Company Zeppelin

This article describes a German commando company in World War II. For the Allied military operation, see Operation Zeppelin .

The Zeppelin company was a secret operation of the security service of the Reichsführer SS (SD), initiated at the instigation of SS-Obersturmbannführer Heinz Gräfe , which was carried out in the context of the German-Soviet War from March 1942 to the surrender of the Wehrmacht in May 1945. The aim was covert warfare in Soviet- occupied territories and the investigation of the movements of the Red Army by Soviet prisoners of war who were willing to collaborate with the SD. Individual command cells of the Zeppelin company remained active until the 1950s and in some cases worked together with Western secret services.

Planning, people and objectives

The SD foreign intelligence service has been in competition with the Abwehr , which was subordinate to the Wehrmacht , since its inception . During the Battle of Moscow , deficits in German military reconnaissance became apparent, which contributed to the defeat of the German troops. This situation took advantage of sturmbannführer Heinz Grafe as head of RSHA Department VI C to a memorandum entitled "Plan of Action for Civic decomposition experiments in the Soviet Union" still in December 1941 Reinhard Heydrich and on January 10, 1942 Heinrich Himmler submitted . Himmler personally presented the plan for the Zeppelin company to Hitler , which approved execution in February 1942.

The domestic political goal of the bill was to upgrade the previously insignificant SD foreign intelligence service and thereby slowly displace the defense from its previous core areas of activity. The quality of intelligence intelligence in the Soviet Union was to be significantly improved through the use of local agents . The company's second goal was to weaken the Soviet Union through sabotage and even to build up guerrilla movements .

Preparations for the Zeppelin company began in March 1942. All RSHA departments were informed about the project in order to ensure maximum support during the preparatory phase. The agents needed for the company were either recruited from the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD in the Soviet area of ​​operations or the Secret State Police in the prison camps . Attracting volunteers was so successful that in the summer of 1942 already enough staff was available and the advertising of other people has been set. Only people from parts of the Soviet Union who were not under German control were recruited . In addition to ethnic Russians , these included Caucasians and other prisoners from the Asian republics of the Soviet Union. A total of around 10,000 to 15,000 Soviet volunteers registered.

The volunteers were trained in special camps in the use of radio equipment, weapons and explosives, in forging official documents and other skills necessary for a covert fight against the Soviet rulers. In addition, the potential Zeppelin agents received extensive propaganda training in line with National Socialist ideology . During all training steps, applicants were selected who proved unsuitable for the tasks. Unsuitable applicants were referred to other associations such as the Druzhina units or later the Russian Liberation Army . In total, only 2,000 to 3,000 applicants were considered suitable for the Zeppelin company's missions.

The SD recruited informants from among the applicants to report pro-Soviet or opportunistic persons. The SD murdered a large number of Zeppelin volunteers on suspicion of disloyalty or as unwanted carriers of secrets. According to the German historian Klaus-Michael Mallmann, there was no brotherhood in arms between the Zeppelin agents and the German support staff. The main reason for this was the racist worldview of the SS men in charge of the company .

The German leadership consisted almost without exception of young academics who made careers in the SS and some of whom were guilty of the most serious crimes against humanity as part of the operations of the Einsatzgruppen. The executives employed in the Zeppelin company included Heinz Gräfe, SS-Sturmbannführer Erich Hengelhaupt , who was responsible for managing the Zeppelin company in 1943 and who succeeded the Gräfe as head of the RSHA department VI C after his death. The head of the personnel department was SS-Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Rohrmann . The SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Kraus had been employed in the Zeppelin company since November 1942 and from February 1943 until the end of the war he was head of the Zeppelin main command north and the training camp in Wohlau ( Silesia ). SS-Sturmbannführer Walter Kurreck was head of the Zeppelin Main Command South from 1942 to 1943 and was a liaison officer for the Zeppelin company in the RSHA until January 1945. Finally, the SS-Sturmbannführer Rudolf Oebsger-Röder has to be mentioned, who was the head of the Zeppelin Main Command South from 1943 until the end of the war and is referred to as the actual head of the entire company until 1943.

Operations

On June 25, 1942, the company's preparatory phase was so far completed that the first operations could be started. By the end of the year, a total of 44 missions had taken place, which had their focus in the Caucasus and whose aim was mainly to sabotage the Soviet infrastructure. A total of 126 agents were either parachuted behind enemy lines or guided directly through the Soviet lines on foot. The Zeppelin commandos were restricted in their mobility due to a lack of fuel in the air force units assigned to provide support . The lack of radios prevented the agents from communicating with the Zeppelin headquarters.

