Second battle of the Isonzo
| date | July 17, 1915 to August 3, 1915 |
|---|---|
| place | From Monte Krn to the Adriatic Sea |
| output | Italian offensive fails |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 5th Army 3 Army Corps 105 + 25 battalions 420 guns |
2nd and 3rd Army 7 Army Corps 260 battalions 840 guns |
| losses | |
|
about 46,000 men |
about 42,000 men |
1915
1st Isonzo - 2nd Isonzo - 3rd Isonzo - 4th Isonzo - Lavarone (1915-1916)
1916
5th Isonzo - South Tyrol offensive - 6th Isonzo - Doberdò - 7. Isonzo - 8. Isonzo - 9th Isonzo -
First Dolomites Offensive - Second Dolomites offensive -
Avalanche disaster
1917
10th Isonzo - Ortigara - 11th Isonzo - 12th Isonzo - Pozzuolo - Monte Grappa
1918
Piave - San Matteo - Vittorio Veneto
The Second Battle of Isonzo was one of a total of twelve battles between the Kingdom of Italy and the Empire of Austria-Hungary . It took place from July 17 to August 3, 1915 and was the second unsuccessful attempt by the Italian armed forces to force a breakthrough through the Austro-Hungarian front line on the Isonzo . This battle is sometimes referred to in literature as the "Battle of Monte San Michele", although Monte San Michele (Debela Griža) was also the focus of events from the 1st to the 6th Isonzo battle due to its exposed location south of Gorizia.
Strategic goals of the attackers
After the failure in the First Isonzo Battle two weeks earlier, the Italian Chief of Staff, General Luigi Cadorna, ordered a new attack by the 3rd (it) Army of General Duke of Aosta , while the 2nd (it) Army, neighboring to the north, interposed opposing forces through sporadic attacks Plava and the Wippach estuary . Six army corps were made available for the direct attacks, while a seventh served as an intervention reserve. In addition, there was a considerable reinforcement of the heavy artillery . The strategic goal of this venture was, as in the previous action, the breakthrough to Trieste and further into the Hungarian lowlands in order to unite with the Russian armed forces there, to smash Austria-Hungary in half and thus to win the war.
The main goal of the Italians was to conquer the Austro-Hungarian positions on the heights of Monte San Michele (Debela Griža), because both Italians and Austrians knew that the fate of the Karst front and consequently the continuation of the Gorizia bridgehead would be decided there .
Actions by the defenders
On the Austro-Hungarian side, the Italian intentions did not go unnoticed. The Austro- Hungarian 5th Army under General Boroević , located in the affected section of the front, had received reinforcements. The army at this time consisted of the VII. Army Corps (Defense Section III) and north of it at Gorizia from the XVI. Army Corps (Defense Section II). The XV. Army Corps held Defense Section I at Tolmein in the north, but was not primarily involved in this battle. In addition, there was a mountain brigade of the 97th Infantry Troop Division as an intervention reserve and the 17th and 93rd Infantry Troop Divisions, which were kept ready on the karst plateau south of Gorizia, as an army reserve. The 10th Mountain Brigade of the 61st Infantry Troop Division was pushed in as reinforcement on the north side of the Gorizia bridgehead.
Applied forces
| Austria-Hungary | Italy | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Armies | ||||
| 5th Austro-Hungarian Army | 2nd Army / 3rd Army | |||
| Army Corps | ||||
| XV. AK | IV. AK | |||
| XVI. AK | II. AK | |||
| VII. AK | VI. AK | |||
| XI. AK | ||||
| XIV. AK | ||||
| X. AK | ||||
| VII. AK | ||||
First phase of attack
July 18th
On July 18, 1915, the Italian batteries opened the barrage on the Austro-Hungarian positions, which mostly consisted of stone walls. After the artillery fire ceased (the defenders suffered great losses from flying stone fragments), the Italian 21st and 22nd Infantry Divisions (XI. (It) AK), the 20th Infantry Division (X. (it) AK) and the 14th Infantry Division (VII. (It) AK) on the Isonzo front arc between Seiz in the south and Monte San Michele in the north. Opposite them were the 39th and 81st Honvéd Infantry - Brigade , and the 14th and 16th Mountain Brigade. The hand-to-hand combat, which lasted all day, brought the Italians only gains of 100 meters of terrain in the area of two Honvéd companies by the evening.
