Venezuela crisis

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Great Britain and Germany “pluck” Venezuela while Uncle Sam watches carefully. Caricature from the New York Herald , January 1903

The Venezuela crisis (rarely also the second Venezuela conflict ) in 1902/03 was as such a diplomatic and military confrontation between Venezuela on the one hand and the German Empire , Great Britain and Italy on the other, but at the same time also an indicator and arena for global political differences between the imperialist powers, especially between Germany and the USA . In addition, it stands for a special stage in German-British relations between the final failure of the German-British alliance negotiations in 1901 and the beginning of British-French rapprochement in 1902/1903 - the “revolutionary turn in the international state system”.

background

In the last years of the 19th century, East Asia and the Latin American-Caribbean region developed into fields of action for German “world politics”. In this context, the Reichsmarineamt pursued the goal of acquiring individual bases that were considered necessary for the planned worldwide operating fleet. In addition to Manila and the Malay island of Pulau Langkawi , the ( Danish ) Virgin Islands St. Thomas and St. John as well as the main island of the Netherlands Antilles , Curaçao , came into focus. The Panama Canal , which was under construction , made the Caribbean, which had previously been peripheral for a long time, much more interesting, and Tirpitz was of the opinion that with an expanded Caribbean naval base there was “no need to fear a conflict with America”. Such German ambitions did not go unnoticed by the USA, acting as the hegemon of the region (see Monroe Doctrine ), and were particularly suspicious of the relationship between the two states, which had been strained since the beginning of the 1890s due to pronounced trade rivalries and ongoing customs disputes. The appearance of the German East Asia Squadron off Manila in the summer of 1898 had already caused an international stir during the Spanish-American War and documented, among other things, that German foreign policy was unwilling to accept zones of influence claimed by the Americans without comment. Even against the Central and South American states, which were largely inaccessible for a long time, German politics now acted with a certain claim to power and order and forced the powers traditionally operating there to come to terms with this. Venezuela's problems provided a scenario for this.

Venezuela, which separated from the Republic of Colombia (see Greater Colombia ) in 1829/1830 , was shaken by coups d'état and civil wars in seldom interrupted succession throughout the 19th century. Their repercussions led to increasing tensions with foreign powers since 1892. During the presidency of Joaquín Crespo (1892–1898), a group of states intervened diplomatically for the first time to assert restitution claims or claims for damages for property losses that occurred in the course of the civil war of 1892. In addition, the Venezuelan-British dispute over the border between British Guiana (see Venezuela crisis of 1895 ) escalated . Regardless of the political friction, foreign capital, especially German capital, increasingly penetrated Venezuela during this period. Fried was especially prominent . Krupp AG , which was entrusted with the construction of the country's first long railway line (Caracas-Valencia, completed in 1894) at the end of the 1980s. The Venezuelan state had received the necessary loans from a consortium led by the Berlin Disconto-Gesellschaft - on terms that were extremely unfavorable for it . In addition, German capital was involved in the transport trade as well as the basic materials and food industry in the country. Venezuela has also been purchasing weapons from Germany since 1891. As early as 1896, the Venezuelan state had to take out a new loan from the Disconto-Gesellschaft in order to guarantee the debt service for the railway loan. From the internal unrest after Crespo's death, Cipriano Castro emerged as the new head of state in 1899 , without being able to consolidate his rule immediately. Since 1901 he had to deal with an uprising which was supported by parts of the Venezuelan upper class around the exiled banker Matos and which also found the more or less open approval of foreign powers. In 1899 and again on March 1, 1902, Castro declared Venezuela's debt servicing suspended. In early 1901, he also restricted compensation payments for property confiscated or destroyed by foreigners. At that time the Venezuelan state was indebted to British and German creditors alone with 119.3 million bolívares (about 96.6 million marks or 4.73 million pounds at the rate at the time ). This contrasted with annual government revenues of only around 30 million bolívares.

course

preparation

The unilateral steps of Castro - who apparently speculated that respect for the Monroe Doctrine would keep the Europeans away - not only caused financial damage, but also represented a kind of breakout by Venezuela from the world order administered by the imperialist great powers. With the exception of Mexico and Cuba , where US capital already exercised dominant influence, at that time all of Latin America was still subject to European - primarily British and German - economic dominance. In view of the simultaneous debt crises in several other Central and South American states, the Venezuelan “indiscipline” - especially if it went unpunished - harbored a certain risk for the economic basis of the level of influence of the (European) imperialist powers in Central and South America. Already in 1896 Wilhelm II. Had in a note "Venezuela (...) about to go through the Monroe Doctrine accordingly." In addition, representatives of the banks concerned were now setting up a financial institution to secure new loans. or at least demanded customs control over the South American country - with which Venezuela would have been subjected to a classic form of informal rule. In the summer of 1901, German warships around the cruiser SMS Vineta first made a demonstrative foray on the Venezuelan coast. This undertaking clearly showed that the Germans appearing with obvious intent were not very welcome in the country; there were several incidents between German seafarers and Venezuelan officials.

