Battle of Kápolna
Pákozd - Schwechat - Košice - Mór - Piski - Mediasch - Kápolna - Hatvan - Tápió Bicske - Isaszeg - Waitzen I - Nagy-Salló - Komorn I - Mocsa - Kács - Pered - Raab - Ács (Komorn II) - Komorn III - Hegyes - Waitzen II - Tura - Sighișoara - Debreczin - Szöreg - Temesvár
Arad - Deva - Esseg - Karlsburg - Komorn - Leopoldov - Oven - Peterwardein - Temesvár
In the Battle of Kápolna on February 26 and 27, 1849, the Hungarians under General Henryk Dembiński went on the offensive with three army corps against the Austrian II Corps. On February 26, the II. Corps (FML Count Wrbna ) advanced from Gyöngyös against Kápolna, while south of it the division of FML Schwarzenberg advanced from Arokszállás to Kál, with the battle of Kápolna developing. The Austrian Colloredo brigade was able to hold the Hungarian division under Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Pöltenberg in the forest of Vécs. The following day, reached at the Imperial Corps addition silt from the north into battle one. General Klapka had not secured the Sirok Valley, so the Hungarian retreat on Mezőkövesd was inevitable. The Hungarian army was not completely defeated at Kápolna, but the battlefield remained in the hands of the imperial troops , who in turn withdrew to Buda .
prehistory
In order to prevent the concentration of the Hungarian army, the imperial field marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz had gathered around 30,000 soldiers and 165 artillery pieces. In mid-February 1849 he wanted to unite his army with the Schlik Corps, which was exposed in the Eger area . Meanwhile, the Croatian corps under Ban Jellacic remained deployed between Pesth and Szolnok to cover the Windisch-Grätz Army against the Hungarian Southern Army.
The strength of the opposing Hungarian troops was about 43,000 men and 150 guns, of which about 36,000 men and 136 guns were available during the following battle. Prince Windisch-Grätz himself followed the advance of the Csorich division ; the headquarters had been moved from Hatvan to Gyöngyös on February 26th . On February 23, Prince Windisch-Grätz had his II Corps under FML Wrbna advance via Kerepes to Gödöllö , and on February 24 the avant-garde moved into Hatvan. From the I Corps of Croats under the Banus Jellacic he received reports of a failed battle at Czibakhaza on February 24th. Austrian reinforcements under Major General Ottinger had left Abony and had arrived at the bridge of Czibakhaza around 5 a.m. after a long night march. The Hungarians had already occupied Czibakhaza and the bridge. Ottinger's attack resulted in the loss of 10 dead and 11 wounded. The right flank of the Schwarzenberg division , which was advancing towards Arokszállás, was covered by the detachment of Major General Zeisberg in the direction of Baczonod.
The plan of the Hungarian Commander-in-Chief Dembiński envisaged offering the decisive battle between Mezőkövesd and Eger, but beforehand accruing advanced Austrian forces at Szolnok and rubbing them up. Dembiński's appointment as commander turned out to be a grave mistake, he was not popular with the Hungarians because of his distrust. As a Pole, Dembiński had initially fallen out with Mór Perczel and Klapka and then was in opposition to Artúr Görgey because of the operational measures . Dembiński neglected the threat on his northern flank, where the Austrian corps under General Schlick was still operating. Dembiński stuck to his plan and even withdrew the division advanced to the right from Pétervására just as General György Klapka was about to attack the Schlik Corps on February 24th.
Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz's reconnaissance service reported that the Hungarian troops had left Eperies and Kaschau and united with other troops between Erlau and Mezőkövesd , so that the main army consisted of the Görgey, Dembinski and Klapka corps. The strength of the Hungarians at Mezökövesd, Maklar and Erlau was determined to be 40,000 to 45,000 men; a separate Hungarian column was advanced in the direction of Heves , where a road led on to Kál and Kápolna.