On the morning of July 19, a new attack followed, this time a little more successful, as it penetrated the Austrian positions in the section along the Vermegliano - Doberdò road and gained a little space. The attacks by three Italian divisions (4th, 11th and 12th ID) on the Görz bridgehead could be repulsed without loss of terrain.
July 19
The Tolmein bridgehead sat like a thorn in the Italian front and prevented any major operation against the Austro-Hungarian northern front. In order to push in the bridgehead, on July 19, alpinism and infantry formations attacked the heights in the north-east in 2041 and 1931 from the peaks of the Vrata, the Krn and the Kozljak. At the same time, the 8th (it) ID attacked the Mrzli vrh. All attacks on that day were unsuccessful.
Austrian reactions
Although the defense against the first attack operation was successful, AOK 5 was concerned about the situation. The VII Army Corps alone reported losses of around 500 men dead, wounded and missing. For this reason, the VII AK was assigned the 93rd ITD from the army reserve and deployed in the area between Doberdó and San Martino. With this division, as well as the 20th Honvéd ITD and 17th ITD, a counter-attack was to be carried out on the morning of July 20th in order to reclaim the lost trenches. Serious losses were already recorded in the staging rooms due to interference fires. The 90th Infantry Regiment suffered 13 officers and 600 men that night.
20th of July
The local attack by the Austrians , which began on the morning of that day, clashed with full force on the major attack of the X. (it) and XI ordered the day before by General Duke of Aosta. (it) Army Corps against Monte San Michele.
Despite hesitant and tenacious resistance by the Hungarian Landwehr units , the Italians managed to work their way up to the top of Monte San Michele, while the attackers were unsuccessful in the southern part of the attack section. However, the ownership of Monte San Michele was decisive for the course of the battle. A loss would have given the attackers the opportunity to grab the defenders' entire positioning system from the flank and roll up. The commander of the 93rd ITD General Boog now gathered 15 battalions from the stocks of his division, the 20th HITD and the 17th ITD and, after two hours of preparatory fire , attacked the artillery from the top of Monte San Michel downhill towards Isonzo. After the Italians could be pushed back from the upper area of the mountain, the attempt to penetrate to the river ultimately failed due to the exhaustion of the people.
Main target of the VI. (it) AK was the bridgehead of Gorizia, which was attacked by the 11th, 12th and 29th ID. The attack failed before Podgora height and Monte Sabotino the stubborn resistance of the Dalmatian and Trieste military police and kk Standschützen (These were the members of the unredeemed territories by Italian reading irredenti or Fratelli designated and have this doctrine actually not fight in the opinion of the advocate allowed.) The attackers lost 436 dead, 2703 wounded and 244 missing. After this catastrophic result, the attacks were initially stopped here.
At the Tolmein bridgehead, after hours of bitter hand-to-hand fighting, the attackers succeeded in taking the positions of the 3rd Mountain Brigade at height 2136. This then withdrew about 400 meters further backwards into the catchment positions at height 2077. Initially, there were no further attacks here.
Austrian reinforcements
Again a reaction was required on the Austrian side. In order to prevent a breakthrough, fresh, unused dressings had to be brought in.
“The critical situation on the south wing of the 5th Army caused the Southwest Front Command to look around for reserves in its own area. Only in Tyrol were two regiments available. The Kaiserjäger - Regiment 4 and the Imperial Rifle Regiment I who filled up their stalls and, long since stripped of their old teams should be trained alpine. They have now been hurriedly moved to the Isonzo. "(Quote from the Austrian General Staff Works)
22nd of July
On that day, Combat Group Boog attacked again and was able to push the Italian formations back to the edge of the heights at Sdraussina , but was then attacked on the flank by troops of the Italian 28th and 30th Infantry Division advancing from the north July lost positions back. The attacks directed against the front of the 61st and 57th ITD on Doberdò in the southern defensive section of the VII. (IT) AK were also unsuccessful.