On October 6, 1901, two mates of the SMS Vineta were arrested in Caracas . Vineta sent a landing corps to La Guaira and freed the mates. This conflict was resolved through diplomatic measures.

Venezuela's attitude was not changed by the fleet demonstration. At the end of 1901, the German ambassador Holleben announced in Washington that a German intervention to enforce claims and repayment claims in Venezuela could be expected. Roosevelt reacted indirectly by once again explaining the formal boundaries drawn by the Monroe Doctrine (no acquisition of territory by European powers) in the annual message to Congress , while at the same time indicating that the United States was committed to a “punishment” for financial “misconduct “Latin American states at least would not openly oppose it. But it was undoubtedly clear to all those involved that the German request for a test of power was tantamount to the United States, since conceptually it ran counter to the wording, but rather to the spirit and political intention of the Monroe Doctrine. At the turn of the year 1901/1902, the head of the Admiralty's Diederichs , the Foreign Office and Reich Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow tried to obtain the consent of Wilhelm II for an expansion of the military engagement in the direction of a comprehensive "punitive action" - including the landing of troops , but were initially unsuccessful, as the head of the Reichsmarineamt Tirpitz advised against provoking the United States. Tirpitz had been warned by Carl Schurz to proceed with England in Venezuela. It was to be expected that England would later abandon Germany because of the Monroe Doctrine. In the first months of 1902, however, British diplomats in Berlin indicated an interest in joint action against Venezuela. Consultations on a coordinated approach began in September and concluded in November during the Emperor's visit to Britain. Before that, Prince Heinrich of Prussia had visited the United States from February 23 to March 11, 1902 , and tried to positively influence the mood there.

The cruisers Vineta , SMS Falke and SMS Gazelle , the gunboat SMS Panther and the old cruiser frigate SMS Stosch , now used as a training ship, were pulled together on the edge of the intended operational area. Tirpitz claims in his memoirs published after the First World War that he advised against this step and suggests that London's accommodation, which was perceived as surprising on the German side, was a trap, set with the intention of furthering German-American relations to shatter. He had suspected that the British would end the intervention immediately after initial criticism from the USA and "abandon the Germans". In fact, the British willingness to cooperate meant a noticeable departure from the practice of the Foreign Office , the open politico-military practice that had been common up until then Avoid collecting claims from private creditors. In view of the comparatively low demands made by British citizens on the Venezuelan state, it is probable that political rather than economic calculations were decisive for the creation of the “alliance” with Germany. The British commitment was officially motivated by attacks by the Venezuelan authorities on British merchant ships.

United States ultimatum, blockade, and entanglement

On December 7, 1902, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Caracas handed a note to the Venezuelan authorities, in which they were ultimately requested to pay compensation by December 31 for property of German citizens damaged or confiscated between 1898 and 1900. A sum of 1.72 million bolívares was immediately requested. In addition, the Reich government declared its eligibility for further demands:

“In this regard, the German complaints from the current Venezuelan civil war, the demands of German companies from the construction of the slaughterhouse in Caracas and the claims of the German Great Venezuela Railway for interest and amortization of the title of the five percent granted to it as replacement of an interest guarantee come into consideration Venezuelan loan from 1896. "

The Venezuelan government should acknowledge in a declaration that these demands are justified. In the event of a refusal, it was announced that in such a case it would “take care of the satisfaction of these claims after the specified period”. The British government had a similar document submitted.

