Operazione Malta Due
Map of the German-Italian regions in the Mediterranean (outlined in green). British strongholds and bases, including Malta, are marked in red.
| date | July 26, 1941 |
|---|---|
| place | in front of Fort St Elmo , Valletta , Malta |
| output | British victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
CF Vittorio Moccagatta, RM |
Col. Henry Ferro, RMA |
| Troop strength | |
| 1 Aviso 2 torpedo boats 9 explosive devices 2 manned torpedoes 2 support boats 10 fighters |
9 light gun emplacements 30 fighters |
| losses | |
|
17 dead, |
1 fighter plane |
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On July 26, 1941, during the Second World War, there was an Italian attack on the port of Valletta in Malta . This operation was carried out by a specialized small arms association of the Italian Navy , the Decima Flottiglia MAS , under the name Operazione Malta Due (Eng .: "Operation Malta Two"). The events are also known in Malta as the Battle of Grand Harbor or, in Maltese , L-Attakk ta 'lE-Boats (German: "Attack of the explosive vessels").
The aim of the Italian attack on the port was to sink the warships and submarines of the Royal Navy stationed on Malta and thus weaken the British forces in the Mediterranean . However, the operation failed completely, achieved none of its goals and led, among other things, to the loss of the entire leadership of Decima MAS .
prehistory
During the Second World War, the events in the Mediterranean were shaped by the fact that the Axis powers had to support their campaigns on the southern coast of the Mediterranean from their core areas of Italy , especially the island of Sicily and the southernmost tip of Calabria . Already since the beginning of the war there was fierce fighting in North Africa between the Italian army attacking from Italian Libya and the British forces operating from Egypt . These struggles were intensified again by the dispatch of the German Africa Corps in February 1941.
However, in supporting and reinforcing the fighting units in North Africa, Great Britain had the strategic advantage of controlling a number of important key positions and bases around the Mediterranean. These strategic bases of operations included, for example, Gibraltar , Tobruk and Egypt with the Suez Canal . In particular, the British colony of Malta soon assumed a central position within the framework of this base line. Located exactly in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea and halfway between the Italian home bases and the Libyan combat area, the island was the main British base for disrupting supplies from the Axis powers. In particular, the submarines of the 10th submarine flotilla (Commander GWG Simpson) operating from Malta severely disrupted the Italian-German supply links to North Africa by carrying out devastating strikes against enemy convoys.
Because of these strategic advantages and the important naval bases on the island, Malta was under almost uninterrupted air raids during the entire course of 1940, 1941 and 1942; Especially in the early years of the war, the port facilities in Valletta and the runways and the military depots in Birkirkara were heavily bombed by German-Italian aircraft. The time is therefore known as the Siege of Malta . The idea arose early on on the Italian side to use the special forces of the Decima Flottiglia MAS (also called "X-MAS"). This special association collected the small arms of the Italian Navy, with which it had already achieved great success in the First World War and which were also used very effectively on other occasions in the Second World War. A first night attack by boats equipped with explosives was planned as Operazione Malta for May 1941, but was then postponed to the night of June 29th to 30th and finally canceled due to bad weather and technical problems.
Operazione Malta Due
The Italian plan
A second attempt should be made a month later. The plan provided for the following forces to be involved:
- the Italian Aviso Diana , the converted and armed private yacht of the Italian Duce Benito Mussolini
- two torpedo boats of the Motoscafo Armato Silurante (MAS) type (MAS-451 and MAS-452)
- nine explosive boats of the type Motoscafo Turismo (MT)
- two manned torpedoes of the type Siluro a Lenta Corsa (SLC)
- two support boats of the type Motoscafo Turismo Lento (MTL) and Motoscafo Turismo Silurante (MTS)
During the failed Operazione Malta , the MT type boats were towed by the MAS type torpedo boats, but it turned out that the small boats were unable to make the passage from the Decima MAS base in Augusta , Sicily to Malta on their own to do. This time they should be brought on board the yacht Diana to a point about 20 nautical miles off the coast of Malta and then put into the water for the attack. The two manned SLC torpedoes were carried on board their own mother boat of the MTL type, the MTS type boat served as a command boat and reception station for returnees after the attack. The MAS torpedo boats were intended to protect the small flotilla from British attacks.
The attack was scheduled for the dark new moon night of July 25th to 26th. The entrance to the Grand Harbor of Valletta was closed at the level of Fort St Elmo by a steel bridge under which a heavy network barrier was located. The plan stipulated that after the small boats had been set down and approached slowly and quietly, one of the two manned torpedoes should first place its warhead on the network barrier and thus blow it up. The other SLC should attack the Royal Navy submarines in Marsamxett Harbor , both torpedoes should retreat to the assembly point after their warheads were dropped. After the network blockage had been blown, the nine MT boats were supposed to enter the harbor at high speed and attack the war and cargo ships anchored there. The explosive devices were used by aiming them at a target by their pilots and accelerating them to high speed. About 100 meters before the impact, the pilot jumped off and saved himself by swimming on land (or to the waiting MTS boat). The boat itself carried a 300 kilogram blast landing, which was triggered by an impact fuse on impact or shortly thereafter triggered by a deep detonator and was supposed to destroy the target.