The main commandos of the Zeppelin company were de facto always dependent on the support of the front reconnaissance commandos (FAK) of the Abwehr . This concerned both the transfer of prisoners and the gathering of information in preparation for operations. Practically before every zeppelin mission, the FAK were therefore consulted about the situation in the Soviet hinterland. After the Abwehr was transferred to the command of the SD in the spring of 1944, the FAK and Zeppelin commandos even carried out joint operations.

In February 1943, Heinz Gräfe stated in an interim balance that the Zeppelin agents' intelligence gathering was satisfactory, but that the decomposition and sabotage activities were unsuccessful due to the extensive surveillance activities of the NKVD and the Smersch . He therefore ordered a reduction in Zeppelin missions to intelligence missions. As a replacement for the Zeppelin sabotage missions, the SS-Sonderverband z. b. V. "Friedenthal" created under SS-Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny . In addition, the Havel Institute, founded in the Wannsee district of Berlin in September 1942, became part of the Zeppelin company. The task of the facility, headed by SS-Sturmbannführer Peter Siepen, was the development of powerful radio equipment.

In 1943 the operations of the Zeppelin company continued. At the end of the year, the headquarters were in contact with a total of 10 different agents who were using their radios to send messages from the area around Moscow, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea coast. The Soviet armaments areas behind the Urals could not be reached by the Zeppelin agents.

In fact, a large number of Zeppelin agents were arrested by the NKVD after they had reached their target area and in many cases used to deceive the SD in so-called radio games and thus lure other German agents into the trap. In addition, false information about the military situation in the Soviet Union was transmitted, which led to a falsification of the enemy situation in the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Nevertheless, Zeppelin agents also achieved success, so anti-Soviet resistance groups could be built in the Caucasus and Transcaucasus . According to Walter Kurreck's later testimony, some Zeppelin agents returned to the SD offices up to five times after the mission was over or sent useful reports for almost three years.

Even when the war situation for the German Reich deteriorated dramatically in the course of 1944, Zeppelin commands continued to be deployed in Soviet-occupied territory. In the final phase of the Third Reich, the deployments were increasingly limited to close reconnaissance missions and sabotage near the front. It was not until April 1945 that the main Zeppelin commandos ceased operations and the agents who had remained undetected in the Soviet sphere of influence went into hiding.

After the end of the war, US intelligence services, with the help of the Gehlen organization, made repeated attempts to contact former agents of the Zeppelin company and use them against the Soviet Union in the context of the beginning of the Cold War . These efforts were partially successful thanks to the support of former German SS officers. According to journalists Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zolling, a group of Wilhelm existed in the forests of Vologda , Yaroslavl and Rybinsk . Other groups were active in Moscow , Tambov , Voronezh and Georgia .

Failed assassination attempt on Stalin

In June 1944 the Soviet summer offensive began under the cover name Operation Bagration , which resulted in the destruction of the entire German Army Group Center . The war situation of the German Reich became more and more desperate in the course of this offensive.

At the beginning of July 1944 the Zeppelin Main Command North therefore started an operation with the support of Kampfgeschwader 200 (KG 200) with the aim of assassinating Stalin. The agents Pyotr Iwanowitsch Schilo (alias Politow) and Lidia Jakowlewna Schilowa had been prepared for such an operation by SS-Obersturmbannführer Georg Greife since March 1943. They were to be brought to a former German airfield near Moscow by night using an Ar 232 B aircraft (factory number 05) and dropped off there.

The two Zeppelin agents were supposed to get to Moscow with a sidecar motorcycle. Pyotr Schilo was commissioned to carry out an assassination attempt on Stalin, while his wife Lidia was supposed to maintain radio contact with the German Reich. Pyotr Shilo was supposed to place a plastic explosive disguised as dirt on Stalin's vehicle and cause it to explode. In fact, the Soviet authorities ( NKVD ) had been informed about the planned Shilos mission since June 1944. By eavesdropping on German radio traffic, the planned landing site of the Ar 232 B was even known.

The mission began late in the evening on a field airfield near Riga . After take-off, the flight went without incident until the machine east of Velikiye Luki came under flak fire . The pilot carried out evasive maneuvers that caused the machine to deviate a little from the planned course. The original destination of the mission was a former German field airport near Smolensk , but the machine mistakenly headed for a large field near a forest that was still criss-crossed by trenches . When landing on the unsuitable terrain, the machine was so badly damaged that a restart was impossible. Pyotr Shilo and his wife set off for Moscow on a motorcycle, but were arrested at a roadblock about 15 kilometers from Moscow. The guards became suspicious that the motorcycle was in an unusually clean and well-maintained condition, which contradicted the alleged distance traveled and the rain that had previously fallen there. The crew of the German machine was captured on the wreckage of the aircraft. All of the SD operation involved were short time later by NKVD members executed .

Photos of the Schilo's equipment and the Ar 232 B were later published by the Soviet security authorities as evidence of the planned assassination attempt.