Restaurador - Cura ¢ ao
The Venezuelan gunboat BOLIVAR is captured by units of the Royal Navy near Trinidad on December 10, 1902 during the Venezuela blockade

On and shortly after December 8th, the four small gunboats of the Venezuelan fleet , u. a. the Restaurador and the Bolívar , captured and three of them subsequently sunk by German warships because Castro had not - as requested - responded to the demands of December 7th within 24 hours. On the same day, the Venezuelan president turned to the USA and asked for their mediation, which the intervention powers announced on December 13th. On the same day, German and British ships shelled Fort Solano, which protected the port of Puerto Cabello . Five days later, the British and German governments accepted the Venezuelan arbitration proposal and proposed the American President as arbitrator. This refused and referred the parties to the Hague Arbitration Court . At the same time, the three warring parties agreed to meet in Washington for negotiations in order to possibly reach an agreement in advance. Notably, the Venezuelan government hired the US Ambassador to Caracas, Herbert Wolcott Bowen , to represent them at these talks. Although this step made the de facto semi-sovereignty of Venezuela public to the whole world, it was not inept in that it forced US policy to openly document its rejection of European intervention in a zone of influence it claimed and, in some respects, to side with Venezuela seize. Bowen accepted the mandate after consulting Washington. Despite these regulations, the intervention powers, which Italy had joined in the meantime, declared the Venezuelan coast to be blocked on December 20.

The German cruiser SMS Vineta

During the blockade, the German contingent was particularly conspicuous due to its particularly aggressive approach. On January 3, 1903, a German ship landed in Puerto Cabello, the marines temporarily occupied the customs office and engaged in a battle with an 800-man Venezuelan detachment. Two weeks later tried the gunboat Panther , to access to Lake Maracaibo to force, but was prevented by bombardment of Fort San Carlos in it. Four days later, the German ship returned with the Vineta and laid the fort in ruins. This process in particular led to the fact that, in addition to the American press, which had been angry since December above all against German action, British newspapers now also took a stand against the alliance with German politics. Since the end of January, British diplomats have been pressing for an end to the blockade, if necessary before a binding agreement with Venezuela. The fear seems to have played a role here that the Americans would otherwise be able to put the recently reached agreement in principle in the dispute over the border between Canada and Alaska at disposal (see Hay-Herbert Treaty ). On January 28, Edward VII asked the German ambassador, Count Metternich, to settle the affair:

“His Majesty King Edward discussed Venezuela with me last night and expressed a desire to bring the matter to an end as soon as possible. It is much more important to get rid of this incident as quickly as possible than to have the mutual monetary claims approved. "

Wilhelm II commented on this passage with the margin note: “Serenissimus loses his nerve! Grandmother would never have said that! "

The Washington Protocols

In mid-January 1903 negotiations began in Washington between Bowen on the one hand and the German and British plenipotentiaries Speck von Sternburg and Michael Herbert on the other. They ended on February 13 with the signing of the so-called Washington Protocols . In it Venezuela recognized the fundamental justification of all claims and assured the immediate settlement of some items, others should be examined and settled by a mixed commission. Venezuela had to agree to transfer 30% of the customs revenue from the ports of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello to a repayment account from March 1, 1903 . The Venezuelan government had to issue redemption bills on the 15th of each month. In the event of late payment, Belgian officials should take over the customs administration in both ports. Finally, the Hague Arbitration Court was supposed to decide whether the demands of the intervention powers had to be taken into account before those of other states. In February 1904 the court declared this request to be legal and thus “awarded” the line of open military discipline pursued by Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The blockade was lifted on February 15, 1903.

consequences

It was only through more recent research that it became known that at the end of 1902 there had been a violent dispute over competencies of fundamental importance in the Reich leadership. On December 17, Bülow had "very secretly" instructed the commander of the German naval association to pass unhindered a US steamer expected in the next few days and to allow the British to go ahead when bringing in American ships. The emperor approved the move retrospectively, but had the chancellor and the officers of the admiral staff involved severely reprimanded by the head of the naval cabinet, Gustav von Senden-Bibran :

“We are at war with Venezuela, so to speak. I have the supreme command and sole direction as warlord. My organ, the admiralty staff, only has to pass on my orders after they have been issued. But he may never issue or even send orders to me without prior presentation ! He has no military measures to be agreed upon with anybody that have an impact on the management of the operations or even - as here - to accept 'requisitions' from civil servants. "

While there is broad agreement on the superficial classification of the disputes with and around Venezuela as a classic case of imperialist regulatory policy, the broader implications for the German-American relationship in particular are assessed quite differently. For decades, the crisis was treated as a footnote in the history of diplomacy and hardly considered - although it resulted in the largest single operation by German naval forces in the Caribbean to date. Since the 1970s, the Venezuela conflict has been "rediscovered" as part of a series of special investigations and, in particular, in the work of Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, it has been discussed as a dramatic and extremely dangerous escalation of German-American tensions - up to and including the assertion that there is an actual immediate danger of war . These source interpretations, which are at least strongly indexed, say, for example, the fact cited as essential evidence that both the German and the US naval command between 1899 and 1903 dealt with operational plans for a possible war between the two countries, and in December 1902 an American fleet demonstration to the east of Puerto Rico took place, some of the political likelihood of such a conflict of - constructive vote is now considered no longer tenable, but nonetheless occasionally (most recently again by John CG Röhl last volume of his extensive work on Wilhelm II.) repeated. More recent studies such as those by Mitchell in no way deny the German-American conflict of interests, but above all contrast the - compared to the actual priorities of German fleet and expansion policy - demonstrably very limited German engagement in Central and South America with the interested public staging of a “German danger "( German threat ) in the United States and their role in legitimizing the expansive fleet and intervention strategy there:

“The German threat (…) was useful. The Germans, with their expansionist talk and their growing navy, provided the Americans with an opportunity. The depiction of Germany as a potential aggressor in the hemisphere helped to exonerate the interventionism of the United States. It distinguishes US policy from European policy. This satisfies a deeply felt need (...). "

“The German threat […] was useful. The Germans, with their expansionist talk and growing navy, offered the Americans an opportunity. Portraying Germany as a potential aggressor in the hemisphere helped ease United States interventionism. It provided a clear distinction between US politics and European politics. This satisfied a deeply felt need [...]. "

The expansion of the Monroe Doctrine, undertaken with the Roosevelt Corollary in December 1904, into a comprehensive self-imposed supervision and care mandate by the USA for all internal and external entanglements in Latin American states - anticipated in Bowen's role in the Washington negotiations in early 1903 - can in this sense can be classified as the climax of the political exploitation of the German threat .

Despite the relatively extensive publication activity since the 1980s, the Venezuela crisis of 1902/1903 was for a long time only noticed by a narrow circle of specialists and is little known even among historians. In 1988 Jürgen Kuczynski stated: “I asked a dozen historians in the FRG and about as many in the GDR what they knew about this military 'incident'. Nobody had a clue what I was talking about. "

literature

  • Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase: Latin America as a source of conflict in German-American relations from 1890 to 1903. From the beginning of Pan-American policy to the Venezuela crisis of 1902/03. 2 volumes. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1986, ISBN 3-525-35924-1 .
  • Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase: Great Power Conflicts in the Western Hemisphere: The Example of the Venezuela Crisis of Winter 1902/03. In: Jost Dülffer, Martin Kröger, Rolf-Harald Wippich: Avoided Wars. De-escalation of conflicts between the great powers between the Crimean War and the First World War 1865–1914. Oldenbourg, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-486-56276-2 , pp. 527-555.
  • Holger H. Herwig: Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela 1870-1914. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton 1986, ISBN 0-691-05483-5 .
  • Johannes Lepsius et al. (Ed.): The Great Politics of the European Cabinets 1871–1914. Volume 17: The twist in the German-English relationship. Berlin 1924.
  • Nancy Mitchell: The Danger of Dreams. German and American Imperialism in Latin America. Univ. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1999, ISBN 0-8078-4775-5 .
  • Reiner Pommerin : The Kaiser and America. The USA in the politics of the Reich leadership 1890–1917. Böhlau, Cologne 1986, ISBN 3-412-03786-9 .
  • The Venezuelan Arbitration Before The Hague Tribunal. GPO, Washington 1905.
  • Big cruiser Vineta. In: Hans H. Hildebrand, Albert Röhr, Hans-Otto Steinmetz: The German warships. Biographies - a mirror of naval history from 1815 to the present. Volume 6, Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, Herford 1983, ISBN 3-7822-0237-6 , pp. 32-34.
  • Erminio Fonzo: Italia y el bloqueo naval de Venezuela 1902–1903 . In: Cultura Latinoamericana. Revista de estudios interculturales , Vol. 21 (2015), pp. 35-61.