Austrian reactions
On July 23, the 20th HITD reported 1,200 men and officers ready for action, while the VII AK had to complain about 2900 men in the last two days. All supply routes had meanwhile been interrupted by the interference from the Italian artillery. The resulting lack of food and, above all, water in the high summer, arid and waterless stone desert of the Karst meant that the great number of soldiers had reached the limit of their physical capabilities. Therefore, the 93rd ITD, which was particularly affected, was taken back to Merna on the evening of that day and the front at this point (west of Monte San Michele) was occupied with the fresh 9th Mountain Brigade of the 59th ITD. The 12th Mountain Brigade stood behind as cover. In the meantime the Kaiserjäger Regiment 4 and the Kaiserschützen Regiment I had arrived in this section of the front and initially gathered in Selo.
July 23
The VII. (It) AK carried out attacks against the section between Selz and Vermegliano. A break-in succeeded, which the Austrians could no longer completely clear up in a counter-attack.
Second attack phase
Actions by the attacker
In view of the rather poor results so far, the Capo di Stato Maggiore , General Cadorna, accused the commander of the 3rd Army (in whose area the Gorizia bridgehead fell) of having acted too lame (zoppo) so far, and demanded more support from the southern one Neighboring army. Furthermore, he now immediately demanded the conquest of the Doberdó plateau at any price (Ad ogni costo!) . For this purpose, the last association of the Army Reserve, the XIII. (it) Army Corps of 3rd Army made available.
24th July
The attack carried out by Italians from 14th Infantry Division against Höhe 118 was repulsed.
July 25th
On that day there was another major attack by the Italians. The VII. (It) Corps attacked with the 14th, 27th and parts of the 13th ID the section between Redipuglia and Seiz with the height 118 in between. The XI. (it) AK was set with the 21st, the 19th and parts of the 22nd ID on the section Monte San Michele (inclusive) to Sagrado.
The 22nd Infantry Division managed to push the newly inserted 9th Mountain Brigade back to San Martino . This threatened the right flank of the 33rd Infantry Brigade adjoining it to the south, so that it also had to retreat. The mountain brigade ( Colonel Prince Schwarzenberg ), which had been relocated to the second line of the front for restoration, had to be moved to the front and, after tough battles, it was possible to stabilize the front and maintain Monte San Michele.
In the southern section, the troops of the 14th Mountain Brigade could no longer resist the overwhelming power, had to go back in the Redipuglia and Seiz area to the summit of height 118 and then give it up. Since the foremost Italian formations came under artillery fire of their own, they were forced to withdraw from their exposed position down the slope. To support the 14th Mountain Brigade and to stabilize the front, the Kaiserschützen Regiment No. I (with the exception of two companies) has meanwhile been pushed into this area.
July 26th
Before another major attack by the Italians began that day, the reinforced 14th Mountain Brigade initially succeeded in recapturing height 118. A sideways approach over the mountain slopes to gain the flank position, however, was no longer successful.
The attack by the Italians that day with all available means threatened to crush the Austrian front. There were almost no reserves left (only five and a half battalions). In addition, there were some burned-out units ready for recovery, such as the 12th Mountain Brigade standing on Monte San Michele and four battalions of the 93rd Infantry Division, which had already been relieved. The marching battalion of the Trieste 97th Infantry Regiment was largely wiped out in the defense of Kote 197 on Monte San Michele.
In the area of Monte San Michele, the Italians of the 21st and parts of the 30th and 28th ID managed to take the mountain peak with very heavy losses at around 10 a.m. The 12th Mountain Brigade was able to recapture the summit just two hours later. After the 9th Mountain Brigade had retreated from the attackers, the San Martino homestead could no longer be held after the loss of Monte San Michele and had to be left to the Austrians.