The battle
February 26th
On February 26th, the Austrian II Corps (FML. Wrbna) stood with the Csorich division in Gyöngyös and the Schwarzenberg division in Hrok-Szallas. After the boiling, the II. Corps marched with the Csorich division (Brigade Wyss and Brigade Colloredo ) from Hrok-Szallas and started moving towards Karácsond and Kál. Csorich's armed forces gathered in Gyöngyös were ordered to advance to Kápolny, followed by the Parrot Brigade. Major General Zeisberg , who had arrived in Eörs with his independent brigade, protected the right flank of Wrbna's corps and advanced an advance guard on Heves. The III. Corps of FML Schlick was also ordered to Gyöngyös to join the main forces. FML Schlick applied for his troops to advance on the road to the east via Sirok to Verpelét instead of via Päszto, in order to combine the union with the Wrbna corps with an attack on the enemy’s northern flank.
In the afternoon, the opposing troops met on the Tarna section. A division of the 7th Corps (General Klapka) under Colonel Dessewffy had reached Verpelét, and one of their battalions secured the road to Sirok. The Pöltenberg division advanced to Feldebrő at 12 p.m. and crossed the Tarna section at 2 p.m. The imperial troops entered the Vecs forest but did not cross the Tarna river. A brigade of the Csorich Division under Major General Colloredo fought on the edge of the Aldebrő forest. At first none of the opponents could force the decision. General Colloredo received reinforcements and drove the Hungarians out of the Vecs forest. However, the imperial troops who took up the pursuit soon realized that the Hungarian troops were stronger than expected and after a brief skirmish they moved to the northeast on Feldebrő.
That night General Pöltenberg appeared at the head of a hussar patrol in Kápolna, a village southwest of Eger, for whose possession the main battle soon shifted. Without instructions from Dembinski, Pöltenberg's vanguard evacuated Aldebrö and Feldebrö and let his troops return to Kerecsend over the Tarna under the fire of the imperial artillery. Dembiński, who had had lunch with Görgey in Eger, immediately after this report hurried to Kápolna, which he reached before dark. He issued his orders at 7:00 p.m. and instructed the Pötenberg division to return his troops to Feldebrő and to attack again together with the Aulich division near Kápolna. Only two divisions had received the order in time, and the Schultz division also joined the troops advancing towards Verpelét. The Driquet brigade of the Máriássy division (1st Corps) was now the vanguard on the west bank of the Tarna between the forests of Schwierot and Kápolna. The Aulich division fought near Kál.
Colonel Máriássys Hussars tried to bypass the imperial brigade under Major General Wyss, but his plan was recognized in time by opponents and dispersed in a counterattack. The Máriássy division eventually returned to its starting position at Kápolna, but remained on the west bank of Tarna. The Kisfaludy Brigade crossed the Tarna, fought near Kál and caused great losses to the enemy with its artillery. The situation of the Hungarian troops worsened during the night. The Schlick corps had advanced that evening via Pétervásár without a fight on the Strait of Sirok and encountered opposing positions in Verpelét. Dembiński withdrew the Hungarian troops in Kál to the east bank of the Tarna during the night. In Kapolna, Dembiński pulled the division back to the lower eastern bank of Tarna and blocked the bridge over the river, the village remained occupied by the Driquet brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Máriássy warned Dembiński that it would be difficult to defend Kapolna. The Austrian Wyss brigade actually pushed across the bridge and still took most of Kapolna.
27th of February
Prince Windisch-Grätz had achieved his goals of occupying Kapolna and defeating the Hungarian right wing. Windisch-Grätz grouped Colonel Brandenstein's brigade after Verpelét against the tip of the Hungarian right wing. On the second day of the battle, February 27th, the effect was noticed by the timely arrival of Schlick's Corps, which had approached from Verpelét and threatened the right flank of the Hungarian line-up.
At 8:00 a.m., Prince Windisch-Grätz gave the order to the Wyss Brigade to force the attack of the 2nd Jäger Battalion, the Schönhals battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Schneider excelled. Major General Wyss and his cavalry hurried from the Meierhof near Kompolt to the area south of Kápolna. Dembiński in turn ordered the Driquet Brigade to attack: the 44th and 47th Battalions and the Zanini Battalion were dispatched to retake Kapolna. Two unsuccessful attempts were made by Máriássy personally against the positions on the eastern edge of the village. After the Zanini battalion had fired its volleys, the Wyss brigade could be driven back. Aulich's troops were able to withstand all attacks by the Schütte and Dietrich brigades south of it . The task of General Klapka on the northern section was to hold a division in Verpelét and to prevent the enemy from uniting. Dembiński instructed Klapka to reopen the Strait of Sirok. The Pöltenberg troops arrived in Verpelét just in time to repel the attacks by Schlick's hussars. After this success, Klapka tried unsuccessfully to recapture the village.