Web links

Commons : Venezuela Crisis of 1902–1903  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See also Friedrich Meinecke: History of the German-English alliance problem 1890–1901. Oldenbourg, Munich / Berlin 1927, DNB 575057025 , pp. 177-228.
  2. ↑ John C. Röhl: Wilhelm II. The way into the abyss 1900-1941. Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-57779-6 , p. 283.
  3. ↑ See Baldur Kaulisch: Alfred von Tirpitz and the imperialist German naval armor. A political biography. 3rd, revised edition. Berlin 1988, p. 122f. and Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 265ff.
  4. ↑ See Mitchell: The Danger of Dreams. 1999, p. 64.
  5. ↑ Quoted from Kaulisch, Tirpitz, p. 123.
  6. ↑ See Mitchell: The Danger of Dreams. 1999, p. 10ff.
  7. ↑ See Rolf-Harald Wippich: "War with Germany is imminent." German-American saber rattle in front of Manila 1898. In: Jost Dülffer et al.: Vermiedene Kriege. De-escalation of conflicts between the great powers between the Crimean War and the First World War 1865–1914. Munich 1997, pp. 513-525.
  8. ↑ See Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase: Latin America as a focus of conflict in German-American relations from 1890 to 1903. From the beginning of the Pan-American policy to the Venezuelan crisis of 1902/03. 2 volumes, Göttingen 1986, volume 1, pp. 68ff., 120ff.
  9. ↑ See Michael Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. The history of Venezuela. Rotpunktverlag, Zurich 2008, ISBN 978-3-85869-313-6 , p. 311.
  10. ↑ See Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. 2008, pp. 311, 319.
  11. ↑ See Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. 2008, p. 311.
  12. ↑ See Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. 2008, p. 317ff.
  13. ↑ See Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase: Great Power Conflicts in the Western Hemisphere: The Example of the Venezuela Crisis of Winter 1902/03. In: Jost Dülffer among others: Avoided wars. De-escalation of conflicts between the great powers between the Crimean War and the First World War 1865–1914. Munich 1997, pp. 527-555, p. 530.
  14. ↑ See Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. 2008, p. 324.
  15. ↑ See Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. 2008, p. 325 and Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela crisis. P. 536.
  16. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 535.
  17. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 533.
  18. ↑ Quoted from Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 272.
  19. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 534.
  20. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase, Conflict Herd, Volume 2, pp. 850ff.
  21. ↑ See Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 273.
  22. ↑ See Hildebrand, Hans H. The German Warships , Volume 6, p. 32.
  23. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 541f.
  24. ↑ See Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 274.
  25. ↑ See Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase: Latin America as a focus of conflict in German-American relations: 1890–1903; from the beginning of the Pan American policy to the Venezuela crisis of 1902/03. Series of publications by the historical commission at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Volume 27. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986, ISBN 3-525-35924-1 , p. 877.
  26. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 532.
  27. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 532 and Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 275f. See also Johannes Lepsius et al. (Ed.): The Great Politics of the European Cabinets 1871–1914. Volume 17: The twist in the German-English relationship. Berlin 1924, p. 252ff.
  28. ↑ See Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase: Latin America as a focus of conflict in German-American relations: 1890–1903; from the beginning of the Pan American policy to the Venezuela crisis of 1902/03. Series of publications by the historical commission at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Volume 27. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986, ISBN 3-525-35924-1 , pp. 943ff.
  29. ↑ See Alfred von Tirpitz: Memories. Koehler, Leipzig 1920, DNB 576689181 , p. 159f.
  30. ^ Tirpitz: Memories. 1920, p. 159.
  31. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 530f.
  32. ↑ The document is printed in: The Venezuelan Arbitration Before The Hague Tribunal. Washington 1905, pp. 827-830.
  33. ↑ Quoted from Arbitration, p. 830.
  34. ↑ Erminio Fonzo: Italia y el bloqueo naval de Venezuela (1902-1903) , in: Cultura Latinoamericana. Revista de estudios interculturales , No. 21 (1), 2015, pp. 35–61, accessed on February 9, 2017.
  35. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 539.
  36. ↑ See Karl Wippermann: Deutscher Geschichtskalender für 1903. Objectively ordered compilation of the most important political events at home and abroad. 2 volumes, Leipzig 1904, volume 2, p. 324.
  37. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 552.
  38. ↑ Quoted from: Lepsius et al.: Die Große Politik. 1924, p. 281.
  39. ↑ Quoted from: Lepsius et al.: Die Große Politik. 1924, p. 282.
  40. ↑ See Arbitration, pp. 833ff.
  41. ^ Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 540.
  42. ↑ Quoted from Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 277.
  43. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 551. Fiebig-von Hase writes, among other things, that after the bombardment of Fort San Carlos on January 21, 1903 in the USA “the military preparations for a potential conflict (...) were in full swing”, but this does not prove any further nor does it state what exactly these "preparations" consisted of. See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 553 and focus of conflict, volume 2, p. 1060.
  44. ↑ See Fiebig-von Hase: Venezuela Crisis. P. 536f. as well as conflict source, volume 1, p. 472ff. and Volume 2, pp. 788ff.
  45. ↑ See Röhl: Wilhelm II. 2008, p. 277.
  46. ↑ Mitchell: The Danger of Dreams. 1999, p. 8.
  47. ↑ Jürgen Kuczynski: 1903. A normal year in imperialist Germany. Berlin 1988, p. 80.