A total of three air strikes by the Italian Air Force were to take place during the operation to distract the British defenders and at the same time provide guidance for the explosive devices. After successful execution, the crews of the SLCs and any MT pilots who had escaped swimming should be picked up by the two torpedo boats and brought back to Augusta. It was accepted that some MT pilots could only save themselves to the coast of Malta and would end up in captivity , but the use of the explosive devices and the manned torpedoes was not intended as a self-sacrifice . For example, a few weeks earlier, on March 26, 1941, there had been an attack on Suda Bay in Crete , in which six boats of the type MT had sunk, among other things, the British heavy cruiser HMS York , and which all six explosive device pilots survived .
the defenders
The defense of Malta against attacks from the sea was led by units of the British Army and above all the Royal Malta Artillery . The nine gun emplacements of the 3rd Coastal Battery of the Royal Malta Artillery stationed on Fort St Elmo were particularly relevant for Operazione Malta Due . This RMA battery was under the command of Colonel ( Colonel ) Henry Ferro. The guns were light 6-pounder twin guns with a range of about 5,500 yards. The 3rd battery also had heavy coastal artillery on St Elmo in the 9.2 and 6 inch calibers , which, however, did not fire on small targets at close range. There were also several machine gun positions around the port , one of which later intervened in the battle, and above all a number of searchlights that were used to locate the targets.
The Royal Air Force in Malta was under Group Captain (Colonel) Hugh Pughe Lloyd , and Hawker Hurricanes from the 126th and 185th Squadrons were deployed on the night of the attack .
Course of the attack: the network block
The Diana was discovered by a radar station on Malta when the explosive boats were set down around midnight. The radar could not see the small boats themselves, however, and so after the Diana turned off in Malta nothing was known of the impending attack. The discovery of Diana , however, led to the alerting of the gun crews at Fort St. Elmo, who were thereby ready at the time of the attack.
The entire group had already been delayed on the crossing from Sicily and technical problems with one of the MT boats (which ultimately failed for the attack) and especially with one of the SLC torpedoes delayed the attack further. Since this was to take place at the same time as a diversionary attack by the Luftwaffe, which was planned for 4:30 a.m., it was ultimately too late for the SLC to deploy their warheads and withdraw to a safe distance before the explosion. The commander of one of the two two-man torpedoes was Maggiore ( Major ) Teseo Tesei , one of the two developers of this weapon. He decided to carry out the attack anyway and to trigger the demolition at the scheduled time, even if he were to be killed in the process.
The Italians had not noticed, however, that a current had driven them from their planned starting point while attempting to repair the damaged SLC. When Tesei started on his SLC, he could not navigate as planned and could not find the St. Elmo network lock. The second SLC, which started a few minutes later despite the technical problems, did not find its destination either. The unnoticed drift also affected the group of the remaining eight MT explosive devices and also influenced their approach to the target.
When the network lock had not been destroyed by an explosion at the planned time, the leader of the MT Boot group decided to implement the alternative plan provided for this case. Two of the eight MT boats were supposed to use their explosive charges against the network locks, the others should then follow. However, the first MT boat hit the barrier too slowly so that its detonators did not go off - the boat simply got stuck in the net without the British noticing. Therefore, the second pilot decided to steer his boat against the steel bridge with full force, without jumping off at a safe distance beforehand. He died in the explosion of his boat, which also ignited the cargo on the other boat. However, the joint explosion of the two heavy charges was so strong that half of the steel bridge collapsed and remained in the port entrance. This meant that the only entrance to the Grand Harbor that could be used by MT boats was now blocked by an insurmountable obstacle - at that time, Operazione Malta Due had failed.
The explosion at the network lock immediately alerted all gun crews and searchlight positions in the area of the port entrance. As the first target, one of the light guns Teseo Teseis SLC discovered and opened fire. Both pilots were killed and the manned torpedo sunk. Meanwhile, the six remaining MT boats drove close to the British fortifications, only to have to realize at the last moment that the entrance was blocked. Two boats were destroyed, another shot immobilized, the others were able to turn, but suffered damage.