Web links

Commons : Company Zeppelin  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

literature

• Perry Biddiscombe: The Zeppelin Company: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union, 1942–1945 ; Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Sept. 2000), pp. 1115-1142; JSTOR 153592
• David Glantz: Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War ; Frank Cass Ltd. New York 1989; ISBN 0-7146-3347-X .
• Heinz Höhne, Hermann Zolling: The General was a Spy - The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring ; Coward, McCann & Geoghegan New York 1972.
• Valerian P. Lebedew, Fritz Langour: Panzerfaust in a Jacket - The Assassination Attack on Stalin in The Second World War , Volume 5, 1943–1945, The total war ; Publishing House for Historical Documentation GmbH Hamburg 1989; ISBN 3-88199-534-X .
• Klaus-Michael Mallmann : The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945 , in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS ; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , pp. 324-346.
• Sergei Sacharowitsch Ostrjakow: Military Chekists , Moscow 1979, German translation by Joachim Wilke, eds from the College of the Ministry of State Security, 1982 (not suitable because of blatant historical distortions of References).
• Helmut Roewer , Stefan Schäfer, Matthias Uhl: Lexicon of the secret services in the 20th century . Herbig Munich 2003; ISBN 3-7766-2317-9 .
• Peter W. Stahl, Manfred Jäger: Secret Squadron KG 200 . Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-613-01034-8 .
• Robert W. Stephan: Stalin's Secret War - Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945 , University Press of Kansas 2004; ISBN 0-7006-1279-3 .
• Sergei Gennadewitsch Tschuew: Спецслужбы Третьего рейха (Special Forces of the Third Reich), Volume 2, Olma Media Group Saint Petersburg, Moscow 2003; ISBN 9785765428313 .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburger Edition , Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 325.
2. ^ David Glantz: Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War; Frank Cass Ltd. New York 1989; ISBN 0-7146-3347-X , pp. 47-58.
3. ↑ Michael Wildt (Ed.): Intelligence Service, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 27.
4. ^ ^{A b} Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 326.
5. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 327.
6. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , pp. 328 and 330.
7. ^ ^{A b c} Robert W. Stephan: Stalin's Secret War - Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945 , University Press of Kansas 2004; ISBN 0-7006-1279-3 , p. 183.
8. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , pp. 331 and 332.
9. ^ Helmut Roewer, Stefan Schäfer, Matthias Uhl: Lexicon of Secret Services in the 20th Century, Herbig Munich 2003; ISBN 3-7766-2317-9 , p. 250.
10. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 332.
11. ^ Perry Biddiscombe: Operation Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union, 1942-1945 ; Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Sept. 2000), p. 1122; on-line.
12. ^ Robert W. Stephan: Stalin's Secret War - Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945 , University Press of Kansas 2004; ISBN 0-7006-1279-3 , p. 184.
13. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 335.
14. ^ ^{A b} Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 336.
15. ↑ Heinz Höhne, Hermann Zolling: The General was a Spy - The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring; Coward, McCann & Geoghegan New York 1972, pp. 39-41.
16. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 337.
17. ^ Perry Biddiscombe: Operation Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union, 1942-1945 ; Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Sept. 2000), p. 1118; on-line.
18. ^ Perry Biddiscombe: Operation Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union, 1942-1945 ; Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Sept. 2000), p. 1130; on-line.
19. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , p. 340.
20. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The war in the dark. The »Zeppelin« company 1942–1945, in Michael Wildt (ed.): Intelligence, Political Elite and Murder Unit. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS; Hamburg Edition Hamburg 2003; ISBN 3-930908-84-0 , pp. 338-340.
21. ↑ Heinz Höhne, Hermann Zolling: The General was a Spy - The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring; Coward, McCann & Geoghegan New York 1972, pp. 161-162.
22. ^ Valerian P. Lebedew, Fritz Langour: Panzerfaust im Jackett - The assassination attempt on Stalin in The Second World War , Volume 5, 1943–1945, The total war ; Publishing House for Historical Documentation GmbH Hamburg 1989; ISBN 3-88199-534-X , pp. 254-255.
23. ^ Perry Biddiscombe: Operation Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union, 1942-1945 ; Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Sept. 2000), p. 1129; on-line.
24. ^ Valerian P. Lebedew, Fritz Langour: Panzerfaust im Jackett - The assassination attempt on Stalin in The Second World War , Volume 5, 1943–1945, The total war ; Publishing House for Historical Documentation GmbH Hamburg 1989; ISBN 3-88199-534-X , pp. 255-256.
25. ^ Valerian P. Lebedew, Fritz Langour: Panzerfaust im Jackett - The assassination attempt on Stalin in The Second World War , Volume 5, 1943–1945, The total war ; Publishing House for Historical Documentation GmbH Hamburg 1989; ISBN 3-88199-534-X , p. 256.