At this point the Hungarian Görgei corps reached the battlefield. The Dessewffy division had been in combat with the Schliks Brigades in the highlands east of Verpelét for three hours. FML Schulzig assembled the warriors and Deym brigades near Verpelet and advanced against the highlands occupied by Pöltenberg's troops near Bulharyn. Colonel Gablenz and his troops worked northeast of Verpelét against the right wing of the Hungarians. Eventually Schlick himself was deployed with the Pergen Brigade and the Fiedler Brigade that followed and the entire cavalry of the Corps between the Bach Ros and Bilincsi. Pöltenberg's troops had to retreat from this overwhelming force. He had to withdraw with his troops to Kerecsend if he did not want to risk that the enemy who had crossed the Tarna at Kapolna, Kálon and Tófalun threatened retreat.
In support, Dessewffy attempted a counterattack against the troops of the Gablenz and Pergen Brigades with the 34th and 43rd Battalions. After Schlick's first meeting was reinforced, Dessewffy and Görgey's right wing had to slowly pull back. After that there were only demonstrations between the troops Klapkas and Schlick until evening, and the Schulz division finally returned to Eger. In the meantime, the fighting has developed in the center and on the south wing. From Kerecsend, Dembinski ordered the arriving Kmety and Guyon division to launch a counterattack between Kerecsend and Kapolna. After the Colloredos Brigade had developed at Tótfalu, he began to threaten the right flank of the Máriássy division.
Dembinski decided to break off the fight at 1 p.m., the left wing should return from Kapolna to Füzos-Abony and the right wing to Maklar. The Máriássy division began to retreat to the left of the Guyon division, to the right of which Pöltenberg had to withdraw immediately to Kerecsend. At the same time General Aulich was ordered, starting with his left wing, to go back towards Tiszafüred on the road to Poroszló (Füzes-Abony). When the Dietrich brigade noticed the retreat of the Hungarians, he followed with two battalions via Kompolt to Kal, where he led a short, insignificant battle with the Szekulic division.
At the same time Schwarzenberg ordered his horsemen under Lieutenant Colonel Nostitz to take action against the Hungarian hussars south of Kapolna. After General Guyon withdrew his right wing on the highlands of Kerecsend, he was united with the newly arrived Kmety division. The Guyon and Kmety divisions were fully assembled in Kerecsend and wanted to take possession of Kápolna again. Aulich's troops wanted to proceed again, but were informed on the way that the imperial troops had already driven the Kisfaludy brigade from Kál.
Losses and consequences
According to Klapka, the Hungarian losses amounted to around 1,200 dead, injured and missing. In addition, about 500–600 men, more than the Zanini battalion, whose Major Venturini was captured, fell into captivity. The Austrian army lost a total of 17 officers and 335 men. Of these, 6 officers and 56 men dead, 11 officers and 248 men wounded and 1 officer and 31 missing persons.
The Hungarian armed forces were dissatisfied with General Dembiński after the defeat. At a meeting in Tiszafüred on March 3, they forced the present government commissioner Bertalan Szemere to dismiss the Polish general and instead to entrust General Artúr Görgey with the supreme command. Lajos Kossuth , President of the National Defense Committee, initially refused to agree to Szemere's election for Görgey's successor and appointed General Antal Vetter as commanding officer. But when Vetter suddenly fell ill on March 28, Kossuth was forced to accept Görgei as temporary commander in chief of the Hungarian main armed forces.
literature
- Rudolph Kiszling: The Revolution in the Austrian Empire 1848 to 1849 , Volume 2, Vienna 1949.
- József Bánlaky : A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme , 3 volumes, (Budapest 1928–1942), Book XXI. Magyarország 1848/49
- Friedrich Jakob Heller von Hellwald: The winter campaign 1848–1849 , Leopold Sommer Vienna 1851, pp. 310–314.
- Anatole Wacquant: The Hungarian Danube Army 1848–49 , Silesian Book Printing, Art and Art. Publishing house v. S. Schottlaender, Breslau 1900, p. 131 f.