Course of the attack: fighting off the coast
After the failure of the breakthrough attempt, the crews of the remaining four MT boats and the two MAS torpedo boats were unsure of what to do. While some opted to retreat or sunk their boats and swim ashore, others attempted a renewed attack on possible targets outside the network lock. They came under fire again by the coastal guns. The most serious incident occurred when a single shell from a light gun accidentally hit MAS-452, which - actually well outside the gun range - was watching the action. The grenade penetrated into the interior and detonated there. The explosion killed eight Italians, including the commander of the Decima Flottiglia MAS , Capitano di Fregata ( frigate captain ) Vittorio Moccagatta, his deputy, Capitano di corvetta ( corvette captain ) Giorgio Giobbe, and the flotilla's medical officer, Bruno Falcomata. The eleven other Italians on board MAS-452 escaped aboard the MTS.
Meanwhile, several Hawker Hurricans had started from Malta, which attacked the remaining MT boats and MAS-451. Italian Macchi MC.200 , launched from Sicily , intervened to defend the boats but were repulsed. The Hurricanes were able to take out all other Italian boats, except for the MTS, on which eleven survivors of MAS-452 escaped to the meeting point with the waiting Diana .
Conclusion and further events
The attack by Decima MAS on July 26, 1941 must be described as a complete failure. Neither of the objectives in the two ports of Malta was achieved. A total of 17 Italians were killed, including the top management of Decima MAS , 18 were taken prisoner of war - in addition, one of the eleven survivors died a few days later due to the wounds he had suffered. In addition to the nine MT boats that were planned as losses anyway, two SLCs, their mother boat, two torpedo boats and two MC.200 fighters were also lost. Not a single one of the 19 Decima MAS members involved in the attack returned to Italy - ten had died and nine were taken prisoners of war. This loss of personnel of four central command officers, including the developer of the SLC, weakened the unit decisively and delayed further operations.
On the British side, only one hurricane was lost, the pilot of which, however, was able to save himself on board the abandoned torpedo boat MAS-452 and returned unharmed. In addition, the Royal Navy succeeded in bringing one of the MT boats (MT-16, which had not been attacked due to technical problems) into port almost undamaged. It served her as an important visual object when developing her own explosive vessels. Although the bridge over the entrance to Grand Harbor had been destroyed, the blockade only affected half of the entrance and did not block the passage for larger ships, it was also soon cleared.
The Italian and German attacks on Malta continued unabated in the months that followed. The Decima Flottiglia MAS also carried out four other operations against Malta, which however no longer provided for direct attacks, but rather aimed at spies (on two occasions) and combat swimmers (on the other two occasions - these operations were canceled due to bad weather) discontinue. The Italian Navy drew the lesson from the catastrophic outcome of Operazione Malta Due to no longer use the vulnerable MT boats or their successors of the MTM types in offensive attacks on fortified ports; in the further course of the war they were only used for coastal defense. The manned torpedoes of the SLC type, however, carried out several very successful operations; Most effective was certainly the attack on the port of Alexandria on the night of December 18-1941, in which the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant were badly damaged.
literature
- Joseph Caruana: The Battle of Grand Harbor. July 26, 1941. St. Julians 2004.
- Harald Fock: Naval small weapons. Manned torpedoes, small submarines, small speed boats, explosives. Yesterday Today Tomorrow. Herford 1982.
- When the Italian Navy attacked Grand Harbor on July 26, 2005 on TimesofMalta.com (accessed August 4, 2012).
Remarks
- ↑ a b including 1 Regia Aeronautica pilot.
- ↑ The loss of the nine explosive devices was part of the plan.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 22-23.
- ↑ cf. for the entire further representation of the plan Caruana: Battle. Pp. 51-57.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. P. 7, based on the memories of the British officer who examined the recovered MT-16 boat after the attack and the official British report. Jib: Naval ordnance. Pp. 198–199, indicates the strength of the explosive charge deviating from this at 330 kg, cf. also ibid., p. 110.
- ↑ cf. Jib: Naval ordnance. P. 116.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 20-22, 40.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 26-27.
- ^ Tesei was a member of the Corpo del genio navale , the corps of geniuses in the Italian Navy; Until 1973 these bore the rank of the Army . The corresponding naval rank would be Capitano di corvetta ( corvette captain ), cf. Jib: Naval ordnance. P. 116.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 28-29.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 31-33.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 33-34.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 34-36.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 41-42, 48.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 40–43, as well as Fock: Marine-Kleinkampfmittel. P. 116.
- ↑ Differentiation between X-MAS and other naval personnel (two MAS torpedo boat crews of thirteen each) according to Caruana: Battle. P. 46.
- ↑ cf. Jib: Naval ordnance. P. 117.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. P. 44.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. P. 49.
- ↑ cf. Caruana: Battle. Pp. 60-63.
- ↑ During the Operazione Malta Due , the last nine existing of a total of 18 built MT-type boats were lost, cf. Caruana: Battle. P. 47. For the rest of the war only boats of the types MTM and MTR were available, but they were constructed similarly.
- ↑ cf. Jib: Naval ordnance. P. 111.