In the evening, the troops of the 20th (it) ID were able to recapture Höhe 118, but were immediately pushed out again in a counterattack. To the east of Polazzo and between Vermegliano and Seiz, the Italians managed to establish themselves in the former Austrian positions. After that it got a little quieter for a while. Only the Italian artillery continued to cause losses among the Austro-Hungarian troops.
Result of the second attack
The thrust of the 3rd Italian Army was exhausted. They had to be regrouped and reinforcements brought in. The Italian casualties on July 26th in the Monte San Michele front section amounted to 2,985 men.
The situation of the Austro-Hungarian associations was no better. The VII Corps had suffered total losses of 25,000 men since July 18 alone. Reserves urgently needed to be brought in. At that time, however, only the 1st regiment of the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger and the Imperial and Royal Landesschützen Regiment "Bozen" No. II were available , and they were immediately set off on the march to the Isonzo.
Final attacks
August 1st
Parts of the 14th Mountain Brigade attacked the Italian positions on the heights near Redipuglia at 3 a.m. and were able to conquer them. Immediate counter-attacks were repulsed with artillery support, with the Italian attackers suffering high losses. In the meantime the Austrians had been able to detach the 8th ITD with the 96th Infantry Brigade and the 88th Rifle Brigade as reinforcement from the Eastern Front and relocate it to the Isonzo.
2nd and 3rd August
Italian attack operations against the height 197 above Sdraussina and height 118 near Redipuglia were unsuccessful. The battle began to wane.
On the evening of the day the commander of the 3rd Italian Army, General Duke of Aosta, and the commander of the neighboring 2nd Italian Army, Lieutenant General Frugoni received the command of the Comando Supremo to temporarily stop the offensive on the middle and lower Isonzo.
Result of the battle
The Italians had again failed to achieve the breakthrough. Neither the front arch between Monte San Michele and Seiz nor the Görzer bridgehead or that at Tolmein could be depressed. General Cadorna was able to show only minor gains in land that were out of proportion to the losses incurred.
literature
- Heinz von Lichem : Spielhahnstoke and edelweiss. Graz 1977.
- Austria-Hungary's Last War Volume II Vienna 1931–1936
- L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915–1918) Volume I - III / Roma: Ministero della Guerra - Ufficio Storico, 1929–1974
- CH Baer: " The War of Nations - Eleventh Volume " Stuttgart 1917
- Tullio Liber e Ugo Leitempergher 1914–1918 Schio: Pasqualoto, 1985
Individual evidence
- ↑ Vasja Klavora, Die Karstfront / 1915 - 1916 (2007), p. 76ff
- ↑ Vasja Klavora, Die Karstfront / 1915 - 1916 (2007), p. 95
- ↑ a b c Austria-Hungary's Last War, Vol. II, p. 750
- ↑ Austria-Hungary's Last War, Vol. II, pp. 747 ff
- ^ L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915–1918) Volume I / Roma: Ministero della Guerra - Ufficio Storico, 1929–1974 Volume I, p. 248
- ↑ Austria-Hungary's Last War, Vol. II, p. 753
- ^ L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915–1918) Volume I / Roma: Ministero della Guerra - Ufficio Storico, 1929–1974 Volume I p. 252
- ↑ Austria-Hungary's Last War, Vol. II, p. 757
- ↑ Heinz von Lichem Spielhahnstoss and Edelweiß vol. P. 77 ff
- ↑ Vasja Klavora, Die Karstfront / 1915 - 1916 (2007), p. 106
- ↑ E. Wisshaupt The Tyrolean Kaiserjäger in the World War 1914–1918 Vol. II, p. 91 ff
- ↑ Austria-Hungary's Last War, Vol. II, p. 91
- ^ L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915–1918) Volume I / Roma: Ministero della Guerra - Ufficio Storico, 1929–1974 Volume I p. 266