Times. August 31, 1953.
  39. ^ Rob Johnson: The Iran-Iraq War. New York, 2011, pp. 24-27.
  40. ^ Whitehouse.gov The White House, 2009 (English). The wording of his speech is very similar to the statements in his book Hope Dare , German 2006, p. 365, i.e. before taking up his post. There Obama complained about "the worldwide consequences " of this wrong decision, which was caused by the "glasses of the Cold War". Obama's English original formulates even more sharply: “seismic repercussions”, ie “earthquake-like consequences”.
  41. ↑ Sixty years later, CIA admits role in Iran coup .
  42. ↑ Sixty years later, CIA admits role in Iran coup . 'There is no longer good reason to keep secrets about such a critical episode in our recent past ... The basic facts are widely known to every school child in Iran. Suppressing the details only distorts the history, and feeds into myth-making on all sides. '
  43. ↑ Malcolm Byrne: CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup , National Security Archive, August 19, 2013.
  44. ↑ Ray Takeyh: What Really Happened in Iran - The CIA, the ouster of Mosadeqq, and the resoration of the Shah. Council on Foreign Relations. July / August 2014. p. 1.
  45. ↑ [1]